The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
Jimmie L. Washington, ) CASE NO. 5: 23 CV 1219
)
Plaintiff, ) JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
)
v. )
) Memorandum of Opinion and Order
Judge Elinore Stormer, )
)
)
Defendant. )
Pro se Plaintiff Jimmie L. Washington, currently a federal prisoner incarcerated at FCI
Tucson in Arizona, has filed a civil rights complaint in this matter under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Summit County Court of Common Pleas Judge Elinore Stormer. (Doc. No. 1.) He
contends Judge Stormer violated his rights in May 2009 by “forging Judge Mary Rowlands
signature” on an order continuing a pretrial conference in a criminal case against him in Summit
County. (See id. at 6, ¶ I(1); State of Ohio v. Washington, No. CR 2009-03-980, May 8, 2009
Docket Entry (Summit Cty. Ct. of Comm. Pls.)). He seeks monetary relief. He has also filed a
motion for a “declaratory judgment.” (Doc. No. 4.)
Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee in the case. He instead filed a motion to proceed in
forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 2.)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), a prisoner is prohibited from bringing a civil action or
appealing a judgment in a civil action in forma pauperis "if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior
occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court
of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous or malicious, or fails
to state claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of
serious physical injury."
Plaintiff has, on three prior occasions while incarcerated or detained in a facility, filed a
civil action in federal court that was dismissed on grounds that it was frivolous or malicious or
failed to state claim upon which relief may be granted. See, e.g., Washington v. State of Ohio, et
al., No. 5: 21 CV 2003 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 4, 2022)1; Washington v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority,
et al., No. 3: 18 CV 1951 (N.D. Ohio Feb., 1, 2019): Washington v. Chris Gerren, No. 1: 18 CV
1347 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 3, 2018).
Plaintiff has not set forth facts demonstrating, and the Court does not find, he is in
"imminent danger of serious physical injury" within the meaning of the rule. Accordingly,
Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED.
Further, the Court finds it would be futile to require Plaintiff to pay the filing fee in
order to proceed with the case because the Court finds, upon its own review, that his complaint
warrants sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A, a district court
is required to dismiss as soon as practicable after docketing any “complaint in a civil case in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity” that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a)(b).
Judge Stormer is entitled to absolute immunity from Plaintiff’s suit. It is well-
established that judicial officers are absolutely immune from civil suits for money damages
1Plaintiff represented on the motion to proceed in forma pauperis he filed with his complaint in
this case that he could not pay the filing fee because he was incarcerated “in the county jail.” See
No. 5: 21 CV 2003, Docket Entry No. 2 at 4.
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arising out of the performance of judicial functions even if they act erroneously or in bad faith.
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 12 (1991); Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir.
1997). There are only two sets of circumstances in which a judicial officer is not entitled to
immunity. A judge is not immune from liability for “nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken
in the judge’s judicial capacity,” or actions “taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.”
Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12.
Plaintiff has not demonstrated either of these circumstances. He states in purely
conclusory terms that Judge Stormer engaged in a non-judical act and had no jurisdiction to
“forge” Judge Rowland’s signature (see Doc. No. 1. at 9), but his allegations against Judge
Stormer clearly arise out of and pertain to the judicial act of signing a continuance order in a
criminal case, and his purely conclusory accusation of “forgery” by the Judge, without any
cogent specific supporting facts, fails to demonstrate that the Judge acted in the “complete
absence of all jurisdiction.”
In addition to immunity, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal because it is clearly
time-barred. Plaintiff purports to bring this federal action under § 1983, which is governed by a
two-year statute of limitations. Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir. 1989). His
complaint pertains to conduct by Judge Stormer that occurred in May 2009, but he did not file
this action until June 2023, well after the statute of limitations on any § 1983 claim arising from
the Judge’s alleged conduct would have expired. Accordingly, his complaint is subject to
dismissal under § 1915A for this reason as well. See Fraley v. Ohio Gallia Cnty., No. 97-3564,
1998 WL 789385, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 1998) (sua sponte dismissal “is appropriate where the
complaint bears an affirmative defense such as the statute of limitations and is therefore
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frivolous on its face”).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motions to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2)
and for a declaratory judgment (Doc. No. 4) are denied, and this action is dismissed pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an
appeal of this Order is not taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Patricia A. Gaughan
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
United States District Judge
Dated: 9/6/23
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