Opinion

Brown v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Court: District Court, N.D. Ohio
Filed: Aug 28, 2023
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 28.1%

noting that “credibility determinations regarding subjective complaints rest with the ALJ”

How later courts described this case

noting that “credibility determinations regarding subjective complaints rest with the ALJ”
“The findings of the Commissioner are not subject to reversal merely because there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion.”
“A claimant who meets or equals a listed impairment is presumptively disabled, without consideration of her age, education, or work experience.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

RENEE C BROWN, ) CASE NO. 3:22-CV-01441-CEH

)

Plaintiff, ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE

) CARMEN E. HENDERSON

v. )

) MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY )

ADMINISTRATION, )

)

Defendant, )

I. Introduction

Plaintiff, Renee C. Brown (“Claimant”), seeks judicial review of the final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security denying her applications for Period of Disability (“POD”) and

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). This matter is before the Court by consent of the parties

under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 9). For

the reasons set forth below, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner of Social Security’s

nondisability finding.

II. Procedural History

Claimant filed applications for POD and DIB on April 17, 2020, alleging a disability onset

date of February 18, 2018. (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 42). The applications were denied initially and

upon reconsideration, and Claimant requested a hearing before an administrative law judge

(“ALJ”). (Id.). On November 2, 2021, an ALJ held a telephonic hearing, during which Claimant,

represented by counsel, and an impartial vocational expert testified. (Id.). The ALJ issued a written

decision finding Claimant was not disabled on January 28, 2022. (Id. at PageID #: 39). The ALJ’s

decision became final on June 16, 2022, when the Appeals Council declined further review. (Id.

at PageID #: 28).

Claimant filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio on

August 12, 2022 to challenge the Commissioner’s final decision. (ECF No. 1). The parties have

completed briefing in this case. (ECF Nos. 10, 11, 13). Claimant asserts the following assignments

of error:

(1) The ALJ erred when she failed to find at Step Three of the

Sequential Evaluation that Brown satisfied the criteria of Listing

11.02B in accordance with Social Security Ruling 19-4p.

(2) The ALJ committed harmful error at Step Four of the Sequential

Evaluation when she improperly relied on the vocational witness

and found that Brown could perform her past work as a general

clerk.

(3) The ALJ committed harmful error when she failed to properly

apply the criteria of Social Security Ruling 16-3p and found that the

effect of the combination of Brown’s symptom allowed her to

engage in substantial gainful activity on a full-time and sustained

basis.

(ECF No. 10, PageID #: 893).

III. Background

A. Relevant Hearing Testimony

The ALJ summarized the relevant testimony from Claimant’s hearing:

At the hearing, the claimant testified she has chronic pain, for which

she has attended physical therapy. The claimant testified she also

has difficulty with reaching overhead. The claimant alleged that

therapy does sometimes provide some relief of symptoms. She

further testified her weight limits her ability at times to perform

prolonged walking. The claimant testified she is also taking a new

medication for pain, gabapentin, which she alleged causes

drowsiness. She also reported she takes a muscle relaxer for pain

symptoms, which also causes drowsiness.

Regarding headaches, the claimant testified she takes medications

(Imitrex) along with Aleve. She alleged she takes Imitrex twice

monthly due to migraine headaches. She alleged the medication

causes her to feel sick, so she only takes it as a last resort. The

claimant testified her insurance does not cover injections for

headaches. She testified she has headaches that occur 1 to 2 times

weekly and can last from 1 day to 4 days. The claimant testified that

laying down helps relieve symptoms to some degree, and she avoids

light and noise.

She testified that she lives at home with her 15-year-old daughter

and is able to perform some household chores and tasks. However,

she testified that her daughter has to help with sweeping or mopping.

She testified that she cooks dinner when she can and does some

laundry. She also testified she changes the bed sheets and takes her

daughter to school daily. However, she alleged sometimes she is

unable to do so because of symptoms and someone else picks her

up.

On a typical day, the claimant testified she sits or lays down, does

some housework in between resting. The claimant explained when

she is sitting, she reads mystery books or watches TV. She denied

difficulty with following along when watching TV. She also alleged

she tries to attend some of her daughter’s sporting events but alleged

she does not make it to them all. She also testified she exercise three

times weekly, up to 30 minutes, to try and help her fibromyalgia

symptoms.

(ECF No. 7, PageID #: 49–50).

