Lockhart v. Jarrett

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

JARVIS LOCKHART, CASE NO. 3:23 CV 1159

Plaintiff, JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II

v.

VANESSA JARRETT, et al., MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

ORDER

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

Pro se Plaintiff Jarvis Lockhart, an inmate in the Warren Correctional Institution, filed this

civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sandusky County Sheriff’s Deputies Vanessa

Jarrett and Chelsea Mercer, Sandusky County Common Pleas Court Bailiff Candace Talbot,

Special Prosecutor Daniel Arnold, Sandusky County Prosecutor Laura Alkire, Sandusky County

Common Pleas Court Judge Jon Ickes, Visiting Judge James Bates, Sandusky County Sheriff Chris

Hilton, Sandusky County Prosecutor Beth Tischler, and Sandusky County Commissioners Russ

Zimmerman, Scott Miller, and Charles Schwochow. See Doc. 1-1. Plaintiff claims he was

wrongfully accused of assaulting a Sheriff’s Deputy in a court elevator after his sentencing in

another case. Id. at 5-9. He asserts claims for malicious prosecution, libel, slander, defamation,

and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 5, 9. He seeks compensatory and punitive

damages. Id. at 9. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that on September 21, 2021, he was in the Sandusky County Court of

Common Pleas for sentencing in another criminal case. Id. at 5. He admits he was unhappy with

the sentencing outcome. Id. at 5. He says the prosecution was based on his “knocking [over] a

bottle of soda on a bench in the hallway” and he heard his public defender laughing at him. Id. He

was turning to confront his attorney when deputies escorting him from the courtroom pushed him

onto the elevator. Id. He claims Deputies Jarrett, Mercer, and Darling1 later testified that Plaintiff

had refused to enter the elevator and became dead weight. Id. Once on the elevator, Jarrett ordered

Plaintiff to turn around and face the wall. Id. Plaintiff admits that he refused to comply and invited

the Deputy to “make” him turn around. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff contends Jarrett then laid down on the

floor and began screaming for help, claiming Plaintiff had attacked her. Id. at 6. Detective Holskey

from the Fremont Police Department2 and Darling entered the elevator to assist. Id.

Plaintiff claims Darling later testified he helped to push Plaintiff onto the elevator and

Plaintiff was pushing the officers back when Darling witnessed Jarrett fall. Id. Mercer’s testimony

echoed Darling’s, except Mercer claimed that at some point, Jarrett either fell or got knocked

down. Id. Plaintiff denies he pushed the Deputies. Id. Plaintiff was arrested and charged with

assault of an officer with a repeat violent offender specification. Id. at 6-7. He was indicted by a

Sandusky County Grand Jury on November 5, 2021. Id. at 7. The case proceeded to a jury trial on

June 7, 2022; the jury found Plaintiff not guilty of felonious assault. Id.; see State v. Lockhart, No.

21 CR 844 (Sandusky Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas).

Plaintiff brings this action for malicious prosecution, libel, slander, defamation, and

intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 5. He contends Deputies Jarrett and Mercer lied

or made misleading statements in an attempt to get him convicted. Id. He contends Prosecutor

Alkire is liable for malicious prosecution by allowing false and misleading statements to be made

1. Deputy Darling is not a named Defendant in this case. See Doc. 1-1, at 1, 4.

2. Detective Holskey is not a named Defendant in this case. See Doc. 1-1, at 1, 4.

to the Grand Jury to obtain an indictment. Id. He asserts Judge Ickes is liable for malicious

prosecution for allowing the prosecution to initiate charges and for negligently supervising his

subordinates. Id. at 7. He contends Special Prosecutor Arnold is liable for malicious prosecution

for trying the case when he knew or should have known that the testimony of the Deputies was

false and misleading. Id. He also contends Arnold declared in his closing statement at trial that

Plaintiff’s last act of defiance was to throw his body around the elevator causing serious injury to

Deputy Jarrett. Id. at 7-8. He asserts Bailiff Talbot is liable for malicious prosecution, slander, and

perjury for testifying Plaintiff was out of control and trying to fight the deputies. Id. at 8. Plaintiff

asserts Judge Bates is liable for malicious prosecution for denying his attorney’s motion for

acquittal when the state clearly had not presented evidence of assault. Id. He claims the Sandusky

County Sheriff and the Sandusky County Prosecutor are liable for negligent supervision of their

employees. Id. Finally, he claims the Sandusky County Commissioners are liable “because they

know about and condone even created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices

occur and allow the continuation of the unconstitutional practices.” Id.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365

(1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the Court is required to dismiss

an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319

(1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d

194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327.

A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks

“plausibility in the Complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A pleading

must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be

sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the

allegations in the complaint are true. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not required

to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-

unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal

conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading

standard. Id. In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir.1998).

DISCUSSION

Immunity

Before addressing the merits of Plaintiff’s claims, the Court must dismiss those Defendants

who are absolutely immune from suit for damages. Plaintiff sues two judges for decisions they

made from the bench which he deemed to be unfavorable. Judges, however, are absolutely immune

from civil suits which derive from decisions they made and actions they committed while presiding

over a case. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991); Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th

Cir. 1997). Immunity is overcome only when the conduct alleged is performed at a time when the

defendant is acting as a private citizen, not as a judge, or when the conduct alleged, although

judicial in nature, is taken in complete absence of all subject matter jurisdiction of the court over

which he or she presides. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12; Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1116. A lack of subject

matter jurisdiction over the case is different from making a decision that is later reversed as being

contrary to the law. A judge will not be deprived of immunity even if the action he or she took was

performed “in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his or her authority”. Barnes, 105

F.3d at 1115 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).

Ickes and Bates were both Common Pleas Court Judges. The Common Pleas Court has

subject matter jurisdiction over prosecutions for alleged violations of Ohio criminal statutes.

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants are based solely on decisions they made

in the course of presiding over his criminal case. These Defendants are absolutely immune from

suit in this case.

Similarly, prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from damages for initiating a

prosecution and in presenting the State’s case. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976);

Pusey v. Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 658 (6th Cir. 1993). Immunity is granted not only for actions

directly related to initiating and presenting a prosecution, but also to activities undertaken “in

connection with [the] duties in functioning as a prosecutor.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431; Higgason v.

Stephens, 288 F.3d 868, 877 (6th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s claims against prosecutors Arnold and

Alkire are based on their presentation of the State’s case to the grand jury and to the petit jury.

Arnold and Alkire are absolutely immune from damages for these actions.

Furthermore, witnesses at trial are absolutely immune from liability for claims based upon

their testimony in judicial proceedings. Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 328 (1983). Plaintiff’s

claims against Talbot and Mercer are based on the testimony they gave to the grand jury and to the

petit jury. They are also absolutely immune from damages.

Non-Participants

In addition to the Defendants who are absolutely immune from suits for damages, Plaintiff

brings claims against individuals who were not present when the incident occurred and did not

participate directly in the criminal proceedings. He claims that the Sandusky County Sheriff and

the Sandusky County Prosecutor are guilty of negligently supervising their employees. He

contends the Sandusky County Commissioners created policies and customs under which

unconstitutional conduct occurs. He does not elaborate on this allegation to identify a particular

custom or policy, nor does he identify a particular constitutional right which these Defendants

violated. Supervisors may be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates in

only certain limited circumstances. The United States Supreme Court has held that “government

officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under the

theory of respondeat superior.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Therefore, “a supervisor cannot be held

liable simply because he or she was charged with overseeing a subordinate who violated the

constitutional rights of another.” Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 241 (6th Cir. 2016)

(citing Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 751 (6th Cir. 2006)). Instead, “supervisory

liability requires some ‘active unconstitutional behavior’ on the part of the supervisor.” Id. at 241

(quoting Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1999)). Consequently, unless the

plaintiff’s complaint affirmatively pleads the direct involvement of the defendant in an allegedly

unconstitutional action, the complaint fails to state a claim against that defendant and dismissal is

warranted. See Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984).

The standard the Court must apply to determine if a supervisor’s failure to supervise or

train is actionable is whether the supervisor “encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in

some other way directly participated in it.” Peatross, 818 F.3d at 242. This means that, “at a

minimum, the plaintiff must show the defendant at least implicitly authorized, approved, or

knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” Id. (internal

quotation omitted). Additionally, there must also be a “causal connection between the defendant’s

wrongful conduct and the violation alleged.” Id. Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to plausibly allege that

Zimmerman, Miller, Schwochow, Hilton, or Tischler implicitly authorized, approved, or

knowingly acquiesced in any allegedly unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates. The claims

against these Defendants are therefore dismissed.

Claims Against Deputy Jarrett

The only remaining claims are those against Deputy Jarrett. Plaintiff first asserts Jarrett

engaged in malicious prosecution in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. To succeed on a

malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the claim is a violation of the Fourth

Amendment, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a criminal prosecution was initiated against him and the

defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute; (2) there was a lack of

probable cause for the criminal prosecution; (3) as a consequence of a legal proceeding, the

plaintiff suffered a “deprivation of liberty,” apart from the initial seizure; and (4) the criminal

proceeding was resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308-10 (6th Cir.

2010).

Plaintiff fails to show elements two and three. First, the Grand Jury found there was

probable cause for the criminal prosecution and issued an indictment. Friedman v. United States,

927 F.2d 259, 262 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating probable cause is presumed when there has been a grand

jury indictment); Higgason v. Stephens, 288 F.3d 868, 877 (6th Cir. 2002) (“the finding of an

indictment, fair upon its face, by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the

existence of probable cause for the purpose of holding the accused to answer”) (quoting Ex parte

United States, 287 U.S. 241, 250 (1932)). Plaintiff’s subsequent acquittal does not negate the

finding of probable cause, as the standard for conviction – beyond a reasonable doubt – is a much

higher standard of proof than required to establish probable cause. See Bradley v. Reno, 749 F.3d

553, 556 (6th Cir. 2014). Second, Plaintiff has not alleged he was deprived of his liberty, apart

from the initial seizure, as a consequence of this criminal proceeding. Plaintiff had been convicted

and sentenced in another criminal action and was serving time for that offense. Plaintiff therefore

fails to state a plausible claim for malicious prosecution.

All of Plaintiff’s other claims against Jarrett arise, if at all, under state tort law.

Supplemental jurisdiction exists whenever state law and federal law claims derive from the same

nucleus of operative facts and when considerations of judicial economy dictate having a single

trial. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966). The Court, however,

may exercise discretion in hearing state law matters. Id. at 726. In cases where the federal law

claims are dismissed before trial, the state law claims should also be dismissed. Id. Having

dismissed Plaintiff’s federal law claims, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

to hear his state law claims and these claims are dismissed without prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is

ORDERED that this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); and the Court

FURTHER CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this

decision could not be taken in good faith.

s/ James R. Knepp II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE