Brooks v. Ohio

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT CINCINNATI

CHARLES BROOKS, : Case No. 1:22-cv-305

:

Plaintiff, :

:

District Judge Douglas R. Cole

vs. :

Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

:

OHIO, et al., :

: REPORT AND

Defendants. : RECOMMENDATION

:

Plaintiff, a prisoner at the Toledo Correctional Institution, has filed a pro se civil rights

complaint in this Court against the State of Ohio and the “County Court,” located in Hamilton

County, Ohio. (See Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID 3) By separate Order, plaintiff has been

granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This matter is before

the Court for a sua sponte review of the complaint to determine whether the complaint, or any

portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 804, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); § 805, 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

Screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint

A. Legal Standard

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower

judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing

so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed

by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous,

malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324

(1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)(1) as part of the statute, which

provides in pertinent part:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. See also § 1915A(b). Thus, § 1915(e) requires

sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or

malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill

v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands

on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d

502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

1 Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

of action’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of

considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the

defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court holds

pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Garrett

v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April 1, 2010)

(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits;

“‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen. Motors,

482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.

1989)).

B. Allegations in the Complaint

Plaintiff brings this action against defendants the State of Ohio and the “County Court”

located in Hamilton County, Ohio. (See Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID 3). Plaintiff seeks to hold

defendants liable in connection with his August 31, 2020 parole board hearing. (See id. at PageID

13-14). According to plaintiff, he was impermissibly denied parole based solely on his drug

addiction disability.

Plaintiff claims that after his hearing he was advised that he was going to be released by

the parole board and he gave away all of his property. (Id. at PageID 6). However, in early

September 2020, he claims that he was notified that his release was terminated. Plaintiff complains

that he has been unable to obtain information regarding the parole decision, the appeal process, or

other records. As an exhibit to the complaint, plaintiff includes a copy of the parole board decision.

(Id. at PageID 13). Noting that the decision mentions his added sentence for conveyance—which

plaintiff claims concerned his “get[ting] drugs into the institution to support [his] drug

addiction”—plaintiff asserts that he was denied parole based solely on his drug addiction

disability. (Id. at PageID 7, 8). According to plaintiff, “[t]he Parole Board does not care that I

have not had any weapons or killed anyone” following his conviction or that he has completed

several drug programs. (Id. at PageID 7).

As relief, plaintiff seeks a new parole board hearing and monetary damages. (Id.).

C. Analysis

Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal at the screening stage. See 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).

Although the complaint does not expressly state under which federal statutes plaintiff

brings his claims, the Court understands from the allegations in the complaint that plaintiff brings

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against both defendants and additional claims under Title II of the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against the State of Ohio.2

2 See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 624 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (“Section 1983

provides a private cause of action for the deprivation, under color of state law, of ‘rights . . . secured by the Constitution

and laws.’”) (footnote omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (providing that under Title II of the ADA “no qualified individual

with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the

services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” ).

The complaint includes numerous citations to the Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations, which the Court

understands to be in support of plaintiff’s ADA claims. Because the complaint is subject to dismissal at the screening

With respect to plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, the complaint should be dismissed against the

State of Ohio because the State is immune from suit in this federal court.3 Absent an express

waiver, the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars suit against a State or one

of its agencies or departments in federal court regardless of the nature of the relief sought.

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996); Pennhurst State School v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); Edelman v.

Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). The exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment bar prohibiting

lawsuits against a state in federal court do not apply in this case. The State of Ohio has neither

constitutionally nor statutorily waived its Eleventh Amendment rights. See Mixon v. State of Ohio,

193 F.3d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1999); State of Ohio v. Madeline Marie Nursing Homes, 694 F.2d 449,

460 (6th Cir. 1982); Ohio Inns, Inc. v. Nye, 542 F.2d 673, 681 (6th Cir. 1976). Nor has plaintiff

sued a state official seeking prospective injunctive relief against future constitutional violations.

Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In addition, Congress has not “explicitly and by clear

language” expressed its intent to “abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States” when

enacting Section 1983. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341-43, 345 (1979). Therefore, the

State of Ohio is immune from suit in this case and plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the State of

Ohio should be dismissed.4

stage, the Court need not determine whether plaintiff can certify defendants as a class under 82 FR 6390, as he requests.

