Gawron v. Belmont County, Ohio / Board of Belmont County Commissioners

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

John Gawron, III, Case No. 2:20-cv-5339

Plaintiff, Judge Graham

v.

Magistrate Judge Jolson

Belmont County, Ohio, et al.,

Defendants.

Opinion and Order

Plaintiff John Gawron, III brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deliberate

indifference of serious medical needs while he was held in custody at the Belmont County jail.

Named as defendants are Belmont County, Ohio, the Belmont County Sheriff, John Doe Correction

Officers, and John Doe inmates.

This matter is before the court on the unopposed motion of Belmont County and the

Belmont County Sheriff to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For

the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Allegations

Gawron alleges that he was arrested on October 11, 2018 in Belmont County on state law

charges relating to what the complaint characterizes as pedophilia. The Belmont County Sheriff’s

Office held him custody at the county jail for an unspecified period of months.

Gawron alleges that for the first nine days at the jail he was held in a cell near the intake area

and was not provided with access to a telephone or a shower.

After the first nine days, Gawron was allegedly moved to a holding area where he was

chained for nineteen days to a metal bench. He was given a mat to sit and sleep on while chained to

the metal bench. Gawron alleges that he was denied immediate or reasonable access to a bathroom

and to drinking water. He claims that he was required to wait unreasonable periods of time to use

the bathroom and to receive drinking water.

Gawron alleges that during the nineteen period, the John Doe corrections officers hit,

kicked, threatened, insulted, and spat upon Gawron, whose alleged criminal conduct was the subject

of much media attention in Belmont County. Gawron further alleges that the corrections officers

caused and allowed the John Doe inmates to hit, kick, threaten, insult, and spit upon Gawron, as

well as to steal from him.

According to the complaint, Gawron was moved to a cell after the nineteen day period, but

he was regularly returned and chained to the metal bench in the holding area. While shackled to the

metal bench, he was subjected to the same physical and verbal abuse by corrections officers and

other inmates as he had been during the nineteen period. He was also denied reasonable access to a

bathroom and drinking water during the periods in which he was chained to the metal bench.

Gawron lastly alleges that he requested but was denied medical attention for depression,

anxiety, alcoholism and post-traumatic stress disorder while incarcerated at the Belmont County jail.

The complaint asserts five causes of action: (1) a § 1983 claim against the Belmont County

Sheriff and the John Doe corrections officers for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs;

(2) a § 1983 claim against the County and Sheriff for failure to adequately train corrections officers

and for maintaining a policy or practice approving of unlawful conduct by corrections officers

against inmates; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress against the Sheriff and John Doe

corrections officers; (4) assault and battery against the Sheriff and John Doe inmates; and (5)

conversion against the Sheriff and John Doe inmates.

II. Standard of Review

When considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss a pleading for failure to state a

claim, a court must determine whether the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted

as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A court should construe the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all well-pleaded material allegations

in the complaint as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007);

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56.

Despite this liberal pleading standard, the “tenet that a court must accept as true all of the

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557 (“labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation

of the elements of a cause of action will not do,” nor will “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further

factual enhancements”). The plaintiff must provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief “rather

than a blanket assertion of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3. Thus, “a court

considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are

no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

When the complaint does contain well-pleaded factual allegations, “a court should assume

their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 679. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Id. at 678. Though “[s]pecific facts are not necessary,” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, the factual

allegations must be enough to raise the claimed right to relief above the speculative level and to

create a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the claim. Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678-79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56. This inquiry as to plausibility is “a context-specific task

that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. . . . [W]here

the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,

the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’– ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

III. Discussion

A. Official Capacity Claim against the Sheriff

In the motion to dismiss, the Sheriff argues that the complaint does not plead any facts to

suggest that the claims are being brought against the Sheriff in his individual capacity. Plaintiff, who

is represented by legal counsel, has not responded to the motion. Upon review of the complaint,

the court agrees that the claims are directed against the Sheriff in his official capacity. The

complaint does not allege that the Sheriff was personally involved in the conduct against Gawron.

