Worthington City School District Board of Education v. Moore

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

WORTHINGTON CITY SCHOOL :

DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, :

: Case No. 2:20-CV-3155

Plaintiff, :

: Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley

v. :

: Magistrate Judge Jolson

LANCE AND SUSAN MOORE, :

in their individual capacities and as :

parents and guardians of C.M., a minor, :

:

Defendants. :

OPINION & ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Worthington City School District Board of

Education’s Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief. (ECF No. 2). For the reasons set forth

below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendants Lance and Susan Moore are the parents of C.M., a minor child, who all reside

within the bounds of the Worthington City School District (“the District”). (ECF No. 2 at 4). C.M.

is autistic and has been identified as a student with a disability pursuant to the Individuals with

Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). (Id.). Plaintiff, the Worthington City School District Board

of Education (“the Board”), alleges C.M. was being educated by the District until 2014, when

Defendants brought their first due process complaint to the Ohio Department of Education

(“ODE”) alleging the District’s individualized education program (“IEP”) was failing to provide

C.M. with free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) pursuant to IDEA. (Id.). As a result of the

complaint, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, in which the District agreed to cover

the expense of sending C.M. to Bridgeway Academy. (Id.). At the end of the 2018 school year, the

District declined to extend the term of the settlement agreement because it believed it could fulfill

its obligations to provide C.M. with FAPE. (Id. at 5). Defendants brought a second due process

complaint in June of 2018, and C.M. returned to the Worthington City School District while the

complaint was ongoing. (Id.). Defendants filed an amended complaint in January of 2019, alleging

C.M. was still not receiving FAPE at the Worthington City School District. (Id.).

On June 26, 2019, the parties entered into another settlement agreement (“the Agreement”),

which is at issue in this case. (ECF No. 1 Ex. 3). The Agreement provided for, among other things,

C.M.’s placement at Bridgeway Academy at the District’s Expense. (Id.). In turn, Defendants

agreed to release and discharge the District from “any and all claims, demands, actions, causes of

action or suits at law or in equity of whatsoever kind and nature, which [Defendants] and/or C[.M.]

may have had, now have, or may now or hereafter assert against the Board and its Agents for the

entire period prior to this Agreement, and during the term of this Agreement, with respect to C[.M.]

and his education including but not limited to claims regarding the provision of FAPE …” (Id. at

¶ 17). The Agreement defined the term as “the beginning of the summer of 2019 to the end of the

summer of 2024.” (ECF No. 1 Ex. 3).

On February 19, 2020, Bridgeway Academy discharged C.M. from its school. (ECF No. 2

at 6). Defendants then filed another due process claim on March 5, 2020 with the ODE, alleging

the District has denied C.M. FAPE by refusing to provide any programming since February 19,

2020. (ECF No. 1 Ex. 4). In their request for a due process hearing, Defendants allege any waiver

“is for past claims and any services delivered by the agreed-upon service provider.” (Id. ¶ 19).

Because Bridgeway Academy “is a third party not bound by this Agreement” and “is no longer

willing to provide services, the District cannot legally absolve itself of its FAPE responsibility and

hide behind a now unenforceable defunct agreement.” (Id.). Defendants alleged C.M.’s current

IEP fails to provide FAPE, that Bridgeway Academy was the only viable alternative, and that the

District is now refusing to pay for any placement that exceeds the costs of Bridgeway. (Id. at ¶¶

14-16). The Parties disagree as to the Board’s level of commitment to settle the issue and provide

education to C.M. The Board claims the District informed Defendants it would be willing to amend

the Agreement with a different placement so long as its financial obligations did not increase. (ECF

No. 2 at 6). It claims it identified three programs that educate children with autism in Central Ohio

that it would pay for, though it does not allege C.M. has been accepted into any of those schools.

(ECF No. 7 at 1-2). Defendants, however, contend that the Board denied any obligation to provide

FAPE to C.M. pursuant to the Settlement Agreement after he was expelled from Bridgeway. (ECF

No. 6 at 3). As a result of the request for a due process hearing, the impartial hearing officer

(“IHO”) issued an opinion on May 15, 2020 scheduling a due process hearing beginning on July

16 and stating that she did not have the authority to issue a decision on any alleged breach of

contract claims relating to the Agreement. (ECF No. 1 Ex. 5).

