The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
DAVID L. MATHIS, ) Case No.: 1:21 CV 169
)
Petitioner )
v. JUDGE SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.
WARDEN KENNETH BLACK,
Respondent ORDER
Currently pending before the court in the above-captioned case is Petitioner David Mathis’s
(“Mathis” or “Petitioner’) Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) (ECF No. 1), pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under Local Rule 72.2, the court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge
William H. Baughman (“Judge Baughman”). The case was later reassigned by General Order to
Magistrate Judge Jennifer D. Armstrong (“Magistrate Judge” or “Judge Armstrong”) to prepare a
Report and Recommendation (“R & R”). For the following reasons, the court adopts Judge
Armstrong’s R & R (ECF No. 11) and denies Mathis’s Petition in its entirety. The court also declines
to issue Mathis a Certificate of Appealability.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The following is a brief summary of the facts established at the Petitioner’s trial. After an
incident at school, A.T., the 12-year-old victim in this case, went to a local subway station to obtain
a ride home from school. (R & R at PageID #401, ECF No. 11). While there, she met Mathis, who
was over 50 years old at the time and ran a café at the station. (Id.) A.T. told Mathis about the
incident at school, and informed him that she was afraid to go home. (Id.) As it turns out, A.T. had
been given detention at school and so she worried her mother would be upset with her. (Id.) Upon
hearing this, Mathis offered to provide A.T. with a motel room for the night. (Id.) However, once
the two arrived at the motel, Mathis proceeded to perform various sexual acts with the child,
including kissing her breasts and vagina and having sex with her. (Id.) Mathis eventually left A.T.
in the hotel for the night before returning the next morning, when he continued to kiss, fondle, and
have sex with her. (Id.)
Shortly thereafter, A.T. was taken to the police station where she explained to officers how
she met Mathis, that he offered her a motel room for the night, and that he proceeded to kiss, touch,
and have sex with her once they arrived at the motel. (Id. at PageID #402). A.T. was then taken to
the hospital where she was treated and examined for sexual assault. (Id.) A.T. told the nurse
examining her the same version of events that she told the police. (Id.) The hospital also
administered a rape kit which found traces of Mathis’s genetic material on swabs from A.T.’s
breasts, underwear, and fingernail scrapings. (Id.) On November 29, 2016, Mathis was indicted for
the following charges: (1) six counts of first-degree felony rape in violation of R.C. §
2907.02(A)(1)(b); (2) three counts of felony gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C. §
2907.05(A)(4); and (3) two counts of felony kidnapping with a sexual motivation specification in
violation of R.C. §§ 2905.01(A)(4) and 2941.147(A). (Id. at PageID #402–03). Mathis pled not
guilty to all charges. (Id. at PageID #403).
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Before trial, Mathis filed a motion in limine to exclude testimony from Christine M. Scott
(“Scott”), an analyst at the Cuyahoga Regional Forensic Laboratory, regarding DNA evidence
analyzed using a technology known as TrueAllele. (Id.) Mathis argued that the Government had not
demonstrated that TrueAllele was reliable or that Scott was qualified to testify. (Id.) The trial court
held an evidentiary hearing in response to Mathis’s motion. (Id.) Ultimately, the court concluded that
the technology was reliable under Ohio Rules of Evidence, and that Scott was qualified to testify
regarding the results of the TrueAllele analysis. (Id. at PageID #403–04). The case then proceeded
to trial.
At trial, Mathis testified to the same timeline of events as A.T., but disputed that he ever had
sex with her. (Id. at PageID #402). He maintained that A.T. was lying and that any genetic material
found in the rape kit was transferred to her when she slept in the bed where Mathis and a female
friend had previously had sex earlier in the evening on the night in question. (Id.) At trial, A.T.
explained that she did not initially disclose the full extent of her physical contact with Mathis
because she was “scared.” (Id.) (citing State v. Mathis, 107365, 2019 WL 4316889, 2019-Ohio-3654,
at ¶ 11 (8th Dist. Sept. 12, 2019)). She also testified that during her interview with the police, she
started having “flashbacks” about her assault, which prompted her to relay the full story to officers.
(Id.)
During trial, Scott testified that part of the results from the TrueAllele analysis were
inconclusive due to an insufficient amount of genetic material found on the victim’s underwear. (Id.
at PageID #404). As a result, Scott explained, Mathis could not be excluded as the source of the
DNA sample from A.T.’s underwear. (Id.) On cross-examination, the prosecution asked several of
Mathis’s character witnesses if their opinion of him would change if they found out that (1) he had
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previously been convicted of assault and (2) he had previously been charged with domestic violence.
(Id.) However, it is undisputed that Mathis was never convicted of assault. (Id.) Also, while Mathis
had previously been charged with domestic violence, he was not convicted of that charge because
he had pled guilty to a lesser offense. (Id.)
Before the close of trial, the prosecution dropped one count of gross sexual imposition and
one count of rape against Mathis. (Id.) (citing Journal Entry, Ex. 6 to Return of Writ, ECF No. 6-1).
