Standifer v. City of Columbus

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

CAMRYN STANDIFER,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:19–cv–3803

Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

v. Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

CITY OF COLUMBUS, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Brandon Harmon, Travis Turner, Holly

Kanode and the City of Columbus’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment.

(ECF No. 74.) The parties have fully briefed the motion and it is ripe for decision. (ECF No. 87.)

For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case arises out of Plaintiff Camryn Standifer’s arrest by several Columbus Division

of Police officers on August 1, 2018. Defendant Officer Brandon Harmon personally arrested Mr.

Standifer, Defendant Officer Travis Turner was present during the arrest, and Defendant Sergeant

Holly Kanode was not present at the arrest but later approved Officer Harmon’s use of force.

(Harmon Dep. 161–62, ECF No. 72-2; Kanode Dep. 17, ECF No. 84-1; Harmon Body Worn

Camera (“BWC”), ECF No. 75.)

On the day of Plaintiff’s arrest, August 1, 2018, Officers Harmon and Turner responded to

multiple complaints of suspicious persons and suspected narcotic trafficking at a Columbus

residence. (Harmon Dep. 120, 128.) Upon arrival, they gathered identification from nine

individuals inside the residence, including the Mr. Standifer, who avers that he could not produce

his license and instead gave the officers his social security number. (Id. 133; Standifer Dep. 116,

ECF No. 72-1.) Officer Harmon ran the individuals’ names through a warrant search and learned

that Mr. Standifer had an outstanding warrant for failing to appear on a traffic violation matter for

failure to maintain marked lanes. (Harmon Dep. 137–138.) The warrant reported that Plaintiff

possessed “violent tendencies,” which Officer Harmon avers means that an individual might have

a criminal history of assault or a weapons offense. (Id. 138–139.)

Officer Harmon’s body camera footage shows that, after he learned about the warrant, he

asked Mr. Standifer what his first name is, then stated, “Go ahead and stand up for me. Put your

arms behind your back.” Officer Harmon then took hold of one of Mr. Standifer’s wrists and

moved it behind his back. At that point, Officer Harmon said, “don’t tense up, don’t tense up,

relax, relax.” The footage shows Mr. Standifer’s arms bending at his elbows and moving up behind

his back. Officer Harmon yelled “don’t tense up” once more before throwing Mr. Standifer to the

ground. (Harmon BWC.)

According to Mr. Standifer, he did not resist or tense his arms during the incident. He

alleges that Officer Harmon pulled his arms “up his back” “forcing it further and further up.” He

avers that he did not have the chance to put his arms down before Officer Harmon raised him off

the ground by his arms and threw him onto his head. (Standifer Dep. 124–29.)

Officer Harmon avers, however, that Mr. Standifer complied with commands to put his

arms behind his back but was using “both of his hands to pull apart, to tense up and lock up.”

Officer Harmon told Mr. Standifer to “relax,” but he was allegedly “actively trying to resist.” To

gain control, Officer Harmon “rais[ed] [Mr. Standifer’s] arms up” to put him off balance and

“tipp[ed] him forward over his legs” onto the ground. (Harmon Dep. 163–69.)

Mr. Standifer alleges that he suffered serious injuries because of Officer Harmon’s

takedown. His alleged injuries from the takedown stemmed from existing injuries caused by a

serious car accident a few weeks prior. Mr. Standifer’s existing leg wound allegedly reopened and

started bleeding after the takedown. While lying on the ground in handcuffs, Mr. Standifer told the

officers that he was unable to walk or roll onto his stomach. (Harmon BWC; Standifer Dep. 133–

34.) Mr. Standifer was transported to the hospital and received a bandage for his leg. Afterwards,

he was transported to the Franklin County jail. (Pl.’s Resp., Ex. B.) Three days later, he allegedly

returned to the hospital complaining of pain in his left leg, left arm, and head. Mr. Standifer

returned to the hospital twice over the next few days and was allegedly diagnosed with serious

injuries to his leg and arm, and a methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infection.

He remained in the hospital undergoing treatment for almost a month. (Pl.’s Resp. 11.)

Mr. Standifer was charged with resisting arrest but the charge was dismissed in December

2018.

