Brown v. Commissioner of Social Security

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

GARY B.,! : Case No. 3:20-cv-179

Plaintiff, : Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry

: (by full consent of the parties)

VS. .

COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security Income in July 2016.

Plaintiff's claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration. After a hearing at

Plaintiffs request, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Plaintiff was not

eligible for benefits because he was not under a “disability” as defined in the Social

Security Act. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. Plaintiff

subsequently filed this action.

Plaintiff seeks an order remanding this matter to the Commissioner for the award

of benefits or, in the alternative, for further proceedings. The Commissioner asks the

Court to affirm the non-disability decision. This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's

See S.D. Ohio General Order 22-01 (“The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the

Judicial Conference of the United States has recommended that due to significant privacy concerns in social security

cases federal courts should refer to claimants only by their first names and last initials.”).

Statement of Errors (Doc. 12), the Commissioner’s Memorandum in Opposition (Doc.

15), Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. 16), and the administrative record (Doc. 11).

Il. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff asserts that he has been under a disability stnce December 1, 2012. He

was 51 years old as of the Supplemental Security Income application date of July 12,

2016. Accordingly, Plaintiff was considered a “person closely approaching advanced

age” under Social Security Regulations for the relevant time period. See 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1563(d), 416.963(d).’ Plaintiff has “a high school education and above.” See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1564(b)(4).

The evidence in the administrative record is summarized in the ALJ’s decision

(Doc. 11-12, PageID 56-68 ), Plaintiff's Statement of Errors (Doc. 12), the

Commissioner’s Memorandum in Opposition (Doc. 15), and Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. 16).

Rather than repeat these summaries, the Court will discuss the pertinent evidence in its

analysis below.

IW. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Social Security Administration provides Supplemental Security Income to

individuals who are under a “disability,” among other eligibility requirements. Bowen v.

City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470 (1986); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 402, 423(a)(1), 1382(a).

The term “disability” means “the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason

of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which ... has lasted or can

2 The remaining citations will identify only the pertinent Disability Insurance Benefits Regulations, as

they are similar in all relevant respects to the corresponding Supplemental Security Income Regulations.

be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1505(a).

This Court’s review of an ALJ’s unfavorable decision is limited to two inquiries:

“whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings of the ALJ

are supported by substantial evidence.” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399,

406 (6th Cir. 2009); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social

Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.”).

“Unless the ALJ has failed to apply the correct legal standards or has made findings of

fact unsupported by substantial evidence,” this Court must affirm the ALJ’s decision.

Emard v. Comm □□ of Soc. Sec., 953 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2020). Thus, the Court “may

not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of

credibility.” (/d.)

“Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing

administrative record and asks whether it contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support the

agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019)

(citation omitted). This limited standard of review does not permit the Court to weigh the

evidence and decide whether the preponderance of the evidence supports a different

conclusion. Instead, the Court is confined to determining whether the ALJ’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence, which “means—and means only—‘such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”

(/d.) (citation omitted).

The other line of judicial inquiry—reviewing the correctness of the ALJ’s legal

criteria—may result in reversal even when the record contains substantial evidence

supporting the ALJ’s factual findings. Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651

(6th Cir. 2009). “[E]ven if supported by substantial evidence, ‘a decision of the

Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and

where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a

substantial right.’” /d. (citations omitted). Such an error of law will require reversal even

if “the outcome on remand is unlikely to be different.” Cardew v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

896 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

IV. THE ALJ’S DECISION

As noted previously, the ALJ was tasked with evaluating the evidence related to

Plaintiffs application for benefits. In doing so, the ALJ considered each of the five

sequential steps set forth in the Social Security Regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.

The ALJ made the following findings of fact:

Step |: Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 12,

2016, the Supplemental Security Income application date.

Step 2: He has the severe impairments of “chronic pain syndrome,

sacroiliitis, lumbosacral radiculopathy, lumbosacral spondylosis and

degenerative disc disease, cervical degenerative disc disease and

radiculopathy, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD][)],

major depressive disorder, dysthymic disorder, and anxiety

disorder.”

