“The public has a strong interest in obtaining the information contained in the court record.”
How later courts described this case
- “The public has a strong interest in obtaining the information contained in the court record.”
- explaining that “the privacy interests of innocent third parties should weigh heavily in a court’s balancing equation”
- finding “the right [of privacy] lapses with the death of the person who enjoyed it” in the tort context
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
KAREN FROHN, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly
situated,
Case No. 1:19-cv-713
Plaintiff, JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE
v.
GLOBE LIFE AND ACCIDENT
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on Plaintiff Karen Frohn’s unopposed
Motion to File Danner Deposition Transcripts and Exhibits under Seal (Doc. 69) and
Motion to File Opposition under Seal (Doc. 70). For the reasons set forth more fully
below, the Court GRANTS Frohn’s Motions (Docs. 69, 70).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A district court’s decision to seal court records is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Beauchamp v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 658 F. App’x 202, 207 (6th
Cir. 2016) (citing Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299,
306 (6th Cir. 2016)). But in the sealing context, that “decision is not accorded the
deference that standard normally brings.” Id. To avoid abusing its discretion, a
district court faced with a motion to seal must “set forth specific findings and
conclusions ‘which justify nondisclosure to the public.’” Shane Grp., 825 F.3d at 306
(quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C, 710 F.2d 1165, 1176 (6th Cir.
1983)).
A district court is under an independent obligation, which exists regardless of
any agreement or disagreement among the parties, to determine whether sealing is
warranted. See Proctor [sic] & Gamble Co. v. Ranir, LLC, No. 1:17-cv-185, 2017 WL
3537195, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 17, 2017) (“A movant’s obligation to provide compelling
reasons justifying the seal exists even if the parties agree the filings should be sealed,
because litigants cannot waive the public’s First Amendment and common law right
of access to court filings.” (citing Rudd Equip. Co. v. John Deere Constr. & Forestry
Co., 834 F.3d 589, 595 (6th Cir. 2016))).
In response to a motion seeking sealing, this Court must determine whether
the party moving for a seal overcomes the “strong presumption in favor of openness.”
Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179. The Court must then justify “why the
interests in support of nondisclosure are compelling, why the interests supporting
access are less so, and why the seal itself is no broader than necessary.” Shane Grp.,
825 F.3d at 306 (citing Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1176). And as the Sixth
Circuit has repeatedly cautioned, “only the most compelling reasons can justify
non-disclosure of judicial records.” In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 927 F.3d 919,
940 (6th Cir. 2019) (brackets and citation omitted). On top of this, the Court must
ensure that any sealing order be “narrowly tailored” to serve the reason asserted.
Shane Grp., 825 F.3d at 305. To meet this narrow tailoring requirement, the moving
party must “analyze in detail, document by document, the propriety of secrecy,
providing reasons and legal citations.” Id. at 305–06 (quoting Baxter Int’l v. Abbott
Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 2002)). So a motion to seal must address each
document the moving party wants to seal or redact.
Courts have recognized a person’s interest in the privacy of their health
information as a legitimate basis for sealing. See, e.g., Patel v. Aetna, No. 2:17-cv-78,
2018 WL 2268147, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 3, 2018) (sealing claim forms containing
medical diagnoses, the identity of healthcare providers, prescription information, and
other personal health information); Bown v. Vore, No. 3:07-cv-375, 2009 WL 2393117,
at *5 n.2 (S.D. Ohio July 30, 2009) (sealing medical records). Indeed, Congress has
specifically recognized the importance of that privacy interest through the enactment
of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). And the Shane
Group court found that, when information is protected by statute or regulation, that
supports sealing. 825 F.3d at 308.
Courts have also recognized that a litigant’s interest in protecting sensitive
business information whose disclosure could result in competitive disadvantage can
be sufficient to support sealing. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., Case
No. 1:11-cv-871, 2017 WL 4168290, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2017) (recognizing
interest in sealing “confidential information that would otherwise allow competitors
an inside look at a company’s business strategies”); Morris v. Tyson Chicken, Inc., No.
4:15-CV-00077-JHM, 2020 WL 3442177, at *2 (W.D. Ky. June 23, 2020) (denying
motion to unseal documents that contain “confidential business information that
could harm [defendant’s] competitive standing”). Such information can include an
insurance company’s underwriting guidelines. See Kinsale Ins. Co. v. JDBC Holdings,
Inc., No. 3:20-CV-8, 2021 WL 2773002, at *5–6 (N.D. W. Va. Mar. 31, 2021) (sealing
guidelines that disclose “overall strategy and instructions for underwriting risks”);
Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Nelson, No. C19-5095RBL, 2020 WL 3488152, at *2 (W.D.
Wa. June 26, 2020) (granting motion to seal insurance company underwriting
guidelines).
Here, Frohn requests permission to file a sealed version of her Memorandum
in Opposition to Globe Life’s Motion for Summary Judgment, her Response to Globe
Life’s Proposed Undisputed Facts and Statement of Proposed Disputed Issues of
Material Fact, and the Declaration of her attorney, Todd B. Naylor, as well as
unsealed redacted versions of each. (Mot. to Seal Opp’n, Doc. 70, #4904). Frohn also
proposes to seal, in their entirety, the deposition transcript of Nicholas Danner, an
underwriter at Globe Life, along with exhibits 1–3, 6, 9, 10, 12–14, 16, 17, 19, 21, and
75 thereto, as well as exhibits 1–3, 6–13, and 16 to the Naylor Declaration. (Mot. to
Seal Danner Dep., Doc. 69, #4897; Mot. to Seal Opp’n, Doc. 70, #4905). Frohn claims
that those materials disclose the Decedent’s (her late husband Gregory Frohn’s)
personal health information, including information related to his treatment,
illnesses, infirmities, diseases, and/or health conditions. (Mot. to Seal Opp’n, Doc. 70,
#4904). Additionally, Frohn claims that other portions of the documents “discuss
Globe’s competitively sensitive and proprietary underwriting and business
information.” (Id.).
Under Shane Group, the Court must determine whether the asserted privacy
and competitive interests are compelling, whether the interests served by sealing this
information outweigh the value of public disclosure, and also whether the seal is
narrowly tailored to protect those privacy interests. With respect to the Decedent’s
confidential health information, the Court finds that this is one of the rare instances
where a party has met Shane Group’s demanding burden. In particular, the Court
agrees that exposure of the Decedent’s sensitive health information, including
information related to the Decedent’s treatment, illnesses, infirmities, diseases
and/or health conditions, would give rise to legitimate privacy concerns. Indeed, were
the Decedent alive, there would be no question that he has a compelling privacy
interest in maintaining the confidentiality of such information. Moreover, even
though a person’s privacy interests generally expire upon their death, see Cordell v.
Detective Publ’ns, Inc., 419 F.2d 989, 990 (6th Cir. 1969) (finding “the right [of
privacy] lapses with the death of the person who enjoyed it” in the tort context), that
is not true of HIPAA-protected information. Rather, HIPAA’s Privacy Rules
specifically provide that a person’s individually identifiable health information
remains protected for 50 years following the individual’s death. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103
(defining “protected health information”). In other words, Congress has recognized
that a person’s privacy interest in their medical information extends beyond their
death. It follows that Frohn has identified a compelling interest that supports sealing.
On the other side of the equation sits the public interest in disclosure. Shane
Group articulates several reasons why the public might have an interest in an open
review of a court’s docket materials. For example, a public docket ensures the public’s
right to guard against corruption and the public’s right to be on notice about what is
and what is not a violation of law. Shane Grp., 825 F.3d at 305. Likewise, the public
may have a legitimate interest in knowing the basis for the Court’s decision in a given
case. See Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1180 (“The public has a strong interest in
obtaining the information contained in the court record.”). None of those reasons,
though, appear to support access to any sensitive health information here.
The appropriateness of sealing is further confirmed in that the Decedent (or,
perhaps more accurately, Decedent’s estate) is not a party to this action. Shane Group
instructs that courts should afford third-party privacy interests substantial weight
when considering a motion to seal. Shane Grp., 825 F.3d at 308 (explaining that “the
privacy interests of innocent third parties should weigh heavily in a court’s balancing
equation”). In sum, the privacy interest in Decedent’s medical information far
outweighs the minimal public interest in disclosure of the information at issue here.
With respect to Globe Life’s sensitive business information, too, the Court
concludes that Frohn has identified a compelling interest that outweighs the value of
public disclosure. The information Frohn seeks to seal, which concerns Globe Life’s
underwriting practices, is sufficiently specific and detailed that its disclosure could
harm Globe Life’s competitive standing. Cf. Morris, 2020 WL 3442177, at *2; Kinsale,
2021 WL 2773002, at *5–6. Moreover, the Court determines that Globe Life’s
compelling competitive interest in sealing its sensitive business information
outweighs any limited impact on the public’s ability to be on notice about what
violates the law or to understand the basis for the Court’s decision in this case. See
Shane Grp., 825 F.3d at 305; Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1180. That is in part
because the specifics of Globe Life’s underwriting practices play only a limited role in
this case, in which Frohn challenges Globe Life’s decision not to pay on her life
insurance policy insuring the Decedent. (See generally Compl., Doc. 1).
The final issue the Court must address is Shane Group’s narrow-tailoring
requirement. Here, the Court has reviewed the unredacted versions of the
Memorandum in Opposition to Globe Life’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Response
to Globe Life’s Proposed Undisputed Facts and Statement of Proposed Disputed
Issues of Material Fact, and Naylor Declaration, and has confirmed that the proposed
redactions contain either the Decedent’s confidential medical information or Globe
Life’s sensitive business information. (See Mot. to Seal Opp’n, Doc. 70, #4904). The
Court has also reviewed the Danner deposition transcript and exhibits 1–3, 6, 9, 10,
12–14, 16, 17, 19, 21, and 75, as well as exhibits 1–3, 6–13, and 16 to the Naylor
Declaration, and find that either the Decedent’s health information or Globe Life’s
sensitive business information is pervasive throughout, such that it would be
impracticable to cull any portions that happen not to contain such information. (See
id., #4904–05; Mot. to Seal Danner Dep., Doc. 69, #4897).
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Frohn’s Motion to File Danner
Deposition Transcripts and Exhibits under Seal (Doc. 69) and Motion to File
Opposition under Seal (Doc. 70) in their entirety.
SO ORDERED.
May 17, 2022
DATE DOUGLAS R. COLE .
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE