The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
MARY K. CURTIS, CASE NO. 5:22-CV-02028
Plaintiff,
vs. MAGISTRATE JUDGE AMANDA M. KNAPP
SUMMIT COUNTY CHILDREN
SERVICES, et al., MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Defendants.
Before the Court is the County of Summit’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
(ECF Doc. 17 (“Motion”).) The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for decision. (ECF Docs. 22,
23.) The parties have consented to the magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed.
R. Civ. P. 73. (ECF Doc. 16.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Motion,
dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the County of Summit, and DENIES Plaintiff’s request for
leave to file an amended complaint.
I. Background
Plaintiff Mary K. Curtis (“Plaintiff” or “Ms. Curtis”) filed the present Complaint against
defendants Summit County Children Services (“SCCS”) and County of Summit (“the County”)
(collectively “Defendants”) on November 9, 2022, seeking to remedy alleged statutory violations
and discrimination relating to her request for “a religious accommodation from Defendants’
mandate that she wear a mask while working.” (ECF Doc. 1 (“Complaint”), p. 1, ¶ 1.) She
asserts that “Defendants statutory violations, discrimination, and retaliation left [her] with the
choice of wearing a mask in violation of her sincerely held religious beliefs or losing her job.”
(Id. at p. 2, ¶ 4.) The more specific allegations of her Complaint are set forth below.
A. Factual Background
1. Alleged Relationship Between the County, SCCS, and Ms. Curtis
The County has a charter form of government and manages “over ten (10) departments in
addition to overseeing various agencies and divisions, including SCCS.” (Complaint, p. 2, ¶ 9.)
SCCS is variously identified as a “Summit County agency,” “the County of Summit’s local child
welfare agency,” and “an agency/division of” the County. (Id. at p. 2-3, ¶¶ 7-8, 13.) More
specifically, SCCS is alleged to be a child welfare agency that works with abused and neglected
children and their families, and which is “mandated to assess and investigate reports involving
the safety and well-being of children.” (Id. at p. 2, ¶¶ 7-8.) The County “maintains oversight
authority and job postings on its website for all open positions at SCCS.” (Id. at p. 3, ¶ 14.)
Ms. Curtis worked as a Social Worker Assistant / Social Service Aide in the Community
Visit Unit at SCCS, where she supervised community court ordered visitations of abused and
neglected children within their homes, in the community, and at the SCCS building. (Complaint,
p. 2, ¶ 7.) Ms. Curtis started employment at SCCS in September 2007 and worked there for over
fourteen years. (Id. at p. 3, ¶ 10.) SCCS was Ms. Curtis’ “direct employer.” (Id. at p. 3, ¶ 13.)
Although it is not alleged in the Complaint, Ms. Curtis asserts that the Summit County Fiscal
Officer issued her paychecks and is listed on her W-2 as her employer. (ECF Doc. 22, pp. 1-2.)
2. COVID-19 Mask Mandates
Starting in July 2020, in response to a rise of COVID-19 infections, the State of Ohio
issued Ohio Department of Health Orders requiring the wearing of facial coverings. (Complaint,
pp. 3-4, ¶¶ 16-18.) On July 27, 2020, SCCS required all SCCS staff to wear a face covering
while conducting SCCS business or on SCCS premises. (Id. at p. 4, ¶ 19.) This policy “did not
provide for any medical or religious exemption to the mask mandate and provided no
instructions as to how employees could request an exemption as required under EEOC
guidelines.” (Id.) SCCS then implemented a written policy on August 3, 2020, entitled
“COVID-19 Response Plan Family Interaction & Child Transportation Guidelines,” which
required “staff to wear face coverings at all times during their participation in family interactions
and while transporting children.” (Id. at p. 4, ¶ 20.) Again, “[n]o instructions for requesting
religious or medical exemptions were provided.” (Id.)
On August 28, 2020, Summit County health officials issued their own mask mandate,
which required the wearing of masks or face coverings in most public places, and also required
businesses to enforce the mandate on their employees and customers. (Complaint, p. 4, ¶ 21.)
The County’s policy permitted exemptions where “the wearing of a mask ‘substantially burdens
the practice of a sincerely held religious belief.’” (Id.)
The County temporarily lifted its mask mandate when the State of Ohio rescinded its own
mask mandate on June 20, 2021. (Complaint, p. 5, ¶ 22.) However, upon information and
belief, Ms. Curtis alleges the County reinstituted its mask mandate “when COVID-19 cases rose
beyond a certain level.” (Id.) On August 9, 2021, following a “period of no masking for several
months,” staff at SCCS were instructed to return to mask wearing. (Id. at p. 5, ¶ 23.)
