Wormald v. Bracy

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

ASHLEY WORMALD, ) CASE NO. 1:22-cv-405

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE DAVIDA. RUIZ

)

V. )

)

WARDEN CHARMAINE BRACY, et )

al., ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

)

Defendants. )

Now pending before the Court is the motion to dismiss Plaintiff Ashley Wormald’s

Complaint. The Complaint raises the following causes of action: (1) an action under 28 □□□□□□ §

1983 for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments against Defendant Brandon

Kohler; and (2) an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments against all Defendants. (R. 1, PageID# 4-7). Defendants Bracy, Brownlee,

Eppinger, Eslick, Evans, Kelly, and Lawson! filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for failure

to state a claim. (R. 21). Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition (R. 31), and Defendants

have filed a reply in support of the motion to dismiss. (R. 35).

I. Factual Allegations

The following factual allegations come from Plaintiff's Complaint. Plaintiff was

incarcerated at Northeast Reintegration Center (“NERC”) from December 2018 through

December 2021. (R. 1, PageID# 2, §1). Defendant Charmaine Bracy was the Warden at NERC.

! The remaining defendant, Brandon Kohler, is not represented by the Office of the Ohio

Attorney General.

Id . at ¶2. Defendant LaShann Eppinger was also the Warden at NERC. Id. at ¶3. Defendant

Brandon Kohler is alleged to have been an employee of NERC at all relevant times relevant. Id.

at ¶4. Defendant Kelly was a Prisoner Rape Elimination Act (PREA) Investigator at NERC at all

applicable times. Id. at ¶5. Defendant Eslick was the Assistant to the Warden at NERC at all

applicable times. Id. at ¶6. Defendant Brian Evans was the Deputy Warden at NERC at all

applicable times. Id. at ¶7. Id. at ¶8. Defendant Lloyd Brownlee was a Corrections

Officer/Investigator at NERC at all applicable times. Id. at ¶8. Defendant Taylor Lawson was a

Case Manager at NERC and was Plaintiff Wormald’s case manager at all applicable times while

she was incarcerated at NERC. Id. at ¶9. All the above individuals have been sued in their

individual and official capacities. Id. at ¶¶2-9.2

The Com[plaint avers that “[o]n several occasions while Plaintiff … was incarcerated at

NERC through the month of June 2021,” Defendant Kohler violated her “rights by abusing,

engaging in sexual misconduct and/or sexually assaulting” Plaintiff while she was an inmate at

NERC. (R. 1, PageID# 4-5, ¶14). The Complaint concludes that Defendant Kohler violated

Plaintiff’s “right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, the right to be protected from

serious harm, and the right to life, liberty, or property with due process of law.” Id. at ¶15.

With respect to ALL Defendants, Plaintiff makes the legal allegation that they were

“negligent, careless, reckless, wanton and/or willful while acting under color of law, acted with

deliberate, callous, and unreasonable indifference to Plaintiff Ashley Wormald’s constitutional

rights by causing and/or allowing Plaintiff Ashley Wormald to be sexually assaulted and abused”

by Defendant Kohler. Id. at ¶18. Plaintiff alleges Defendants exhibited “deliberate, callous, and

2 The Complaint also names ten “John Doe” defendants with no description of their roles other

than the assertion that they were employees or agents of the State of Ohio and/or NERC.

