The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
MIRANDA GUY,
Case No. 1:18-cv-893
Plaintiff,
Bowman, M.J.
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION ROCK HILL
LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND DECISION
This civil action is now before the Court on Defendants Chart-Snyder Benefits
Solutions, Lawrence County Schools and Marsh & McLennon Agency’s LLC’s motions to
dismiss Plaintiff’s COBRA claims asserted against them (Docs. 122, 125, 126) and the
parties’ responsive memoranda. (Docs. 132, 134, 136, 139, 140). The motions will be
addressed in turn.1 The parties have consented to disposition of this matter by the
magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 636(c). (Doc. 21).
I. Background and Facts
Plaintiff’s second amended complaint alleges that [“f]ollowing her effective
termination by Defendant Board, no notice was ever sent to Plaintiff of her eligibility for
COBRA benefits, with the result that she ceased to have vision and dental insurance
available to her and her family.” (Doc. 86, ¶ 19). Plaintiff further alleges that “Chard-
Snyder Benefits Solution, acting as service provider for Rock Hill Local School District
1 Defendants Lawrence County Schools and Chard‐Snyder Benefits Solutions filed each filed motions to dismiss.
(See Docs. 122, 125). Defendant Marsh & McClennan then filed a motion to dismiss adopting and incorporating
the arguments raised by Chart‐ Snyder and Lawrence County Schools. (Doc. 126 ).
through Lawrence County Schools, Lawrence County Schools identified as Plan
Administrator on the COBRA notice provided to Plaintiff, and Marsh McLellan Agency
LLC, the unidentified Plan Administrator, were responsible for forwarding any COBRA
information to Plaintiff and failed in their duty to do so. Id. at ¶.53
As for relief sought, Plaintiff alleges that “as a direct and proximate result of
Defendants’ failure to comply with the aforesaid requirements, Plaintiff has suffered
damages and asks this court to impose sanctions under COBRA up to and including fines
of up to $100 per day, attorney fees and such other relief to which she may be entitled by
law and equity. (Doc. 86, ¶ 53).
II. Standard of Review
In determining a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court
accepts all well-pled facts as true to determine whether the complaint states a plausible
claim for relief. Aschcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). But “[a] pleading that offers
‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other
words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Boxill v. O’Grady, 935 F.3d 510, 517 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Jackson v. Ford Motor Co., 842 F.3d 902, 906 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Cagayat v. United Collection Bureau, Inc., 925 F.3d 749, 753 (6th
Cir. 2020) (quoting Cates v. Crystal Clear Techs., LLC, 874 F.3d 530, 534 (6th Cir. 2017)).
“Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate if the facts alleged fail to state a claim under
which relief can be granted.” Nikolao v. Lyon, 875 F.3d 310, 317 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)
III. Analysis
A. Chard-Snyder
At the outset, Defendants each contend that because Plaintiff’s employer is a
public entity, the Public Health Services Act (“PHSA”) and its COBRA-related provisions
(as opposed to ERISA) govern continuation coverage notice obligations. See Watson v.
Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 409 F.Supp.2d 892, 895 (N.D. Ohio July 16, 2005) (“Watson
II”) (“Because Cleveland Schools is a public employer, this dispute is governed by the
Public Health Services Act (“PHSA”), as amended by the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (“COBRA”)). Notably, the PHSA imposes separate coverage notice
obligations on group health plans, employers, and plan administrators. See 42 U.S.C. §
300bb-6. Notably, the PHSA’s notification requirements, however, apply only to group
health plans, employers, and plan administrators. See 42 U.S.C. § 300bb-6.
In this regard, Defendant Chard Snyder argues first that the second amended
complaint expressly recognizes Chard Snyder as the plan’s service provider, not the plan
administrator. As detailed above, the PHSA’s notification requirements, however, apply
only to group health plans, employers, and plan administrators – not to plan service
providers like Chard Snyder. See 42 U.S.C. § 300bb-6. As such, service providers have
no obligation to provide notice of any kind – concerning continuation coverage or
otherwise – to employees under the PHSA. See 42 U.S.C. § 300bb-6. See Watson v.
Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., No. 1:04 CV 1825, 2005 WL 1123521, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Apr.
11, 2005) (“Watson I”) (finding dismissal “warranted because plaintiff does not allege that
Ceridian is either the plan sponsor or the plan administrator,” rejecting the plaintiff’s
argument that Ceridian was an “agent or instrumentality” of her employer, the plan
sponsor. Accordingly, as a service provider, the undersigned agrees that Chard Snyder
is not a proper defendant.