(See Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID 3).

3 Having determined below that plaintiff has not stated a plausible Title II claim against the State of Ohio, the Court

need not reach the issue of whether the State is immune from those claims under the Eleventh Amendment. Cf. Saqr

v. Univ. of Cincinnati, No. 1:18-CV-542, 2019 WL 699347, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 20, 2019) (Bowman, M.J.), report

and recommendation adopted, No. 1:18CV542, 2019 WL 1200802 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 14, 2019) (Dlott, J.).

4 The complaint lists Ohio as a defendant, with the mailing address for the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and

Correction. (See Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID 3). To the extent that plaintiff seeks to name the ODRC as a

defendant, a correctional facility or department is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Parker

v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 65 F. App’x. 922, 923 (6th Cir. 2003) (Department of Corrections not a “person”

under § 1983). See also, e.g., McGlone v. Warren Corr. Inst., No. 1:13cv126, 2013 WL 1563265, at *3 (S.D. Ohio

Apr. 12, 2013) (Bowman, M.J.) (Report & Recommendation) (and numerous cases cited therein) (holding that claims

Likewise, plaintiff’s § 1983 claims should be dismissed as to the Hamilton “County Court”

because the Hamilton “County Court” is not a legal entity capable of being sued under § 1983.

Capacity to sue or be sued in the United States District Courts is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 17.

Rule 17(b) provides, in pertinent part: “In all other cases capacity to sue or be sued shall be

determined by the law of the state in which the district court is held. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b).

The Ohio Supreme Court has concluded that Ohio courts are not sui juris. “Absent express

statutory authority, a court can neither sue nor be sued in its own right.” Malone v. Court of

Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, 45 Ohio St.2d 245, 248, 344 N.E.2d 126 (1976) (quoting

State ex rel. Cleveland Municipal Court v. Cleveland City Council, 34 Ohio St.2d 120, 121, 296

N.E.2d 544 (1973)). See Harsh v. City of Franklin, Ohio, No. 1:07-cv-874, 2009 WL 806653, at

*4 -5 (S.D. Ohio March 26, 2009) (holding the Warren County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas and

City of Franklin Municipal Court not sui juris); Burton v. Hamilton County Juvenile Court, No.

1:04-cv-368, 2006 WL 91600, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 11, 2006) (holding that Hamilton County

Juvenile Court is not a legal entity capable of being sued); see also Yoel v. Gandolf, No. 1:06-cv-

387, 2007 WL 777983, at *5 (N.D. Ohio March 12, 2007) (holding that Lake County, Ohio Court

of Common Pleas cannot sue or be sued in a § 1983 action). Even if the Court were to liberally

construe the complaint as against Hamilton County itself, plaintiff has failed to allege that his

constitutional rights were violated pursuant to a county policy. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Therefore, plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the Hamilton

“County Court” should also be dismissed.

against a state prison and the ODRC should be dismissed at the screening stage because “neither the state prison

facility nor the state corrections department is an entity capable of being sued under § 1983”), adopted, 2013 WL

2352743 (S.D. Ohio May 29, 2013) (Dlott, J.); see also Hix v. Tennessee Dep’t of Corr., 196 F. App’x 350, 355-56

(6th Cir. 2006) (and cases cited therein); Rodgers v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., 29 F. App’x 259, 260 (6th Cir. 2002).

In any event, even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff could state a § 1983 claim against

either defendant, such claims would fail as a matter of law. To the extent that plaintiff claims that

his parole hearing resulted in a violation of his due process rights, he fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. Plaintiff alleges that the parole board had already made its decision

before the hearing. (See Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID 6). However, a claim for a violation of

due process rights “depends upon the existence of a constitutionally cognizable liberty or property

interest with which the state has interfered” and “the State of Ohio has not created a liberty interest

in parole eligibility, as it has a completely discretionary parole system.” Michael v. Ghee, 498

F.3d 372, 378 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). The complaint therefore fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted to the extent that plaintiff claims a due process violation in

connection with his parole hearing.

