Beeman v. Veterans Affairs

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

TRACEY BEEMAN, ) CASE NO. 1: 23-cv-276

)

Plaintiff, )

) JUDGE BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN

v. )

)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN )

AFFAIRS, ) MEMORANDUM OPINION

) AND ORDER

Defendant. )

Background and Introduction

Pro se Plaintiff Tracey Beeman has filed this action against the U.S. Department of

Veteran Affairs (“VA”). (Doc. No. 1.) She did not pay the filing fee, but instead, filed a motion

to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 2.) She also filed a motion for appointment of counsel.

(Doc. No. 3.)

In her complaint, Plaintiff states only “wrongful termination” and indicates that she seeks

to “reclaim employment.” (See Doc. No. 1 at 4.) Beyond these bare assertions, the complaint

provides no further explanation or allegations. It alleges no facts or specific legal claims.

Plaintiff simply attaches to her complaint a copy of a decision of the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (Doc. No. 1-2.) This decision on its face states that it is a

denial of a request Plaintiff made for reconsideration of an EEOC decision finding no

discrimination with respect to a complaint she filed with the Agency. The decision states that

Plaintiff worked as a Health Technician at the VA’s Cleveland Medical Health Center and was

terminated during her probationary period. In a complaint she filed with the EEOC, she alleged

“the Agency subjected her to a hostile work environment based on race (Black), age (50), and in

reprisal for protected EEO activity” when her supervisor: (1) assigned her more demanding

work than her “non-Black peers”; (2) constantly watched her and singled out her work ethic and

production; (3) made comments indicating that she was being watched and that her job was at

stake; and (4) participated in an event that was “misconstrued and used against her in termination

charges.” (Id. at 1-2.)1

Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied. Appointment of counsel in civil

cases is “justified only by exceptional circumstances” which the Court does not find exist here.

Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605-06 (6th Cir. 1993). Her motion to proceed in forma

pauperis is granted. For the following reasons, her complaint is dismissed.

Standard of Review and Discussion

Districts courts are expressly required, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), to review all in

forma pauperis complaints filed in federal court, and to dismiss before service any such

complaint that the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief.

To survive a dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the complaint

must set forth sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state claim to relief that is plausible

on its face. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the dismissal standard

articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544 (2007) for determining a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) governs

1 The EEOC found that Plaintiff provided no evidence warranting reconsideration of its

decision finding no discrimination on the basis of these allegations and informed her of her right

to sue in federal court.

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dismissals for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). Although detailed factual

allegations are not required, the “allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level” on the assumption they are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Additionally,

they must be sufficient to give the defendants “fair notice of what [the plaintiff’s] claims are and

the grounds upon which they rest.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002).

Further, although the standard of review of pro se pleadings is liberal, the generous

construction afforded pro se plaintiffs has limits. Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th

Cir. 1996).

Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim in accordance with §

1915(e)(2)(B). The unclear and purely conclusory assertions in her complaint of “wrongful

termination” and “reclaim employment” fail to meet basic pleading requirements and are

insufficient to state any plausible federal employment discrimination claim even under the liberal

standard accorded pro se plaintiffs. Even pro se pleadings must satisfy basic pleading

requirements, and courts are not required to conjure allegations or construct claims for them in

determining whether their complaint states a claim for relief. See Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d

567, 577 (6th Cir. 2008); Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th

Cir. 2008); Erwin v. Edwards, 22 Fed. App'x 579, 580 (6th Cir. Dec. 4, 2001).

Further, even if the Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s complaint as intending to assert a

claim or claims under federal anti-discrimination laws based on her contentions as summarized

in the EEOC’s decision, her action still warrants dismissal.

To demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must show that “(1) he or

she was a member of a protected class; (2) he or she suffered an adverse employment action; (3)

he or she was qualified for the position; and (4) he or she was replaced by someone outside the

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protected class or was treated differently than similarly-situated, non-protected employees.”

DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 415 (6th Cir. 2004). To demonstrate the fourth element of a

claim on the basis of disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show that she was treated less

favorably than an employee outside of her protected class who was similarly situated to her in

“all relevant respects.” Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 710 (6th Cir. 2006). She

must show that an employee outside of her protected class who dealt with the same supervisor,

was subject to the same standards, and engaged in the same conduct as she did was treated more

favorably. Id.; Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir.1992).

Plaintiff has not identified facts plausibly demonstrating these elements. Her conclusory

contention that she was assigned more difficult work than “non-Black peers” does not permit a

plausible inference that any employee outside of her alleged protected classes (of either age or

race) who similarly-situated to her in “all relevant respects” was treated more favorably than she

was.

Nor are Plaintiff’s contentions sufficient to suggest plausible claims of retaliation or a

hostile work environment.

To establish a prima facie claim of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she engaged

in activity protected by federal anti-discrimination laws; (2) this exercise of protected rights was

known to defendant; (3) defendant thereafter took adverse employment action; and (4) there was

a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Canitia

v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1064, 1066 (6th Cir.1990).

To demonstrate a claim for a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must show that: (1)

she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the

harassment was based on a protected characteristic; and (4) the harassment unreasonably

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interfered with her work performance or created a hostile or offensive work environment that

was severe and pervasive; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the charged

harassment and failed unreasonably to take prompt and appropriate corrective action. Fenton v.

HiSAN, Inc., 174 F.3d 827, 829-30 (6th Cir. 1999).

Plaintiff has not provided factual content from which the Court may reasonably infer the

elements of these claims. Plaintiff has failed to identify any protected activity in which she

engaged and for which she could have been subjected to unlawful retaliation. And her unclear

and conclusory contentions that her work was scrutinized and that she was assigned more

demanding work than “non-Black peers” by her supervisor fail to support plausible inferences

that she experienced unlawful “severe and pervasive” harassment, harassment “based on” her

age or race, or that her employer knew of harassment and failed to take corrective action as

necessary to demonstrate a hostile-work environment claim.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B). The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal

from this decision could not be good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: June 14, 2023 _________________________________

BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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