The Board now brings claims under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(F) for enforcement of the

IDEA settlement and for breach of contract against Defendants, in their individual capacities and

as parents and guardians of C.M. (ECF No. 1). The Board brought this motion for a temporary

restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief seeking an order: “(i) ordering Defendants to

dismiss, without prejudice, their Due Process Complaint, Case Number SE 3856-2020; (ii) barring

Defendants from accruing additional legal costs in pursuit of Defendants’ Due Process Complaint,

Case Number SE 3856-2020; (iii) barring Defendants from filing additional administrative

complaints against the District related to C.M.’s education; and (iv) any additional equitable relief

deemed fair and just by this Court.” (ECF No. 2 at 15). This Court held a Rule 65.1 conference on

June 25, 2020 and orally denied the Board’s Motion for a TRO, finding no immediacy or

irreparability of harm. The Board is proceeding with its Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

Defendants filed their Response in Opposition on July 2, 2020 and the Board filed its Reply on

July 7. (ECF Nos. 6, 7). This Court held a preliminary injunction hearing on July 14, 2020.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Hunt v.

Mohr, No. 2:11-CV-00653, 2012 WL 368060, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 2012) (quoting Winter v.

Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008)).

Preliminary injunctive relief “should be granted only if the movant carries his or her burden of

proving that the circumstances clearly demand it.” Jones v. Caruso, 569 F.3d 258, 265 (6th Cir.

2009) (internal quotations omitted). The “purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve

the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Univ. of Tex. v.

Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395, (1981). In light of its “limited purpose,” a preliminary injunction

is “customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less

complete than in a trial on the merits.” Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v.

Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 542 (6th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, a party need not prove their case in

full at a preliminary injunction hearing. Id. But see Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 739 (6th

Cir. 2000) (noting that the “proof required for the plaintiff to obtain a preliminary injunction is

much more stringent than the proof required to survive a summary judgment motion”).

When considering a motion for preliminary injunction, the Court balances four factors:

“(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant

would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether issuance of the injunction would

cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by the

issuance of the injunction.” Cremeans v. Taczak, No. 2:19-CV-2703, 2019 WL 5420256, at *2–3

(S.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2019) (citing Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580, 590–

91 (6th Cir. 2012). These four considerations are “factors to be balanced, not prerequisites that

must be met.” Certified Restoration, 511 F.3d at 542. Whether the combination of the factors

weighs in favor of issuing injunctive relief in a particular case is left to the discretion of the district

court. See Leary, 228 F.3d at 739.

III. ANALYSIS

This Court previously held in its TRO Order that Plaintiff had not met the requirements for

a temporary restraining order based on irreparability and immediacy of harm. (ECF No. 8). The

Court went on to consider the remaining preliminary injunction factors, and though not dispositive,

found they also weighed against injunctive relief. (Id.). Plaintiff has not made substantively

different arguments in its Reply or at the preliminary injunction hearing than it did in its original

Motion, and for that reason and the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes Plaintiff has not

met its burden to obtain a preliminary injunction.

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The Board argues it will likely prevail in its enforcement of the Agreement under IDEA

because of Defendants’ breach of the waiver provisions of the contract. (ECF No. 2 at 8). The

Court analyzes the Board’s claim under 20 U.S.C. §1415(e)(2)(F) and its state law breach of

contract claim together, since both pertain to Defendants’ alleged breach of the Settlement

Agreement. The Court finds Plaintiff’s arguments misconstrue the terms of the Agreement and

ignore the likely invalidity or impossibility of the Agreement.

This Court has held, “a settlement agreement is a contract, and as such, is enforceable under

contract law principles.” Echols v. Williams, 267 F.Supp.2d 865, 867 (S.D. Ohio 2003). In order

to make out a claim for breach of contract, plaintiff must show: “(1) the existence of a contract,

(2) performance by the plaintiff, (3) breach by the defendant, and (4) damages or loss resulting

from the breach.” Claris, Ltd. v. Hotel Dev. Servs., LLC, 104 N.E.3d 1076, 1083 (Ohio Ct. App.