un reasonable indifference” in the following ways:

a. Failing to properly staff Ashley Wormald’s prison unit;

b. Failing to monitor Ashley Wormald’s prison unit;

c. Ignoring complaints of Brandon Kohler’s sexual involvement, sexual assault

and/or abuse of inmates and/or other individuals;

d. Failing to remove Brandon Kohler from Ashley Wormald’s prison unit upon

the opening of an investigation into allegations of Kohler’s misconduct and/or

sexual assault and/or abuse of inmates and instead wrongfully punished/retaliated

against the victim Plaintiff Ashley Wormald;

e. Failing to terminate Brandon Kohler’s employment and/or place him on

administrative leave upon being put on notice of sexual assault and abuse

allegations against him;

f. Failing to provide protection to Plaintiff from a clear danger;

g. Knew or should have known that there was a problem with sexual assaults

and/or abuse of prisoners and/or others at NERC, but failed to provide protection

to inmates such as Plaintiff Ashley Wormald;

h. Retaliated against Plaintiff Ashley Wormald after she reported abuse in

violation of prison rules and/or the Prisoner Rape Elimination Act (PREA);

i. Making it a custom or practice to not adequately or inadequately supervise,

investigate, discipline and/ prevent employees of NERC from engaging in sexual

harassment, sexual abuse and/or sexual assault against inmates;

j. Making it a custom of failing to adequately train on or enforce the applicable

process and procedures set forth by the Ohio Department of Corrections;

(R. 1, PageID# 6-7, ¶18). The Complaint further alleges that “[a] custom and practice of sexual

abuse and sexual assault of female inmates, such as Plaintiff, and a custom and practice of

inaction was permitted and even encouraged at NERC by Defendants” that was known by and

accepted by Defendants. Id. at ¶¶20-21.

II. Standard of Review

When ruling upon a motion to dismiss filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12 (b)(6), a court must accept as true all the factual allegations contained in the complaint

and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007); accord Streater v. Cox, 336 F. App’x 470, 474 (6th

Cir. 2009). Nonetheless, a court need not accept a conclusion of law as true:

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” As

the Court held in [Bell Atlantic Corp. v.] Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955,

167 L.Ed. 2d 929, the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require

“detailed factual allegations,” but it demands more than an unadorned, the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Id., at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167

L.Ed. 2d 929 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92

L.Ed. 2d 209 (1986)). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 550 U.S., at

555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed. 2d 929. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders

“naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id., at 557, 127 S.

Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed. 2d 929.

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id., at 570,

127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed. 2d 929. A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id., at 556, 127

S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed. 2d 929. The plausibility standard is not akin to a

“probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are

“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between

possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id., at 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955,

167 L.Ed. 2d 929 (brackets omitted).

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544 (2007)).

III. Analysis

A. Count Two: § 1983

For a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two elements: (1)

“the defendant acted under color of state law;” and (2) “the defendant’s conduct deprived

th e plaintiff of rights secured under federal law.” Chambers v. Sanders, 63 F.4th 1092,

1096 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th

Cir. 2010)). As the Complaint unambiguously alleges that the moving Defendants were

all employed by the State at the NERC and that said individuals acted under color of state

law (R. 1, PageID# 2-4), the Court’s inquiry focuses on the second prong—whether the

alleged conduct deprived Plaintiff of a federal right.

1. Eighth Amendment

It is well established that “[a] prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a

substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828-829 (1994) (citations omitted). The Eighth Amendment

“also imposes duties on these officials, who must provide humane conditions of

confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing,

shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of

the inmates[.]’” Id. at 832 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–527 (1984)).

Recognizing that “[p]rison conditions may be restrictive and even harsh, but gratuitously

allowing the beating or rape of one prisoner by another serves no legitimate penological

objective.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment where two requirements are

satisfied. First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively and sufficiently serious.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The Complaint alleges that “on several occasions” during her

incarceration at NERC, Defendant Kohler, an alleged NERC employee, “abus[ed],

engag[ed] in sexual misconduct and/or sexually assault[ed] Plaintiff….” (R. 1, PageID#

5, ¶14). While Plaintiff’s allegation is admittedly somewhat vague and imprecise, the

C ourt cannot find at this early stage of the proceedings that the Complaint fails to

sufficiently allege an objectively serious deprivation. Moreover, Defendants’ brief in

support of their motion does not argue that the alleged conduct is insufficiently serious,

but only that Defendants had no knowledge that a substantial risk of harm existed. (R. 21,

PageID# 75-76).