Step 3: He does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that

meets or equals the severity of one in the Commissioner’s Listing of

Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

Step 4: His residual functional capacity (RFC), or the most he can do despite

his impairments, see Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235,

239 (6th Cir. 2002), consists of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §

404.1567(b), subject to the following limitations: “[Plaintiff] cannot

climb ropes, ladders, or scaffolds. [Plaintiff] can occasionally climb

ramps and stairs, crouch, crawl, balance on uneven, moving, or

narrow surfaces, kneel, and stoop. [Plaintiff] cannot reach overhead

with the right upper extremity. [Plaintiff] can frequently reach in all

other directions at shoulder level bilaterally. [Plaintiff] cannot

engage in work involving any exposure to extreme hot and cold

temperatures, excessive humidity or wetness, unprotected heights,

dangerous moving machinery, or commercial driving. [Plaintiff] can

have occasional exposure to dust, fumes, odors, gases, and other

pulmonary irritants. [Plaintiff's] work cannot involve production rate

work or strict production quotas. [Plaintiff's] work must involve

few, if any, changes in work processes. [Plaintiff] can have

occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors. [Plaintiff]

cannot interact with the general public or engage in tandem or team

work.”

He is unable to perform any of his past relevant work.

Step 5: Considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and residual

functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in

the national economy that he can perform.

(Doc. 11-2, PageID 56-68.) These findings led the ALJ to conclude that Plaintiff does not

meet the definition of disability and so is not entitled to benefits. /d., PageID 68.)

V. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination is unsupported by her own

analysis and the medical evidence. (Doc. 12, PageID 3484.) For the reasons discussed

below, the ALJ’s conclusions are supported by substantial evidence and thus cannot be

reversed by this Court.

A. ALJ’s Analysis of the Evidence

Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ’s limitation to light work is “inconsistent with

her own analysis of the evidence.” (/d.) Plaintiff cites to several examinations and

medical imaging reports and asserts this evidence does not support the ALJ’s RFC for

light work. (Doc. 12, PageID 3484-87.) Plaintiff also asserts the ALJ 1s “not qualified to

interpret this substantial objective imaging data in functional terms.” (Doc. 12, PageID

3485-86; Doc. 16, PageID 3510-12.)

The regulations require the ALJ to evaluate the medical evidence to determine

whether Plaintiff is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3); Webb v. Comm'r of Soc.

Sec., 368 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating, “the ALJ is charged with the

responsibility of evaluating the medical evidence”); Coldiron v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 391

F. App’x 435, 439 (6th Cir. 2010) (“The Social Security Act instructs that the ALJ—not a

physician—ultimately determines a claimant's RFC. ... An ALJ does not improperly

assume the role of a medical expert by weighing the medical and non-medical evidence

before rendering an RFC finding.’’).

Further, the substantial-evidence standard discussed above “presupposes that there

is a zone of choice within which the decisionmakers can go either way, without

interference by the courts.” /d. (citation omitted). Therefore, if substantial evidence

supports the ALJ's decision, this Court will defer to that finding, “even if there is

substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.’”

Blakley, 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009).

The ALJ’s RFC determination is clearly articulated and supported by substantial

evidence. The ALJ provided a detailed summary of Plaintiff's medical records, which

included citations to all of the evidence cited by Plaintiff. (Doc. 11-2, PageID 60-66.)

Plaintiff specifically cites to a January 2017 lumbar spine MRI, a March 2017 cervical

spine MRI, and a January 2018 thoracic spine CT scan. (/d.) In evaluating these reports in

the RFC analysis section of the decision (Doc. 11-2, PageID 62-63), the ALJ did not

interpret the objective medical data beyond her ability. As discussed above, the

regulations require the ALJ to evaluate the medical evidence to determine whether

Plaintiff is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3); Webb, 368 F.3d at 633; Coldiron,

391 F. App’x at 439.

In this case, the imaging reports cited by Plaintiff were read and interpreted by a

radiologist. (Doc. 11-17, PageID 2560, 2634, 3152). The ALJ cited the radiologists’

interpretations in her detailed summary of the medical evidence. (Doc. 11-2, PageID 62-

63.) She balanced these interpretations with the other objective medical evidence to

assess the RFC. For example, the ALJ acknowledged many of the abnormal examination

findings in the record. (/d.) She cited to examinations that showed limited lumbar range

of motion, stooped posture, and an antalgic, ataxic, or limping gait. (/d., citing, e.g., Doc.

