Noble v. The Young Men's Christian Association of Central Ohio

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER NOBLE,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:19-cv-5094

v. JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

THE YOUNG MEN’S CHRISTIAN

ASSOCIATION OF CENTRAL OHIO,

et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter arises on Defendant Young Men’s Christian Academy of Central Ohio (the

“YMCA”) and John Bickley’s (together with the YMCA, the “YMCA Defendants”) Motion for

Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 90.) For the reasons stated herein, the YMCA Defendants’ motion

is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED AS MOOT IN PART, (id.), and the remainder of this

case will be remanded to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

I.

In 1998, Plaintiff Christopher Noble, then an eight-year-old student at Fair Avenue

Elementary School, attended a school-based summer program conducted by the YMCA known as

the “YMCA Challenge 2000.” At the time, the YMCA—which was then led by Bickley, its Chief

Executive Officer—employed Defendant Ralph Bowman as a program director.

On June 24, 1998, Noble’s group took a field trip to a nearby library. At some point before

the event, Noble contends Bowman stopped him, took him to an apartment, and sexually abused

him. Later that day, Noble reported the abuse to his parents, who then went to the police.

Ultimately, Bowman was criminally indicted for the alleged event, but never convicted.

On October 17, 2019, Noble sued (1) the YMCA Defendants; (2) Bowman; (3) Bowman’s

Ohio-based company, Visions Unlimited Academy (“Visions Unlimited”); (4) the Columbus

Board of Education (the “Board”); (5) Columbus City Schools (the “School District”); and (6)

Cynthia Ball (the principal of Fair Avenue Elementary School in 1998) in the Franklin County

Court of Common Pleas (collectively, “Defendants”). (ECF No. 2.) His claims included:

1. Count I: Rape, Gross Imposition, and Sexual Imposition and/or Attempt Pursuant

to Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2907.02, 2907.05, and 2907.06 against all defendants;

2. Count II: Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision against all defendants;

3. Count III: Infliction of Emotional Distress against all defendants;

4. Count IV: Violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.

§§ 1681, et seq. against the Board and the School District;

5. Count V: Negligence against all defendants;

6. Count VI: Negligence per se against all defendants;

7. Count VII: Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against “all [d]efendants who were

acting under color of state law,” pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436

U.S. 658 (1978) (the “Monell Claim”); and

8. Count VIII: Nuisance against the YMCA and Bickley.

(Id.)

On November 19, 2019, Defendants, citing Noble’s Title IX and Monell claims (collectively,

Noble’s “federal claims”), removed his complaint to this Court. (ECF No. 1.) In February 2021,

this Court dismissed the School District as a defendant. (Op. & Order, ECF No. 49.) Roughly one

year later, in April 2022, Noble voluntarily dismissed all claims against the Board and Ball with

prejudice. (ECF No. 72.) That left the YMCA Defendants, Bowman, and Visions Unlimited as the

only remaining defendants in this case.

II.

Pending before the Court is the YMCA Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (the

“Motion”), which asks this Court, for various reasons, to dismiss Noble’s claims against them in

full. (ECF No. 90.) With respect to Noble’s federal claims, the YMCA Defendants argue that

judgment in their favor is warranted, as there is no “genuine dispute” they were private (i.e., non-

state) actors during the relevant time period. Noble raises no argument to the contrary. Instead, he

concedes he “never intended” to bring either his Title IX or Monell claims against the YMCA.

(Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 90.) And while Noble “fails to explicitly state that these counts against

Bickley should also be dismissed, he does not otherwise address” the YMCA Defendant’s

arguments that Bickley—who Noble sued in his capacity as the YMCA’s CEO—cannot be subject

to liability under Title IX or § 1983.1 (Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 103.) And even if Noble did counter

those arguments, his would be unlikely to prevail. See Freeman v. Helldoefer, 208 F.3d 213, 2000

WL 125885, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan 28, 2000) (noting that the YMCA is a private entity); Molina v.

