Cox v. United States

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

ANDREW COX, CASE NO. 4:23 CV 1329

Petitioner,

v. JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING

UNITED STATES,

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Respondent. AND ORDER

Pro se petitioner Andrew Cox is currently incarcerated in the Elkton Correctional

Institution. He filed his seventh Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in

this Court, challenging his conviction in the United States District Court for the District of New

Jersey. (ECF No. 1). On October 26, 2023, guided by the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Cox v. United

States, No. 22-3366, 2022 WL 15526712 (6th Cir. Oct. 25, 2022), this Court dismissed Cox’s

petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 3, PageID# 24–25). Cox now timely

moves this Court to alter or amend its judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 59(e) provides, “A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than

28 days after the entry of judgment.” Amending or altering a judgment is appropriate “(1) to

accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not

available at trial; and (3) to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice.” Total

Benefits Planning Agency Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 630 F. Supp. 2d 842, 847

(S.D. Ohio 2007) (citing GenCorp, Inc. v. Am. Int’l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir.

1999)). However, a motion under Rule 59(e) is an improper vehicle to obtain a complete reversal

of a judgment. See, e.g., Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374

(6th Cir. 1998) (“A motion under Rule 59(e) is not an opportunity to re-argue a case.”); Brown v.

Robinson, No. 3:20-cv-113, 2022 WL 1819336, at *1 (S.D. Ohio June 3, 2022) (denying Rule

59(e) motion filed by habeas petitioner where the motion reargued the petitioner’s case); Dana

Corp. v. U.S., 764 F. Supp. 482, 488–89 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (denying motion to alter or amend a

judgment when it sought a complete reversal of the court’s judgment “by offering essentially the

same arguments presented in [the] initial motion for summary judgment”); Erikson Tool Co. v.

Balas Collet Co., 277 F. Supp. 226, 234 (N.D. Ohio 1967) (denying a motion for alteration or

amendment of the Court’s judgment when the plaintiff sought a complete reversal of the judgment

because “[s]uch is not the purpose of the Rule[]”).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Clear Error of Law

Cox argues that this Court’s October 26, 2023 Memorandum Opinion and Order is based

on a clear error of law and produced manifest injustice. (ECF No. 5, PageID# 27). A party moving

to alter or amend a judgment based on a “clear error of law” is held to a high standard. Lonardo

v. Travelers Indem. Co., 706 F. Supp. 2d 766, 809 (N.D. Ohio 2010), on reconsideration in part

(Jul. 21, 2010). To alter or amend its judgment under Rule 59(e), the Court must find that it

wholesale disregarded, misapplied, or failed to recognize controlling precedent.. Id. (quoting Oto

v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (6th Cir. 2000)). In other words, “a judgment must be

‘dead wrong’ to qualify as being clearly erroneous.” Id. (quoting H & A Land Corp. v. City of

Kennedale, No. 4:02-CV-458, 2005 WL 6803499, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2005).

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This Court’s Order found as follows:

Cox’s current petition is effectively identical to his 2022 petition. He argues

yet again that the delay in his § 2255 proceedings allows him to invoke the

savings clause. However, as this Court has previously opined, he has not

demonstrated that inordinate delay in § 2255 proceedings implicates the

narrowly-applied provisions of the savings clause. Absent that showing,

this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider his § 2241 petition.

Cox v. United States, No. 22-3366, 2022 WL 15526712, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct.

25, 2022) (citing Taylor v. Owens, 990 F.3d 493, 495, 499–500 (6th Cir.

2021)).

(ECF No. 3, PageID# 24-25).

Cox’s Rule 59(e) Motion claims that this Court failed to address Workman v. Tate, 957

F.2d 1339 (6th Cir. 1992), which Cox argues supports his position that “inordinate delay” triggers

the § 2255 savings clause. (ECF No. 5, PageID# 27). Specifically, Cox interprets Workman as

standing for the proposition that “any showing of inordinate delay in post-conviction proceedings

renders the procedures ‘ineffective or inadequate[.]’” (Id.). But Workman addressed a far more

discreet issue: whether habeas relief can be barred by a petitioner’s failure to exhaust his state

court remedies when the state court failed to address the petitioner’s post-conviction ineffective

assistance claim over a three-year period. Id. at 1344. The Sixth Circuit answered that question

in the negative, holding that, where a state court delays its adjudication of a petition for post-

conviction relief, the state cannot challenge a later-issued writ of habeas corpus due to a failure to

exhaust state-court remedies. Id. Workman did not address the § 2255 savings clause nor whether

“inordinate delay” by federal courts during federal post-conviction proceedings implicates the

legality of a prisoner’s sentence, as it must under the § 2255 savings clause. See Wright v.

Spaulding, 939 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2019 (“By its terms, § 2255 only covers challenges to a

sentence.”). The Court, therefore, did not ignore controlling precedent when it determined that

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Cox’s petition fails to invoke the § 2255 savings clause and that this Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction to hear his petition. There is no clear error of law.

B. Manifest Injustice

The manifest injustice inquiry is “a fact-specific analysis that falls squarely within the

discretionary authority of the court.” Id. (citing GenCorp, 178 F.3d at 834). It is not a catch-all

provision permitting litigants to relitigate their case; rather, it requires the Court to balance “the

importance of bringing litigation to a firm conclusion and the need to render fair and just rulings.”

Id. at 809 (citing GenCorp, 178 F.3d at 834).

The Court disagrees that its October 26, 2023 Order produced manifest injustice. The

petition filed in this case is Cox’s seventh such petition in the Northern District of Ohio, and it is

identical in substance to Cox’s sixth petition, which this Court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit plainly

held—with respect to this petitioner asserting claims that mirror those asserted in this petition—

his failure to establish that his remedy under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective” deprives the

District Court of subject matter jurisdiction. Cox v. United States, No. 22-3366, 2022 WL

15526712, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 25, 2022). This Court’s Order, based upon Sixth Circuit precedent

concerning Cox and the very claims he asserted in this case, is both fair and just, and it is supported

by controlling Sixth Circuit authority. Therefore, altering or amending this Court’s Order would

not prevent manifest injustice.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Petitioner Andrew Cox’s Motion to Alter or Amend

Judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Further, the Court CERTIFIES pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§1915(a)(3) that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: November 14, 2023

__ _________________

CHARLES E. FLEMING

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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