11-17, PageID 2558, 2600-01, 2603, 2614-15, 2623; Doc. 11-20, PageID 3123.) The ALJ

accurately explained that these examinations also showed other normal findings which

included normal motor strength in the upper and lower extremities, as well as normal and

symmetric deep tendon reflexes. (/d.) The ALJ balanced these findings with other

relatively normal examinations, many of which showed normal range of motion, normal

motor functioning, intact sensation in the upper and lower extremities, no back or neck

tenderness, and no significant ambulatory difficulties. U/d., citing, e.g., Doc. 11-16,

PageID 2402-03; Doc. 11-17, PageID 2489-90; Doc. 11-19, PageID 2939; Doc. 11-20,

PageID 3161-62; Doc. 11-21, PageID 3384-85.) She concluded that the preponderance of

the evidence supports the reduced range of light work set forth in the RFC. This

conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.

Plaintiff points to several of the abnormal examination findings identified in the

ALJ’s decision and states that “the ALJ’s own description of these physical

examinations...does not support a finding that [Plaintiff] can perform light exertion

work.” (Doc. 12, PageID 3484-85.) Plaintiff further contends: “While these exams are

arguably consistent with sedentary exertion work because [Plaintiff] was could [sic] sit or

briefly rise from a chair, they are not consistent with light exertion work which, again,

requires ‘a good deal of walking or standing.’” (/d., PageID 3485.)

Plaintiff's contention 1s without merit. As discussed above, the regulations and

Sixth Circuit precedent charge the ALJ with the responsibility of evaluating and weighing

the medical and non-medical evidence to render an RFC finding. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1545(a)(3); Webb, 368 F.3d at 633; Coldiron, 391 F. App’x at 439. The ALJ

provided a detailed summary of Plaintiffs medical records, and she balanced the normal

findings against the abnormal findings and pathology to conclude Plaintiff can perform a

reduced range of light work. (Doc. 11-2, PageID 60-65.) For the reasons discussed

above, this conclusion is supported by substantial evidence. The applicable legal

framework did not require her to do more.

B. State Agency Medical Consultants

State agency medical consultant Leigh Thomas, M.D. reviewed the record and

completed a physical RFC assessment on October 13, 2016. (Doc. 11-3, PageID 130-33.)

Dr. Thomas opined that Plaintiff was limited to light exertion, subject to the following

limitations: never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally perform all other

postural activities; occasional right-sided overhead reaching; avoid concentrated exposure

to extreme cold, extreme heat, wetness, humidity, and pulmonary irritants; and avoid all

exposure to hazards. (/d.) Stephen Sutherland, M.D. reviewed the updated record at the

reconsideration level on November 29, 2016. Dr. Sutherland essentially affirmed Dr.

Thomas’ assessment, except he opined Plaintiff could frequently balance, stoop, and

kneel. (Doc. 11-3, PageID 146-48.)

The ALJ gave significant weight to the opinions of the State agency medical

consultants. (Doc. 11-2, PageID 65.) The ALJ reasoned that the consultants based their

opinions on their expertise and review of the medical records, and she concluded that

their opinions are generally consistent with the additional evidence received at the

hearing level. /d.) The ALJ explained that the medical evidence since the reconsideration

level supported additional postural limitations compared to Dr. Sutherland’s opinion.

(/d.) Further, the ALJ included more restrictive limitations in the RFC, such as no

overhead reaching with the right upper extremity, frequent reaching in all other directions

at shoulder level bilaterally. Ud. at PageID 59.)

Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s evaluation of the consultants’ opinions and

argues that the consultants “already limited [Plaintiff] to light work in 2016 without

reviewing the substantial material evidence in the record,” including the MRI and CT

scan reports discussed above. (Doc. 16, PageID 3512.) This argument is not persuasive.