YMCA, No. 08-cv-577, 2008 WL 789888, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2008) (“To the extent that

plaintiff alleges that he was mistreated by the YMCA or individual staff members, these claims

must be dismissed because neither the organization nor its staff members are ‘state actors.’”).

Thus, insofar as Noble’s Title IX and Monell claims are concerned, the YMCA Defendant’s

Motion is GRANTED. (ECF No. 90.)

1 To that extent, Noble has essentially abandoned his federal claims insofar as they relate to Bickley. See, e.g., Clark

v. City of Dublin, 178 Fed. App’x 522, 524-25 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in an employment discrimination suit due to the plaintiff-appellant’s failure to “properly respond to the

arguments asserted under the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act] and [Americans with Disabilities Act]”).

III.

When Noble brought his federal claims in state court, he created an avenue for Defendants

to remove his case to this Court on the basis of “federal question” jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§

1331, 1441. Obviously, they took the opportunity. (ECF No. 1.) But at this point, the landscape of

this case has changed. No longer do Noble’s federal claims pertain to any public entities (i.e., the

School District and the Board) or officials (i.e., Ball). The only defendants left for Noble to orient

his federal claims around are Bowman and his company, Visions Unlimited. But that, for various

reasons, cannot be.

For one, Noble’s Title IX claim is narrowly cabined to the “School [District] and the

Board.” (See Complaint, ECF No. 2 at ¶¶ 54-64.) It does not, on its face, apply to Bowman or

Visions Unlimited. Nor would it make any difference if the claim was pled to include them, given

Title IX’s baseline applicability to “educational institutions”—namely, public or private

“preschool, elementary . . . secondary . . . or higher education” institutions. See 20 U.S.C. §

1681(c).

The same goes for Noble’s Monell claim, which, generally speaking, could only be brought

against (1) a municipality that (2) maintained an unconstitutional “policy or custom.” Robertson v.

Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 622 (6th Cir. 2014); accord Doe v. Claiborne County, Tenn., 103 F.3d 495,

507 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Doe cannot base her claim against the County and the School Board solely

on Davis's conduct, for respondeat superior is not available as a theory of recovery under section

1983. Rather she must show that the School Board itself is the wrongdoer.”) (citation omitted);

Anderson v. Jones, 440 F. Supp. 3d 819, 835 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (noting that it is “the

[municipality’s] policy”—rather than the “action” of its “agent”—which gives rise to a Monell

claim). As noted, here, there is no municipality left for Noble to hold liable under § 1983;2 only

two defendants who were not acting “under the color of state law” (or at all) during the relevant

time period.3

IV.

Thus far, no party has addressed this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. But the Court, in

light of the above, the Court takes up the matter on its own. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati,

173 F. Supp. 3d 586, 598 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (noting that federal courts may, at any juncture, raise

“sua sponte . . . the question of their own subject matter jurisdiction”).

At this point, the only colorable claims left for this Court to adjudicate (specifically, Counts

I-III, V, VI, and VIII) arise under Ohio law, and exclusively involve Ohio residents. In other words,

there is no “diversity” jurisdiction, nor any federal question—“substantial” or otherwise—for this

Court to decide. See Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257-58 (2013). Thus, the inquiry becomes

“whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over [Noble’s] state-law claims pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1367 and 1441(c)” or to “remand the case to state court” under those same statutes.

Mencer v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 667, 672 (S.D. Ohio 2010); see also McKinney

v. City of Grosse Pointe Park, 72 F. Supp. 2d 788, 790 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (noting that § 1441(c)

2 True enough, “a suit against an official of the state” may, in certain instances, be treated as a “suit against the

municipality.” See Doe v. Claiborne County, Tenn., 103 F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Kentucky v. Graham,

473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)). But here, the record unambiguously demonstrates that neither Bowman nor Visions

Unlimited were acting as “official[s] of the state” during the relevant time period. See infra, n. 3; Molina, 2008 WL

789888, at *2.

3 As Noble acknowledges, Bowman was “an employee of [the YMCA]” in June 1998. (Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 98 at

PageID #1914.) And by all accounts, that is the only capacity he acted in when he allegedly sexually abused Noble.

See Deposition of Rebecca Ciminillo, ECF No. 82 at 9:10-18, 16:15-24 (noting that YMCA staff members like

Bowman—even if employed by the School District during the school year—were solely employed by the YMCA

during its “Challenge 2000” summer program); Deposition of Cynthia Ball, ECF No. 86 at 38:19-22 (same);

Deposition of Ralph Bowman (“Bowman Dep.”), ECF No. 87 at 19:19-22 (same). Moreover, the record reflects that

Visions Unlimited was not involved with the “Challenge 2000” program. See Deposition of Christopher Noble, ECF

No. 76 at 158:5-6 (noting the he had no recognition of Visions Unlimited); Deposition of Steven Hiller, ECF No. 85

at 45:1-4 (same); Bowman Dep. at 94:22-24 (noting that Visions Unlimited “did not start until after the Christopher

Noble situation”).

vests district courts with “the discretion to remand [an] entire civil action to state court when state

law predominates,” even when “federal question jurisdiction would have existed if the action were

brought originally in federal court”).

A district court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is a “doctrine of discretion, not of

plaintiff’s right.” Brown v. Scaglione, No. 20-cv-10192, 2020 WL 674291, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Feb.

11, 2020) (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)). Thus, under

§ 1367(c), a court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over any given “supplemental” state-law

claim if it finds that:

(i) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,

(ii) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district

court has original jurisdiction,

(iii) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or

(iv) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining

jurisdiction.

“In deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . . a judge must take into

account concerns of comity, judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and the like.” Id. at *1.

Notably, “[w]hen all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of considerations usually

will point to dismissing” or remanding the claims to state court. Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed.

Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254-55 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill,

484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)); accord Oberer Land Devs. Ltd. v. Sugarcreek Twp., No. 21-3834,

2022 WL 1773722, at *6 (6th Cir. June 1, 2022) (“Out of comity to state courts, this circuit applies

a ‘strong presumption against the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction once federal claims have

been dismissed.’”).

Again, here, there is no colorable federal question at issue. See Shophar v. Gorski, No. 17-

13322, 2018 WL 4442271, at *2 (E.D. Mich. June 5, 2016) (noting that, in order for federal

question to lie under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, a plaintiff’s claim must “colorabl[y]” arise “under the

Constitution or laws of the United States”). And given this circuit’s “strong presumption against

the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction” in such instances, the Court is of the mind that Noble’s

remaining state-law claims—which largely hinge upon application of Ohio’s respondeat superior

doctrine—are better off dealt with by an Ohio court.4 Oberer, 2022 WL 1773722, at *6; see also

Southard v. Newcomb Oil Co., LLC, 7 F.4th 451, 455 (6th Cir. 2021) (“Once a federal court no

longer has federal claims to resolve, it ‘should not ordinarily reach the plaintiff's state-law

claims.’”). Thus, they will be remanded pursuant to §§ 1367(c) and 1441(c). See Mencer, 695 F.

Supp. 2d at 672.

V.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART AS

MOOT the YMCA Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 90.) To the extent they

apply to the YMCA Defendants, Counts IV and VII of Noble’s complaint are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. The remainder of Noble’s claims are REMANDED to the Franklin County Court

of Common Pleas.

The case shall be remanded and closed on the docket of this Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

8/16/2022 s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

DATE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

4 To mind, the only factor that meaningfully weighs in favor of this Court’s exercise supplemental jurisdiction is the

fact the parties have reached the summary judgment stage. But that, absent more, is not enough to overcome its “strong

presumption” against adjudicating issues of state law in the absence of any colorable federal claim. Oberer, 2022 WL

1773722, at *6; see also Sanders v. City of Hodgenville, 323 F. Supp. 3d 904, 916 (W.D. Ky. 2018) (noting that a

district court’s “discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims extends to all stages of litigation,

including summary judgment”).