2018) (citing Lucarell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 97 N.E.3d 458, 469 (Ohio 2018)). Defendants

assert they did not breach the terms of the Agreement’s waiver and, alternatively, that the contract

is rendered either null and void or impossible to perform because Bridgeway will no longer serve

C.M. (ECF No. 6).

1. Alleged breach of paragraph 17

This Court finds the Board has not demonstrated it is likely to succeed on the merits of

breach of contract claims. The Board first argues that Defendants breached paragraph 17 of the

Agreement, the waiver clause. (ECF No. 2 at 10).1 “Contract provisions which are unambiguous

must be construed according to their plain, express terms.” Textron Fin. Corp. v. Nationwide Mut.

Ins. Co., 684 N.E.2d 1261, 1268 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). The Board has not shown a likelihood of

success on the merits that Defendants breached the express terms of paragraph 17 when they filed

the March 2020 ODE complaint. Plaintiff argues Defendants breached the Agreement because

they agreed to not do any of the following until the end of the summer of 2024: (1) bring a cause

of action of any kind against the Board; (2) file a claim related to C.M.’s education or the

provisions of FAPE; (3) file an action requesting the provision of compensatory education; (4)

assert claims against the District regarding C.M.’s receipt of special education. (ECF No. 2 at 10-

11). The Board also claims Defendants (5) agreed their discharge included IDEA claims; and (6)

1 Paragraph 17 states in relevant part: “In consideration of the promises and commitments of the Board, Parents, on

their own and on behalf of C[.M.], forever release and discharge the Board… from any and all claims, demands,

actions, causes of action or suits at law or in equity of whatsoever kind and nature, which Parents and/or C[.M.] may

have had, now have, or may now or hereafter assert against the Board and its Agents for the entire period prior to

this Agreement, and during the term of this Agreement, with respect to C[.M.] and his education including but not

limited to claims regarding the provision of FAPE …Parents reserve the right to bring any claim, demand, due

process complaint, ODE complaint, or other action alleging that any IEP developed after the 2019-2020 IEP is not

reasonably calculated to provide FAPE… This discharge of any liability includes… any and all claims arising out of

Student’s placement at Bridgeway Academy.” (ECF No. 1 Ex. 3 at ¶ 17).

agreed their discharge included all claims arising out of C.M.’s placement at Bridgeway Academy.

(Id. at 11).

The Board’s arguments ignore the language of the contract that limits the waiver to claims

related to “services provided pursuant to this Agreement.” (ECF No. 1 Ex. 3 at ¶ 17) (emphasis

added). Defendants did not file any due process complaints against the District during the period

C.M. was being educated at Bridgeway Academy. Their claims against the Board do not “arise out

of” C.M.’s placement at Bridgeway. Rather, Defendants explicitly limit their claim to the Board’s

failure to provide C.M. with FAPE from February 19, 2020 onward—the time period beginning

after he was discharged from Bridgeway. (ECF No. 1 Ex. 4 at 3).

At the preliminary injunction hearing the Board continued to focus on the application of

the waiver “during the Term of this Agreement,” which it reads exclusively to mean through 2024.

(ECF No. 1 Ex. 3 at ¶ 17). The “Term of the Agreement” does indeed contemplate the Agreement

will remain in effect through 2024 because that is when C.M. was anticipated to graduate. But the

Agreement further defines the “Term” as “regarding placement and services” provided. (ECF No.

1 Ex. 3). The Agreement specifies Bridgeway Academy as the placement to provide such services,

and contemplates C.M. would remain there through 2024. (ECF No. 1 Ex. 3 at ¶ 6). The Board’s

attempt to construe the Agreement and waiver as enforceable through 2024 absent all other

conditions ignores the surrounding provisions and context of the contract. Read together as an

integrated whole, the “Term” contemplates the provision of educational services, which the parties

designated Bridgeway to provide.