A vocational expert also testified at the administrative hearing. They opined that Claimant

could work their past position as a general clerk with an occasional overhead reaching restriction.

(Id. at PageID #: 94–95). They also opined that Claimant could perform three alternative jobs with

such a restriction. (See id. at PageID #: 88, 89, 90).

B. Relevant Medical Evidence

The ALJ also summarized Claimant’s health records and symptoms:

Turning to the objective medical evidence, the record supports the

claimant has a history of chiropractic treatment for chronic

headaches and neck pain symptoms. (3F/7-8). In March 2018, the

record supports the claimant was participating in treatment with a

primary care physician. (4F/42-45). On exam, it was noted that she

had normal range of motion, no edema, and normal cranial nerve

deficit. (Id.). At her next appointment in January 2019, the claimant

reported lower right back pain and muscle tenderness of the lower

spine; however, she was noted to have had normal range of motion,

no edema, and no bony tenderness. (4F/34-37). Thus, she was

referred for physical therapy for her alleged pain symptoms. (Id.).

Physical therapy records support the claimant participated in 4 visits

in January 2019, but was discharged from therapy on February 13,

2019, when she failed to return for the remainder of her

appointments. (See 19F/1-7).

Treatment notes from September 2019 showed an assessment of

fibromyalgia and she was prescribed Ultram for pain symptoms.

(4F/32-33). Further, the record supports on September 23, 2019, the

claimant was admitted for emergency treatment related to alleged

chest pain, fatigue, and shortness of breath. (4F/12-32). The record

supports the claimant underwent testing, a stress test, and an

echocardiogram, which were normal, but on exam she reported

lightheadedness and feel extremely fatigued. (4F/9-12). In October

2019, for the claimant’s alleged pain symptoms, she underwent

chiropractic treatment. (3F/11-15).

In October 2020, the record supports the claimant was reevaluated

for chronic neck and headache pain. (10F/5-9). At the appointment,

the claimant reported headaches occurring a few times a week and

lasting all day, with pain in her head down to her shoulders. (Id.).

She was noted to have minimal response to her current treatment

(Imitrex, Norvasc, and Zanaflex) and her medications were

adjusted; specifically, Topamax was added. (Id.). It was further

noted that she had a history of rebound headaches due to

medications. (10F/5-9). On exam, the claimant was noted to have

had normal gait, intact sensation, normal muscle tone and strength,

normal memory, but with mild to moderate tenderness over the

lower cervical spine and trapezoid muscles bilaterally. (Id.). She was

also referred to physical therapy for her pain symptoms. (Id.).

Treatment record support the claimant participated in physical

therapy in November 2020 and December 2020 for her neck pain

and headaches symptoms. (12F/5-8, 14F/5-6/7-8, 15F/5-6, and

16F/20-23). On December 21, 2020, the claimant also presented for

a neurological assessment related to her headaches. (15F/6-11). On

exam, she was noted to have had no confusion or aphasia, normal

memory, normal muscle tone, no focal weakness, normal (5/5)

strength, and normal gait. (Id.). Yet, she was also observed to have

had moderate tenderness of the cervical paraspinal muscles and

trapezius muscles bilaterally and mild to moderate tenderness over

the temporalis muscles on both sides. (Id.). She was assessed with

fibromyalgia and chronic tension headaches, possibly migraines and

her medication (Zanaflex) was increased in dosage. (Id.). She also

underwent x-rays of the cervical spine on December 21, 2020 which

showed evidence of somewhat limited mobility on extension and of

the upper cervical spine on flexion; mild anterolisthesis C3 on C4

and C5 on C5, increased slightly with flexion; intervertebral disc

space narrowing C5-C6 and C6-C7; mild spondylosis seen at C4-

C7; partial facet fusion of C2-C3; multilevel facet arthropathy, most

severe at C3-T1; some impingement on the neural foramina, best

seen at C5-C6 and C6-C7 on the left; no loss of vertebral height;

mild degenerative changes of the atlantoaxial joints; and no

destructive or blastic lesion.

