plaintiffs did not raise a viable Bivens claim where they did not allege that any of defendants were federal agents or employees who had acted under color of federal law
How later courts described this case
- plaintiffs did not raise a viable Bivens claim where they did not allege that any of defendants were federal agents or employees who had acted under color of federal law
- Heck bars Fourth Amendment claims where the contested search produced all the evidence supporting the conviction
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
Damarcus Brown, ) CASE NO. 5:23 CV 1605
)
Plaintiff, ) JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
)
v. )
) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
Adam Guilmette, et al., ) AND ORDER
)
Defendants. )
I. Background
Pro se Plaintiff Damarcus Brown, a federal prisoner, brings this in forma pauperis civil
rights action against the Akron Police Department and Akron Police Officers Adam Guilmette and
Corey Mook. In three separate complaints (Doc. Nos. 1, 1-1, and 1-2), Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants discriminated against him because he is an African American male and violated his
rights under Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments by conducting a traffic stop and search of
his person and vehicle in May 2021. He contends he was unlawfully stopped, searched, and
arrested, and that the unlawful stop and search “led to the officers making false and fabricated
evidence for probable cause.” (Doc. No. 1 at 5, ¶ III.) He seeks damages and that Defendants be
enjoined from “using this type [of] actions.” (Doc. No. 1 at 4, ¶ IV.)
Although Plaintiff does not make reference to his federal criminal conviction in his
complaint, this Court’s public docket indicates that Plaintiff was convicted in this district in August
2023 on federal drug and firearm charges after a guilty plea. See United States v. Brown, No. 5:
21 CR 522 (N.D. Ohio) (Polster, J.). It is apparent from the docket in Plaintiff’s criminal case that
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the search of Plaintiff’s person and vehicle of which he complains in this case yielded the evidence
that provided probable cause for his federal prosecution and the basis for his conviction. Plaintiff
pled guilty in his federal criminal case after the trial court denied his motion to suppress the
evidence found on his person and in his vehicle on the basis of the Fourth Amendment. (See id. at
Docket Nos. 30, 31 and 33.)
II. Standard of Review
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), the lenient
treatment generally accorded pro se plaintiffs “has limits,” and pro se plaintiffs are “not
automatically entitled to take every case to trial.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir.
1996). Federal district courts are expressly required, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), to screen
all in forma pauperis complaints brought in federal court, and to dismiss before service any such
action that the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). In order to survive a dismissal for failure to state
a claim, a complaint must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (holding that the dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) governs
dismissals for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)).
III. Discussion
Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed pursuant to §
1915(e)(2)(B).
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Although Plaintiff indicates he brings his federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397
(1971), he sues only state actors; therefore, he has no plausible claim under Bivens, which
applies to federal defendants. See Hall v. Creech, 17 Fed. Appx. 270 (6th Cir. 2001) (plaintiffs
did not raise a viable Bivens claim where they did not allege that any of defendants were federal
agents or employees who had acted under color of federal law).
Further, Plaintiff has alleged no cognizable claim for relief under § 1983.
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held that “in order to
recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm
caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” a § 1983
plaintiff must first “prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28
U.S.C. § 2254.” Id. at 486-87.
Under Heck’s favorable termination rule, if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” a court must dismiss the claim
“unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated.” Id. at 487.
Plaintiff’s civil rights claims here all imply the invalidity of his federal conviction. But
he has not alleged or demonstrated that his federal conviction has been invalidated or called into
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question in any of the ways articulated in Heck.1 Accordingly, Heck bars his claims. See, e.g.,
Holson v. Good, 579 Fed. Appx. 363, 365 (6th Cir. 2014) (Heck bars Fourth Amendment claims
where the contested search produced all the evidence supporting the conviction); Corley v.
Vance, 365 F. Supp.3d 407, 425–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (Heck precluded a plaintiff’s § 1983
claims against a city police department and county district attorney's office arising from the
investigation, arrest, and prosecution of plaintiff on earlier state charges that were dismissed and
subsequently subsumed by a federal case, which did not result in favorable termination).
Furthermore, an individual's criminal conviction conclusively establishes the existence
of probable cause for his arrest for the purposes of a § 1983 action. See Corley, 365 F.Supp.3d
at 444 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff was convicted of federal charges
brought against him as result of the evidence derived from his stop and search, and his
conviction has not been overturned or invalidated. Thus, there was presumptively probable case
for his arrest.
Finally, plaintiff’s complaint against the Akron Police Department for the additional
reason that police departments are not sui juris, meaning they are not separate legal entities
under Ohio law that can sue or be sued. See Wagner v. City of Canton, No. 5:19-cv-377, 2020
WL 1514551, at *1 n.2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2020) (finding that Canton Police Department is
not sui juris). Municipalities may be held liable under § 1983 only “when execution of [the
municipality's own] policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts
1The docket in Plaintiff’s criminal case indicates that he has appealed from the trial court’s
denial of his motion to suppress, but the Sixth Circuit has not reversed or overturned that ruling or
Plaintiff’s federal criminal conviction and sentence.
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or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts [an] injury that the government as
an entity is responsible [for] under § 1983.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978). Plaintiff asserts, in unclear and purely conclusory terms, that the Akron Police
Department “failed to train their officers adequately,” apparently because the state traffic
offenses for which he was initially cited were later dismissed. (Doc. No. 1 at 8, ¶ III (4).) But
in order to state a valid cause of action, a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief
which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of actions will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “Factual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. Plaintiff’s pleadings fail to
meet these legal benchmarks as to a municipal policy of the City of Akron. They do not
describe plausible constitutional infractions caused by a constitutionally infirm municipal policy
of inadequate training of the City of Akron itself. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against the
“Akron Police Department” fail for these reasons as well.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).2 The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: December 18, 2023 /s/ John R. Adams
JOHN R. ADAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2In light of this dismissal before service pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B), the pending motion of a
City of Akron attorney to withdraw (Doc. No. 5) is denied as moot.
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