The ALJ evaluated the findings of the State agency medical consultants and

assigned weight pursuant to the regulations. (Doc. 11-2, PageID 65.) As discussed above,

the ALJ provided a detailed summary of Plaintiff's medical records in the RFC

assessment portion of the decision. (Doc. 11-2, PageID 60-65.) She weighed the State

agency medical consultants’ opinions against the evidence for the entire relevant time

period—including the evidence cited by Plaintiff in his Statement of Errors—and she

provided good reasons for the weight assigned to these reviewers. (/d. at PageID 65.) The

ALJ provided good reasons for concluding that a reduced range of light work accounts

for the balance of the evidence, but she also recognized a need for additional limitations

to account for evidence submitted after the consultants’ 2016 assessments. (/d.) For

example, the ALJ further limited Plaintiff to occasional kneeling and stooping, and she

explained that the additional stooping restriction accounted for the January 2018 CT scan.

at PageID 59, 65) The ALJ also limited Plaintiff to no right-sided overhead reaching

and frequent reaching in all other directions bilaterally. (/d. at PageID 59.) The ALJ’s

conclusions are supported by substantial evidence, and the applicable legal framework

did not require her to do more.

C. Plaintiff's Use of a Cane

Plaintiff also contends: “The ALJ also found that [Plaintiff's] cane was prescribed,

but inexplicably failed to evaluate whether the cane was medically necessary and/or

incorporate [Plaintiff's] prescribed cane use into her RFC determination.” (Doc. 12,

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PageID 3485, citing Doc. 11-2, PageID 60.) However, Plaintiffs statement

mischaracterizes the ALJ’s decision, because the ALJ did not “find” that Plaintiff's cane

was prescribed. Instead, the ALJ merely restated Plaintiff's testimony that he “uses a

cane, which was prescribed.” (/d.)

The Sixth Circuit has held that if a cane is not a necessary device for the claimant's

use, it cannot be considered a restriction or limitation on the plaintiff's ability to work.

Carreon v. Massanari, 51 F. App’x 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2002). Further, if the ALJ does not

find that such device would be medically necessary, then the ALJ is not required to pose

a hypothetical to the vocational expert. Casey v. Sec'y of Health Servs., 987 F.2d 1230,

1235 (6th Cir. 1993). The ALJ is only required to pose to the vocational expert those

limitations found to be credible. /d. This Court has recognized that “multiple references

in the medical evidence to the use of a cane” can lead to an inference that such use is

“more than just a subjective desire of the claimant.” Penn v. Astrue, 2010 WL 547491, at

*6 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 2010) (Holschuh, D.J.) (citation omitted). Further, the “consistent

reference” to the use of a cane triggers an ALJ’s obligation to determine if a cane is

medically necessary. /d. Conversely, this Court has also recognized that in cases where

there was no medical documentation stating that a claimant needed to use a cane, the ALJ

“did not err either by (1) omitting any consideration of the clatmant’s cane usage in

assessing the claimant’s capacity for work, or (2) declining to explain that omission.”

declining to explain that omission. Ethel R. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:20-CV-69,

2022 WL 190043, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 21, 2022) (Cole, D.J.) (citations omitted).

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Plaintiff’s case falls into the latter category. The record in this case does not

contain “consistent reference” to the use of a cane. In fact, other than Plaintiff’ s

testimony, the record contains no references to the use of a cane. For example, although

Plaintiff testified that he used a cane, Plaintiff made no mention of any ambulation aids in

the August 2016 Function Report (Doc. 11-6, PageID 287.). Likewise, the medical

records do not document any use of a cane or a prescription for a cane. As the ALJ

accurately pointed out, Plaintiff's providers documented an ataxic or limping gait on

some occasions, yet they documented a normal gait on several other occasions. (Doc. 11-

2, PageID 60-64, citing, e.g., Doc. 11-17, PageID 2480, 2558, 2600; Doc. 11-20, PageID

3075, 3123.) They did not indicate that Plaintiff was using a cane on any of these

occasions, or during any other medical visits in the record. (/d.) Accordingly, the record

does not contain “consistent” or “multiple” references to the use of a cane, and thus the

ALJ is not obligated to determine whether a cane is medically necessary.