Chard Snyder further argues that Plaintiff’s claim against it separately fails
because the PHSA does not authorize the relief she seeks, namely: fines, attorney’s fees,
and other compensatory damages. Under the PHSA, “[i]f notice [of a qualifying event] is
not properly provided, an individual may bring an action for ‘appropriate equitable relief.’”
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §300bb-7). “Appropriate equitable relief” under the PHSA “is to be
narrowly construed[.]” Watson II, 409 F.Supp.2d at 895 (quoting Thomas v. Town of
Hammonton, 351 F.3d 108, n.5 (3d Cir. 2003)). Such relief does not include fines or
attorney’s fees. Brett v. Jefferson Cnty., 123 F.3d 1429, 1435 (11th Cir. 1997); see also
Mansfield v. Chicago Park Dist. Grp. Plan, 946 F.Supp. 586, 595 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
Similarly, the PHSA does not authorize the recovery of compensatory monetary
damages, and claims seeking such damages under the PHSA are subject to dismissal as
a matter of law. Loizon v. Evans, No. 18 C 2759, 2020 WL 5253852, at *12-14 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 3, 2020)(granting motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because requests for
monetary compensation are “barred by the PHSA”); Lyons v. Bd. of Regents, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 310, *5-8 (E.D. Wisc. Jan. 5, 2015) (granting motion for judgment on the
pleadings because plaintiff’s claim for monetary compensation is “not cognizable under
42 U.S.C. § 300bb-7”).
Accordingly, Chard Snyder argues that Plaintiff’s claim seeks relief to which she is
plainly not entitled under the PHSA, namely, “fines of up to $100 per day” and “attorney’s
fees[.]” (Doc. 86 ¶ 53). Chard Snyder further argues that although Plaintiff also requests
“such other relief to which she may be entitled by law and equity,” Plaintiff fails to
specifically identify the relief sought or allege any specific damages suffered to support
her entitlement to “such other relief.”
Notably, the Second Amended Complaint alleges that “Plaintiff suffered damages”
but fails to specifically identify any damages suffered. While Plaintiff may have given
deposition testimony regarding her alleged damages (e.g., her unreimbursed medical
expenses), the Second Amended Complaint includes no allegations concerning those
damages. Chard Snyder submits that this alone warrants dismissal of her Sixth Claim.
Nonetheless, even if Plaintiff had more specifically alleged these damages, they are not
recoverable under the PHSA for the reasons stated above.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim against Chard Snyder fails to state a claim and is
therefore properly dismissed under Fed. R.Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
B. Lawrence County Schools
Lawrence County also asserts that Plaintiff has not properly alleged a COBRA
violation. In this regard, Lawrence County argues first that Plaintiff’s barebone allegations
are not sufficient to state a claim. Furthermore, even accepting the factual allegations as
true, Lawrence County asserts that Plaintiff has not alleged a failure in notification.
Namely, Lawrence County contends that the allegations in Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint establish the opposite—Plaintiff received a COBRA notice.
Paragraph nineteen of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint alleges “[f]ollowing her
effective termination by Defendant Board, no notice was ever sent to Plaintiff of her
eligibility for COBRA benefits…]” In this regard, Plaintiff’s Sixth Claim alleges,
“Defendants failed to provide notices to Plaintiff of continuation of coverage to which she
was entitled by law, and have failed to continue to provide vision and dental insurance to
Plaintiff. (Doc. 86 , ¶ 52). Yet, in this very same paragraph Plaintiff indicates that she did
in fact receive a COBRA notice. Paragraph 52 states “Chard-Snyder Benefits Solution
acting as service provider for Rock Hill Local School District through Lawrence County
Schools, Lawrence County Schools identified as Plan Administrator on the COBRA notice
provided to Plaintiff...” Id. Thus, by Plaintiff’s own admission she received her COBRA
notice. As a result, Lawrence County contends that Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim
against Lawrence County Schools for a failure to receive notice of COBRA benefits when
she admittedly received her COBRA notice as she states in her Second Amended
Complaint.
In response to Defendants motion to dismiss, Plaintiff alleges for the first time that
she did not timely receive a notice. However, Plaintiff made no such claim in her Second
Amended Complaint nor did she allege any facts to support such an allegation. It is well
recognized that when ruling on a Motion to Dismiss, a court should look no further than
the four corners of the complaint. Kostrzewa v. City of Troy, 247 F.3d 633, 643 (6th Cir.
2001) Weiner v. Klais and Co., Inc. 108 F. 3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). It
is the court’s duty to determine whether Defendant will prevail on their motion to dismiss
based solely upon the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Associated Gen.
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S.
Ct. 897, 74 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1983); Lee v. W. Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Ctr., 747
F.2d 1062, 1065 (6th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff may not amend her complaint by submitting
additional allegations in response to a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Roulhac v. Southwest
Reg'l Transit Auth., No. 1:07cv408, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25415, 2008 WL 920354, at
*4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2008).
In any event, assuming arguendo that Plaintiff’ second amended complaint meets
the minimum pleading requirements, Defendant Lawrence County Schools argues that
Plaintiff requests relief which is not authorized by law. As noted above, the PHSA
authorizes only “appropriate equitable relief” for failure to provide a timely notification of
the right to elect continuation coverage. 42 U.S.C. § 300bb-7. “Appropriate equitable
relief” under the PHSA “is to be narrowly construed[.]”Watson II, 409 F.Supp.2d at 895
(quoting Thomas, 351 F.3d at 108, n.5).
Such relief does not include fines or attorney’s fees. Brett v. Jefferson Cnty.,
123F.3d 1429, 1435 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Mansfield v. Chicago Park Dist. Grp. Plan,
946F.Supp. 586, 595 (N.D. Ill. 1996). Nor does such relief include compensatory
monetary damages. See, e.g., Loizon v. Evans, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161382, *12-14
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2020) (granting motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because
requests for monetary compensation are “barred by the PHSA”); Lyons v. Bd. of Regents,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 310, *5-8 (E.D. Wisc. Jan. 5, 2015) (granting motion for judgment
on the pleadings because plaintiff’s claim for monetary compensation is “not cognizable
under 42 U.S.C. § 300bb-7”).
Plaintiff argues she is entitled to restitution in the form of unreimbursed medical
expenses. (Doc. 131 Page Id # 1643) “Appropriate equitable relief” is narrowly construed
within the PHSA. Watson v. Cleveland Mun. School Dist., 409 F.Supp.2d 892, 897 (N.D.
Ohio 2005). Such relief is limited to those remedies traditionally available at equity such
as injunction, mandamus, and equitable restitution. Id. citing Thomas v. Town of
Hammonton, 351 F.3d 108, n.5 (3rd Cir. 2003). Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff’s Sixth
Claim of her Second Amended Complaint seeks non-equitable damages, such requests
are improper and must be dismissed.
Plaintiff’s argument that she is entitled to restitution in the form of unreimbursed
medical expenses is unavailing. Notably, in making her argument Plaintiff relies on facts
outside the four corners of her Complaint. As detailed above, Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint includes no allegations concerning her alleged damages.
More importantly, even if considered by the Court, Plaintiff’s alleged damages as
stated in her Memorandum Contra, unreimbursed medical expenses, are not recoverable
under the PHSA as they are legal, not equitable. See Loizon, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
161382 at *12-13 (dismissing PHSA claim seeking “damages in the amount of extra
medical expenses and the increase in premiums that [plaintiff] incurred post-termination”).
The undersigned recognizes that Plaintiff also requests “such other relief to which she
may be entitled by law and equity” but she fails to identify the relief sought or allege any
specific damages suffered to support such a claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim against
Lawrence County Schools fails to state a claim for relief and is properly dismissed under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6).
C. Marsh & McLennan (Doc. 126)
Defendant Marsh & McLennan Agency LLC (“MMA”), also seeks dismissal of
Plaintiff’s claims. In this regard, MMA adopts and incorporates by reference the separate
Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendant Chard Snyder and Defendant Lawrence County
For the reasons set forth in those Motions to Dismiss, MMA argues that it is also entitled
to have the claims dismissed against it with prejudice. The undersigned agrees.
Accordingly, for the reasons outlined above, Plaintiff’s claims against MMA also
fail to state a claim for relief and are properly dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6).
III. Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims asserted
against them in the second amended complaint (Docs. 122, 125, 126) are GRANTED
and Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Chard-Synder, Lawrence County Schools and
MMA are herein DISMISSED.
/s Stephanie K. Bowman
Stephanie K. Bowman
United States Magistrate Judge