“SCCS provided no method or system by which employees could request
accommodation to its mask mandate.” (Complaint, p. 6, ¶ 30.) “SCCS did not prohibit
employees from applying for a religious exemption to the masking mandate,” but “provided no
instruction as to how an employee might request for religious or medical exemption on their own
initiative” and “[e]mployees seeking exemption from the mask mandate had to figure it out on
their own with no direction or assistance from SCCS.” (Id. at p. 7, ¶¶31-32.)
3. Challenged Employment Actions
On September 14, 2021, Ms. Curtis submitted a notarized “religious accommodation
request” to SCCS, requesting relief from its mask mandate because “her sincerely held religious
beliefs prevented her from wearing a mask or any form of facial covering.” (Complaint, p. 7, ¶
33.) After submitting the request, she “was sent home and forced to take Paid Time Off (“PTO”)
until her request was resolved.” (Id. at p. 7, ¶ 35.)
The next day, the SCCS Deputy Executive Director for Human Resources & Support
Services, Valerie Nash, “called for a hearing to discuss Plaintiff’s request for an exemption.”
(Complaint, p. 7, ¶ 36.) At the hearing, Ms. Curtis “spoke of her deeply held religious
convictions” and stated that “[w]earing a mask evidences a lack of faith and trust in God to
protect her.” (Id.) Ms. Curtis “offered to complete periodic COVID-19 testing . . . as a
reasonable accommodation.” (Id.) In response, SCCS offered Ms. Curtis “a lower paid position
that still required wearing a mask/face shield.” (Id. at p. 8, ¶ 37.) Further, instead of seeking an
interactive discussion of her accommodation request, SCCS allegedly said Ms. Curtis “would
have to wear a mask or resign” and instructed her to use PTO until the matter was resolved. (Id.)
On September 20, 2021, Ms. Nash told Ms. Curtis via email that her exemption request
was denied. (Complaint, p. 8, ¶ 38.) Ms. Nash wrote that Ms. Curtis’ beliefs were not sincerely
held religious beliefs protected by law, and that SCCS would deny the religious accommodation
even if her beliefs were sincere “because of undue hardship due to the ‘threat’ of spreading
COVID by not wearing a mask.” (Id.) Ms. Nash also ordered Ms. Curtis to return to work the
next day wearing a mask, and said SCCS would consider her to have resigned if she did not do
so. (Id.) The same day, Ms. Curtis responded via email that “she would not wear a facial
covering/mask due to her sincerely held religious beliefs and would not accept a voluntary
resignation under any circumstances.” (Id. at p. 8, ¶ 39.) Due to Ms. Curtis’ refusal to return to
work wearing a mask, Ms. Nash informed Ms. Curtis via email on September 22, 2021 that a
meeting would be held with her on October 13, 2021. (Id. at p. 8, ¶ 40.)
SCCS held a disciplinary meeting with Ms. Curtis on October 13, 2021. (Complaint, p.
8, ¶ 41.) At that meeting, Ms. Nash inquired about Ms. Curtis’ professional counseling licensure
and referenced counseling ethics “even though Plaintiff never worked in that capacity for
SCCS.” (Id. at p. 8, ¶ 41.) Ms. Nash’s inquiry and discussion of counseling ethics caused Ms.
Curtis to be concerned that Ms. Nash “was threatening her professional counseling license due to
her religious beliefs.” (Id.) Ms. Nash also allegedly instructed Ms. Curtis to read and explain
how each COVID-19 protocol, including those unrelated to the mask mandate, “went against her
religious beliefs.” (Id. at pp. 8-9, ¶ 41.) As a result, Ms. Curtis felt “threatened and demeaned
for her faith.” (Id. at p. 9, ¶ 41.)
On October 22, 2021, SCCS met with Ms. Curtis “to communicate the disposition of the
charges against her.” (Complaint, p. 9, ¶ 42.) Ms. Curtis was terminated on November 1, 2021.
(Id. at p. 9, ¶ 43.) Ms. Curtis timely filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (Id. at p. 9, ¶ 44.) The EEOC issued a Notice of Right to
Sue on August 11, 2022. (Id. at p. 9, ¶ 45.)
B. Procedural History
Ms. Curtis filed the present Complaint on November 9, 2022, asserting the following
claims for relief against both Defendants: (1) Religious Discrimination-Failure to Accommodate
in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; (2) Religious Discrimination-Retaliation in
violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; and (3) violation of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (“RFRA”) (42 U.S.C. §2000BB-1). (Complaint, pp. 9-12, ¶¶ 46-68.)