Further, in February 2021, the claimant was evaluated by pain

management for symptoms control related to fibromyalgia, cervical

pain, and her headaches. (16F/3-19). She reported headaches

occurring several times weekly and indicated she has ongoing

intermittent neck pain and bilateral shoulder pain. (Id.). On exam, it

was noted that the claimant had tenderness and limited range of

motion of her cervical spine; however, she was also observed to

have had normal muscle tone and strength; normal sensation; and

normal gait. (Id.). Further, it was indicated that she had mild to

moderate tenderness over lower cervical paraspinal muscles and

trapezius muscles bilaterally along with tender points on scapular

region supraspinatus and pyriformis areas. (Id.). For treatment of her

symptoms the record supports that acupuncture was provided and

her medications were adjusted (Toprol and magnesium trials started

for her headaches and Norvasc dose was cut in half). (Id.).

The record supports no further treatment until the claimant

established with a new primary care provider in September 2021.

(21F/1-8). At that time, the claimant was assessed with fibromyalgia

and she was started on new medication (gabapentin) for her pain

symptoms and Zanaflex was also continued. (Id.). On exam, the

claimant was noted to have had tenderness with multiple myalgias

present, but no edema, normal attention, normal cognition, and it

was noted that she presented as mildly anxious. (Id.).

(Id. at PageID #: 50–51).

IV. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ made the following findings relevant to this appeal:

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social

Security Act through March 31, 2024.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since

February 18, 2018, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: tension

headache/migraine/drug induced headache; fibromyalgia; and

cervical degenerative disc disease. (15/13-16); (20 CFR

404.1520(c)).

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of

the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

(20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to

perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except: The

claimant can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and can

occasionally climb ramps and stairs, crouch, kneel, stoop, and crawl.

She must be able to alternate positions, at his/her option, every 45

minutes for 1-2 minutes so long as she is not off task or has to leave

the vicinity of the workstation. With the bilateral upper extremities,

she can occasionally reach overhead. She can have occasional

concentrated exposure to unprotected moving mechanical

machinery and cannot work around vibrations or unprotected

heights. She cannot have more than occasional concentrated

exposure to noise levels that are in excess of the moderate noise

levels defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. She can

occasionally perform any commercial driving.

6. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a

general clerk (DOT 209.562-010, svp 3, light as generally

performed and sedentary as actually performed). This work does not

require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the

claimant’s residual functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565).

7. In the alternative, for the period prior to March 9, 2020 (prior to

the claimant turning 55 years-old), although the claimant was

capable of performing past relevant work, there were also other jobs

existing in the national economy that she was able to perform.

Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge makes the following

alternative findings for step five of the sequential evaluation process

for the period prior to March 9, 2020.

8. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the

Social Security Act, from February 18, 2018, through the date of

this decision. (20 CFR 404.1520(f)).

(Id. at PageID #: 44–56).

V. Law & Analysis

A. Standard of Review

The Court’s review “is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.” Winn v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 615 F. App’x 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2015); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

“[S]ubstantial evidence is defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.’” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting

Cutlip v. Sec’y of HHS, 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)).

“After the Appeals Council reviews the ALJ’s decision, the determination of the council

becomes the final decision of the Secretary and is subject to review by this Court.” Olive v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., No. 3:06 CV 1597, 2007 WL 5403416, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2007) (citing Abbott

v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 922 (6th Cir. 1990); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 538 (6th Cir. 1986)

(en banc)). If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be

affirmed, “even if a reviewing court would decide the matter differently.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g); Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059–60 (6th Cir. 1983)).

B. Standard for Disability

The Social Security regulations outline a five-step process that the ALJ must use in

determining whether a claimant is entitled to DIB: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in

substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination

of impairments; (3) if so, whether that impairment, or combination of impairments, meets or equals

any of the listings in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) if not, whether the claimant can

perform her past relevant work in light of her residual functional capacity (“RFC”); and (5) if not,

whether, based on the claimant’s age, education, and work experience, she can perform other work

found in the national economy. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v); Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d

640, 642–43 (6th Cir. 2006). The claimant bears the ultimate burden of producing sufficient

evidence to prove that she is disabled and, thus, entitled to benefits. § 404.1512(a). Specifically,

the claimant has the burden of proof in Steps One through Four. Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997). The burden shifts to the Commissioner at Step Five to establish

whether the claimant has the RFC to perform available work in the national economy. Id.

C. Discussion

Claimant raises three issues on appeal. First, she argues the ALJ erred in finding that

Claimant did not satisfy the criteria of Listing 11.02B. (ECF No. 10, PageID #: 893). Second, she

argues they committed harmful error at Step Four by relying on the vocational expert’s testimony

that Claimant could perform past work. (Id.). Finally, Claimant contends the ALJ did not properly

apply Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p. (Id.). The Court will review each assignment of error

below.