On July 31, 2019, Mr. Standifer filed suit against Officers Harmon, Turner, and Kanode,

and the City of Columbus in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas asserting the following

claims: a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Officer Harmon; Fourth Amendment

false imprisonment claims against Officers Harmon and Turner; Fourth Amendment malicious

prosecution claims against Officers Harmon, Turner and Sergeant Kanode; a Monell claim against

the City of Columbus. Plaintiff also asserted the following state law claims: assault and battery

against Officer Harmon; wrongful imprisonment against Officers Harmon and Turner and the City

of Columbus; malicious prosecution against Officers Harmon, Turner, Sergeant Kanode and the

City of Columbus; intentional infliction of emotional distress against all Defendants. (See Compl.,

ECF No. 2; Third Am. Compl., ECF No. 47.)

Defendants removed the case to federal court on September 3, 2019, (Notice of Removal,

ECF No. 1), and filed the instant motion for summary judgment on all claims on January 4, 2022

(ECF No. 74). In his Response in Opposition, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his Fourth

Amendment false imprisonment claims, his state law wrongful imprisonment claims, all claims

against Officer Turner, and the state law claims against the City of Columbus. (Pl.’s Resp. 16, 21.)

The Court addresses the remaining claims below.

II. STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

The Court may therefore grant a motion for summary judgment if the nonmoving party who has

the burden of proof at trial fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element that is essential to that party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

The “party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions” of the record which

demonstrate “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The

burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who “must set forth specific facts showing that there is

a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e)). “The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences

are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–

59 (1970)). A genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,

Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (The requirement that a dispute be “genuine”

means that there must be more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”).

Consequently, the central issue is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to

require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of

law.” Hamad v. Woodcrest Condo. Ass’n, 328 F.3d 224, 234–35 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Qualified Immunity

As to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, qualified immunity shields government officials sued

for performance of discretionary functions from civil liability unless “their actions violate clearly

established rights of which a reasonable officer would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 818 (1982). At the summary judgment stage, a government official is “entitled to

qualified immunity on summary judgment unless the facts, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, would permit a reasonable juror to find that: (1) the defendant violated a

constitutional right; and (2) the right was clearly established.” Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 765

(6th Cir. 2011). A right is clearly established if “[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear

that a reasonable official would understand what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (“the

unlawfulness must be apparent”).

In determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, “[t]he ultimate

burden of proof is on [the plaintiff] to show that [the defendants] are not entitled to qualified

immunity.” Wegener v. City of Covington, 933 F.2d 390, 392 (6th Cir. 1999). A district court has

discretion to decide whether there was a constitutional violation and a violation of clearly

established law. Id.

1. Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Claim Against Officer Harmon

Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment excessive force

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Defs.’ Mot. at 6.) Whether a use of force is reasonable turns on the

objective reasonableness of the totality of the circumstances and should be “judged from the

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395–98 (1989). Relevant are “(1) the severity of the crime at

issue; (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; and

(3) whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Mitchell

v. Schlabach, 864 F.3d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 2017).

Defendants contend that Officer Harmon’s use of force was reasonable because Plaintiff’s

outstanding warrant indicated that he had “violent tendencies” and Plaintiff allegedly resisted

arrest by tensing his arms to prevent handcuffing. (Defs.’ Mot. at 7–8.) Plaintiff contends that

Officer Harmon’s use of force was unreasonable because Mr. Standifer was compliant with all the

commands and did not resist arrest. (Pl.’s Resp. at 12–13.)

When viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether Officer Harmon used objectively reasonable force in lifting Plaintiff up

by his arms and taking him to the ground during the arrest. First, the crime at issue was not severe.

“Conduct that is not a violent or serious crime does not permit an officer to use increased force

absent other factors.” Vanderhoef v. Dixon, 938 F.3d 271, 277 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Goodwin v.

City of Painesville, 781 F.3d 314, 322 (6th Cir. 2015)). Plaintiff’s failure to appear for a traffic

violation for failure to follow marked lanes was not a violent or serious crime. Id. (noting that the

crime of reckless driving is not severe and is within the “lowest rung of unlawful activity”).

Second, there was minimal evidence that Plaintiff posed a threat to Officer Harmon’s safety

or the safety of others. The body camera footage shows that Plaintiff complied with the officers’

directions to provide identification and stand up from the couch. There were also several other

officers in the room providing support. Although the warrant stated that Plaintiff had “violent

tendencies,” Officer Harmon testified in his deposition that it simply meant the person could have

a criminal history of assault or a weapons offense. Officer Harmon does not contend that he was

aware of any violent criminal history. This factor weighs in Plaintiff’s favor.

