Opinion

Brown v. Warden, London Correctional Institute

Court
District Court, S.D. Ohio
Filed
Mar 23, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 28.2%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

LARRY E. BROWN, II,

Petitioner, : Case No. 3:20-cv-113

- vs - District Judge Douglas R. Cole

Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz

NORMAN ROBINSON, Warden,

London Correctional Institution,

:

Respondent.

ORDER TO FILE PETITION

This case is before the Court on Petitioner’s Motion to Stay habeas corpus proceedings

pending exhaustion of his state court remedies (ECF No. 1). In the Motion he represents that he

is simultaneously filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, but he has not actually done so.

District courts have authority to grant stays in habeas corpus cases to permit exhaustion of

state court remedies in consideration of the AEDPA’s preference for state court initial resolution

of claims. However, in recognizing that authority, the Supreme Court held:

[S]tay and abeyance should be available only in limited

circumstances. Because granting a stay effectively excuses a

petitioner's failure to present his claims first to the state courts, stay

and abeyance is only appropriate when the district court determines

there was good cause for the petitioner's failure to exhaust his claims

first in state court. Moreover, even if a petitioner had good cause for

that failure, the district court would abuse its discretion if it were to

grant him a stay when his unexhausted claims are plainly meritless.

Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) ("An application for a writ of habeas

corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of

the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the

State"). . . .

On the other hand, it likely would be an abuse of discretion for a

district court to deny a stay and to dismiss a mixed petition if the

petitioner had good cause for his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted

claims are potentially meritorious, and there is no indication that the

petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.

Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-278 (2005). “Staying a federal habeas petition frustrates

AEDPA’s objective of encouraging finality by allowing a petitioner to delay the resolution of

federal proceedings. Id.

Before this Court can grant a stay under Rhines, it must actually have a pending petition.

Accordingly, Petitioner Brown is ordered to file his petition immediately.

March 20, 2020.

s/ Michael R. Merz

United States Magistrate Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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