St. Thomas v. State of Ohio

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

DWAYNE HOWARD ST. THOMAS, ) Case No.: 4:23 CV 2007

Pro Se, )

)

Plaintiff ) JUDGE SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.

)

v. )

)

STATE OF OHIO, et al., )

) MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendants ) AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Pro Se plaintiff Dwayne Howard St. Thomas filed this in forma pauperis action against the

State of Ohio; Gina Thomas, Trumbull County Assistant Prosecutor; Dennis Watkins, Trumbull

County Prosecutor; and Judge Sean J. O’Brien (Doc. No. 1).

For the reasons that follow, the Court dismisses the action.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s complaint contains very few factual allegations. In the statement of his claim,

Plaintiff states that he gave no entity or individual the “right to administrate [his] property,” and he

asked the judge for the nature and cause of action and under which jurisdiction the Court operates.

(Id. at 4). Plaintiff states that he “accepted for value return for value all the charging instruments in

this matter” and that he does not dispute the facts contained in the charging instruments. (Id. at 5).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions constitute “a condition of contract under criminal aspects

of admiralty jurisdiction.” (Id.).

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2). The Court grants that

application.

Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365, 102 S. Ct.

700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30

L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972). The district court, however, is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks

an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed.

2d 338 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville,

99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised

on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly baseless.

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

when it lacks “plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564, 127 S.

Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868

(2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the

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speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but he or she must

provide more than “an unadorned, the defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of

action will not meet this pleading standard. Id. The Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932,

92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986).

In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).

B. Analysis

As an initial matter, the complaint consists only of bare, conclusory assertions, providing no

facts upon which a court could find the defendants engaged in any wrongdoing.

The Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers. El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2008). However, the

“lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d

413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Liberal construction for pro se litigants does not “abrogate basic pleading

requirements.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court is not required to

conjure unpleaded facts or construct claims against defendants on behalf of a pro se plaintiff. See

Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Ath. Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008). Although specific facts

are not required, to meet the basic minimum notice pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff’s complaint must give the defendants fair notice of what the

plaintiff’s legal claims are and the factual grounds on which they rest. Id.

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Here, Plaintiff’s complaint, even liberally construed, fails to meet the most basic pleading

standard under Rule 8. The complaint fails to connect any alleged occurrence to any specific,

cognizable injury, and Plaintiff fails coherently to identify how the defendants have harmed him.

Plaintiff’s pleading is nothing more than a mere “unadorned, the defendant unlawfully harmed me

accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact,

and it fails to state a claim on which the Court may grant relief.

Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff attempts to invoke the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction, his

claim is legally and factually frivolous. Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over all civil

admiralty and maritime cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). Admiralty jurisdiction, however, requires

a factual connection to navigable waters. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 736, 81 S. Ct.

886, 6 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1961); Moore v. Child Support Enforcement Agency, N.D.Ohio No. 1:14 CV

1266, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160307, at *8 (Nov. 10, 2014). Even where the cause of action

concerns a contract dispute, the purported contract must relate to “ships and vessels, masters and

mariners, as the agents of commerce.” Horizon Ins. Co. v. Kinsman Marine Transit Co., 256 F.

Supp. 9, 12 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, “even in

cases where jurisdiction is invoked via a contract which is traditionally ‘maritime’ in nature, the

issue must still retain some connection to navigable waters or maritime commerce.” In re Fields, 967

F. Supp. 969, 974 (M.D. Tenn. 1997); see also New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Home Sav. & Loan Co.

of Youngstown, Ohio, 581 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2009). Here, there is no suggestion of a claim or

contract pertaining to navigable waters or maritime commerce. Admiralty jurisdiction is therefore

inapplicable.

And finally, even if Plaintiff satisfied Rule 8 pleading requirements, Plaintiff cannot maintain

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an action against any of the defendants because they are immune from suit. The Eleventh

Amendment is an absolute bar to the imposition of liability upon states and state agencies. Latham

v. Office of Atty. Gen. of State of Ohio, 395 F.3d 261, 270 (6th Cir. 2005); Bouquett v. Clemmer, 626

F. Supp. 46, 48 (S.D. Ohio 1985). Under the Eleventh Amendment, federal courts lack jurisdiction

to hear suits by private citizens against a state unless the state explicitly consents to the suit or unless

Congress, pursuant to a valid exercise of power, abrogates the states’ sovereign immunity. Port Auth.

Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304, 110 S. Ct. 1868, 109 L. Ed. 2d 264 (1990). Ohio

has not waived its sovereign immunity. McCormick v. Miami Univ., 693 F.3d 654, 664 (6th Cir.

2012). The State of Ohio is therefore absolutely immune from suits for damages.

Judges and prosecutors also enjoy immunity from civil suits for damages. It is well

established that judges are generally entitled to absolute immunity from civil suits for money

damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9, 112 S. Ct. 286, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991); Barnes v. Winchell,

105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). They are accorded this broad protection to ensure that the

independent and impartial exercise of their judgment in a case is not impaired by the exposure to

damages by dissatisfied litigants. Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1115. For this reason, absolute immunity is

overcome only when (1) the conduct alleged is performed at a time when the defendant is not acting

as a judge; or (2) the conduct alleged, although judicial in nature, is taken in complete absence of

all subject matter jurisdiction of the court over which he or she presides. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12;

Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1116. A judge will not be deprived of immunity even if the action at issue was

performed in error, done maliciously, or was in excess of his or her authority. Stump v. Sparkman,

435 U.S. 349, 356, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978); Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 271 (6th

Cir. 1984) (merely acting in excess of authority does not preclude immunity).

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Here, there are virtually no facts concerning Judge O’Brien’s purported misconduct. And

consequently, Plaintiff gives no indication that Judge O’Brien was acting in any capacity other than

that of a judge when the conduct alleged in the complaint occurred or that such conduct was taken

in complete absence of all subject matter jurisdiction of the court over which he presides. Judge

O’Brien is therefore absolutely immune from damages in this action.

Prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under Section 1983 for their conduct in

“‘initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case.’” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486, 111

S. Ct. 1934, 114 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1991) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431, 96 S. Ct.

984, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1976)). So long as the prosecutor was engaged in prosecutorial functions, he

or she is absolutely immune regardless of whether he or she undertook actions maliciously, in bad

faith, or with an improper motive. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427 & n.27, 431 & n.34 (prosecutor

immune after knowingly presenting perjured testimony and suppressing exculpatory evidence at

trial); Joseph v. Patterson, 795 F.2d 549, 555 (6th Cir. 1986) (prosecutor immune after “knowingly

obtaining issuance of criminal complaints and arrest warrants . . . based on false, coerced

statements”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1139 (6th Cir. 1989) (prosecutor immune for

deciding to investigate and conspiring to present false charges to the grand jury, allegedly to satisfy

a campaign promise to be tough on child abuse). Prosecutorial functions include participation in

probable cause hearings, grand jury hearings, pretrial proceedings, witness preparation, and trials.

Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir. 2010). A supervising prosecutor is also

absolutely immune to claims stemming from his supervision of other prosecutors. See Van de Kamp

v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 344, 129 S. Ct. 855, 172 L. Ed. 2d 706 (2009) (stating that, although the

supervision of prosecutors is an administrative function, it is “directly connected with the conduct

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of a trial”).

Once again, Plaintiff’s complaint is almost completely devoid of facts concerning the conduct

of Assistant Prosecutor Thomas or Prosecutor Watkins. Plaintiff appears to take issue with a

“charging instrument.” The Court liberally construes this claim as Plaintiff’s objection to the manner

in which the prosecutors initiated a prosecution or presented the state’s case. These claims concern

typical prosecutorial functions for which both prosecutors are immune. And Prosecutor Watkins is

absolutely immune from claims related to both his personal conduct as a prosecutor, as well as his

conduct as a supervisor to the assistant prosecutor, because at all times he was performing

prosecutorial functions. See Burns, 500 U.S. at 486; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427 & n.27, 431 & n.34.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma

pauperis (Doc. No. 2) and dismisses this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). Further, the court

certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in

good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

S/SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

February 2, 2024

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