1. Listing 11.02B

Claimant first argues that the ALJ erred in finding her headaches did not medically equal

Listing 11.02B since she claims the evidence was “more than sufficient” to meet the requirements

of SSR 19-4p. (Id. at PageID #: 901 (citing Harper v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2021 WL 2383833, at

* 12 (N.D. Ohio May 25, 2021)). In support, she cites medical records throughout the period at

issue that indicate the nature and frequency of her headaches, prescribed medications, medication

side effects, and the impact of headaches on her daily activities. (See id. PageID #: 902–04). The

Commissioner argues that Claimant has failed to produce “any of the requisite evidence” to

establish medical equivalency under SSR 17-2p and challenges her reliance on Harper. (ECF No.

11, PageID #: 929).

At Step Three, an ALJ considers whether a claimant’s impairment is severe enough to

prevent them from completing gainful activity. § 404.1525. If an impairment meets or equals a

“Listing of Impairments,” they are presumed disabled. Id.; Lee v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.

App’x 706, 710 (6th Cir. 2013) (“A claimant who meets or equals a listed impairment is

presumptively disabled, without consideration of her age, education, or work experience.”).

“To make a finding of medical equivalence, an ALJ must have either: 1) a prior

administrative finding from an agency doctor that supports the finding of medical equivalence, or

2) medical expert evidence; or 3) a report from the appeals council medical staff to support the

finding of equivalence.” Strittmatter v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 207907, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 17,

2023); see SSR 17-2p, 2017 WL 3928306, at *3 (S.S.A. Mar. 27, 2017).

“Primary headache disorder is not a listed impairment in the Listing of Impairments.” SSR

19-4p, 2019 WL 4169635, at *7 (S.S.A. Aug. 26, 2019). However, “Epilepsy (listing 11.02) is the

most closely analogous listed impairment for an MDI of a primary headache disorder.” (Id.).

Listing 11, Paragraph B, “requires dyscognitive seizures occurring at least once a week for at least

3 consecutive months despite adherence to prescribed treatment.” Id.

ALJs consider the following factors in determining whether a headache disorder equals

Listing 11.02B:

A detailed description from an [acceptable medical source] of a

typical headache event, including all associated phenomena (for

example, premonitory symptoms, aura, duration, intensity, and

accompanying symptoms); the frequency of headache events;

adherence to prescribed treatment; side effects of treatment (for

example, many medications used for treating a primary headache

disorder can produce drowsiness, confusion, or inattention); and

limitations in functioning that may be associated with the primary

headache disorder or effects of its treatment, such as interference

with activity during the day (for example, the need for a darkened

and quiet room, having to lie down without moving, a sleep

disturbance that affects daytime activities, or other related needs and

limitations).

Id.; see also Snyder v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-5948, 2023 WL 3673265, at *3 (6th Cir. May

26, 2023) (discussing ALJs’ consideration of Listing 11.02B headaches).

While the ALJ acknowledged Listing 11.02, they found that Claimant’s headaches did not

meet the listing. (See ECF No. 7, PageID #: 48). They explained their finding with the following

rationale:

the evidence does not provide a detailed description of typical

migraine pattern including all associated phenomena, occurring

more frequently than once weekly in spite of at least 3 months of

prescribed treatment. Moreover, there is no concrete evidence of

alteration of awareness or loss of consciousness and transient

postictal manifestations of unconventional behavior or significant

interference with activity during the day

(Id.).

This analysis is consistent with SSR 19-4p which requires ALJs to consider, in part,

whether a “detailed description . . . of a typical headache event” supports the existence of

“dyscognitive seizures occurring at least once a week for at least 3 consecutive months.” SSR 19-

4p, 2019 WL 4169635 at *7. The ALJ here found no such report in the record, nor any “concrete

evidence” that Claimant’s headaches caused any alterations of awareness, loss of consciousness,

unconventional behavior, or activity interference. (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 48).

Claimant does not contest this. She does not point to any record or other evidence of

dyscognitive headaches. She also does not point to records of alterations of awareness, loss of

consciousness, or unconventional behavior. While she points to activity interference, the ALJ

discounted her subjective complaints, as discussed below, and substantial evidence supports their

decision. (See ECF No. 10, PageID #: 903).

