Opinion

Smith Land Company, Inc v. City of Fairlawn, Ohio

Court: District Court, N.D. Ohio
Filed: Mar 13, 2024
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 28.1%

“[W]e have made clear that the ‘driving force’ behind creation of the qualified immunity doctrine was a desire to ensure that ‘ “insubstantial claims” against government officials [will] be resolved prior to discovery. ”

How later courts described this case

“[W]e have made clear that the ‘driving force’ behind creation of the qualified immunity doctrine was a desire to ensure that ‘ “insubstantial claims” against government officials [will] be resolved prior to discovery. ”
“It is well-settled that conspiracy claims must be pled with some degree of specificity.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

SMITH LAND COMPANY, INC., et al., ) CASE NO. 5:21-cv-01848

)

Plaintiffs, ) JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING

)

vs. )

) MEMORANDUM ORDER AND

THE CITY OF FAIRLAWN, OHIO, et al., ) OPINION

)

Defendant. )

Before the Court is Defendant City of Fairlawn (“Fairlawn”), Defendant Mayor William J.

Roth (“Roth”), and Defendant Christopher Randles (“Randles”) (collectively “Defendants”)

Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 25) Plaintiffs’ Smith Land Company (“SLC”) and Robert G. Smith’s

(“Smith”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) Amended Complaint (ECF No. 19). For the reasons discussed

below, the Motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The allegations in this action arise from the subdivision, sale, designation as wetlands of,

and fill material placement on real property owned by Plaintiffs. (ECF No. 19, PageID #389).

Plaintiffs’ allegations are as follows:

1. Purchase and Subdivision of the Property

SLC purchased and sought to subdivide 9.7 acres of real property on Brunsdorph Drive in

Fairlawn, Ohio (the “Property”) in 1999. (Id. at PageID# 390-91). To do so, SLC applied to

Defendant City of Fairlawn (“Fairlawn”) to subdivide the property into ten single-family

residential lots and Block A. (Id. at PageID# 391). Fairlawn determined the Property contained

isolated wetlands, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States under the Clean Water Act (the

“CWA”). (Id.). To subdivide the Property, Fairlawn required a 404 Permit from the U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers (the “USACE”) to fill or impact the isolated wetlands. (Id.). On April 14,

2000, SLC obtained a 404 Permit from the USACE and a 401 Permit from Defendant Ohio

Environmental Protection Agency (“Ohio EPA”), both of which were valid until February 11,

2002. (Id.).

When SLC sought to further subdivide Block A into three single-family residential parcels,

it provided a copy of the 404 Permit to Fairlawn. (Id.). Fairlawn approved the subdivision of

Block A on April 18, 2000 and SLC filed deeds approved by Fairlawn subdividing Block A into

three parcels on May 19, 2000. (Id.). Fairlawn required SLC to pay three additional sewer tap

fees for the three additional single-family residential parcels. (Id.).

2. Supreme Court Decision

On January 9, 2001, the Supreme Court decided Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty.

v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). (Id.). The Supreme Court held that the

migratory bird rule, which purported to extend jurisdiction of isolated wetlands on the Property to

the USACE, exceeded the authority granted under the CWA. (Id.). Thus, the isolated wetlands

on the Property were no longer within the jurisdiction of the USACE. (Id. at PageID# 392).

3. Fairlawn Fills Block A

In February 2001, a road contractor for Fairlawn dumped fill on two parcels in Block A.

(Id. at PageID# 391-92). Smith complained to Fairlawn that the dumping was unauthorized, and

Fairlawn sent the contractor to grade the dumped fill. (Id. at PageID# 392). Plaintiffs allege they

were never given the opportunity to challenge Fairlawn’s dumping of fill. (Id. at PageID# 400).

On July 17, 2001, Ohio enacted a permanent permitting process for impacting isolated wetlands,

O.R.C. § 611.02-029. (Id.).

4. Sale of Property

Defendants Shawn A. Herhold (“Herhold”) and Malavanh D. Rassavong (“Rassavong”)

contracted to purchase a Block A parcel (the “Herhold Parcel”) on July 11, 2002. (Ud.). The

contract included a disclosure noting the Herhold Parcel had been designated as a wetland. (/d.).

On March 26, 2003, Timothy and Dawn Kensinger (collectively the “Kensingers”) contracted to

purchase a Block A parcel (the “Kensinger Parcel”). (/d. at PageID# 393). The contract did not

include a disclosure noting that the Kensinger Parcel had been designated as a wetland. (/d. at

Pagel 394).

