White v. Erdos

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

JERMEAL WHITE, Case No. 1:20-cv-101

Plaintiff,

Black, J.

vs Bowman, M.J.

WARDEN RON ERDOS, et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This civil action is now before the court on Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment (Doc. 50) and the parties’ responsive memoranda. (Docs. 59, 60).

I. Background and Facts

Plaintiff Jermeal White is an inmate currently housed at the Southern Ohio

Correctional Facility (SOCF) in the custody of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and

Correction (“ODRC”). On February 6, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants

Warden Ron Erdos, Unit Manager Chief Cynthia Davis, and four John Doe Correction

Officers. (Doc. 1). Upon initial screening of the complaint, Court dismissed Warden Ron

Erdos and permitted Plaintiff to proceed with his allegations against Defendant Davis and

against the John Doe Correction Officers, all in their official capacities. (Doc. 11, PageID

113).

Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint on September 20, 2020.1 (Doc. 25). In

the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Correctional Officer “CO” Justin

1 For purposes of this order, given Plaintiff’s pro se status and the fact that Plaintiff refers back to the

original complaint in the amended complaint, the Court has considered Docs. 1, 12 and 25, combined, as

the operative pleading.

Deerfield told White that he was going to mess with him that day and that he lied when

he alleged that White spit on him. (Doc. 25, PageID 189). He then alleges that Lt. William

Bauer came to White’s cell and sprayed him with Oleoresin Capsicum (aka “OC”) for no

reason. (Id). White alleges that COs Ryan Tabor and Joshua Kinner applied extreme

force on him for no reason while he was being escorted and that they tried to break his

hands. (Id., PageID 190). White also claims that they threw him up against a window

along a wall causing his shoulder to be cut “real bad.” (Id.). White requests declaratory

judgment finding that the acts and omissions described in his complaint violate his

constitutional rights. (Doc. 25, PageID190, Doc. 1, PageID 11). He also requests a

preliminary and permanent injunction ordering his transfer to another prison. He seeks

$1 million in compensatory damages against each defendant, jointly and severally. (Id.).

The evidence of record establishes the following undisputed facts:2

On December 30, 2019, Lt. Bauer and Lt. Fri were called to the J2 Block because

Jermeal White was refusing to come out of his cell for a routine shakedown. (Doc. 48,

citing Doc. 41, Lt. Bauer Decl, ECF No. 41, PageID 319). When Lt. Bauer and Lt. Fri

arrived at J2, they learned that Plaintiff had spit on CO Deerfield. (Id., Doc. 41, Ex. 5, Use

of Force Report, PageID 387, 395, 405, 413). CO Deerfield used a short burst of OC

spray to quell Plaintiff’s assaultive and recalcitrant behavior and to maintain order and

security of the inmate and staff. (Doc. 47, Skidmore Declaration, PageID 457, ¶5). When

Lt. Bauer and Lt. Fri arrived at the cell front, Lt. Bauer gave Plaintiff an order to turn around

so that he could be handcuffed. As the outer door began to open, Plaintiff began spitting

2 Defendants’ proposed undisputed facts are well-supported and herein adopted. (Doc.48). As more fully

explained below, Plaintiff’s response to Defendants undisputed facts is not supported by any citations to

contradicting evidence.

in Lt. Bauer’s direction. (Doc. 41, Bauer Declaration, PageID 319, Fri Declaration, Doc.

47, PageID 459). 5. Lt. Bauer immediately reacted to White’s action by deploying OC to

his facial area. (Id., Doc. 47. Skidmore Declaration, PageID 458). Plaintiff continued

spitting out of his cell door. Lt. Bauer continued to deploy OC spray until Plaintiff complied

with his orders. (Id.).

Plaintiff was treated by medical prior to leaving his cell. (Doc. 41, Use of Force

Report, PageID 361, “Inmate White complied with all orders of the strip search and was

checked by medical.”). He was then placed in restraints and removed from his cell. (Id.,

Doc. 47, Skidmore Declaration, PageID 458, Fri Declaration, PageID 460). Correctional

Officers Tabor and Kinner were present to escort Plaintiff to the strip cage. CO’s Tabor

and Kinner used an escort technique in order to maintain control over inmate White. (Id.,

Doc. 41, Use of Force Report, , PageID 399, Declarations of Tabor and Kinner).

While being escorted to the J2 strip cage, Plaintiff was resisting by attempting to

pull away from the escorting officers as they were coming up the stairs in J2 North. (Doc.

41, Tabor Declaration, Kinner Declaration, PageID 319-320). Once Plaintiff was placed

in the strip cage, and the strip search was completed, Plaintiff was removed from the cage

and again was placed in an escorting technique by Officers Tabor and Kinner. (Id.) While

escorting Plaintiff through K-Corridor, Plaintiff leaned his weight forward and to the right

of CO’s Tabor and Kinner, causing them to momentarily lose balance, which caused

White to bump up against a glass window in the corridor, breaking the glass and causing

a cut to his right shoulder. (Doc. 41, Declarations of CO’s Tabor, Kinner, and Lt. Fri., see

also Use of Force Report, PageID 366-368).

Prior to Plaintiff’s injury, while Lt. Fri and CO’s Tabor and Kinner continued with

their escort of Plaintiff to K2, Lt. Bauer went to the Captain’s Office. While there, he was

called over the radio to report to K-Corridor. When he arrived, Lt. Bauer observed Plaintiff

on the floor bleeding. (Doc. 41, Bauer Declaration, PageID 320). Lt. Bauer called for a

wheelchair and Plaintiff was assisted from the floor and placed in the wheelchair. (Id.)

Plaintiff then became irate, screaming and yelling at Lt. Bauer, stating, “I hate you

bitches.” Lt. Bauer ordered him to calm down so they could get him to medical for

treatment. (Id.) Plaintiff refused and began spitting in the direction of Lt. Bauer. Lt. Bauer

deployed OC to Plaintiff’s facial area to gain his compliance and prevent him from spitting

on him and other staff. (Id., see Doc. 41, Declarations of CO’s Tabor and Kinner). Plaintiff

put his foot on the floor and was turning the wheelchair in an attempt to evade the OC

spray. Lt. Bauer continued spraying OC to gain Plaintiff’s compliance so that he would

stop moving the wheelchair and quit spitting, and to protect the officers from exposure to

Plaintiff’s blood. (Id., see also Doc. 41, Use of Force Report, PageID 375). Once Plaintiff

complied with Lt. Bauer’s orders, he was escorted to medical for treatment. Once medical

completed their assessment and decontaminated Plaintiff, he was sent to an outside

hospital by ambulance to treat his injuries. (Doc. 41, Ex. 5, Use of Force Report, PageID

401).

Defendants William Bauer, Cynthia Davis, Justin Deerfield, Joshua Kinner, and

Ryan Tabor now move for summary judgment. (See Doc. 50). Defendants assert, inter

alia, that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Plaintiff has failed to

establish any violation of his Eighth Amendment rights and Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity. For the reasons detailed below, the undersigned finds Defendants’

motion for summary judgment is well-taken.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment is proper

“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A dispute is “genuine” when “the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A court must view the evidence

and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The moving party has the

burden of showing an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Once the moving party has met its burden of production, the non-moving party cannot

rest on his pleadings, but must present significant probative evidence in support of his

complaint to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. at 248-49. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence to support the non-

moving party’s position will be insufficient; the evidence must be sufficient for a jury to

reasonably find in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. at 252.

B. Applicable Law

As detailed above, Plaintiff asserts that Corrections Officer Parish used excessive

force against him in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth

Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment protects prison inmates from

the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Barker v. Goodrich, 649 F.3d 428, 434

(6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). An Eighth

Amendment excessive force claim has both a subjective and an objective component.

Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014). The subjective component

focuses on “whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore

discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Id.; see also Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992). In making this inquiry, the Court must

consider the need for the use of force; the relationship between that need and the type

and amount of the force used; the threat reasonably perceived by the official; and the

extent of the injury inflicted. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320

(1986).

On the other hand, the objective component of an Eighth Amendment excessive

force claim requires that a plaintiff’s injury or pain be “sufficiently serious” to offend

“contemporary standards of decency.” Cordell, 759 F.3d at 580; Williams, 631 F.3d at

383. As the Supreme Court of the United States has stated, not “every malevolent touch

by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10;

Rafferty v. Trumbull Cty., 915 F.3d 1087, 1094 (6th Cir. 2019). Rather, the Eighth

Amendment protects prisoners only from that conduct which is “repugnant to the

conscience of mankind” and excludes “de minimis uses of physical force.” Wilkins v.

Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37-38 (2010) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10). In addition, this

Court has recognized how the Sixth Circuit gives deference to prison officials using force

in maintaining institutional discipline and security. See, e.g., Anderson v. Lawless, S.D.

Ohio No. 2:17-cv-1057, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209814, at *17 (Dec. 21, 2017) (citing

Combs, 315 F.3d at 556-57). On occasion, the maintenance of prison security and

discipline may require that inmates be subjected to physical contacts actionable as

assault under the common law. Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034, 1037 (6th Cir. 1995).

“Because prison officials must make their decisions in haste, under pressure, and

frequently without the luxury of a second chance, we must grant them wide-ranging

deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment

are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.”

Combs, 315 F.3d at 557.

C. Plaintiff failed to properly oppose Defendants’ summary judgment motion

Rule 56 (c) provides that the nonmovant must “cit[e] to particular parts of materials

in the record” to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact, or

otherwise “show[ ] that the materials cited” by the moving party do not demonstrate that

no disputed issue of material fact exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Thus, the non-moving

party must “designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, interrogatories, or other

factual material” from which a reasonable jury could find in his favor. Maston v.

Montgomery Cty. Jail Med. Staff Pers., 832 F.Supp.2d 846, 849 (S.D. Ohio 2011). He

“cannot rest on the mere allegations of the pleadings.” Id. See also Id. at 851-52 (holding

that a pro se party cannot rely on allegations or denials in unsworn filings when opposing

a motion for summary judgment).

Thus, to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact, the opposing party “must do more

than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts .... Where

the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving

party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.

574, 587 (1986)(citation omitted). It is the Plaintiff’s burden to point out record evidence

to support his claims. “[T]he Court has no duty when deciding a motion for summary

judgment to scour the record for evidence that supports a plaintiff’s claims.” Abdulsalaam

v. Franklin County Bd. Of Com’rs, 637 F. Supp.2d 561, 576 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (citing

Williamson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 481 F.3d 369, 379 (6th Cir. 2007)).

Here, Defendants note that Plaintiff’s responsive pleading contains no new

information, no citation to legal authority, no sworn affidavits or declarations to support

his position, nor any additional evidence submitted to overcome Defendants’ well-

supported Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff has not submitted verifiable evidence

into the record to substantiate his claims of excessive force. The video recording that he

relies on in support of his allegations, which Defendants submitted into the record, support

the fact that excessive force was not used on White when faced with his assaultive

behavior (spitting on Defendants Deerfield and Lt. Bauer and failure to obey direct

orders).

In light of the foregoing, the undersigned agrees that Plaintiff has failed to properly

oppose Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment by failing to cite to the evidence in

the record of the kind required by Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As

such, pursuant to Rule 56(e) if the Plaintiff fails to properly support an assertion of fact or

fails to properly address Defendants asserted facts, the Court may consider the fact

undisputed for summary judgment purposes and grant summary judgment if Defendants’

motion and supporting materials, including the facts considered undisputed show that

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow,

the undersigned recommends that Defendants’ well supported motion for summary

judgment should granted.

D. Defendants Skidmore, Deerfield, Bauer and Tabor are entitled to judgment as

a matter of law with respect to Plaintiff’s excessive force claims under the Eighth

Amendment

1. OC Spray

As detailed above, on December 30, 2019, COs Skidmore and Deerfield randomly

picked Plaintiff’s cell for a shakedown. When they asked White to cuff-up so he could be

taken to the shower while they searched his cell, he became hostile and started cussing

at them. Plaintiff shouted an expletive at CO Deerfield, who was standing in front of the

cell door, and he then spit on CO Deerfield’s facial area and torso. CO Deerfield reacted

with a burst of OC spray to Plaintiff’s facial area.

Because of Plaintiff’s assaultive behavior and refusal to move from his cell, Lt.