Third, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff resisted arrest. The

body camera footage does not reveal whether Plaintiff’s arm movements are voluntary or whether

Officer Harmon lifted Plaintiff’s arms behind his back. It is also not clear whether Plaintiff had an

opportunity to comply with Officer Harmon’s commands, either because Officer Harmon

controlled Plaintiff’s arms or did not wait to allow Plaintiff to comply before performing the

takedown. The footage shows that Officer Harmon performed the takedown just moments after he

initially told Plaintiff to put his arms behind his back.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity if there is a genuine issue of fact as to

whether the officer gave verbal commands before using force or whether he gave the arrestee an

opportunity to comply with commands. See Richards v. Cnty. of Washtenaw, 818 F. App’x 487,

492 (6th Cir. 2020) (denying qualified immunity where a plaintiff could not comply with

commands when he was pinned to the ground, and there was an issue of fact as to whether the

officers told the plaintiff to “stop resisting” before taking him to the ground); Harris v. City of

Circleville, 583 F.3d 356, 366 (6th Cir. 2009) (denying qualified immunity when, in a

nonthreatening situation, officers immediately took a man to the ground prior to issuing any verbal

commands). It is a proper question for a jury whether Plaintiff resisted arrest and consequently

whether Officer’s use of force was objectively reasonable. Officer Harmon is not entitled to

qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.

2. Fourth Amendment Malicious Prosecution Claims Against Officer Harmon and

Sergeant Kanode

Plaintiff asserts claims against Officer Harmon and Sergeant Kanode for malicious

prosecution, arguing that they filed a criminal charge against him for resisting arrest even though

he did not resist. (Pl.’s Mot. at 16.) Defendant moves for summary judgment on these claims.

To establish a malicious-prosecution claim pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate

that: “(1) the defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute the plaintiff;

(2) there was no probable cause for the criminal prosecution; (3) as a consequence of the legal

proceedings, the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty apart from the initial arrest; and (4) the

criminal proceeding was resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.” Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647,

659 (6th Cir. 2015). “To be liable for participating in the decision to prosecute, the officer must

participate in a way that aids in the decision, as opposed to passively or neutrally participating.”

Id. at 660.

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim

because there is insufficient evidence that Officer Harmon made, influenced, or participated in the

decision to prosecute Plaintiff in more than a passive or neutral way. Officer Harmon was involved

in Mr. Standifer’s case only until the end of the arrest process. (Harmon Dep. 179–80.) He filed

an arrest report and transported Plaintiff to jail. The Sixth Circuit has held that “[m]erely filing an

allegedly misleading case report, without more active participation, qualifies only as ‘passive or

neutral’ participation and is thus an insufficient basis for a malicious-prosecution claim.”

Washtenaw, 818 F. App’x at 493; see also Miller v. Davis, 653 F. App’x 448, 455–56 (6th Cir.

2016) (holding that a detective’s report to prosecutors, even if “fundamental to the commencement

of the criminal proceedings” was by-itself insufficient for a malicious-prosecution claim); Kinkus

v. Vill. of Yorkville, 289 F. App’x 86, 91 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that an officer’s actions of only

filing a police report, signing a blank criminal complaint, and soliciting a written report from

another officer were insufficient).

Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim against

Officer Turner in his Response. (Pl.’s Resp. at 16.) He did not explicitly dismiss his malicious

prosecution claim against Sergeant Kanode but also does not make any reference or argument

supporting the claim against her in his Response in Opposition.

Even if Plaintiff did support his malicious prosecution claim against Sergeant Kanode, it

would fail for the same reasons. The fact that Sergeant Kanode completed a use of force review

does not, by itself, show that she made, influenced, or participated in the prosecutor’s decision to

charge Plaintiff with resisting arrest. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims against Officer Harmon and Sergeant Kanode.

B. Monell Claim Against City of Columbus

Plaintiff claims that the City is liable under 28 U.S.C. §1983 because (1) it has a policy of

rubber-stamping excessive force incidents as reasonable, and (2) the City was deliberately

indifferent to the danger Officer Harmon posed to the public because it ignored Officer Harmon’s

propensity for unnecessary violence. (Pl.’s Mot. at 17.)

It is well established that a municipality may be held liable under § 1983 for customs or

policies that violate constitutional rights. Monell v. Dept. of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91,

94 (1978). A municipality’s customs or policies can take the form of (1) official policy or

legislative enactment, (2) decisions or ratifications of final decision makers, (3) inadequate training

or supervision, or (4) a custom of acquiescence to or tolerance of rights deprivations. Jackson v.

City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 828 (6th Cir. 2019). To bring a proper Monell claim, Mr. Standifer

must establish the existence of a municipal custom or policy, a constitutional violation, and a

causal link between the two. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).

1. Sergeant Kanode’s Ratification of Officer Harmon’s Use of Force

As stated above, a municipality’s policy can come in the form of a final decision-maker’s

ratification of a subordinate’s decision. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480–81, 85

(1986). Even if it is shown that a municipality subsequently ratified a decision, a plaintiff must

still “prove that the ratification was a ‘moving force’ in causing the constitutional

violation.” Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 988 F.2d 649, 656 n.3 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Williams

v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 885 (6th Cir. 1991)). In other words, the ratification must have a

constraining effect so that the subordinate’s only option—outside disobedience—is to carry out

the unlawful act. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (plurality).

Plaintiff claims the City of Columbus has a policy of rubber-stamping officers’ use of

excessive force, and that it is evident by Sergeant Kanode’s ratification of Officer Harmon’s use

of force against him. Sergeant Kanode ratified Officer Harmon’s use of force against Mr. Standifer

in her report after reviewing the body camera footage and speaking to the officers who were

present. (Pl.’s Resp. at 17; Kanode Dep., Ex. C.) Plaintiff’s expert, Andrew Scott, found it

“troublesome” that Sergeant Kanode concluded that the body camera footage did not show

excessive force. He alleges that Sergeant Kanode copied and pasted Officer Harmon’s statement

into her review including the mistakes within, and that she had never referred a Columbus Police

Officer to the department’s Employee Action Review System. (Kanode Dep. at 72, Ex. C; Pl.’s

Resp. Ex. A, B.)

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is insufficient evidence

that Sergeant Kanode’s ratification was a “moving force” behind Officer Harmon’s alleged

constitutional violation. In England v. City of Columbus, this Court found that a supervisor’s

ratification might have been a “moving force” in the Plaintiff’s constitutional violation where there

was evidence that the supervisors incorrectly believed officers could use deadly force when they

subjectively—but unreasonably—feared for their lives. England v. City of Columbus, Case No.

2:19-cv-1048, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 242518, at *35 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 20, 2021). This was an

unconstitutional standard. But the defendant officer, relying on the supervisors’ beliefs, testified

with “‘absolute’ confidence that his actions would ultimately be found within policy.” Id.

There are no such facts here. The record does not suggest that supervisors wrongly ratified

excessive uses of force or that Officer Harmon believed his actions would be ratified. In other

words, the evidence presented does not show that Sergeant Kanode’s ratification was a “moving

force” in Officer Harmon’s actions or that he felt he would be disobedient by not performing the

takedown. See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127. Even if Sergeant Kanode has never referred an officer

to the Employee Action Review System, this does not suggest that she has incorrectly ratified

officers’ use of excessive force.

2. Deliberate Indifference to Officer Harmon’s Propensity for Violence

Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim also lacks support. In Monell claims involving the

police, a municipality is liable for “deliberate indifference” if the need for training that was so

obvious, and the inadequacy was likely to result in a violation of constitutional rights, that the

municipality can be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the rights of persons with whom

the police come into contact. Barber v. City of Salem, 953 F.2d 232, 236 (6th Cir. 1992); Harris,

489 U.S. at 388–89. A plaintiff can establish deliberate indifference by showing that either the

City “fail[ed] to act in response to repeated complaints of constitutional violations by its officers.”

Ellis, 455 U.S. at 700–01 (quoting Brown v. Shaner, 172 F.3d 927, 931 (6th Cir. 1999)).

Plaintiff contends that the City was deliberately indifferent to the danger Officer Harmon

posed to the public because the City knew or should have known of Officer Harmon’s propensity

for violence. (Pl.’s Resp. at 19.) Plaintiff’s expert, Andrew Scott, opines that the City’s failure to

address and monitor Officer Harmon despite 43 complaints against him over 13 years shows the

City consciously disregarded his aggressive tendencies. (Pl.’s Mot. at 18, Ex. C.) Plaintiff notes

that 28 of the complaints occurred when Officer Harmon was arresting an individual, and 62% of

the complaints reported an allegedly injury sustained because of Officer Harmon’s actions. (Pl.’s

Mot. at 18, Ex. C.)

Defendants argue that Columbus Police officers receive extensive training with respect to

all facets of policing, including the use of force. (Harmon Dep. at 30–31, 218–226.) Officer

Harmon, in particular, allegedly has significant training on use of force and arrest procedures.

(Harmon Dep. at 218–26.)