The jury went to verdict on the remaining counts and found Mathis guilty on all counts. (Id.) (citing
Journal Entry of Conviction, Ex. 7 to Return of Writ, ECF No. 6-1). Accordingly, on May 31, 2018,
the court sentenced Mathis to life with a possibility of parole after 20 years on each of the counts of
rape and kidnapping, and a term of five years on both counts of gross sexual imposition. (R & R at
PageID #404–05, ECF No. 11). The court ordered that Mathis’s sentences would run concurrently.
B. Procedural Background
On June 25, 2018, Mathis filed a notice of appeal to the state appellate court challenging his
conviction. (Id.) After the appellate court affirmed Mathis’s sentence, he filed a notice of appeal to
the Ohio Supreme Court which declined jurisdiction over the case. (Id. at PageID #405–06, ECF No.
11). Mathis then filed the instant Petition on January 21, 2021, asserting the following grounds for
relief:
GROUND ONE: Ineffective assistance of counsel
Supporting Facts: Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in violation of Mathis’s
Sixth amendment right by: (1) failing to repeatedly object to the
prosecution’s assertion that Mathis had been convicted of assault and
arrested for domestic violence and (2) failing to interview one of
Mathis’s character witnesses ahead of trial.
GROUND TWO: Prosecutorial misconduct
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Supporting Facts: The prosecution violated Mathis’s due process rights guaranteed by
the 14th amendment by falsely asserting that Mathis had been
convicted of assault when in fact he had not.
GROUND THREE: Admission of misleading evidence
Supporting Facts: The trial court violated Mathis’s due process rights under the 14th
amendment by permitting expert testimony regarding DNA evidence
from the victim’s underwear despite the expert testifying that she
could not conclusively determine or exclude Mathis as the source of
the genetic material.
GROUND FOUR: Introduction of improper expert testimony
Supporting Facts: The trial court violated Mathis’s due process rights under the 14th
amendment by permitting one of the prosecution’s witnesses, a social
worker, to testify regarding the disclosure habits of child-victims of
sexual assault.
(Pet. at PageID #23–30, ECF No. 1-2). Warden Kenneth Black (“Respondent” or “Warden Black”)
filed a Return of Writ (ECF No. 6) on May 21, 2021. In it, Respondent argues that Mathis
procedurally defaulted on his third claim for relief by failing to present that ground before the state
courts on direct appeal. (Return of Writ at PageID #47–52, ECF No. 6). As to Petitioner’s other three
grounds for relief, Respondent contested each of those claims on their merits. (See id. at PageID
#52–79). On August 4, 2021, Mathis filed his Traverse (ECF No. 9) followed by a correct Traverse
on August 5, 2021 (ECF No. 10).
On September 2, 2022, the case was reassigned by General Order from Judge Baughman to
Judge Armstrong. Judge Armstrong subsequently submitted her R & R on November 30, 2023 (ECF
No. 11). Having found that Petitioner’s four grounds for relief are without merit, and that Petitioner
has procedurally defaulted on his third claim for relief, Judge Armstrong recommends that the court
deny Mathis’s Petition in its entirety and not grant him a Certificate of Appealability. (R & R at
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PageID #400, ECF No. 11). More specifically, Judge Armstrong determined that Mathis’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim failed under the “extremely deferential” standard attorneys are afforded
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which presumes that attorneys render adequate
assistance and exercise reasonable professional judgment in representing their clients. (See id. at
PageID #412–17). Judge Armstrong also concluded that, because the state court had adjudicated
Mathis’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the merits on direct appeal, the district court must
afford the state court’s decision an additional layer of deference. (See id. at PageID #413–14) (citing
Perkins v. McKee, 411 F. App’x 822, 828 (6th Cir. 2011)) (“Because the Michigan court of appeals
reviewed [Petitioner’s] ineffective-assistance claim on the merits, we give the state court's
adjudication AEDPA deference.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Magistrate Judge similarly
found Mathis’s prosecutorial misconduct claim unavailing because the state appellate court had
adjudicated the claim on the merits and determined that the prosecutor’s conduct was harmless in
context of the trial as a whole. (See id. at PageID #417–422). Accordingly, she concluded that the
state court’s determination should also be afforded AEDPA deference. (Id. at PageID #420).
With respect to Mathis’s challenge regarding the admissibility of the DNA evidence and the
Government’s DNA expert witness, Judge Armstrong agreed with the Ohio appellate court that
Mathis had procedurally defaulted on this claim because he failed to object to the admissibility of
the DNA evidence at trial. (Id. at PageID #422). The Magistrate Judge also found fatal to Mathis’s
third claim the absence of clearly established Supreme Court precedent holding that an error of state
law regarding the admissibility of evidence constituted a cognizable basis for habeas relief. (Id. at
PageID #424–26). Finally, Judge Armstrong agreed with the state court’s conclusion that Mathis’s
challenge regarding the social worker’s testimony was without merit because the witness’s testimony
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did not “so infect the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process.” (Id. at PageID #428) (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986)); see also
Mason v. Brunsman, 483 F. App’x 122, 131 (6th Cir. 2012). Judge Armstrong also concluded that
because the Supreme has never held that Daubert challenges are cognizable on habeas review,
Mathis’s argument that the social worker’s testimony should be excluded as improper expert
testimony was similarly in vain. (R& R at PageID # 428, ECF No. 11) (citing Bojaj v. Berghuis, 702
F. App’x 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2017). Petitioner filed his Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s R & R
on January 2, 2024 (ECF No. 12). This case is now ripe for review.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
As the Magistrate Judge pointed out, Mathis’s Petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). (See R & R at PageID #406–07, ECF No. 11).