See Flagg v. City of Detroit, 715 F.3d 165, 174 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Under § 1983, there is no respondeat

superior or vicarious liability. . . . When suing an individual actor . . . for constitutional violations

under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the actor ‘directly participated’ in the alleged

misconduct, at least by encouraging, implicitly authorizing, approving or knowingly acquiescing in

the misconduct, if not carrying it out himself.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The complaint

expressly alleges that it was the John Doe corrections officers who engaged in the alleged deliberate

indifference and the alleged abuse of plaintiff.

The court thus will construe the complaint as asserting only an official capacity claim against

the Sheriff. Such an official capacity claim is treated as a claim against the County. See Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985); Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir. 1996)

(affirming a district court’s dismissal of official capacity claims against school officials “because a suit

against an official of the state is treated as a suit against the municipality”).

B. Claim against the County

The County argues that the complaint fails to state a claim that the Sheriff had a policy of

allowing corrections officers to engage in the alleged constitutional violations. Under Monell v.

Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690–95 (1978), to recover against

Belmont County, plaintiff “must show that his civil rights were violated pursuant to and as a direct

result of the county’s official policy or custom.” Napier v. Madison Cnty., 238 F.3d 739, 743 (6th Cir.

2001).

The County contends that the complaint’s allegations concerning a policy are too formulaic

and conclusory to survive a motion to dismiss. The court disagrees. The complaint alleges that it

was the known practice or custom of officers in the Sheriff’s Office to engage in and allow abuse of

individuals, like Gawron, who were accused of being a pedophile. Specifically, the complaint alleges

that Gawron was placed in an area – the holding area – where corrections officers and inmates could

have access to hit, kick, threaten, insult and spit upon him. Gawron was allegedly subjected to

mistreatment in the holding area for a nineteen period, and, even after he was placed in an individual

cell, he was regularly brought back to the holding area so that corrections officers and inmates could

take physical and verbal action against him.

The court finds that these allegations are sufficient to state a Monell claim. See Napier, 238

F.3d at 743 (plaintiff must show that an unconstitutional custom existed, that the custom was

connected to the County, and that the custom caused his constitutional violation) (citing City of

Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985)).

C. State Law Claims

The complaint asserts claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and

battery, and conversion against the Sheriff. The court finds that the Sheriff and County are entitled

to statutory immunity against these state law claims.

Belmont County is a political subdivision. O.R.C. 2744.01(F). It is immune from liability

against state law claims for injury caused by an employee in connection with a governmental

function. O.R.C. § 2744.02(A)(1). The operation of a county jail is a governmental function.

O.R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(h); Hiles v. Franklin Cnty. Bd. of Commrs., 2005-Ohio-7024, ¶ 34, as amended

nunc pro tunc (Jan. 5, 2006); Buoscio v. McFaul, No. 78758, 2001 WL 898426, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug.

2, 2001).

None of the exceptions to statutory immunity apply to the fact pattern of this case. The

only exception which might potentially apply is O.R.C. § 2744.02(B)(4), which creates an exception

for loss “caused by the negligence of employees [of a political subdivision] and that occurs within or

on the grounds of buildings that are used in connection with the performance of a governmental

function.” However, this exception is not applicable to injuries sustained in “jails, places of juvenile

detention, workhouses, or any other detention facility.” Id.; Buoscio, 2001 WL 898426, at *1.

Accordingly, the County is entitled to statutory immunity with respect to the state law

claims.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the motion of Belmont County and the Belmont County

Sheriff to dismiss (doc. 16) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. It is granted with

respect to plaintiff’s state law claims and denied with respect to plaintiff’s Monell claim under § 1983.

s/ James. L. Graham

JAMES L. GRAHAM

United States District Judge

DATE: June 11, 2021