In November 2003, William J. Roth (“Roth”), Mayor of Fairlawn, wrote the USACE

enquiring as to whether future owners of the Block A parcels would have to acquire USACE

authorization to impact wetlands on the parcels. (/d. at PageID# 393). The USACE responded on

February 4, 2004, stating that a USACE permit was not required for impacts to wetlands on Block

A and advising to contact the Ohio EPA to determine the state permit requirements.' (/d.). On

February 9, 2004, the Ohio EPA informed Fairlawn that owners of the Block A parcels will need

to apply for and receive an Isolated Wetland Permit (“IWP”) before impacting isolated wetlands.’

(Id. at PageID# 393-34).

5. The Kensinger Lawsuit

The Kensingers applied to Fairlawn for a building permit and Fairlawn denied the

application, requiring the fill previously deposited by Fairlawn’s contactor to be removed. (/d. at

PageID# 394). The Kensingers sued Plaintiffs for breach of contract, stating that they were not

aware that the Kensinger Parcel was a designated wetland that required a USACE permit in order

to obtain a building permit from Fairlawn. (/d.). Plaintiffs settled with the Kensingers and bought

1 ECF No. 19-2, PageID# 430-31.

2 ECF No. 19-3, PageID# 432.

the Kensinger Parcel back upon learning that its realtor did not provide the Kensingers with the

wetland disclosure. (/d.).

6. Herhold Lawsuit One

On May 9, 2008, Herhold and Rassavong also sued the Plaintiffs for breach of contract and

fraud in state court. (/d. at PageID #395). The Plaintiffs refused to buy the Herhold Parcel back

because Herhold and Rassavong were provided with a wetland disclosure, a USACE permit was

issued for the fill Fairlawn’s contractor dumped on the parcel, and Fairlawn authorized the

dumping. (/d.). The Plaintiffs moved to dismiss and were denied, and in 2014, the case went to a

Jury trial and judgment was for Herhold and Rassavong. (/d.). Thereafter, the judge recused, and

a new trial was ordered. (/d.).

7, Ohio EPA Public Records

After Herhold Lawsuit One, on May 4, 2015, Smith made a public records request to Ohio

EPA for all records of its employee, Defendant Ed Wilk (“Wilk”). (Ud. at PageID# 398). Included

in the records were Wilk’s calendar, notes, and letters. (/d. at PageID# 399).

a. The Wilk-Randles Letter

Wilk met with Herhold and Rassavong at the Herhold Parcel on May 27, 2005. Ud.). On

May 31, 2005, Wilk wrote a letter (“Wilk-Randles Letter”) to Chris Randles (“Randles”), an

employee of the Fairlawn Building and Zoning Department.’ (/d.). The Wilk-Randles Letter stated

that after walking the Herhold Parcel, Wilk determined that the fill was mostly on the neighboring

property to the north of the Herhold Parcel and some fill activity occurred on the north boundary

of the Herhold Parcel. (/d.). Wilk also stated the amount of over-fill on the Herhold Parcel is

minimal compared to the adjacent property and removal of the over-fill is not required as long as

the area is used as a buffer zone between the fill permitted on the Herhold Parcel and the wetlands

that should not have been filled. (/d.). Plaintiffs allege the Wilk-Randles Letter was sent to

Herhold. (/d.).

b. The Wilk-Herhold Letter

On October 24, 2005, Wilk wrote a letter to Herhold (“Wilk-Herhold Letter”’).4 (/d. at

PageID# 400). The Wilk-Herhold Letter stated that the fill previously dumped on the Herhold

Parcel failed to comply with the USACE limits. (/d.). It further stated that SLC overfilled the

wetlands at the north property boundary and, since then, the wetlands have been determined to be

regulated by the Ohio EPA. (/d.). Wilk further stated “your decision was to have the excessive

fill properly removed off site. I have visited the site numerous times providing direction during

the project.” (/d.). He also said that he visited the Herhold Parcel on the date of the letter to inspect

the work and the excess fill was removed, but it must also meet the conditions and approval of the

Fairlawn Building and Zoning Department. (/d.).

Plaintiffs allege they were never notified of a claim of overfill on the Herhold Parcel, any

violation of the USACE permit and/or the Ohio EPA regulation, or any enforcement action being

taken due to the overfill. (7d. at PageID# 400, 403). They allege they first learned of the overfill

when they were served with a copy of the complaint for Herhold Lawsuit One. (/d. at PagelD#

403).

c. The Wilk-White Tail Letter

On March 28, 2007, Wilk wrote a letter to a property owner on White Tail Ridge Road in

Fairlawn regarding the property owner’s concern about the wetlands behind the homes on White

Tail Ridge Road that border the homes on Brunsdorph Road (“Wilk-White Tail Letter’”).° (/d. at

PageID# 409). In the Wilk-White Tail Letter, Wilk stated he visited the area on March 21, 2007

“ECF No. 19-5, PageID# 434.

5 ECF No. 19-7, Wilk-White Tail Letter at PageID #436.

and verified the conditions of the wetlands. (/d.). He also stated that the USACE issued a permit

allowing the fill of wetlands along the properties on Bunsdorph Road and any additional impacts

to wetlands will require a 401 permit from the Ohio EPA. (/d.).

d. Notice of Violation

On February 24, 2016, Wilk issued a Notice of Violation (“NOV”) against Plaintiffs for

unauthorized fill on both of the Block A parcels they owned. (/d.). Plaintiffs allege that Wilk

issued the NOV in retaliation for Plaintiffs’ public records request. (/d.). Plaintiffs allege the

NOV was mailed to Smith at an old address, where he no longer resided, and he did not receive it.

(/d.). Plaintiffs allege that Wilk issued the NOV to deliberately and unlawfully encumber

Plaintiffs’ parcels so that they could not be used for a single-family residence and prevent Plaintiffs

from marketing and selling their parcels. (id. at PageID# 411).

8. Herhold Lawsuit Two

The second trial was in July 2017. (d.). Wilk was designated as the Ohio EPA’s

representative. (/d.). Wilk testified that he is an Ohio EPA 401 Coordinator and his job duties

include reviewing 401 permit applications, conducting pre-application meetings, reviewing

complaints of unauthorized fill, and enforcement. (/d. at PageID# 398). Wilk also testified to the

measurements of the overfill and that mitigation was available in 2005 for $35,000 per acre,

approximately $442 for the Herhold Parcel. U/d. at PageID# 403). Plaintiffs allege they were not

notified of Wilk’s involvement with the Herhold Parcel. (/d.). Wilk also testified that the USACE

would handle any violations on the Herhold Parcel until 2004. (Ud. at PageID# 410).

° ECF No. 19-8, NOV at PageID #437.

On September 19, 2017, the court issued a final order of judgment for Herhold and

Rassavong. (Id.). Plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial

that was denied on November 30, 2017. (Id.). The Ohio Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed

the judgment on June 19, 2019. (Id.). The Ohio Supreme Court declined jurisdiction on October

15, 2019, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on June 8, 2020. (Id.).

9. Post-Lawsuit

After the second Herhold trial, on September 28, 2017, Plaintiffs allege that they received

two Google Earth Pro photos (the “Block A Photos”), dated April 9, 2005 and February 28, 2006,

respectively. (Id. at PageID# 404). Plaintiffs allege the Block A Photos show what Block A

looked like before Herhold and Rassavong removed the overfill from the Herhold Parcel and after.

(Id. at PageID# 404-05). Plaintiffs assert the Block A Photos show that dirt from the Herhold

Parcel was improperly removed and dumped on SLC’s parcel. (Id. at PageID# 405). Plaintiffs

contend that Wilk oversaw the improper removal of dirt from the Herhold Parcel and dumping on

SLC’s parcel. (Id.). Plaintiffs claim the Block A Photos also show that homes built to the south

of the Herhold Parcel have filled in wetlands. (Id.). Plaintiffs aver that the Block A Photos support

their claim that Fairlawn, Roth, Randles, Wilk, Herhold, and Rassavong engaged in conduct that

constitute or contributed to trespass on their parcel. (Id. at PageID# 406).

Plaintiffs allege that beginning in 2006, Fairlawn began mowing the grass on SLC’s parcel,

and has since assessed hundreds of dollars in special assessment taxes a year on SLC’s parcel in

addition to sewer tap fees Plaintiffs paid Fairlawn. (ECF No. 19, PageID# 411-12). Plaintiffs

claim that they never received a bill for mowing or taxes owed on the SLC parcel. (Id. at PageID#

412). On February 10, 2021, Fairlawn filed tax foreclosure action on the SLC parcel for the

Summit County Land Reutilization Corporation (“SCLRC”) to acquire it. (Id.). The SCLRC

determined the land was nonproductive and the acquisition of the land was necessary for the

implementation of an effective land reutilization program. (Id.). Plaintiffs aver that Fairlawn’s

refusal to allow the land to be “productive” is the sole reason for the tax delinquency. (Id. at

PageID# 413).

10. Claims Against Fairlawn, Roth, and Randles

Count One of the Amended Complaint is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and alleges that

Fairlawn, Roth, Randles, Wilk, Herhold, and Rassavong conspired to deprive Plaintiffs of their

interest in the Property. (ECF No. 19, PageID# 414-16).