Plaintiff also fails to state an actionable claim to the extent that he complains about the loss

of his property. (See Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID 6). In order to assert such a claim, plaintiff

must first “plead . . . that state remedies for redressing the wrong are inadequate.” Vicory v.

Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1066 (6th Cir. 1983). See also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).

“If satisfactory state procedures are provided in a procedural due process case, then no

constitutional deprivation has occurred despite the injury.” Jefferson v. Jefferson County Pub.

Sch. Sys., 360 F.3d 583, 587-88 (6th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, in order to state a procedural due

process claim under section 1983 “the plaintiff must attack the state’s corrective procedure as well

as the substantive wrong.” Meyers v. City of Cincinnati, 934 F.2d 726, 731 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting

Vicory, 721 F.2d at 1066). A plaintiff “may not seek relief under Section 1983 without first

pleading and proving the inadequacy of state or administrative processes and remedies to redress

[his] due process violations.” Jefferson, 360 F.3d at 588.

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts even remotely indicating that his remedies under Ohio

law to redress the wrong of which he complains are inadequate. Plaintiff’s complaint fails to

explain why a state tort remedy for conversion would not suffice to address his claim. See Fox v.

Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 349 (6th Cir. 1999). Therefore, he fails to state an actionable due

process claim.

Finally, to the extent that plaintiff brings claims under Title II of the ADA, his conclusory

allegation that he was denied parole solely based on his drug addiction is insufficient to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable for failing to

comply with Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2002). (See Doc. 1-1, Complaint at Page

ID 3). In Thompson, the Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff may state a claim under Title II of the

ADA where they allege “that the parole board failed to perform an individualized assessment of

the threat they pose to the community by categorically excluding from consideration for parole all

people with substance abuse histories.” Id. at 898 n.4. However, Thompson is not persuasive in

this case where there are no allegations from which the Court can plausibly infer that the State of

Ohio has categorically excluded plaintiff from being paroled based on his substance abuse history

or failed to conduct an individualized assessment of his suitability for parole. Plaintiff’s only

allegation in this regard is that the parole board mentioned his added sentence for conveyance in

its decision. But the mere fact that his sentence for conveyance was a factor in the parole board’s

decision does not suggest that plaintiff has been categorically excluded him from parole based on

a drug addiction. Cf. Thompson at 898 n.4 (“Title II does not categorically bar a state parole board

form making an individualized assessment of the future dangerousness of an inmate by taking into

account the inmate’s disability. . . . . A person’s disability that leads one to a propensity to commit

crime may certainly be relevant in assessing whether that individual is qualified for parole.”).

To the contrary, the parole decision attached to the complaint, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A

copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is part of the pleading for all

purposes.”), sets forth the rationale for the decision as follows:

Inmate has served 16 years for the brutal shooting death of another male in the

streets where he shot him multiple times at close range. He also has an added

sentence for conveyance. He has taken some drug programs, but his conduct has

been deplorable leading all the way to his hearing. After considering the relevant

factors, the Board does not consider the inmate suitable for release at this time.

(Doc. 1-1, Complaint at PageID 13). The decision further specifies that the parole board concluded

that there is substantial reason to believe that the inmate will engage in further criminal conduct or

fail to conform to conditions of release; that due to the serious nature of the crime, plaintiff’s

release would create under risk to public safety, not further the interest of justice, or not be

consistent with the welfare and security of society; and plaintiff’s release would not act as a

deterrent to plaintiff or other inmates from violating institutional rules. (Id.). Plaintiff’s

conclusory allegation that he was denied parole based solely on his drug addiction disability is

insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 570). Because the complaint fails to set forth a plausible claim that any named defendant

categorically excluded him from parole, failed to conduct an individualized assessment, or

otherwise violated his rights under the ADA, plaintiff’s ADA claims should be dismissed.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. The plaintiff’s complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).

2. Plaintiff’s pending “86 FR 24031 Case Standards Request” motion (Doc. 4) be

DENIED.

3. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing reasons an

appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in good faith

and therefore deny plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114

F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

August 29, 2022 s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers

Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections

to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served

with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely motion by either

side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of the R&R objected to,

and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party shall

respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy

of those objections. Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit

rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947

(6th Cir. 1981).