Furthermore, the ALJ reviewed records demonstrating “normal” cognitive functioning.

They noted that a December 2020 provider found Claimant alert and oriented, demonstrating

“normal” memory, and free from confusion or aphasia. (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 51 (referencing

ECF No. 7, PageID #: 793)). The same doctor also noted Claimant had no trouble concentrating

and did not experience seizures. (Id. at PageID #: 790). The ALJ noted that while Claimant’s

chiropractor reported a long history of debilitating headaches, he had only treated Claimant twice

and based this statement on her subjective reports, which the ALJ later discounted. (Id. at PageID

#: 51–52). Moreover, they found that even the chiropractor did not provide functional limitations

to accommodate Claimant’s headaches. (Id.). Finally, only one state agency consultant

recommended headache-related restrictions for the RFC. (See id. at Exs. 2A, 4A). Therefore,

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Claimant’s headaches did not equal Listing

11.02(B).

While Claimant cites numerous records referencing the frequency and nature of her

headaches, she neglects to point out that these points are generally based on her subjective reports

to providers. (See ECF No. 10, PageID #: 902–03). As the ALJ discounted the severity of her

allegations later in the opinion, it is clear that they questioned the legitimacy of such allegations.

(See ECF No. 7, PageID #: 53 (discounting Claimant’s allegations)). Moreover, Claimant points

to no objective records indicating any “premonitory symptoms, aura . . . accompanying symptoms”

of her headaches, as SSR 19-4p discusses.

To the extent that Claimant attempts to suggest and support an alternative reading of the

record, this argument fails. Even if substantial evidence supports an alternative finding, this is not

enough to disturb the ALJ’s finding. As long as substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s

decision, the Court must defer to it, “‘even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would

have supported an opposite conclusion[.]’” Wright v. Massanari, 321 F.3d 611, 614 (6th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)); see Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762,

772 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The findings of the Commissioner are not subject to reversal merely because

there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion.”) (citations

omitted).

Finally, the Court agrees with the Commissioner that Harper is distinguishable from this

case. (See ECF No. 11, PageID #: 929). There, the claimant challenged the ALJ’s treatment of her

subjective allegations related to migraines, an RFC challenge. 2021 WL 2383833 at *10–11. As

SSRs 17-2p and 19-4p were not implicated in the Harper court’s analysis, Claimant’s reliance on

the case is misplaced.

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Claimant’s headaches did not equal

Listing 11.02B. This Court therefore will not disturb the ALJ’s decision.

2. Past Relevant Work

Claimant next argues the ALJ erroneously accepted on the vocational expert’s (“VE”)

experience as a proper basis for their opinion and testimony at the administrative hearing. (ECF

No. 10, PageID #: 906). Additionally, she argues the ALJ erred in finding she could perform her

past job since it required “frequent reaching” and the RFC had an “occasional overheard reaching”

restriction. (Id.). The Commissioner admits there was a conflict between the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles (“DOT”) and the VE’s testimony but argues that the VE’s experience

reasonably resolved the issue and supplemented the DOT. (ECF No. 11, PageID #: 932).

At the administrative hearing, the ALJ asked the VE whether Claimant could perform her

past job as a general clerk with a hypothetical set of restrictions, including “occasionally reach

overhead.” (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 94). The VE testified that Claimant could perform her past work

with such restrictions and provided three additional jobs she could work as well. (Id. at PageID

#: 89, 94). Toward the end of the hearing, the VE also testified about directional reaching

restrictions. While the DOT did not contain directional reaching restrictions, such as “reaching in

any direction” or “reaching overhead,” the VE testified that they could opine on such limitations

based on their experience. (Id. at PageID #: 95). They testified that while occasional reaching in

any direction would preclude Claimant’s past work, Claimant would still be able to perform the

job with only overhead occasional reaching. (Id. at PageID #: 94–95).