Bauer and Lt. Fri were called to the cell block. Plaintiff then refused Lt. Bauer’s order to

cuff-up and then he spit towards Lt. Bauer, who reacted with a burst of OC spray. Plaintiff

finally complied. He was cuffed and leg ironed and removed from the cell. In response to

Plaintiff’s spitting, threatening and disobedient behavior, CO Deerfield and Lt. Bauer used

the least amount of force to quell any further assaultive behavior, with a short burst of OC

spray, which each conducted reasonably under the circumstances. This is supported by

the video and by the Declarations of COs Lt. Bauer, CO Tabor, CO Kinner, CO Skidmore

and Lt. Fri. (ECF Nos. 41-1, 41-6, 41-7, ECF Nos. 47-1, 47-2 and Video – 565-19), and

the Use of Force Report (ECF No. 41-5). In light of the foregoing, Defendants contend

that their use of force was reasonable under the circumstances. The undersigned agrees.

As noted by Defendants, corrections officers do not violate a prisoner’s Eighth

Amendment rights when they use force “in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore

discipline.” Roberson v. Torres, 770 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Jennings v.

Mitchell, 93 Fed. Appx. 723, 725 (6th Cir. 2004)). A prison official’s duty under the Eighth

Amendment is to ensure “reasonable safety,” “a standard that incorporates due regard

for prison officials’ ‘unenviable task of keeping dangerous men in safe custody under

humane conditions.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 844-45. As such, the Sixth Circuit

has found no Eighth Amendment violation in numerous cases involving “the use of ...

chemical agents against recalcitrant prisoners.” Id. (quoting Caldwell v. Moore, 968 F.2d

595, 600 (6th Cir. 1992) (collecting cases)); Jennings, 93 Fed. Appx. at 725 (“The

videotape squarely demonstrates that Jennings disobeyed repeated direct orders prior to

the use of pepper spray.”). See also Thompson v. Joseph, No. 1:12-cv-992, 2014 WL

1685918, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 2014) (Report and Recommendation) (Bowman, M.J.),

adopted, 2014 WL 2172894 (S.D. Ohio May 23, 2014) (the defendant was entitled to

qualified immunity because “no reasonable officer would have understood that it violated

the Eighth Amendment to reactively aim chemical spray at Plaintiff in his cell for less than

two seconds (based on the videotape record), in order to force a threatening inmate to

retreat and restore order.”).

Here, the evidence of record establishes that CO Deerfield used 10 grams of OC

spray in reaction to White spitting on him and disobeying a direct order to cuff up. (Doc.

41, Use of Force Report, PageID 363). Lt. Bauer used a short burst of OC spray in

response to Plaintiff spitting towards him. (Id., PageID 364). After being sprayed by Lt.

Bauer, Plaintiff then followed orders and allowed the officers to cuff him and transport him

from his cell to the strip cage. This de minimis use of force had the intended effect of

restoring order and discipline from White and was justified. CO Deerfield’s and Lt. Bauer’s

actions were not excessive nor was the force used maliciously or sadistically.

2. Shoulder injury

Plaintiff next alleges that CO Kinner and CO Tabor used excessive force on him

while escorting him to K2 by trying to break his hands and making it difficult for him to

walk or move. (Doc. 59, PageID 534-535). He states that the force used was so extreme

that CO’s Kinner and Tabor slowly twisted and turned him toward a prison window and

pushed him through the window resulting in him being seriously cut [in his upper right

shoulder area]. (Id.). Plaintiff’s contentions are unsupported by the record evidence.

As noted above, corrections officers do not violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment

rights when they use force “in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.”

Roberson v. Torres, 770 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Jennings v. Mitchell, 93

Fed. Appx. 723, 725 (6th Cir. 2004)). Here, the evidence establishes that while Plaintiff

was being escorted to K corridor by CO Tabor and CO Kinner, he was resisting and pulling

away from the officers Kinner and refusing orders to stop resisting. This resulted in

Plaintiff’s right shoulder being thrust up against a glass window, breaking the glass,

causing his shoulder to be cut. Even then, Plaintiff continued to struggle, and the COs

then placed him on the floor. (Doc. 41, Kinner and Tabor Declarations, Doc. 47, Fri

Declaration). Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the Defendant COs

used reasonable force to gain control over Plaintiff, for the safety and security of those

involved, and of the prison. As such, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is well-

taken in this regard.