Plaintiff contends that a cane “would be medically necessary if the record reflects

more than just a subjective desire on the part of the Plaintiff as to the use of the cane.”

(Doc. 12, PageID 3485, citing Simmons v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:12-CV-2591, 2013

WL 3873952, *at 29 (N.D. Ohio July 9, 2013) (Adams, D.J.). However, Plaintiff

identified no evidence showing that a physician prescribed a cane or that the use of a cane

is medically necessary. (See Doc. 12, Doc. 16.) In fact, as discussed above, the medical

evidence contains no reference to the use of a cane. The fact that Plaintiff's medical

providers documented observations of Plaintiff's gait but did not document the use of an

ambulation aid (see Doc. 11-2, PageID 60-64, citing, e.g., Doc. 11-17, PageID 2480,

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2558, 2600; Doc. 11-20, PageID 3075, 3123) supports the conclusion that Plaintiff did

not need or use a cane. Thus, the record does not warrant an inference that Plaintiff had

“more than just a subjective desire” to use a cane. See Penn, 2010 WL 547491, at *6. For

all of these reasons, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that a cane is not a

necessary device for Plaintiffs use, and it cannot be considered an exertional limitation

that reduces his ability to work. See Carreon, 51 F. App’x at 575. The ALJ’s failure to

evaluate Plaintiff's testimony that he used a cane is not reversible error, because the

applicable legal framework did not require him to do so.

D. State Agency Psychological Consultants

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred because she gave significant weight to

the opinions of the State agency psychological consultants but did not incorporate all of

their limitations into the RFC. (Doc. 12, PageID 3486-87.) For the reasons discussed

below, Plaintiff’?s contention is not well-taken.

Patricia Kirwin, Ph.D. reviewed Plaintiffs file on behalf of the State agency on

October 13, 2016. (Doc. 11-3, PageID 133-35.) Dr. Kirwin opined that Plaintiff retained

the ability to understand and remember one- to four-step tasks involving no high pace or

high production quotas. (/d. at PageID 133-34.) According to Dr. Kirwin, Plaintiff could

interact “briefly and occasionally in situations that do not require more than superficial

contact with coworkers, supervisors, and the general public.” (/d. at PageID 134.) He

further opined that Plaintiff could not resolve conflicts or persuade others to follow

demands and that changes needed to be occasional and explained in advance. (/d. at 134-

35.)

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Vicki Warren, Ph.D. reviewed the updated record on November 29, 2016. (/d. at

PageID 148-50.) Dr. Warren opined that Plaintiff was limited to performing routine tasks

in a setting with no strict production demands and with relatively static duties. (/d. at

PageID 149-50.) Dr. Warren also opined that Plaintiff could interact with others on a

“superficial level” and that he was unable to perform customer service duties, conflict

resolution, or persuading others. (/d. at PageID 149.)

The ALJ assigned “significant weight” and found that the consultants’ opinions

are generally consistent with the evidence. (Doc. 11-2, PageID 65-66.) In the RFC, the

ALJ limited Plaintiff to work involving no production rate work or strict production

quotas; few, if any, changes in work processes; occasional interaction with coworkers or

supervisors; no interaction with the general public; and no tandem or team work. (/d. at

PagelID 59.)

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to adequately evaluate the administrative

findings of Drs. Kirwin and Warren because the “ALJ failed to incorporate their finding

that [Plaintiff] was limited to a work environment that did not require more than

‘superficial’ contact with co-workers and supervisors.” (Doc. 12, PageID 3486-87.)

According to Plaintiff, “’occasional’ and ‘superficial’ are not coterminous,” and the ALJ

failed to meet her burden at Step Five because “the Court cannot discern whether the

additional limitation to superficial contact would preclude substantial gainful

employment in the national economy.” (/d. at PageID 3487, citing Perrine v. Berryhill,

No. 1:18-CV-49, 2019 WL 1331597, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2019) (Ruiz, M.J.).)