A VE’s testimony about a Claimant’s work abilities constitutes substantial evidence in

support of an ALJ’s Step Four and Five findings. See Webb v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 368 F.3d 629,

633 (6th Cir. 2004) (“The vocational expert’s testimony is directed solely to whether, given a

claimant’s age, experience, and education, along with the ALJ’s assessment of what she ‘can and

cannot do,’ there exist a significant number of employment opportunities for her in the regional

and national economies. The vocational expert is not expected to evaluate the claimant’s medical

conditions in making this determination.”). Likewise, VE testimony is not confined to the contents

of the DOT and may also encompass their personal experience. SSR 00-4P, 2000 WL 1898704, at

*2 (S.S.A. Dec. 4, 2000) (“Information about a particular job’s requirements or about occupations

not listed in the DOT may be available in other reliable publications, information obtained directly

from employers, or from a VE’s or VS’s experience in job placement or career counseling.”).

Here, the VE testified that Claimant could perform past work with an occasional overhead

reaching restriction. (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 94–95). Their testimony was supported by their

experience—an acceptable source of information pursuant to SSR 004-p—and constitutes

substantial evidence. See Webb, 368 F.3d at 633. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the

ALJ’s finding that Claimant could perform past relevant work, and this Court will not disturb the

finding.

Despite Claimant’s argument that the position required frequent reaching, this does not

impact the ALJ’s finding. (See ECF No. 10, PageID #: 906–07). While they limited Claimant to

occasional overhead reaching, they did not adopt any additional reaching restrictions, finding

Claimant had unlimited reaching capability outside of the overhead limit. (See ECF No. 7, PageID

#: 48–49). Again, as the VE testified that Claimant could still perform past work with an occasional

overhead reaching restriction, and Claimant is not limited in any other direction, this constitutes

substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s finding.

3. SSR 16-3p

Claimant finally argues the ALJ “failed to articulate any supportable rationale” for

discounting her subjective complaints, including pain. (ECF No. 10, PageID #: 911–12). She

further contends that the ALJ failed to provide “specific reasons” for their finding or a logical

bridge between the evidence and their determination. (Id.). Finally, because the ALJ “ignored”

evidence of Claimant’s impairments, Claimant argues the opinion requires remand. (Id. at PageID

#: 913).

The Commissioner rejects Claimant’s argument as an attempt to reweigh the evidence or

support an alternative finding. (ECF No. 11, PageID #: 936). Reviewing the ALJ’s rationale for

rejecting the opinion, the Commissioner points out that the ALJ reviewed several SSR 16-3p

factors including the medical record, daily activities, treatment, medication, as well as mitigating

factors. (Id. at PageID #: 934–35).

The evaluation of a claimant’s subjective complaints rests with the ALJ. See Siterlet v.

Sec’y of HHS, 823 F.2d 918, 920 (6th Cir. 1987); Rogers, 486 F.3d at 248 (noting that “credibility

determinations regarding subjective complaints rest with the ALJ”). In evaluating a claimant’s

symptoms, the ALJ must look to medical evidence, statements by the claimant, other information

provided by medical sources, and any other relevant evidence on the record. § 404.1529(c); SSR

16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304.

Beyond medical evidence, SSR 16-3p sets forth seven factors that the ALJ should consider.

The ALJ need not analyze all seven factors but should show that she considered the relevant

evidence. See Cross v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 373 F. Supp. 2d 724, 733 (N.D. Ohio 2005).

[I]f an individual’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and

limiting effects of symptoms are inconsistent with the objective

medical evidence and the other evidence, we will determine that the

individual’s symptoms are less likely to reduce his or her capacities

to perform work-related activities or abilities to function

independently, appropriately, and effectively in an age-appropriate

manner.

SSR 16-3P, 2017 WL 5180304. The ALJ’s “decision must contain specific reasons for the weight

given to the individual’s symptoms . . . and be clearly articulated so the individual and any

subsequent reviewer can assess how the adjudicator evaluated the individual’s symptoms.” Id.; see

also Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.2d 1027, 1036 (6th Cir. 1994) (“If an ALJ rejects a claimant’s

testimony as incredible, he must clearly state his reason for doing so.”). While a reviewing court

gives deference to an ALJ’s credibility determination, “the ALJ’s credibility determination will

not be upheld if it is unsupported by the record or insufficiently explained.” Carr v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., No. 3:18CV1639, 2019 WL 2465273, at *10 (N.D. Ohio April 24, 2019) (citing Rogers,

486 F.3d at 248-49), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3752687 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 8,

2019).

Claimant states that “the ALJ failed to articulate any supportable rationale for her finding

that [her] statements . . . were broader and more restricted than was established in the medical

evidence.” (ECF No. 10, PageID #: 912).

The ALJ specified Claimant’s subjective complaints: