Opinion

Wampler v. Handwerk

Court
District Court, S.D. Ohio
Filed
Jul 11, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 28.3%

“The separation of powers between a state trial judge and state parole board members is a matter of state law.” (citing Austin v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 298, 302 (6th Cir. 2000))

How later courts described this case

  • “The separation of powers between a state trial judge and state parole board members is a matter of state law.” (citing Austin v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 298, 302 (6th Cir. 2000))
  • “The district court properly found that the disputed state [parole] laws did not implicate federal separation of powers principles.” (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957))

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

Charles Keith Wampler,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:21-cv-5852

Vv. Judge Michael H. Watson

Alicia Handwerk, et al., Magistrate Judge Vascura

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Inmate Charles Wampler (“Plaintiff’) sues Alicia Handwerk (“Handwerk”),

Lance Pressley (“Pressley”), Kathleen Kovach (“Kovach”), Mare Houk (“Houk’),

Scott Widmer (“Widmer’), Steve Herron (“Herron”), and Lisa Hoying (“Hoying,”

collectively, “Defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Compl., ECF No. 1. The

Magistrate Judge screened Plaintiffs pro se Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

and issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending the Court

dismiss the same. R&R, ECF No. 2. Plaintiff timely objected. Obj., ECF No. 3.

For the following reasons, the Court ADOPTS IN PART the R&R but

RECOMMITS this matter to the Magistrate Judge for an analysis of Plaintiff's

remaining claims.

I. FACTS

Defendants, who are all members of the Ohio Parole Board, denied

Plaintiff parole after a video parole hearing on September 20, 2021. Compl.,

ECF No. 1 at PAGEID # 19. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied him parole

partly because he maintained his innocence for the crime of conviction during the

hearing. /d. Plaintiff alleges the meeting minutes indeed reflect that Plaintiff was

denied parole because of the nature of his crime of conviction and because he

refused to accept responsibility for that crime. /d. at PAGEID # 20.

Plaintiff brings claims under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution and argues that the authority granted to the

Ohio Parole Board violates the separation-of-powers requirement in the United

States Constitution.

ll. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3), the Court reviews de

novo those portions of the R&R that Plaintiff specifically objected to. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72(b)(3).

lll. ANALYSIS

The R&R recommended dismissing Plaintiffs separation-of-powers claim

because the separation-of-powers doctrine that applies to the federal

government is not mandatory for states. R&R 5, ECF No. 2. The R&R

recommended dismissing Plaintiffs due process claim because Plaintiff lacks a

protected liberty interest in parole. /d.

A. Separation of Powers

On objection, Plaintiff presses his argument that the function of the Ohio

Parole Board essentially usurps the role of the judiciary, in violation of the federal

Case No. 2:21-cv-5852 Page 2 of 5

Constitution’s separation-of-powers requirement. Obj. 2-3, ECF No. 3. Plaintiff

argues that the State of Ohio cannot act in contravention of the United States

Constitution; thus, any separation-of-powers violation by Ohio is a federal

violation. /d. at 3.

As Magistrate Judge Vascura explained, the federal Constitution requires

separation of powers within the federal government but does not require states to

follow that separation of powers within their own governments. See, e.g.,

Johnson v. Voinovich, 49 F. App’x 1, 3 (6th Cir. 2002) (“The district court properly

found that the disputed state [parole] laws did not implicate federal separation of

powers principles.” (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255

(1957))); Harris v. Wilson, No. 1:06 CV 2342, 2006 WL 3803410, at *5 (N.D. Ohio

Dec. 26, 2006) (“The separation of powers between a state trial judge and state

parole board members is a matter of state law.” (citing Austin v. Jackson, 213

F.3d 298, 302 (6th Cir. 2000))); Michael v. Ghee, 411 F. Supp. 2d 813, 823 (N.D.

Ohio 2006) (“The alleged violation of separation of powers doctrine relates to the

relationship between the branches of Ohio’s government: plaintiff's contention

being that the executive, through the APA, is taking over the job of the state

judiciary. Any alleged violation concerns only state law. Thus, § 1983 is

inapplicable.”), aff'd 498 F.3d 372, 376 (6th Cir. 2007). Because the federal

Constitution’s separation-of-powers requirement does not apply to state

governments, Ohio's scheme does not violate the federal Constitution’s

separation-of-powers doctrine. This objection is therefore OVERRULED.

Case No. 2:21-cv-5852 Page 3 of 5

B. Procedural Due Process

With respect to his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim,

Plaintiff argues on objection that he is not asking the Court for a guarantee of

parole but rather asks the Court to prohibit the Ohio Parole Board from denying

parole without the due process guaranteed by the federal Constitution. Obj. □□□□

ECF No. 3. His claim is that the Ohio Parole Board denied him procedural due

process by: (1) considering the elements of Plaintiff's crime of conviction without

letting him present evidence of his innocence; (2) considering community

opposition to parole without letting Plaintiff face his accusers; and (3) violating

the separation of powers between the executive and judiciary. Compl., ECF

No.1 at PAGEID ## 15-16.

Those allegations, however, do not state a viable procedural due process

claim. “Procedural due process requirements only apply to deprivation of

interests in liberty and property.” Ghee, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 817 (citation omitted).

Neither the United States Constitution nor Ohio law create a liberty interest in

parole. /d. (citations omitted). “If inmates do not have a liberty interest in parole

itself, they cannot have a liberty interest in parole consideration or other aspects

of parole procedures.” /d. (citations omitted). Thus, as Magistrate Judge

Vascura correctly explained, R&R 4-5, ECF No. 2, the due process requirements

of the federal Constitution do not apply to Plaintiffs parole decision-making

process because Plaintiff lacks a liberty interest in parole. See also, e.g.,

Case No. 2:21-cv-5852 Page 4 of 5

Jergens v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. Adult Parole Auth., 492 F. App’x 567,

570 (6th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff's objection is therefore OVERRULED.

C. Remaining Claims

Upon review, it appears the R&R did not analyze Plaintiff's Fifth

Amendment, Eighth Amendment, or Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection

claims. This aspect of Plaintiff's objection is therefore SUSTAINED, and the

Court RECOMMITS the matter to the Magistrate Judge to perform an initial

screen of those claims.

IV. CONCLUSION

The R&R is ADOPTED IN PART. The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's

Separation of Powers claim and Procedural Due Process claim. The Court

RECOMNMITS the matter for additional review and issuance of an R&R consistent

with this Opinion and Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. (| Mbt.

ICHAEL H. WATSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case No. 2:21-cv-5852 Page 5 of 5

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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