applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
How later courts described this case
- applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
ANGELA HARDING,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action 2:21-cv-3572
v. Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley
Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura
US ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Angela Harding, an Ohio resident proceeding without the assistance of counsel,
has submitted a request to file a civil action in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1.) The Court
GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. All judicial officers who render
services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). This
matter is also before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint as required by 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s
Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons that follow,
it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
I.
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to
“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992).
In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are
assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from
filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e), which
provides in pertinent part as follows:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been
paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that--
* * *
(B) the action or appeal--
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte
dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or
upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the
basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule
8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual
demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,
727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).
Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]
pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
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of action,’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on
a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for
the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank , 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, when
considering a pro se plaintiff’s Complaint, a Court “must read [the allegations] with less
stringency . . . and accept the pro se plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible.” Reynosa v. Schultz, 282 F. App’x 386, 389 (6th Cir. 2008)
(citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (internal citation omitted).
II.
Plaintiff’s Complaint lacks clarity and contains numerous “irrational or wholly
incredible” allegations. Plaintiff names as Defendants the United States Attorney’s Office;
Chance Harding, who she identifies as her brother; and Fred Pancake, who she neglects to
further identify. Plaintiff generally alleges that an investigation is ongoing and that as a result,
she feels harassed, her cat has been killed, dogs without owners are “stalking” her neighborhood,
and cameras have been installed—without her permission—in her living room and other rooms
where she gets dressed. (Compl., ECF No. 1-4 at PAGEID # 12.) Plaintiff also alleges that she
has filed for protection orders “against vice and sheriff [department].” (Id.) Finally, she alleges
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that she believes that her brother, Defendant Chance Harding, is working with the investigation,
which prompted him to engage in domestic violence that resulted in her suffering a contusion to
her rib. Although Plaintiff does not identify who is conducting the alleged investigation or what
the investigation is about, she names the U.S. Attorney’s Office as a Defendant and alleges that
she called the U.S. Attorney’s Office to complain about the investigation.
The undersigned concludes that Plaintiff’s Complaint provides insufficient factual
content or context from which the Court could reasonably infer that Defendants violated
Plaintiff’s rights. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set
forth in Rule 8(a). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, the allegations Plaintiff sets forth in
her Complaint are so nonsensical as to render her Complaint frivolous. For these reasons, it is
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
III.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis is GRANTED. (ECF No.
1.) For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS this action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen
(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those
specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with
supporting authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court
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may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made
herein, may receive further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with
instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report
and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision
of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura
CHELSEY M. VASCURA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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