In support of the Title VII failure to accommodate claim in Count I, Ms. Curtis alleges
she informed SCCS that her sincere religious beliefs precluded her from wearing a mask or facial
covering and requested accommodation from the masking mandate, but that “SCCS denied [her]
request for religious accommodation on masking” and “did not engage in an interactive process .
. . regarding her request for religious accommodation.” (Id. at p. 9, ¶¶ 47-50.) She also asserts
generally that “Defendants” responded to her attempts at resolution with a blanket denial,
ignored mitigating factors, did not provide reasonable accommodations, discriminated against
her, and caused her harm as a result. (Id. at pp. 9-10, ¶¶ 50-53.)
In support of the Title VII retaliation claim in Count II, Ms. Curtis alleges that she
engaged in protected activity when she requested religious accommodations from SCCS’s
masking mandate and complained to management about the discriminatory behavior of SCCS
staff in response to her religious objections to the masking mandate. (Complaint, p. 10, ¶ 56.)
She then asserts generally that “Defendants” responded to her protected activity by giving her a
false choice between masking and effective termination, did not engage in an interactive process,
and never intended to provide an accommodation. (Id. at p. 10, ¶¶ 57-58.) She asserts that her
religious beliefs and protected activity were the causes of “Defendants’ adverse employment
action,” and that “Defendants” discriminatory and disparate treatment of her accommodation
request reflected their hostility to requests for religious accommodation. (Id. at p. 10, ¶¶ 58-59.)
In support of the RFRA claim in Count III, Ms. Curtis alleges “Defendants’ actions” in
failing to engage in a dialogue regarding accommodations, in refusing to accommodate her, and
in terminating her imposed a substantial burden on her exercise of religion. (Id. at p. 11, ¶ 65.)
The County filed this Motion on January 30, 2023, seeking judgment on the pleadings
because Ms. Curtis “accuses only SCCS of forcing her to take time off, holding a hearing
regarding her request for accommodation, refusing her request, then terminating her in violation
of her civil rights.” (ECF Doc. 17, p. 8.) The County argues it cannot legally exercise control
over SCCS employees, it is not Ms. Curtis’ employer, and the Complaint lacks sufficient factual
detail to state a claim against the County as a “joint employer.” (ECF Docs. 17, 23.)
Plaintiff argues in response that “it is premature to determine at the pleading stage that
there is insufficient relationship between SCCS, a County agency, and the County to dismiss the
County as a party.” (ECF Doc. 22, p. 4.) She contends that she has alleged “sufficient
interrelationship between the County and SCCS for the County to remain a party.” (Id.)
Alternately, in the event that the Court grants the Motion, Ms. Curtis “requests leave to amend
her Complaint to assert that her paychecks are issued by the Summit County Fiscal Officer and
that her employer is listed as the Summit County Fiscal Officer on her W-2.” (Id. at p. 6.)
II. Standard of Review
“The standard of review for a Rule 12(c) motion is the same as for a motion under Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fritz v. Charter Twp. of
Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Ziegler v. IBP Hog Market, Inc., 249 F.3d
509, 511-12 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted)). Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may
dismiss a claim when a party fails to plead facts on which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A
pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The plaintiff is not required to include “detailed
factual allegations,” but must provide more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).
This Court “must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
accept all allegations as true.” Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 588 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation
omitted). However, while “we must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint
as true, we need not ‘accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” Hensley
Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555,
quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
III. Discussion
A. Whether Allegations of Complaint State Claims for Relief Against the County
The Complaint contains detailed allegations regarding both Ms. Curtis’ employment with
SCCS and the challenged conduct of SCCS and its representatives. (See, e.g., Complaint, pp. 3,
6-9, ¶¶ 10, 12-13, 15, 30-31, 33-34, 36-38, 41-42.) In comparison, the allegations regarding the
County are generalized and vague. Ms. Curtis alleges that SCCS is a child welfare agency over
which the County “maintains oversight authority and job postings on its website” (id. at pp. 2-3,
¶¶ 7-9, 13-14), that the County had its own mask mandate, separate from SCCS’s, which allowed
religious exemptions (id. at pp. 4-5, ¶ 21), and that the County temporarily lifted its mask
mandate after June 20, 2021, but later reinstituted it when COVID-19 cases rose (id. at p. 5, ¶
22).