Further, the Board’s argument ignores the remaining language of paragraph 17, which

reserves Defendants’ “right to bring any claim, demand, due process complaint, ODE complaint,

or other action alleging that any IEP developed after the 2019-2020 IEP is not reasonably

calculated to provide FAPE.” (ECF No. 1 Ex. 3 at ¶ 17). Paragraph 17 establishes C.M.’s parents’

right to bring claims related to new IEPs developed after the 2019-2020 school year. (Id.). The

Board argues in its Reply that Defendants’ claims relate to the 2019-2020 IEP and that there was

no other IEP developed. (ECF No. 7 at 4). But C.M.’s 2019-2020 IEP designated his placement at

Bridgeway Academy. (ECF No. 1 Ex. 3 at ¶ 6). When C.M. was discharged from Bridgeway

Academy in February 2020, the 2019-2020 IEP was no longer enforceable. Bridgeway was no

longer providing C.M. an education and thus, C.M. was in need of a new IEP. Because Defendants’

claims can logically be construed as relating to the District’s failure to create a new IEP and

provide FAPE after C.M.’s discharge, and not arising out of the original 2019-2020 IEP, the Board

has failed to demonstrate it is likely to succeed on the merits of its claim that Defendants’ breached

paragraph 17. The explicit exception in paragraph 17 reserves the parents’ right to bring claims

related to a new IEP (or lack thereof) after the old IEP became unenforceable.

2. Alleged breach of paragraph 9

The Board also argues Defendants breached paragraph 9, which states “neither

[Defendants] nor [C.M.] shall have the right to seek compensatory education or any other relief

from District as a result of any real or perceived failures, injuries or damages caused by Bridgeway

Academy or its employees.” (ECF No. 1 Ex. 3 at ¶ 9). The Agreement makes clear the District is

not responsible for the quality of the education C.M. received at Bridgeway “[s]ince Bridgeway

Academy is the education placement at the election of the Parents.” (Id.).

The Court concludes the Board has not shown a likelihood of success on this interpretation

of the Agreement. Defendants’ due process complaint does not relate to any real or perceived

failures by Bridgeway. In its Reply and at the preliminary injunction hearing, the Board persisted

in its argument that Bridgeway’s discharge of C.M. constitutes a “failure” by Bridgeway under

paragraph 9, and Defendants are therefore barred from bringing any claims related to it. (ECF No.

7 at 4). The Court finds the Board has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of this

argument based on the plain language of paragraph 9 and the language of Defendants’ due process

complaint. Their due process claim is not about C.M.’s discharge, but about the Board’s alleged

“failure to provide FAPE since February 19, 2020 following the discharge.” (ECF No. 6 at 5)

(emphasis added). Defendants are not bringing a claim against the District for failure to provide

FAPE at Bridgeway. Rather, Defendants’ claim pertains to the District’s “refusal to provide any

services since C.M. was discharged from Bridgeway.” (ECF No. 1 Ex. 4 at 5).

3. Impossibility of performance

While the Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on its

claims that Defendants breached the express terms of the waiver provisions, the Court further

concludes that, even if Plaintiff could show breach, it has not shown a likelihood of success on the

merits of defeating Defendants’ asserted defense.

Defendants argue C.M.’s discharge from Bridgeway makes the Agreement impossible to

perform, and therefore renders it null and void. (ECF No. 6 at 6-7). Impossibility of performance

is an affirmative defense to breach of contract claims under Ohio law, and can be asserted where

“an unforeseen event arises rendering impossible the performance of one of the contracting

parties.” Stuckey v. Online Res. Corp., 909 F. Supp. 2d 912, 931-32 (S.D. Ohio 2012).

The Agreement clearly contemplated that C.M. would remain at Bridgeway Academy for

the duration of the Agreement (until the end of the summer of 2024). (ECF No. 1 Ex. 3 at ¶ 6).

The Agreement provides: “[t]he parties further agree that for the Agreement Period, the separate

facility that will provide educational services to the Student will be Bridgeway Academy”. (Id.).

Which party has the obligation to “perform” this term is not made explicit by the terms of the

Agreement. As the entity legally responsible for providing C.M. education, this obligation is likely

the Board’s, not Defendants’. But in either case, no party to the contract could perform this

provision—C.M. could not be placed at Bridgeway Academy through 2024 because he was

discharged in February 2020.

The Board argues the Agreement is not null and void and that contract principles permit

the District to provide a comparable educational placement without voiding the Agreement. (ECF

No. 7 at 4-5). This Court need not reach the question at this stage as to whether Bridgeway’s

discharge of C.M. rendered the Agreement null and void. Even if the District could still

substantially perform the Agreement by providing C.M. a comparable educational placement, the

Board has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of the claim that it has actually done so.

When placement at the old facility becomes impossible, the District maintains an obligation to

“provide educational services that approximate the student's old [Individualized Education

Program] as closely as possible.” Tindell v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., No.

309CV00159SEBWGH, 2010 WL 557058, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 10, 2010) (quoting John M. v.

Board of Educ. of Evanston Tp. High School Dist. 202, 502 F.3d 708, 714-15 (7th Cir.2007)).

Defendants dispute in the first instance the Board’s claims that it offered alternative

comparable educational placements to C.M. prior to July 2020. Defendants further maintained at

the preliminary injunction hearing that C.M.’s educational needs changed since the Agreement

was executed, which constituted an unforeseen change in circumstances, such that his educational

needs and placement options need to be reassessed. On any version of these facts, the Court finds

the Board has not met its burden because it has not shown evidence that any placements have

actually accepted C.M., that they would be able to accommodate his educational needs, or that the

District is currently educating CM in any way.

Finally, the Board argues Defendants cannot avail themselves of the impossibility defense

because the impossibility is a result of Defendants’ own actions. (ECF No. 7 at 5-6). See Truetried

Serv. Co. v. Hager, 118 Ohio App. 3d 78, 87 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (defense available “where

performance has been rendered impossible without [defendant’s] fault and when the difficulties

could not have reasonably been foreseen”). The Board argues Defendants should have entered into

a separate agreement with Bridgeway to guarantee C.M.’s placement through 2024. (ECF No. 7 at

5-6). This argument is unavailing. There is no language in Agreement making the settlement

contingent on Defendants’ execution of a separate agreement with Bridgeway or imposing that

responsibility on Defendants. The Board provides no evidence or argument that the Settlement

Agreement was predicated on such a contract. They merely present the hypothetical argument that

such an agreement would have prevented C.M.’s discharge and that Defendants’ failure to do so

made the impossibility “their making.” (ECF No. 7 at 5-6). The Court is not persuaded by this

argument. As the entity tasked with providing FAPE and one that regularly enters into such

settlement agreements with parents, the District may desire to draft contracts that contemplate such

changes in circumstances. But it is not the Court’s job to decide what would have made for better

contract terms as a matter of policy. The Court finds, as a matter of law, that the Board has not

adequately established that Defendants bore the responsibility to foresee the need for a separate

contract with Bridgeway, and thus have not shown Defendants are at fault for the impossibility.

B. Irreparability of Harm

The second factor the Court must consider is the irreparability of harm that Plaintiff would

face absent injunctive relief. The Court addressed this factor in its Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion

for a Temporary Restraining Order. (See ECF No. 8). Finding the Board has not put forth any more

evidence about the irreparability of harm, the Court likewise finds they have failed to prove this

factor at the preliminary injunction stage.

The Board raised two alleged harms in its Motion stemming from Defendant’s

administrative request for a due process hearing: (1) the Board will have to expend resources to

defend the due process complaint; (2) the IHO could render a decision on Defendants’

administrative complaint before this Court rules on the merits. (ECF No. 2 at 13). In its Reply, the

Board reframed its arguments on irreparable harm, claiming (1) they will not receive the benefit

of the Agreement absent an injunction while Defendants have already received their benefit; and

(2) they could receive a “contrary” ruling from the IHO without being able to rely on the

Agreement as a defense. (ECF No. 7 at 6-7).

As this Court previously held, Plaintiff “failed to meet its burden of demonstrating

irreparability of harm because expending resources on legal fees as a matter of law does not

constitute irreparable harm.” (ECF No. 8 at 5). Harm generally is not irreparable if it is fully

compensable by money damages and the prospect of expending resources to defend an action does

not amount to irreparable harm just because the Board believes that action lacks merit. See

Basicomputer Corp. v. Scott, 973 F.2d 507, 511 (6th Cir. 1992). The Board argues monetary

damages alone may be irreparable if they are unlikely to be recovered. (ECF No. 7 at 8). However,

even the supporting case law Plaintiff cites for this proposition requires the harm be “certain and

great.” Clarke v. Office of Fed. Hous. Enter. Oversight, 355 F. Supp. 2d 56, 65 (D.D.C. 2004). The