Count Two of the Amended Complaint is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and alleges

that Fairlawn, Roth, Randles, Wilk, Herhold, Rassavong, and Skidmore conspired to deprive

Plaintiffs of equal protection of the law by conspiring to deprive them of their interest in the

Property. (Id. at PageID# 417-18).

Count Three of the Amended Complaint is brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 for civil

conspiracy under Ohio law. (Id. at PageID# 418). Plaintiff alleges that Fairlawn, Roth, Randles,

Wilk, Herhold, and Rassavong conspired to obtain a civil judgment against Plaintiffs in Herhold

Lawsuit Two, based on fabrication of a need to properly remove overfill from the Herhold Parcel.

Plaintiffs allege a conspiracy to commit fraud, trespass, and take property, including a judgment

against Plaintiffs for $284,889.29 plus interest. (Id. at PageID# 418-20).

Count Four of the Amended Complaint is brought under Section 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §

1331, alleging that Fairlawn deprived Plaintiffs of their private property, in violation of the Fifth

Amendment Takings Clause because it denied Plaintiffs’ building permit subject to wetland

restrictions on their parcels. (Id. at PageID# 420-21).

Count Five of the Amended Complaint is brought under Section 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §

1331, alleging that Fairlawn deprived Plaintiffs of their private property, in violation of the Fifth

Amendment Takings Clause because it required Smith to pay sewer tap fees. (Id. at PageID# 421-

22).

Count Seven of the Amended Complaint is a request for permanent prospective injunction

against the Ohio EPA, Wilk, and Fairlawn, requesting this Court to permanently enjoin them from

enforcing or penalizing them based on the NOV. (Id. at PageID# 424-25).

Count Nine of the Amended Complaint is a request for exemplary punitive damages against

Fairlawn, Roth, Randles, Wilk, Herhold, and Rassavong for their alleged conduct constituting

“conspiracy to commit fraud, trespass, and taking of [their parcels],” and denying Plaintiffs “of

equal protection of the law to commit trespass and the physical taking of [their parcels].” (Id. at

PageID# 425-26).

Plaintiffs bring all claims against Roth individually and in his official capacity. (ECF No.

19, PageID# 390). They bring all claims against Randles in his individual capacity only. (Id.).

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiffs filed this action on September 28, 2021. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiffs subsequently

filed an Amended Complaint on December 27, 2021. (ECF No. 19). Defendants filed their Motion

to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 25) on January 14, 2022. Plaintiffs filed their

Opposition (ECF No. 29) on February 14, 2022. Defendants filed their Reply in Support of the

Motion (ECF No. 32) on February 25, 2022.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6)

A party may move to dismiss a claim against it when the claimant has “failed to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

tests the complaint’s legal sufficiency. Riddle v. Egensperger, 266 F.3d 542, 550 (6th Cir. 2001).

A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks “plausibility

in the Complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A pleading must contain

a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to

raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the

Complaint are true. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. The Plaintiff is not required to include

detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than “an unadorned, the-Defendant-unlawfully-

harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a

simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard. Id. In

reviewing a Complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the

Plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir.1998).

B. Federal Rule of Procedure 12(c)

“After the pleadings are closed–but early enough not to delay trial–a party may move for

judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A motion for judgment on the pleadings

essentially constitutes a delayed motion under Rule 12(b)(6) and is evaluated under the same

standard. See, e.g., Holland v. FCA US LLC, 656 F. App'x 232, 236 (6th Cir. 2016). Judgment on

the pleadings is appropriate where, construing the material allegations of the pleadings and all

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court concludes

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anders v. Cuevas, 984 F.3d 1166,

1174 (6th Cir. 2021). In construing the pleadings, the Court accepts the factual allegations of the

non-movant as true, but not unwarranted inferences or legal conclusions. Holland, 656 F. App'x at

236–37 (citing Gregory v. Shelby Cnty., 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir. 2000)). On a motion under

Rule 12(c), courts “must follow the Supreme Court's changes to the pleading standards in Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 [129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868] (2009), and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 [127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929] (2007).” Bates v. Green Farms Condo. Assoc.,

958 F.3d 470, 480 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Engler v. Arnold, 862 F.3d 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2017)).

Only “well-pleaded factual allegations” that “plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief” and

“allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged” will survive. Id. (quotation and citation omitted). Conversely, “[m]ere labels and

conclusions are not enough[.]” Engler, 862 F.3d at 575. Nor are facts that are “merely consistent

with” liability. Bates, 958 F.3d at 480 (quotation omitted).

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Immunity

Defendants argue that Roth and Randles are entitled to qualified immunity for all federal

claims alleged in the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 25, PageID# 461).

1. Roth and Randles are entitled to qualified Immunity.

“Although a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) invites an inquiry into the legal sufficiency

of the complaint, not an analysis of potential defenses to the claims set forth therein, dismissal

nevertheless is appropriate when the defendant is entitled to a meritorious affirmative defense such

as qualified immunity.” See Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 240 (6th Cir. 2016).

Generally, the defense of qualified immunity is rejected when asserted in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

Wesley v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 421, 433 (“[I]t is generally inappropriate for a district court to grant

a 12(b)(6) motion on the basis of qualified immunity.”).

However, qualified immunity can be asserted in a motion to dismiss and district courts

“cannot ‘avoid ruling on the issue.’” (Sterling Hotels, LLC v. McKay, 71 F.4th 463, 466 (6th Cir.

2023). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly…stressed the importance of resolving immunity

questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231–32

(2009) (“[W]e have made clear that the ‘driving force’ behind creation of the qualified immunity

doctrine was a desire to ensure that ‘ “insubstantial claims” against government officials [will] be

resolved prior to discovery. ”) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 n. 2, (1987)).

At the pleadings stage, the complaint's factual allegations are taken as true and the court decides

whether – based on those facts – the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Sterling, 71 F.4th

at 467; citing Courtright v. City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d 513, 518 (6th Cir. 2016).

a. Entitlement to Qualified Immunity

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “government officials performing discretionary

functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

A government official defendant in a section 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity if their

conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known” Scott v. Churchill, 377 F.3d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 601 (6th Cir. 2002). For a right to be clearly established,

“[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand

that what he is doing violates that right.” Bell, 308 F.3d at 601 (quoting Russo v. City of Cincinnati,

953 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th Cir.1992) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639, 107 S.Ct.

3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)).

The federal claims against Roth and Randles, in their individual capacities, are the Section

1983 and 1985(3) conspiracy claims. (ECF No. 19, PageID# 414-18). The facts as alleged in the

Amended Complaint fail to show that Roth and Randles engaged in conduct that gives rise to

Section 1983 and 1985(3) conspiracy claims. Indeed, Defendants correctly point out that there are

no allegations that Roth ever had any communication with Wilk, Herhold, or Rassavong at all, let

alone conspired with them to deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. (ECF No. 25,

PageID# 476). Similarly, other than alleging Randles met with Wilk, Herhold and Rassavong in

2005, there are no facts alleged that show Randles ever entered into an agreement with them to

violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. (Id.). Accordingly, Counts One and Two are dismissed as

to Roth and Randles.

B. Conspiracy Claims

1. Conspiracy under Sections 1983

A Section 1983 civil conspiracy claim requires a plaintiff to show “(1) a ‘single plan’ existed, (2)

[defendants] ‘shared in the general conspiratorial objective’ to deprive [plaintiffs] of [their]

constitutional ... rights, and (3) ‘an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy *768

that caused injury’ to [plaintiffs].” Siefert v. Hamilton County, 951 F.3d 753, 767 (6th Cir. 2020)

(quoting Bazzi v. City of Dearborn, 658 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2011)). Count One fails because

there are no facts alleged by Plaintiffs that any such agreement existed. Plaintiffs’ allegations are

conclusory, only stating that Defendants conspired to deprive them of their property rights. (ECF

No. 19, PageID# 414-20). Although Plaintiffs include the working relationships between the

Defendants, they do not allege any facts supporting the allegation that Defendants agreed to violate

Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Without specific allegations that Defendants entered into an

agreement to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights, Count One fails to state a claim for relief as to

Fairlawn, Roth, and Randles. Siefert, 951 F.3d at 768 (“It is well-settled that conspiracy claims

must be pled with some degree of specificity.”) (quoting Heyne v. Metropolitan Nashville Schools,

655 F.3d 556, 563 (6th Cir. 2011) (editing mark omitted.)).

2. Conspiracy under Sections 1985(3)

A §1985(3) civil conspiracy claim requires a plaintiff to show “1) a conspiracy involving

two or more persons; 2) for the purpose of depriving, directly or indirectly, a person or class of

persons of the equal protection of the laws; and 3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; 4) which

causes injury to a person or property, or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the

United States.” Smith v. Thornburg, 136 F.3d 1070, 1078 (6th Cir.1998) (citing Johnson v. Hills

& Dales Gen. Hosp., 40 F.3d 837, 839 (6th Cir.1994), cert denied). The plaintiff must demonstrate

that the conspiracy was motivated by a class-based animus, such as race. Johnson, 40 F.3d at 839;