While Plaintiff refers specifically to SCCS in describing the discriminatory and
retaliatory conduct underlying her Complaint (id. at pp. 7-10, ¶¶ 33-43, 48-50, 56), she makes
only general allegations against “Defendants” collectively when alleging conduct involving the
County (id. at pp. 9-12, ¶¶ 50-54, 57-61, 64-67). Nevertheless, she argues “Defendants” are
jointly liable for (1) failing to provide religious accommodations under Title VII (id. at pp. 9-10,
¶¶ 50-53), (2) retaliating in response to the request for religious accommodations under Title VII
(id. at p. 10, ¶¶ 57-59), and (3) imposing a substantial burden on Plaintiff’s exercise of religion
under RFRA by refusing her religious accommodations and terminating her (id. at p. 11, ¶ 65).
Title VII makes it unlawful for an “employer” to discharge or otherwise discriminate
against a person with respect to her employment because of her “race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). RFRA makes it unlawful for the government to
“substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability,” subject to certain exceptions. Doster v. Kendall, 596 F. Supp. 3d 995,
1014 (S.D. Ohio 2022) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)).
The County argues that any allegations suggesting it had an employment relationship
with Ms. Curtis “are nothing more than unwarranted inferences” unable to withstand a Rule
12(c) motion. (ECF Doc. 17, p. 3.) In support, it cites provisions in the Ohio Constitution, Ohio
Revised Code, Summit County Charter, and Summit County Codified Ordinances which provide
that SCCS and the County are separate government entities, and that the County does not have
legal authority to control or discipline SCCS employees. (Id. at pp. 3-6.) The County also cites
an Ohio Attorney General opinion finding a county children services board was not under the
control of Summit County. (Id. at p. 6 (citing 194 Ohio Op. Atty. Gen. No. 94-095 (Ohio A.G.),
1994 WL 725890 (Dec. 30, 1994).)) In that opinion, the Ohio Attorney General concluded:
“Ohio Const. art. X, § 3 does not authorize a county to adopt a charter amendment that would
place a . . . county children services board . . . under the legislative control of either the county
executive or the legislative authority of a charter county.” Ohio Op. Atty. Gen. No. 94-095.
Ms. Curtis does not dispute the legal authority cited by the County to show its lack of
authority over SCCS and its employees. She acknowledges that “the County denies certain
authority over SCCS,” but argues that she has “clearly allege[d] the County manages SCCS.”
(Id. at p. 5 (citing Complaint, ¶ 9).) In the cited paragraph, Ms. Curtis alleges:
Defendant County of Summit, Ohio is the official managerial and legal body of
Summit County, Ohio. With a charter form of government, it manages over ten (10)
departments in addition to overseeing various agencies and divisions, including
SCCS. It is one of the largest employers in the county and is headquartered in
Akron, Ohio.
(Complaint, p. 2, ¶ 9.) Given her failure to challenge the authority demonstrating that the County
and SCCS are separate government entities, and that the County does not have authority over
SCCS’s employees, any interpretation of ¶ 9 as alleging an employment relationship between
Plaintiff and the County is no more than a legal conclusion couched as factual allegation, which
need not be accepted as true. See Hensley Mfg, 579 F.3d at 609. Based on its review of the
Complaint, the Court finds Ms. Curtis has failed to adequately and plausibly allege that the
County was her employer, or that it otherwise exercised control over the employment actions
challenged in the Complaint. See Nelson v. Clermont Cnty. Veterans' Serv. Comm’n, No. 1:11-
CV-335-HJW, 2012 WL 893877, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 15, 2012) (finding allegations that
county was an “employer” were inadequate to state a claim under the ADA and FMLA).
Ms. Curtis also argues the County’s focus on its lack of authority “ignores the ultimate
questions in this case,” which are: “[W]as Plaintiff discriminated against due to her religious
beliefs and, if so, who was responsible for the discriminatory practices and policies?” (ECF Doc.
22, p. 4.) Even if the County did not have authority to take the challenged actions, Ms. Curtis
argues that “does not foreclose all possibility that the County influenced SCCS’s mandates and
discipline of employees.” (Id. at p. 5.) In particular, she argues that her Complaint “suggests the
County was responsible for SCCS’s re-institution of a mask mandate” and “states enough to
plausibly allege that SCCS may have adopted the County’s masking policies which ultimately
led to Plaintiff’s discriminatory termination.” (Id. at pp. 5-6 (citing Complaint, ¶¶ 22-23).)
Although Ms. Curtis argues that the allegations in the Complaint “suggest[]” the County
was responsible for SCCS instructing its employees to return to mask wearing, and that SCCS
“may have” been “adopt[ing] the County’s masking policies” (id.), the relevant allegations state
only that the County and SCCS had separate masking mandates, that the County lifted and then
reinstituted its own mandate, and that SCCS instructed its employees to return to mask wearing
(Complaint, pp. 4-5, ¶¶ 20-23). There is not even a suggestion in this language that SCCS
instructed its employees to return to mask wearing because the County reinstituted its mandate.
More importantly, even if Ms. Curtis had alleged that SCCS reinstituted its mandate because it
was following the County’s example or “adopt[ing] the County’s masking policies,” Ms. Curtis
has still offered no argument or authority to demonstrate how or why the County would be
legally accountable for SCCS’s actions in that circumstance, given the legal authority
establishing that Defendants are separate legal entities and that the County does not have
authority over SCCS’s employees.
Under Twombly, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court finds that Ms.
Curtis has failed to plausibly allege – beyond a “sheer possibility – that the County was involved
in, or legally responsible for, the alleged conduct that is challenged in Counts I, II, and III of the
Complaint. While Ms. Curtis is not required to include “detailed factual allegations,” she must
provide more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. Ms. Curtis’ conclusory allegations of discriminatory or retaliatory conduct by the
County do not “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Given Ms. Curtis’ failure to meet these basic pleading standards, her additional argument that “it
is simply too early in the process” to assess whether “the County exerted a culpable level of
control here” is not well taken. (ECF Doc. 22.)
For the reasons set forth above, the County’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is
GRANTED and Plaintiffs claims against the County are dismissed.
B. Plaintiff’s Request for Leave to Amend Complaint
Having granted the County’s Motion, this Court must next consider Ms. Curtis’ request
in the alternative for leave to amend the Complaint “to assert that her paychecks are issued by
the Summit County Fiscal Officer and that her employer is listed as the Summit County Fiscal
Officer on her W-2.” (ECF Doc. 22, p. 6.) With these added allegations, Ms. Curtis argues this
case is analogous to Burkhard v. Henry Soil & Water Conservation Dist., No. 3:02CV7428, 2005
WL 1863828 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 2005), where the court found two public entities – a county and
a soil and water conservation district – should be aggregated as a “single employer” for Title VII
purposes. (ECF Doc. 22, pp. 2-4.)
The County responds that the proposed allegations would still be inadequate to
demonstrate the amount of control over SCCS employees necessary for Title VII liability,
consistent with the courts’ findings in Satterwhite v. Ashtabula Cnty. Metroparks, 514 F. Supp.
3d 1014, 1035 (N.D. Ohio 2021) and Onuoha v. Greene Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, No. 3:15-
CV-047, 2015 WL 7820633 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 12, 2015), report and recommendation adopted,
No. 3:15-CV-47, 2015 WL 7871352 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 3, 2015). (ECF Doc. 23, pp. 4-5.)
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that leave to amend should be freely given
when justice requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, a court is not required to grant leave
to amend where there is “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.” Skatemore,
Inc. v. Whitmer, 40 F.4th 727, 737 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 527 (2022) (quoting
Parchman v. SLM Corp., 896 F.3d 728, 736 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
178, 182 (1962)) (emphasis in original). For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that
amendment as requested by Ms. Curtis would be futile.
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge or discriminate against a person
with respect to her employment because of her “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . .”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).1 An “employer” is defined as “a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent of such a person.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b). “The determination of whether a particular entity is an employer of a Title
VII plaintiff involves an examination of whether the alleged employer exercises control over the
manner and means of the plaintiff’s work.” Sutherland v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 344 F.3d
603, 612 (6th Cir. 2003).
“While direct employment relationships provide the usual basis for liability under Title
VII, there are situations where two entities are so interrelated that they may be deemed a
common employer for Title VII.” Higgins v. Vitran Exp. Inc., No. 1:09CV228, 2009 WL
3873662, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 18, 2009). An entity that does not meet the definition of
1 Both parties focus their legal arguments exclusively on the Title VII claims set forth in Counts I and II of the
Complaint. Since Plaintiff has not proposed to make any amendments to revive the RFRA claim in Count III, that
claim is not considered in assessing Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend the Complaint.
employer because it does “not formally employ the plaintiff or do[es] not meet the numerosity
requirement [] may still face liability through the single-employer or joint-employer doctrines.”
Sanford v. Main St. Baptist Church Manor, Inc., 449 F. App’x 488, 491 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing
Swallows v. Barnes & Noble Book Stores, Inc., 128 F.3d 990, 993 (6th Cir. 1997)).
“Under the single-employer doctrine, ‘two nominally independent entities are so
interrelated’ that all of the employees of one are attributed to the other.” Sanford, 449 F. App’x
at 491 (quoting Swallows, 128 F.3d at 993 n. 4). In contrast, “[t]he joint-employer doctrine
involves a business that maintains sufficient control over some or all of the formal employees of
another business as to qualify as those employees’ employer; unlike in the single-employer
context, the two businesses are in fact independent.” Id. While the parties in this case use the
term “joint employer” in their briefing, their legal arguments primarily focus on cases decided
under the “single employer” doctrine. (ECF Docs. 17, 22, 23.)
The Sixth Circuit has observed that there is some lack of clarity as to the relationship
between the “single-employer” and “joint-employer” doctrines. Swallows, 128 F.3d at 993 n. 4.
There is additionally some question regarding the applicable standard for a “single-employer
doctrine” analysis in cases where the employers are public subdivisions. Compare Satterwhite,
514 F. Supp. 3d at 1030-31 (applying four-factor test in Swallows, 128 F.3d at 993) with
Burkhard, 2005 WL 1863828, at *2 (applying standard from Lyes v. City of Rivera Beach, Fla.,
166 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1999)). Each standard is briefly outlined below.
As to the “joint-employer doctrine,” the Sixth Circuit has held that an entity may be
considered “the joint employer of another entity’s formal employees” for purposes of liability
under federal anti-discrimination laws “if the two ‘share or co-determine those matters governing
essential terms and conditions of employment.’” Sanford, 449 F. App’x at 492 (quoting Carrier
Corp. v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 778, 781 (6th Cir. 1985)); see also Nethery v. Quality Care Invs., L.P.,
814 F. App’x 97, 103 (6th Cir. 2020). “[M]ajor factors in this determination are the ability to
hire, fire, and discipline, affect compensation and benefits, and direct and supervise
performance.” Sanford, 449 F. App’x at 492.
As to the “single-employer doctrine,” the Sixth Circuit has considered the following four
factors in assessing whether to treat two non-governmental entities as a single employer:
(1) interrelation of operations, i.e., common offices, common record keeping,
shared bank accounts and equipment; (2) common management, common directors
and boards; (3) centralized control of labor relations and personnel; and (4)
common ownership and financial control.
Satterwhite, 514 F. Supp. 3d at 1024 (quoting York v. Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n, 684 F.2d
360, 362 (6th Cir. 1982)); Swallows, 128 F.3d 990, 993–94 (same). “None of these factors is
conclusive, and all four need not be met in every case.” Swallows, 128 F.3d at 994 (citation
omitted). However, “control over labor relations is a central concern.” Swallows, 128 F.3d at
994; see also Satterwhite, 514 F. Supp. 3d at 1024 (explaining that the “central concern driving
courts’ single-employer analyses is the extent to which the nominal employer exercised control
over the named employer’s employment decision of which the employee complains”).
Although the Sixth Circuit has not addressed whether the same four-factor standard
applies when the “single-employer doctrine” is applied to government entities, some district
courts in the Sixth Circuit have applied a different standard that was adopted by the Eleventh
Circuit in Lyes, 166 F.3d 1332. See Burkhard, 2005 WL 1863828, at *2; Beauchamp v. City of
Paducah, No. 5:12-CV-00090-TBR, 2014 WL 2805609, at *3 (W.D. Ky. June 20, 2014; Dumas
v. Hurley Med. Ctr., 905 F. Supp. 2d 775, 780 (E.D. Mich. 2012); Schwarz v. Berrien Springs
Police Dep’t, No. 1:98-CV-88, 1999 WL 819639, at *12-13 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 6, 1999); but see
Satterwhite, 514 F. Supp. 3d at 1030-31 (“[T]he Court is not persuaded that the Sixth Circuit
would necessarily adopt Lyes, particularly when other circuits approach the issue of aggregating
public employers differently from the Eleventh Circuit.”).
The Lyes court found the four-factor standard did not apply where a party sought to
“aggregate two or more governmental entities and treat them as a single Title VII ‘employer’. . .”
166 F.3d at 1344 (emphasis added). Instead, the court held:
[W]hen assessing whether multiple governmental entities are a single “employer”
under Title VII, we begin with the presumption that governmental subdivisions
denominated as separate and distinct under state law should not be aggregated for
purposes of Title VII. That presumption may be rebutted by evidence establishing
that a governmental entity was structured with the purpose of evading the reach of
federal employment discrimination law. Absent an evasive purpose, the presumption
against aggregating separate public entities will control the inquiry, unless it is
clearly outweighed by factors manifestly indicating that the public entities are so
closely interrelated with respect to control of the fundamental aspects of the
employment relationship that they should be counted together under Title VII.
Id. at 1345. In applying this standard, the Lyes court found some factors from the existing four-
factor test to be inapplicable, including “common management” and “common ownership or
financial control.” Id. at 1343. In contrast, the court found factors such as “interrelation of
operations” and “centralized control of labor operations” remained applicable. Id. at 1345. The
court explained that “[u]seful indicia of control may be drawn from the agency context,
including: the authority to hire, transfer, promote, discipline or discharge; the authority to
establish work schedules or direct work assignments; [and] the obligation to pay or the duty to
train the charging party.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The court also
observed that all courts applying a “single-employer” doctrine share a “common focus” in that
they all “seek to determine who (or which entity) is in control of the fundamental aspects of the
employment relationship that gave rise to the claim.” Id. (citing cases).
The three standards above may be summarized as follows. Under the “joint-
employment” doctrine, courts consider whether the entities “‘share or co-determine . . . matters
governing essential terms and conditions of employment,’” like “the ability to hire, fire, and
discipline, affect compensation and benefits, and direct and supervise performance.” Sanford,
449 F. App’x at 492 (citation omitted). Under the Sixth Circuit’s four-factor “single-
employment” analysis, courts are to consider (1) the interrelation of operations, (2) common
management, (3) centralized control of labor relations and personnel, and (4) common ownership
and financial control, with “control over labor relations” being “a central concern.” Swallows,
128 F.3d at 994. Alternately, under the Lyes “single-employment” standard, there is a
presumption that public entities should not be aggregated, and the presumption must be “clearly
outweighed by factors manifestly indicating that the public entities are . . . closely interrelated
with respect to control of the fundamental aspects of the employment relationship,” with indicia
of control that may include: “the authority to hire, transfer, promote, discipline or discharge; the
authority to establish work schedules or direct work assignments; [and] the obligation to pay or
the duty to train the charging party.” 166 F.3d at 1345.
Here, Ms. Curtis argues the Court should apply the Lyes standard to find that the County
“is sufficiently interrelated with SCCS” for the entities to be aggregated as an employer under
Title VII because Plaintiff “can show that her W-2 was issued by the County and that her
paychecks are issued from the County’s account.” (ECF Doc. 22, p. 4.) She argues that such a
holding is supported by the court’s finding in Burkhard that a county was an employer under
Title VII when it was listed as the employer on the plaintiff’s W-2 and the county auditor issued
the plaintiffs’ paychecks. (Id. at p. 3-4.) The County argues in response that “managing payroll
does not equate to exercising control over an employee.” (ECF Doc. 23, p. 4.)
The plaintiff in Burkhard sued his former employer – a soil and water conservation
district – and the local county, arguing that the government entities should be aggregated as a
single employer under Title VII. 2005 WL 1863828. The court acknowledged that the entities
were independent legal bodies, with district employees supervised by and accountable to district
leadership and subject to district personnel policies and pay scales. Id. at *3. Nevertheless, it
found the plaintiff had “presented significant evidence of interrelation between the District and
the County” under Lyes because the county was listed as the plaintiff’s employer on his W-2, the
county auditor issued district employee paychecks, and the plaintiff was “listed on his pay stub
as employee number one hundred nineteen (119).” Id. In further support of this finding, the
Burkhard court explained:
Furthermore, the County plays a significant role in the determination and
administration of employee benefits. The County Commissioners select the health
care plan provided to the District’s employees, the County’s workers’
compensation policy covers the District, the District’s Public Employee Retirement
System payments and administration is done by the County, and the County
Commissioners determine what paid holidays the District’s employees receive.
Additionally, Burkhard was required to attend County personnel management
training sessions. Thus, regarding fundamental aspects of the employment
relationship, there is significant interrelation between the District and the County.
Id. at *4.
The analysis and findings of the Burkhard decision were recently discussed at length by
this court in Satterwhite, 514 F. Supp. 3d 1014. The court contrasted the findings in Burkhard
with the findings of three other courts within the Sixth Circuit who applied a Lyes analysis. Id. at
1027-30 (citing Burkhard, 2005 WL 1863828; Beauchamp, 2014 WL 2805609; Dumas, 905 F.
Supp. 2d 775; Schwarz, 1999 WL 819639). While the decision in Burkhard was premised
generally on “significant interrelation” between two entities “regarding fundamental aspects of
the employment relationship” 2005 WL 1863828, at *4, the other courts focused more
specifically on who was in control of “the fundamental aspects of the employment relationship
that gave rise to the claim.” Dumas, 905 F.Supp.2d at 780-81 (quoting Lyes) (emphasis in
Dumas); Beauchamp, 2014 WL 2805609, at *4 (same); see also Schwarz, 1999 WL 819639, at
*16 (finding entities separate “because plaintiffs have presented no evidence that the village and
township exercised control over employees of the police department”).
Following a detailed analysis of the decisions applying the Lyes standard, the Satterwhite
court ultimately was “not persuaded that the Sixth Circuit would necessarily adopt Lyes,” and
instead applied the Sixth Circuit’s four-factor “single-employer” test. 514 F.Supp.3d at 1031.
Applying the four-factor test, the court found:
At most, Satterwhite's evidence shows that ACMP, a small governmental
subdivision, relied on Ashtabula County, a much larger governmental subdivision,
for support in managing payroll, record-keeping, and employee benefit functions.
The Court agrees with ACMP that Satterwhite's evidence regarding Ashtabula
County's performance of payroll and human resource functions does not suggest
that Ashtabula County exerted control over ACMP's allegedly discriminatory
decision to terminate Satterwhite’s employment.
Id. at 1032. The court then went on to apply the Lyes standard in the alternative, finding the
decisions in Beauchamp and Dumas instructive, and Burkhard unpersuasive. Id. at 1032-33.
Specifically, the court was “not persuaded that a W-2 employer designation is enough to ‘clearly
overcome’ the presumption of separation between [government entities]” given the Lyes court’s
focus on “whether the nominal employer exerted control over the fundamental aspects of the
actual employer’s employment decisions that gave rise to the claim.” Id. at 1033 (citations
omitted). The court found the county and its subdivision should not be aggregated as a single
employer under Lyes or the four-factor single employer test, explaining:
While the Court agrees that Satterwhite’s evidence demonstrates interrelation
between Ashtabula County’s and ACMP’s operations, the Court disagrees that
Satterwhite’s evidence demonstrates that the two were so interrelated that
Ashtabula County exercised control over ACMP’s decision to terminate
Satterwhite’s employment.
Id.
Consistent with the analysis in Satterwhite, this Court finds an additional allegation that
the Summit County Fiscal Officer issued Ms. Curtis’ paychecks and was listed as her employer
on her W-2 would still be insufficient to establish – even at the pleading stage – that the County
is an employer under the “joint-employer” or “single-employer” standards. Even if the County
manages paychecks and W-2s for SCCS, Ms. Curtis has offered neither factual allegations nor
legal authority to support a further finding that the County was able to hire, fire, discipline, affect
benefits, or direct or supervise her performance under the joint-employer standard. See Sanford,
449, F. App’x at 494. She has likewise failed to allege or cite legal authority to fully address the
“central concern” of the four-factor single-employer standard, that the County exercise
“centralized control over labor relations and personnel.” Swallows, 128 F. 3d at 994; see
Satterwhite, 514 F. Supp. 3d at 1024 (explaining central concern is the extent to which the entity
“exercised control over the . . . employment decision of which the employee complains”). She
has also failed to allege factual grounds or cite legal support for a finding that the County
exercised “control of the fundamental aspects of the employment relationship that gave rise to
the claim” under the Lyes standard. Lyes, 166 F. 3d at 1345; Satterwhite, 514 F. Supp. 3d at
1033. The Court therefore finds that the amendment proposed by Ms. Curtis remains insufficient
to state a claim against the County as an “employer” under Title VII.
The Burkhard court’s findings do not require a different result. Not only is this Court
persuaded by the Satterwhite court’s criticism of that decision, the Court also observes that the
Burkhard court did not simply rely on checks and W-2s to support its finding of “significant
evidence of interrelation” between the county and its subdivision, but also highlighted the
county’s significant role with respect to employee benefits (including health care, workers’
compensation, retirement, and holidays) and personnel management. 2005 WL 1863828, at *4.
This Court is also unconvinced by Ms. Curtis’ argument that it is premature to assess the
County’s status as a Title VII “employer” at the pleading stage. She cites no authority for this
proposition, which is contrary to existing caselaw. See Nelson, 2012 WL 893877, at *6
(“Plaintiff argues that the Court must decide the ‘employer’ issue on summary judgment after
discovery []. On the contrary, research reflects numerous cases where defendants were dismissed
on the ground that they were not the plaintiff’s employer as a matter of law, and thus could not
be liable for employment discrimination or retaliation claims.”) (citing cases).
For the reasons above, the Court finds Ms. Curtis’ proposed amendments would be futile
because her Title VII claims against the County “still could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss.” Skatemore, 40 F.4th at 737 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the County’s Motion (ECF Doc. 17),
dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the County of Summit, and DENIES Plaintiff’s request for
leave to file an amended complaint.
August 28, 2023
/s/Amanda M. Knapp
AMANDA M. KNAPP
United States Magistrate Judge