E. Defendant Davis is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to

Plaintiff’s failure to protect claim under the Eighth Amendment

In order to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Davis based on a

failure to protect him from an attack, Plaintiff must allege facts showing that Defendant’s

conduct amounted to “deliberate indifference” to a known risk of harm to Plaintiff. Farmer

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994); see also

Vaughan v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d 736, 741 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that a prison

administrator’s indifference to brutal behavior of guards towards inmates is sufficient to

state an Eight Amendment claim), overruled on other grounds by Koch v. Ricketts, 68

F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 1995). A prison official may be held liable for his failure to protect

inmates from attacks only if the official knows that an inmate faces “a substantial risk of

serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847.

Here, Plaintiff alleges he informed Defendant Davis that his safety was

compromised by being housed at SOCF; that people were out to kill him; that Correction

Officers attempted to kill him on December 30, 2019; and that he requested a transfer

from SOCF based on these allegations, to no avail. (Doc. 1). In support of these claims,

White alleges that he “kept expressing the fact to the prison that it’s not safe on the units

here for Plaintiff, but that unit manager Cynthia Davis doesn’t address his concerns.” (Id.,

PageID 7). Instead, he claims that Defendant Davis keeps placing Plaintiff in harm’s way.

(Id.). And that she placed Plaintiff on the K2-unit against “the obvious fact it is not

responsible for me (sic) on this unit.” (Id.). He claims that Defendant Davis’ supervision is

inappropriate and that his allegations prove it. (Id.). Plaintiff also claims that a “real big

C/O from a case before this court, and his partners, have been trying to kill Plaintiff, and

told Plaintiff they are going to get him.” (Id.).

Plaintiff claims his safety is in serious danger, and refers to an Informal Complaint

Resolution that he filed with Warden Erdos on January 20, 2020 in support of this

allegation. (Id., PageID #8, ¶1). He states in an “Amended Complaint” that Defendant

Davis knowingly placed Plaintiff in harm’s way by not addressing his documented “serious

concerns as required by administrative prison rules.” (Doc. 12, PageID 121, ¶1).

However, Plaintiff has failed to provide affidavits, declarations or evidence of any

kind to support his claims against Defendant Davis, and thus fails to establish that there

is a genuine dispute as to any material fact. The only records Plaintiff has provided to

support his claims are his (unverified) complaints and grievance documents, which fail to

establish a claim for deliberate indifference as to Plaintiff’s safety. Furthermore, as set

forth above, Plaintiff has failed to prove the underlying excessive force claim. Thus, his

failure to protect claim must fail as well.

F. Qualified Immunity

Assuming Plaintiff has met his burden of establishing a violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights, which he has not, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The

purpose of qualified immunity is to provide governmental officials with the ability

“reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.”

Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). Thus, a governmental official performing

discretionary functions will be entitled to qualified immunity unless his actions violate

“clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982). A

governmental official is entitled to immunity if the facts alleged do not make out a violation

of a constitutional right, or if the alleged constitutional right was not clearly established at

the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129

S. Ct. 808 (2009). Once a defendant has raised the defense of qualified immunity, the

plaintiff bears the burden of proof to show that the defendant is not entitled to that defense.

See Garretson v. City of Madison Heights, 407 F.3d 789, 798 (6th Cir. 2005).

Here, as detailed above, there is no evidence that Defendants used excessive

force against Plaintiff or that Defendant Davis failed to protect Plaintiff. To the contrary,

the evidence establishes that Defendants use of OC spray and Plaintiff’s shoulder injury

was caused by his own actions. As such, Plaintiff has failed to establish a violation of his

constitutional rights. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Defendants are immune

from Plaintiff's claims against him.

III. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT; Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment (Doc. 50) be GRANTED; and this matter be TERMINATED on the

Court’s docket.

s/Stephanie K. Bowman

Stephanie K. Bowman

United States Magistrate Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

JERMEAL WHITE, Case No. 1:20-cv-101

Plaintiff,

Black, J.

vs Bowman, M.J.

WARDEN RON ERDOS, et al.,

Defendants.

NOTICE

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written

objections to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after

being served with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on

timely motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the

portion(s) of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in

support of the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within

FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make

objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas

v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).