This brings us to the second requirement: “To violate the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause, a prison official must have a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’

In prison-conditions cases that state of mind is one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate

health or safety….” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “An official is deliberately indifferent if he

or she ‘knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official

must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’” Reedy v. West, 988

F.3d 907, 914 (6th Cir. 2021) (“This standard entails ‘more than mere negligence’ and

instead is akin to ‘subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law.’”)).

The Complaint alleges that Defendants ignored “complaints of Brandon Kohler’s

sexual involvement, sexual assault and/or abuse of inmates and/or other individuals,” that

Defendants failed “to remove Brandon Kohler from Ashley Wormald’s prison unit upon

the opening of an investigation into allegations of Kohler’s misconduct and/or sexual

assault and/or abuse of inmates and instead wrongfully punished/retaliated against the

victim Plaintiff Ashley Wormald,” and that Defendants failed “to terminate Brandon

Kohler’s employment and/or place him on administrative leave upon being put on notice

of sexual assault and abuse allegations against him.” (R. 1, PageID# 6).

Plaintiff’s allegations are admittedly perilously vague. While the Complaint

al leges several occasions on which abuse, sexual misconduct and/or sexual assault

occurred, it does not unequivocally allege that any of the aforementioned complaints

concerning Defendant Kohler predate any of the instances of abuse. This is significant,

because it goes to the very heart of the issue of whether Defendants knew of and

disregarded an excessive risk. The Complaint is also conspicuously vague on the issue of

who made the alleged complaints concerning Defendant Kohler’s conduct, and to whom

such complaints were made. Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings, the Court finds

that the Complaint can be construed as alleging that Defendants were well aware of the

sexual assaults of Defendant Kohler prior to at least one of their occurrences, and

recklessly allowed these assault to continue by ignoring an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s

safety.

Thus, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim in Count Two

is not well taken.

2. Due Process Claim

Defendants’ motion to dismiss also argues that the Due Process Claim in Count

Two should be dismissed because § 1983 does not cover official conduct that violates

only state law, arguing that Plaintiff’s claims against them sound in negligence. (R. 21,

PageID# 74-75, citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 328 (1986) (concluding that “the

Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing

unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property”)). Accord Chambers v. Sanders,

63 F.4th 1092, 1098 (6th Cir. 2023) (finding that the Due Process Clause is not

implicated by an act resulting in an “unintended loss of injury to life, liberty, or

property,” even if a government official acts negligently with respect to a plaintiff’s

co nstitutionally protected interests or unintentionally harms those interests with no

culpable state of mind).

It is Defendants’ position that the Complaint “consistently argues negligence,

rather than a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process violation.” (R. 21, PageID# 74-75).

While some of the allegations in the Complaint admittedly sound like claims of

negligence, such as the alleged failure to properly staff or monitor the Plaintiff’s prison

unit, the allegations, taken as a whole, sufficiently alleges actions that could be

tantamount to deliberate indifference if supported by evidence. As stated above, the

Complaint can be construed as alleging that Defendants were well aware of the sexual

assaults of Defendant Kohler by virtue of complaints made about his conduct, that such

complaints may have been made prior to at least one of the occurrences of which Plaintiff

complains, and that Defendants’ failure to protect Plaintiff against repeated assaults by

Defendant Kohler—under these circumstances—went beyond mere negligence but

crossed the line into recklessness and a deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s safety.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the Due Process Clause claim in Count

Two is not well taken.

B. Qualified Immunity

Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the

claims set forth in the Complaint. (R. 21, PageID# 78-79).

Defendants are correct that “[u]nder the doctrine of qualified immunity,

‘government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

st atutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”

Miller v. Sanilac Cnty., 606 F.3d 240, 247 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Whether

government officials are entitled to qualified immunity generally involves two inquiries:

“First, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, has the plaintiff

shown that a constitutional violation has occurred? Second, was the right clearly

established at the time of the violation?” Id.