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Plaintiff correctly asserts that the terms “occasional” and “superficial” are not

interchangeable. This Court has routinely recognized that “occasional contact” refers to

the quantity of time spent with individuals, while “superficial contact” goes to the quality

of the interactions. See Garvin v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:20-CV-2566, 2021 WL

2200423, at *6 (S.D. Ohio June 1, 2021) (Deavers, M.J.), report and recommendation

adopted, No. 2:20-CV-2566, 2021 WL 2533191 (S.D. Ohio June 21, 2021) (Sargus,

D.J.), citing, e.g., Hutton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:20-CV-339, 2020 WL 3866855,

at *5 (S.D. Ohio July 9, 2020) (Vascura, M.J.), report and recommendation adopted sub

nom. Hutton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:20-CV-339, 2020 WL 4334920 (S.D. Ohio

July 28, 2020) (Morrison, D.J.) (reversing and remanding where ALJ explanation was

lacking because “superficial interaction” is a well-recognized, work-related limitation);

Corey v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:18-cv-1219, 2019 WL 3226945, at *4 (S.D. Ohio

July 17, 2019) (Vascura, M.J.) ("[R]eversal is warranted because the ALJ assigned

significant weight to Dr. Marlow's opinions, but failed to include limitations for

‘superficial’ interactions.""); Lindsey v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:18-CV-18, 2018 WL

6257432, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 30, 2018) (Vascura, M.J.) ("Occasional contact’ goes to

the quantity of time spent with [ ] individuals, whereas 'superficial contact’ goes to the

quality of the interactions." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).

Nevertheless, Plaintiff's contention lacks merit because the ALJ adequately

accounted for both the quantity and the quality of social interaction in the RFC. As

discussed above, Dr, Kirwin opined that Plaintiff could interact “briefly and

occasionally” in situations requiring no more than superficial contact with coworkers,

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supervisors, and coworkers. (Doc. 11-3, PageID 134.) Dr. Warren limited Plaintiff to

superficial interactions with others. (/d. at PageID 149.) The ALJ then limited Plaintiff to

“occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors” (Doc. 11-2, PageID 59), which

addresses Dr. Kirwin’s opinion regarding the guantity of time (“occasional”) that Plaintiff

could spend with such individuals. The ALJ further limited Plaintiff to “tandem or team

work” (id.), which addresses the reviewers’ assessments regarding the quality of the

interactions (“superficial”) between Plaintiff and his supervisors or coworkers. Moreover,

the ALJ’s limitation of Plaintiff to no interaction with the general public (id.) is more

restrictive than — and thus more than adequately accounts for — the State agency

reviewers’ assessment that Plaintiff is limited to superficial and/or occasional interaction

with the general public. Thus, although the ALJ did not specifically explain the

difference between “occasional” and “superficial,” the ALJ sufficiently accounted for the

difference between these terms in the RFC.

The ALJ also did not err at Step Five of the sequential evaluation. She

appropriately asked the vocational expert to testify about the jobs available to a

hypothetical person with Plaintiff's work limitations, including occasional interaction

with coworkers and supervisors, no tandem or team work, and no interaction with the

general public. (Doc. 11-2, PageID 114-15.) See Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 378 (6th

Cir. 2001) ("A vocational expert's testimony concerning the availability of suitable work

may constitute substantial evidence where the testimony is elicited in response to a

hypothetical question that accurately sets forth the plaintiff's physical and mental

impairments.").

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For these reasons, the ALJ’s evaluation of the State agency psychological

consultants’ findings is supported by substantial evidence.

VI. CONCLUSION

In sum, although Plaintiff maintains the ALJ should have evaluated the evidence

differently, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC for a reduced range of light

work. The ALJ also provided reasonable explanations, supported by substantial evidence,

for why and how she weighed the medical opinions. Her explanations for assigning

substantial weight to the opinions of the State agency medical and psychological

consultants were within the zone of reasonable choices and supported by substantial

evidence. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Statement of Errors lacks merit.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. Plaintiff's Statement of Errors (Doc. 12) is OVERRULED;

2. The Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s non-disability determination;

and

3. The case is terminated on the Court’s docket.

/s/ Caroline H. Gentry

Caroline H. Gentry

United States Magistrate Judge

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