The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
DONALD SULLIVAN, ) Case No. 1:23-cv-1913
)
Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese
)
v. ) Magistrate Judge
) James E. Grimes Jr.
MICHAEL C. O’MALLEY, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Donald Sullivan filed this action pro se to challenge his criminal
convictions in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. State of Ohio v.
Sullivan, No. CR-19-639981-A (Cuyahoga Cnty Ct. Comm. Pl. Feb. 22, 2022); State
of Ohio v. Sullivan, No. CR-19-642705-A (Cuyahoga Cnty Ct. Comm. Pl. Feb. 22,
2022). He brings this action against the Judges that presided over his cases and the
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor asserting that they lacked jurisdiction to prosecute
him. The pleading is composed entirely of rhetoric and appears to rely on documents
he created based on his understanding of the Uniform Commercial Code. It contains
no factual allegations, and no legal causes of action. He seeks monetary damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Sullivan indicates that he was the Defendant in two criminal cases in the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. See id. At various points in the
litigation, all three judicial officers named as Defendants presided over his cases.
Although Michael O’Malley did not personally enter an appearance in the case, he
is the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor who supervises the assistant county prosecutors
that presented the State’s case against Mr. Sullivan. In both cases, Mr. Sullivan
entered guilty pleas. Currently, he is incarcerated in the Lake Erie Correctional
Institution, serving an aggregate sentence of five to seven and a half years of
incarceration.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff challenges his convictions claiming that the State trial court lacked
jurisdiction to prosecute him, making his convictions void. He asserts that “[a]ll
‘judicial power’ of the Article II ‘inferior courts’ comes from the Judiciary Act of
1789 . . . .” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 29, PageID #7.) Because the judicial power comes from
Article III of the United States Constitution, he concludes that there have been no
judges in the United States since 1789. He argues that Article II courts are
administrative courts operating under the Administrative Procedure Act and that
their judicial officers are administrators, not judges. He contends that such officials
only have the power to hear only cases involving contracts, commercial claims, and
commerce, but not criminal matters.
Next, Plaintiff asserts that the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court is a
banking system corporation. He states that Defendants did not deny this assertion
to his satisfaction when he presented it to them; therefore, he deems it to be
admitted. He asserts that, as a banking system, the Cuyahoga County Common
Pleas Court lacks jurisdiction over a secured party. Plaintiff lists documents that
he submitted to the State trial court to support his contention that he is a secured
party. Those documents included an Acknowledgment of Acceptance Deed of
Re-Conveyance, a Notice of Transfer of Reserved Name, an Affidavit of Status as
Secured Party and Creditor filed with the Ohio Secretary of State, an Affidavit of
Birth Certificate Ownership, a Trade Mark ID number, an Assumed Name
Registration, a Common Law Copyright Certification, a Copyright number, an
Affidavit Common Law Copyright Notice Writ–National and International, a
Declaration Certificate of Sovereign Status, an Aboriginal Native Moor American
National ID, a Foreign International Private EIN number, a Corporate Created
Public EIN number, an Affidavit of Truth, and a document he titled as “In the
Morocco Consular Court at the Ohioan State Republic Consular Jurisdiction and
Venue.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 33, Page ID #8–9.) He asserts that the Eleventh Amendment
removed the right of the States to bring suits against the people. He contends he is
a secured party who is one of the people protected by the Eleventh Amendment. He
also asserts that the Eleventh Amendment removed jurisdiction from Article II
“inferior courts.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 34, Page ID #9.) He claims that the State trial court
lacked jurisdiction to hear, issue rulings, or proceed to enter judgment against him.
He seeks monetary damages.
ANALYSIS
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,
365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The district
court, however, is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted or if it lacks an
arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989); Lawler
v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d
194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact where it is
premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions
are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
A cause of action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted where it
lacks “plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564
(2007). In any civil action, a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 677–78 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise
the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not
required to include detailed factual allegations, but he must provide more than “an
unadorned, the defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a
cause of action does not meet this pleading standard. Id. The Court is “not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559,
561 (6th Cir. 1998).
I. Rule 8
Plaintiff fails to meet the basic notice pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To meet these minimal standards, Plaintiff’s
complaint must give Defendants fair notice of what Plaintiff’s legal causes of action
are and the factual grounds on which they rest. Bassett v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff’s numerous assertions are
neither legal causes of action that support the Court’s federal jurisdiction, nor are
they factual allegations. The complaint consists entirely of meaningless rhetoric
leading to unsupported and irrational conclusions based on fanciful
misunderstandings of the law and American history. Plaintiff has not satisfied the
minimum notice pleading requirements and has not established a basis for the
exercise of federal jurisdiction. For that reason alone, this case must be dismissed.
II. Collateral Attack on a State Court Conviction
Even if Plaintiff had met the basic notice pleading requirements of Rule 8, his
complaint appears to be an attempt to collaterally attack his State court convictions.
Although he seeks monetary damages rather than release, he cannot pursue a
challenge to his conviction in a civil action unless he pleads and proves that his
convictions were reversed on direct appeal or called into question by a federal court’s
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994). Plaintiff pled guilty to the amended charges in both cases
at issue in this action. He is serving his sentences in an Ohio prison. He cannot
pursue this civil action as he has attempted to plead it.
III. Immunity
Finally, all of the Defendants are immune from suits for damages. Judges,
like Judge Turner, Judge Jones, and Judge Kelley, enjoy absolute immunity against
suits for damages based on decisions made from the bench or actions they took in
their roles as judges, provided that the case is within the subject matter jurisdiction
of the court over which they preside. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991); Barnes
v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). Contrary to the Plaintiff’s rhetoric,
Judge Turner, Judge Jones, and Judge Kelley are (or were) Judges on the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas, and that court has subject matter jurisdiction over
criminal prosecutions for violations of State laws. The judicial officers who presided
over his cases have absolute immunity against the damages Mr. Sullivan seeks.
As the prosecutor, Michael O’Malley also has absolute immunity against
damages for actions performed in carrying out his role as the State’s advocate in
Plaintiff’s criminal cases. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976); Pusey v.
Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 658 (6th Cir. 1993). Immunity extends not only to actions
directly related to initiating a prosecution and presenting the State’s case, but also
to activities undertaken in connection with the duties in functioning as a prosecutor.
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431. Although there are no factual allegations against
Mr. O’Malley, he appears to have been named as a Defendant due to his connection
to Plaintiff’s criminal cases. He is immune from damages in this suit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES this action pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §1915(e). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(8), the Court certifies that an
appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 19, 2024
J.PhilipCalabrese
United States District Judge
Northern District of Ohio