Under the AEDPA statute, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus cannot be granted to a person in
custody as a result of a state conviction unless the adjudication “(1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2). Under § 2254(d)(1)’s “unreasonable application”
language, “a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing
legal principle[...] but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Lockyer
v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). In order for this to be the case, the state court’s application of
the law must be “objectively unreasonable,” not just incorrect or erroneous. Id. This standard is
intentionally “difficult” for prisoners to meet. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)
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(“If [AEDPA] standard [for granting habeas relief] is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant
to be.”)
Although Mathis indicates he raises general objections to Judge Armstrong’s conclusions
with respect to claims one, three and four, he sets forth specific objections only regarding the R &
R’s recommendation in respect to his second ground for relief: the allegation of prosecutorial
misconduct. (See generally Obj., ECF No. 13). In his Objection, Mathis contends that the Magistrate
Judge erroneously deferred to the state appellate court’s conclusion on his prosecutorial misconduct
claim because the state court performed a harmless error analysis when it should have performed a
“prejudicial effect” analysis of the prosecutor’s words. (Id.) More specifically, Mathis argues that
federal law requires courts to conduct a “prejudicial effect” analysis to determine the “probable effect
the prosecutor’s response would have on the jury’s ability to judge the evidence fairly”. (Id. at
PageID # 440) (citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985)). The court finds Petitioner’s
argument unpersuasive.
The Supreme Court has held that, “[i]nappropriate prosecutorial comments, standing alone,
would not justify a reviewing court to reverse a criminal conviction obtained in an otherwise fair
proceeding.” Young, 470 U.S. at 11. As the state appellate court, the Magistrate Judge, and Mathis’s
Objection all point out, a prosecutor’s improper remarks “must be examined within the context of
the trial to determine whether the prosecutor’s behavior amounted to prejudicial error.” Id. at 12
(emphasis added). Here, the state court did exactly that and determined that the prosecutor’s conduct
was harmless and therefore not prejudicial. The Eighth District Court of Appeals for Ohio concluded
that, “[e]ven were we to assume that the state’s mention of an assault conviction was improper, when
viewed in the context of the entire trial, we find that the state’s reference to an assault conviction to
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be harmless.” (R & R at PageID #419–420, ECF No. 11) (emphasis added). Despite Mathis’s
contention, the Supreme Court does not “require more” of the state court. (Obj. at PageID #441, ECF
No. 13). In fact, the Supreme Court has held that federal courts on habeas review can tolerate much
less of an explanation from state courts. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 97–98 (finding that a federal
court on habeas review must still defer to a state court’s adjudication of a claim even when the
state’s order is “unaccompanied by an opinion explaining the reasons relief has been denied”).
Because the state court already adjudicated Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim on the
merits, the court rejects Mathis’s sole objection.
In his Objection, Mathis also implies that the state court’s decision was an unreasonable
application of federal law. (See Obj. at PageID #440–41, ECF No. 13) More specifically, Mathis
contends that because the state court and the Magistrate Judge both concluded that the prosecutor’s
remarks regarding Mathis’s non-existent assault conviction amounted to misconduct, “it can be said
that ‘no fair-minded jurist’ would disagree” that the prosecutor’s remarks were improper. (See id.
at PageID #440). Mathis’s argument misses the mark. The Supreme Court’s test in Young is not
intended to determine whether the prosecution’s remarks amounted to misconduct. Rather, the
purpose of the test is to assess “the probable effect” of the misconduct to determine whether the
remarks were so prejudicial that they deprived the defendant of a fair trial. See Young, 470 U.S. at
11–12. The fact that two jurists agreed that the prosecution’s remarks in this case amounted to
misconduct—a point that the Government also conceded— is irrelevant to the question of whether
“fair-minded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with this Court’s
precedents.” (R&R at PageID #411, ECF No. 11) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102).
Accordingly, the proper inquiry on habeas review is whether the Eighth District Court of Appeals
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for Ohio’s conclusion—that the prosecutor’s remarks were ultimately harmless in context of the
entire trial—was so unreasonable, such that “no fair-minded jurist could disagree that the state
court’s decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. Mathis makes
no argument that meets this intentionally high bar for habeas relief. Accordingly, the court finds that
Mathis’s Objection is without merit.
III. CONCLUSION
After careful de novo review of the R & R, Mathis’s Objection, and all other relevant
documents in the record, the court finds that Judge Armstrong’s recommendation is fully supported
by the record and controlling case law. Accordingly, the court adopts the R & R and hereby denies
and dismisses the Petition. The court also certifies that there is no basis on which to issue a
Certificate of Appealability. Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
February 21, 2024
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