Both questions at this initial stage must be answered in the affirmative. The

Complaint sufficiently alleges that Plaintiff was the victim of abuse and/or sexual assault,

and that the moving Defendants, having been put on notice of Defendant Kohler’s alleged

behavior, knew of an excessive risk to her health and safety yet disregarded that risk.

With respect to the second question, Plaintiff points to a decision from the Sixth

Circuit Court of Appeals stating that “an individual’s right to be free from a government

official’s sexual assault was clearly established in July 2017, including that facilitating

such an assault would also violate that right. In addition to this established law, the

Supreme Court has explained that: ‘officials can still be on notice that their conduct

violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.’” Sexton v. Cernuto, 18

F.4th 177, 192 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).

Defendants’ reply, while maintaining that they are entitled to qualified immunity,

fails to address this binding authority. As such, the motion to dismiss based on qualified

immunity is denied at this stage.

C. Remaining Arguments

Defendants’ motion to dismiss asserts that they cannot be held liable under the

doctrine of respondeat superior. (R. 21, PageID# 76-77). Plaintiff responds that she is not

se eking to impose liability on the basis of respondeat superior. (R. 31, PageID# 129-

131). Indeed, the Complaint does not mention respondeat superior, nor does the Court

construe the Complaint as attempting to raise such an argument. As such, Defendants’

argument is moot.

Defendants also assert that they enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity with

respect to claims made against them in their official capacity. (R. 21, PageID# 80).

“When a plaintiff brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against a state official in his or her

official capacity, the claim is treated as though brought against the government itself.”

Moncier v. Jones, 557 Fed. App’x 407, 409 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Kentucky v. Graham,

473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)). “To that end, the Eleventh Amendment bars official-capacity

claims for damages against state officials.” Id. (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)); see also accord Rolfes v. Davis, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190401,

*4 (N.D. Ohio, Oct. 4, 2021) (Gwin, J.).3

Plaintiff has not suggested that the moving Defendants are not state officials, but

argues that her official capacity claims should go forward because “[a]lthough a state

official sued in his official capacity is generally entitled to sovereign immunity [for

monetary damages], there is an exception to that immunity … for claims that ‘seek

prospective relief to end a continuing violation of federal law.’” Rudd v. Pittman, 2022

U.S. App. LEXIS 11219, *3-4 (6th Cir. Apr. 25, 2022) (citing Diaz v. Mich. Dep't of

Corr., 703 F.3d 956, 964 (6th Cir. 2013)). Plaintiff contends that her lawsuit does not

3 “While it is true that state officials sued in their official capacity, like the state they represent,

are immune from Section 1983 liability under the Eleventh Amendment … that immunity does

not extend to municipalities or their officials.” Hawks v. Jones, 105 F. Supp. 2d 718, 723 (E.D.

Mich. 2000).

so lely seek monetary damages, as her prayer for relief asks for “all other relief which this

Court deems equitable and just.” (R. 31, PageID# 134-135).

While the Complaint contains a catch-all claim for relief, it notably does not

allege a continuing violation of federal law. To the contrary, the Complaint states that she

was incarcerated at NERC through December of 2021, raising the inference that she is no

longer incarcerated at that aforementioned institution where Defendants are/were

employed. As such, the Complaint does not fall into the identified exception, as it does

not seek prospective relief to end a continuing violation of federal law.

Therefore, the moving Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED to the extent

it seeks dismissal of claims against them in their official capacity only. The claims

against these Defendants, however, can proceed in their individual capacities.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (R. 21) is DENIED, except

that it is GRANTED with respect to official capacity claims against the moving Defendants

Bracy, Brownlee, Eppinger, Eslick, Evans, Kelly, and Lawson.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ David A. Ruiz

David A. Ruiz

United States District Judge

Date: September 26, 2023