Wheatley v. D'Apolito

PEARSON, J.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

TIFFANY D. WHEATLEY, )

) CASE NO. 4:24CV0987

Plaintiff, )

) JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON

v. )

)

HON. ANTHONY D'APOLITO, et al., ) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

) AND ORDER

Defendants. ) [Resolving ECF Nos. 2, 3, and 4]

Pro Se Plaintiff Tiffany D. Wheatley filed the above-entitled action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) to challenge a criminal

action pending against her in the Mahoning County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas. See State of

Ohio v. Wheatley, No. 2023 CR 0349 (filed June 8, 2023). Plaintiff □□ free on bond awaiting trial

on three felonies and two misdemeanor charges. She brings this action against Judge Anthony

D’ Apolito (the Common Pleas Court Judge presiding over her case), Mahoning County

Prosecutor Gina DeGenova, Assistant Mahoning County Prosecutor Katherine Jones, and the

Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff asserts that she was falsely arrested, denied

due process in her arrest, coerced to waive procedural rights, denied attendance at grand jury

proceedings, denied access to discovery or exhibits, and denied the right to represent herself. See

Complaint (ECF No. 1) at PageID #: 13-14. Her case has not yet been set for trial. Plaintiff asks

this Court to enjoin the state court proceedings for a minimum of 30 days to allow her to submit

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a more formal complaint for injunctive relief. See ECF No. | at PageID #: 6. She also seeks

unspecified monetary damages. See ECF No. | at PageID #: 14.

Plaintiff also filed an Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees (ECF No. 2).

For good cause shown, that Motion is granted.

I. Standard for Dismissal

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,

365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is

required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v.

City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). An action has no arguable basis in law or

fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions

are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks

“plausibility in th[e] complaint.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A

pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Igbal_,556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2)). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief

above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations,

but must provide more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard. /d. In reviewing a complaint,

the court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean

Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir, 1998).

II. Law and Analysis

As an initial matter, none of the defendants are subject to suit for the claims Plaintiff

asserts. The Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas is not sui juris, meaning it is not a

separate legal entity under Ohio law that can sue or be sued. See Carmichael v. City of

Cleveland, 571 Fed.Appx. 426, 435 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding that “under Ohio law, a county

sheriff's office is not a legal entity that is capable of being sued”); Black v. Montgomery Cty.

Common Pleas Court, No. 3:18-cv-00123, 2018 WL 2473560, at *1 (S.D. Ohio June 4, 2018)

(finding Common Pleas Court was not sui juris). Consequently, Plaintiff's claims against the

Mahoning County Common Pleas Court fail as a matter of law.

The remaining Defendants are the prosecutors in Plaintiffs criminal case and the judge

that is presiding over her trial. All of these Defendants are absolutely immune from suit. Judges

are absolutely immune from civil suits for damages that stem from decisions they made while

presiding over a case. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991); Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111,

1115 (6th Cir. 1997). Prosecutors are absolutely immunity from damages for initiating a

prosecution and in presenting the state’s case. Jmbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976);

Pusey v. Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 658 (6th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff's allegations pertaining to

Judge D’Apolito concern decisions he made while presiding over her criminal prosecution. She

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does not include specific allegations against either of the prosecutors, Gena DeGenova or

Katherine Jones. To the extent that her claims against them pertain to actions they took in the

course of representing the State of Ohio in her criminal case, they are also immune from suit.

To the extent that Plaintiff’s claims against DeGenova and Jones pertain to actions taken

outside of their roles as prosecutors, she failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

A plaintiff cannot establish the liability of any defendant absent a clear showing that the

defendant was personally involved in the activities which form the basis of the alleged

unconstitutional behavior. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976); Mullins v. Hainesworth,

No. 95-3186, 1995 WL 559381 (6th Cir. Sept. 20, 1995). Absent factual allegations that concern

these Defendants, the claims against them must be dismissed.

Plaintiff also alleges she is bringing claims under Title II of the ADA. Title II prohibits a

public entity from discriminating against a “qualified individual with a disability” by excluding

that individual from participation in or by denying the benefits of the services, programs or

activities of the public entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The term “public entity” is defined, in

relevant part, as “any State or local government.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A). Title II does not

provide a cause of action against individual state or local government employees or officials.

Williams v. McLemore, 247 Fed.Appx. 1, 8 (6th Cir. 2007) (“We have held repeatedly that the

ADA does not permit public employees or supervisors to be sued in their individual capacities.”);

Lee v. Mich. Parole Bd., 104 Fed.Appx. 490, 493 (6th Cir. 2004) (the ADA does not impose

liability upon individuals.). Plaintiff’s ADA claims cannot be brought against Judge D’Apolito,

DeGenova or Jones.

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Finally, this Court cannot enjoin the state court criminal proceedings. A federal court

must decline to interfere with pending state proceedings involving important state interests unless

extraordinary circumstances are present. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971).

When a person is the target of an ongoing state action involving important state matters, she

cannot interfere with the pending state action by maintaining a parallel federal action involving

claims that could have been raised in the state case. Watts v. Burkhart, 854 F.2d 839, 844-48

(6th Cir. 1988). If the state defendant files such a case, Younger abstention requires the federal

court to defer to the state proceeding. /d.; see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15

(1987). Based on these principles, abstention is appropriate if: (1) the state proceedings are

on-going; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and, (3) the state

proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal questions. Middlesex County Ethics

Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). Abstention is mandated whether

the state court proceeding is criminal, quasi-criminal or civil in nature as long as federal court

intervention would “unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the State[ ].” Younger, 401

U.S. at 44.

All three factors supporting abstention are present. Plaintiff admits that the criminal

action against her is still pending and this Court acknowledges that state court criminal matters

are of paramount state interest. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 44-45. The third requirement of

Younger is that Plaintiff must have an opportunity to assert her federal challenges in the state

court proceeding. The pertinent inquiry is whether the state proceedings afford an adequate

opportunity to raise the federal claims. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 430 (1979). The burden at

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this point rests on Plaintiff to demonstrate that state procedural law bars presentation of her

claims. Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 14. When a plaintiff has not attempted to present her federal

claims in the state court proceedings, the federal court should assume that state procedures will

afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of “unambiguous authority to the contrary.” Jd. at 15.

Here, there has been no showing that the claims asserted by Plaintiff in this federal lawsuit are

barred in the state action. The requirements of Younger are satisfied and this Court must abstain

from interfering in any pending state court criminal action against Plaintiff. Therefore,

Plaintiff's Motion for Emergency Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief

(ECF No. 3) is denied.

Generally, the doctrine requires a federal court to stay an action for damages during the

pendency of a state action on the same matter. See Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, 139 F.3d

1072, 1075 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Myers v. Franklin Cnty. Court of Common Pleas, 23

Fed.Appx. 201, 206-207 (6th Cir. 2001). As discussed above, however, Defendants are immune

from suits for damages and are not subject to suit under Title II of the ADA. The claims for

damages have been dismissed. See Wheat v. Jessamine Journal Newspaper, No. 95-6426, 1996

WL 476435, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 20, 1996) (stating that it was proper for the district court to

dismiss plaintiff's damages claims, rather than hold them in abeyance, when the plaintiff failed to

state a valid claim for relief).

II. Conclusion

Accordingly, Plaintiff's Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees (ECF No. 2)

is granted. Plaintiffs Motion for Emergency Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and

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Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 3) is denied. This action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e). Plaintiff’s Motion for Electronic Filing Privileges (ECF No. 4) is denied as moot.

The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could

not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

June 13, 2024 /s/ Benita Y. Pearson

Date Benita Y. Pearson

United States District Judge

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