The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
ANGELA COMPTON, Case No. 1:19-cv-973
Plaintiff,
Barrett, J.
vs. Bowman, M.J.
BARBARA BARRETT, et. al.,
Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, a resident of Cincinnati, brings this action against Barbara Barrett, the
secretary of the Air Force, Marianne Martineu, acting Director, DoD Consolidated
Adjudications Facility (DoD CAF), and the Honorable Mark Esper, U.S. Secretary of
Defense. By separate Order issued this date, plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed
in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This matter is before the Court for a sua
sponte review of plaintiff=s complaint to determine whether the complaint, or any portion
of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B).
In enacting the original in forma pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a
“litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying
litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive
lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized
federal courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if they are satisfied that the action
is frivolous or malicious. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be
dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable
basis in fact or law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see also Lawler v.
Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis
when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal
interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable
factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or
“wholly incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need
not accept as true factual allegations that are Afantastic or delusional@ in reviewing a
complaint for frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).
Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). A
complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same
token, however, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also
Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71 (“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs
dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept
all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual
allegations,” it must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-
me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading
that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
“naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557. The complaint
must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff asks the Court to amend her security clearance record and all
matching Federal Systems of records by invoking the Privacy Act of 1974, 32 CFR 806b,
Air Force Privacy Act Program. This Court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims.
Notably, federal courts lack jurisdiction to review an agency decision to revoke a security
clearance. See generally Tenenbaum v. Caldera, 45 Fed. Appx. 416, 2002 WL 2026347
(6th Cir. Aug. 29, 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 926 (2003); (citing Department of Navy v.
Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988). Moreover, the merits of an executive branch decision to deny
security clearance generally are not reviewable. Dept. of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518,
108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988). Egan dealt with the narrow question of what
statutory authority was vested in an executive agency to review the substance of a
security clearance decision. Its separation of powers rationale establishes that, absent
express congressional authorization, sensitive security clearance decisions should be
free from interference by judicial officers with little expertise in the important and complex
realm of national security. Tenenbaum v. Caldera, 45 F. App'x 416, 417–18 (6th Cir.
2002). As such, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief that can be granted by this
Court.
Accordingly, for these reasons, it is therefore RECOMMENDED this action be
DISMISSED with PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim for relief. It is further
RECOMMENDED that the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that for the
foregoing reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation
would not be taken in good faith and therefore deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma
pauperis.
s/ Stephanie K. Bowman
Stephanie K. Bowman
United States Magistrate Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
ANGELA COMPTON, Case No. 1:19-cv-973
Plaintiff,
Barrett, J.
vs. Bowman, M.J.
BARBARA BARRETT, et. al.,
Defendant.
NOTICE
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after
being served with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on
timely motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the
portion(s) of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in
support of the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within
FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make
objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).