The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
LORMET COMMUNITY FEDERAL ) Case No. 1:23-cv-00627
CREDIT UNION, )
) Judge J. Philip Calabrese
Plaintiff and Counter- )
Defendant, ) Magistrate Judge
) James E. Grimes, Jr.
v. )
)
CITY OF OBERLIN, )
)
Defendant, )
)
and )
)
VAUGHN’S AUTO REPAIR & 24 )
HOUR TOWING, LLC, )
)
Defendant and Counter- )
Claimant. )
)
OPINION AND ORDER
LorMet Community Federal Credit Union made an auto loan. When the
borrower was arrested, the car was impounded. Eventually, LorMet filed this lawsuit
against the City of Oberlin and Vaughn’s Auto Repair & 24 Hour Towing, LLC,
asserting that the towing policies and practices at issue violate its due process and
property rights under the federal and Ohio Constitutions. In response, Vaughn’s
Auto filed a counterclaim against LorMet for unjust enrichment. Essentially,
Vaughn’s Auto argues that it has provided a service—the towing and storage of the
car—for which it is entitled to be paid.
LorMet seeks a judgment on the pleadings on the counterclaim of Vaughn’s
Auto, which did not timely respond to or oppose the motion. Also, the deadline the
Court set for amendments to the pleadings has now passed, and no party amended
as of right or sought leave to amend. Because the Court has an independent
obligation to examine its own jurisdiction, the Court declines to reach the merits of
LorMet’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and concludes that the counterclaim
is not ripe for judicial review. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES the counterclaim
of Vaughn’s Auto WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
FACTS
Taking the facts alleged in the counterclaim of Vaughn’s Auto as true and
construing them in favor of the non-moving party, as the Court must in the present
procedural posture, the record shows the following facts relevant to LorMet’s motion
for judgment on the pleadings.
On December 2, 2022, police arrested the owner of a 2018 Jeep Renegade.
Because the vehicle was left on a public street, the police formally requested that
Vaughn’s Auto tow it (ECF No. 15, ¶ 1, PageID #91), pursuant to Section 4513.61 of
the Ohio Revised Code (id., ¶ 8, PageID #92). Vaughn’s Auto charged $325.00 to tow
the vehicle and continues to charge $35.00 per day to store it. (Id., ¶ 9, PageID #92.)
As a lienholder, LorMet has a property right, a perfected security interest, in
the vehicle. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 20, PageID #7.) LorMet first learned of the vehicle’s
seizure on or around February 2, 2023, when it received a letter from the Oberlin
Police Department notifying LorMet of the vehicle’s seizure. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 11,
PageID #5.) After receiving this notice, LorMet contacted Vaughn’s Auto and
attempted to recover the vehicle but was instructed that it must first pay the towing
and storage fees. (Id., ¶ 13, PageID #5.) Later, LorMet obtained a State court order
directing Vaughn’s Auto to release the vehicle, but only after payment of fees. (Id.,
¶ 15, PageID #6.) Vaughn’s Auto agrees that it will allow LorMet to retrieve the
vehicle as soon as payment is made. (ECF No. 15, ¶ 13, PageID #92.) As of the date
of this ruling, to the Court’s knowledge, Vaughn’s Auto continues to possess the
vehicle, and storage fees continue to accrue. (See ECF No. 34.)
ANALYSIS
Though neither party questions the Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate LorMet’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court has an independent duty “to inquire
sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to the existence of federal jurisdiction.”
Kentucky Press Ass’n, Inc. v. Kentucky, 454 F.3d 505, 508 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Mt.
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977)). Article III of
the Constitution restricts the jurisdiction of federal courts to live cases and
controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 (1974);
Brown v. Ferro Corp., 763 F.2d 798, 801 (6th Cir. 1985).
Ripeness doctrine derives from the jurisdictional prerequisites that Article III
mandates, but it also adds a prudential element that compels federal courts to
consider whether judicial resolution of an actual case or controversy is desirable
under the circumstances. Id. Ripeness “separates those matters that are premature
because the injury is speculative and may never occur from those that are appropriate
for the court’s review.” National Rifle Ass’n of America v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 280
(6th Cir. 1997); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967), overruled on other
grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977). Ripeness is “peculiarly a
question of timing.” Young v. Klutznick, 652 F.2d 617, 625 (6th Cir. 1981). It comes
into play where a case is “anchored in future events that may not occur as anticipated,
or at all.” Kentucky Press Ass’n, Inc., 454 F.3d at 509 (quoting National Rifle Ass’n,
132 F.3d at 284); see also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation &
Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 200–01 (1983)).
To determine whether a claim is ripe for judicial review, the Court applies a
two-part test. First, it asks “whether the issues tendered are appropriate for judicial
resolution.” Next, it “assess[es] the hardship to the parties if judicial relief is denied
at that stage.” Brown, 763 F.2d at 802 (quoting Young v. Klutznick, 652 F.2d 617,
625 (6th Cir. 1981); Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 807 (6th Cir. 2019).
Sometimes, the Sixth Circuit variously stated the inquiry as directed to: (1) the
likelihood that the harm alleged will ever occur; (2) whether the factual record is
sufficiently developed for a fair adjudication of the merits; and (3) the hardship to the
parties if judicial relief is denied at this stage of the proceedings. Kentucky Press
Ass’n, 454 F.3d at 509 (quoting Adult Video Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Justice, 71
F.3d 563, 568 (6th Cir. 1995)).
Vaughn’s Auto alleges that LorMet “would be unjustly enriched by the actions
of Defendant in preserving and maintaining its collateral, if Plaintiff were to receive
the collateral without payment, pursuant to” Section 4513.61 of the Ohio Revised
Code. (ECF No. 15, § 21, PageID #93.) This counterclaim anticipates a future
entitlement to damages, contingent on LorMet’s success on the merits and retrieval
of the collateral without any payment to Vaughn’s Auto—events that have not
occurred and might not.
The issue is not presently appropriate for judicial resolution. The claim for
unjust enrichment depends on a future circumstance which might or might not occur.
At this point in time, its likelihood of occurrence is unclear to the Court, and the
record is not sufficiently developed on the underlying merits for a proper
determination on that question. Nor would the parties experience hardship if relief
is denied at this stage. Vaughn’s Auto may assert the counterclaim at an appropriate
time if the anticipated events come to pass. For now, however, the claim is not ripe
for review.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES Vaughn’s <Auto’s
counterclaim WITHOUT PREJUDICE and DENIES AS MOOT LorMet’s motion
for judgment on the pleadings.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 11, 2023
J. Philip Calabrese
United States District Judge
Northern District of Ohio