Board has not demonstrated its expenses are certain, great, or unlikely to be recovered if they

prevail. Defendants correctly assert that, even in the event of a monetary judgment against

Defendants, the Board would continue to have a legal remedy and could collect a judgment in

other ways, like through garnishment. The Board’s damages are speculative at best. Moreover, as

Defendants correctly argue, any “burden” on Plaintiff to expend resources pursuant to the

requirements of IDEA is one imposed by Congress. (ECF No. 6 at 9) (citing Florence County

School District Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993) (“Congress has imposed a significant

financial burden on the States and school districts that participate in IDEA”)). Such a financial

burden on the District that it incurs as a result of its routine legal obligations is not an irreparable

harm.

Likewise, the threat of an adverse outcome from the results of a due process decision would

only impose a financial burden on the Plaintiff, potentially in the form of requiring the District to

provide more services to C.M., subsidize an alternative educational placement, or pay Defendants’

attorneys’ fees. The Board has failed to demonstrate how speculative financial obligations

resulting from a potential IHO determination are irreparable. The Board’s argument that it will not

receive the benefits of the Agreement absent an injunction while Defendants have already received

their benefit is also unpersuasive. Both parties received the agreed-upon benefits until C.M. was

discharged from Bridgeway—C.M. received the benefit of education at his placement of choice

and the District received the benefit of Defendants’ waiver. Defendants did not bring any claims

against the District while C.M. was placed at Bridgeway. Now Defendants and C.M. are not

receiving any benefits from the District whatsoever. C.M. is not at Bridgeway or a comparable

alternative placement. There is no evidence the District has paid for or provided any education to

C.M. since February 2020. Thus, Plaintiff’s situation bears no resemblances to those cases in

which one party to a contract would be unjustly enriched absent an injunction.

C. Harm to Others

The Court also considers the potential harm to others by granting injunctive relief. See

United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1099 v. Southwest Ohio Regional Transit

Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 363 (6th Cir.1998). The Board “is required to show through clear and

convincing evidence that granting a preliminary injunction would not harm third parties.”

Youngstown City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 104 N.E.3d 1060 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018). The

Court finds the Board has not met this burden.

The Board attempts to argue a preliminary injunction will have no negative effects on

Defendants or C.M. because they entered the Agreement willingly and the Board has offered to

provide comparable educational placements for C.M. (ECF No. 2 at 13). As this Court held in its

TRO Order, “[t]his argument is unpersuasive, and presupposes the merits of Defendants’ due

process complaint, in which they allege Bridgeway Academy was the only acceptable alternative

placement for C.M. and it is no longer willing to provide services. Any potential liability or

financial harm to the District does not amount to irreparable harm and does not outweigh the

potential harm to C.M. in barring his ability to enforce his federal rights through the administrative

complaint process.” (ECF No. 8 at 10). As Defendants argue, the harm to C.M.—a child with a

disability who is currently deprived of educational services—is not compensable by monetary

damages. (ECF No. 6 at 11). While the harm to the Plaintiff is speculative and merely financial in

nature, the potential harm to the C.M. and his ability to access education is great.

D. Public Interest and Balance of Factors

The final factor, the public interest, also weighs in favor of denying Plaintiff’s motion for

a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff argues the public interest favors enforcement of settlement

agreements, while Defendants argue an injunction would be contrary to the purpose of IDEA.

(ECF No. 7 at 9; ECF No. 6 at 13).

As this Court explained above, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on

the merits of its claims that Defendants have breached the contract or that the contract is still

enforceable. Furthermore, as the Court held in its TRO Order, “the public has a strong interest in

ensuring students with disabilities have access to education and the ability to enforce their rights.”

(ECF No. 8 at 10). IDEA represents the “congressional purpose of providing access to a free and

appropriate education.” Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). The

terms of the Agreement intended to satisfy FAPE were predicated on C.M.’s placement at

Bridgeway. C.M. has been discharged and is no longer receiving an education at Bridgeway, or

anywhere else. An injunction barring Defendants from filing a due process complaint against the

District leaves C.M. without a remedy to enforce this right.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion for preliminary

injunctive relief. (ECF No. 2).

IT IS SO ORDERED. ee, pile

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATE: July 15, 2020

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