To establish deliberate indifference through the number of complaints against Officer

Harmon, Plaintiff must show some evidence of the normal number of complaints a Columbus

police officer receives. In Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2005), the

plaintiff introduced evidence of forty-five suits of excessive force against the Chattanooga Police

Department to establish that the department had a custom of condoning excessive force by its

officers. The Sixth Circuit held that such evidence was “conclusory” because the plaintiff “did not

produce any data showing what a ‘normal’ number of excessive force complaints would be.” Id. at

431; see also Ellis v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 701 (6th Cir. 2006) (upholding

requirement that a plaintiff must show evidence of a “normal” number of complaints to suggest

the defendant was deliberately indifferent to the number of complaints).

Likewise, the conclusory allegations that 43 complaints over 13 years is “excessive” for a

police officer are insufficient to suggest the City of Columbus has an policy of ignoring complaints

so that it is deliberately indifferent to the rights of citizens. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 388–89. There

no evidence presented of what a normal number of complaints is for an officer in Officer Harmon’s

position. Additionally, “the plaintiff bears a heavy burden in proving municipal liability, and he

cannot rely solely on a single instance” or on one officer’s conduct “to infer a policy of deliberate

indifference.” Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 1996). Defendants are entitled to

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Monell claims.

C. State-Law Claims

Plaintiff asserts state-law claims against Officer Harmon for assault, battery, malicious

prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He also asserts malicious prosecution

and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against Sergeant Kanode. (Third Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 34–77.)

Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state law claims arguing that they

qualify for state statutory immunity. Under Ohio law, employees of political subdivisions,

including police officers, are statutorily immune from tort liability unless:

(a) their acts or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of their employment

or official responsibilities;

(b) their acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton

or reckless manner; or

(c) civil liability is expressly imposed upon them by some other section of the Ohio

Revised Code.

R.C. § 2744.03(A)(6).

The statute creates a presumption of immunity, and Plaintiff must provide sufficient

evidence to rebut it with one of the three statutory immunity exceptions. See Cook v. Cincinnati,

103 Ohio App. 3d 80, 90 (Ohio App. 1st Dist., 1995). Because the Officer Harmon and Sergeant

Kanode’s conduct was within the scope of their employment and because civil liability is not

expressly imposed by another section of the Ohio Revised Code, Plaintiff must show that they

acted “with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” Id. §

2744.03(A)(6)(b).

Officer Harmon is not entitled to state statutory immunity at summary judgment because

his state immunity defense “stands or falls with [his] federal qualified immunity defense.” Hopper

v. Plummer, 887 F.3d 744, 760 (6th Cir. 2018). That is, whether Officer Harmon acted objectively

reasonable is based on the same disputed facts that determine whether he acted with “with

malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” Chappell v. City of Cleveland,

585 F.3d 901, n.3 (6th Cir. 2009); Martin v. City of Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 963 (6th

Cir. 2013) (“As resolution of the state-law immunity issue is heavily dependent on the same

disputed material facts as the excessive force determination under § 1983, the district court

properly denied summary judgment to the officers on the estate’s state-law claims”). Because there

is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Officer Harmon acted with malicious purpose, he

is not entitled to state statutory immunity.

Sergeant Kanode, however, has no surviving constitutional claims against her for which

she argues qualified immunity. She is shielded by state statutory immunity because there are

insufficient facts that she acted “with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless

manner” R.C. § 2744.03(A)(6)(b). Malicious purpose is defined as the “willful and intentional

design to do injury . . .” Anderson v. Massillon, 134 Ohio St.3d 380, 2012-Ohio-5711, 983 N.E.2d

266. Bad faith denotes a “dishonest purpose” or “conscious wrongdoing.” Id. Wanton misconduct

is “the failure to exercise any care towards those to whom a duty of care is owed in circumstances

in which there is a great probability that harm will result.” Id. Finally, reckless conduct is the

“conscious disregard or indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm to another…” Id.

Plaintiff asserts that Sergeant Kanode knew “full well that Mr. Standifer did not resist in

any way, [and] approved Officer Harmon’s use of force in yet another example of the systemic

rubber stamping that gives rise to significant and traumatic injury to the public.” This conclusory

assertion is insufficient, without more, to suggest malicious purpose, bad faith, wantonness or

recklessness.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 74). Specifically, the Court GRANTS

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s §1983 malicious prosecution claims, Monell claims against the

City of Columbus, and all state-law claims against Sergeant Kanode. The Court DENIES summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s §1983 excessive force claim against Officer Harmon and Plaintiff’s state

law claims against Officer Harmon. Officer Harmon is the only remaining defendant. This case

remains open.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

1/31/2022 s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

DATE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE