The opinion
PEARSON, J.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
DAWN GUARINO GEDEON, )
)
) CASE NO. 4:22CV441
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON
)
MICHELLE NICOLE FRENCHKO, et al, )
) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND
) ORDER
Defendants. ) [Resolving ECF No. 39]
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings
(ECF No. 39). Plaintiff Dawn Guarino Gedeon filed a brief in opposition. See ECF No. 45.
Defendants replied. See ECF No. 47. Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, and applicable
law, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the
Pleadings.
I. Background
On October 19, 2022, Plaintiff Dawn Gedeon filed a first amended complaint asserting
three claims. Count 1 alleges ancestry discrimination against the Board of Trumbull County
Commissioners in violation of Title VII; and Count 2 and Count 3 allege defamation and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, respectively, against Defendant Commissioner
Frenchko in her individual capacity.1 See ECF No. 37 at PageID #: 273-276. While employed
1 The parties stipulate that Count 1 of the amended complaint is brought only under
Title VII and only against the Board of Trumbull County Commissioners. See ECF No.
as an office worker by the Board, Plaintiff alleges to have experienced disparate treatment in the
workplace,after Defendant Frenchko became Commissioner. This disparate treatment, Plaintiff
alleges, was in the form of derogatory and discriminatory comments made via social media and
in the workplace2. See ECF No. 37 at PageID #: 270-271. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Frenchko engaged in behavior that amounted to defamation. See ECF No. 37 at
PageID #: 275. Plaintiff also alleges to have suffered from emotional distress because of
Defendant Frenchko’s intentional misconduct toward Plaintiff in the form of mental abuse
toward Plaintiff in the workplace and creating a hostile work environment to force Plaintiff to
resign from her employment. See ECF No. 37 at PageID #: 276.
II. Standard of Review
The standard for deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(c) is indistinguishable from the standard for dismissals based on failure to state a claim under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). U.S. ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 342 F.3d 634, 643 (6th
Cir. 2003); Ziegler v. IBP Hog Mkt., Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 511-12 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mixon v.
Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 399-400 (6th Cir. 1999)). In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), or a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), the Court must take all
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and construe those allegations in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted). “To
39-1 at PageID #: 306. The parties also stipulate that Counts 2 and 3 of the amended
complaint are brought only against Commissioner Niki Frenchko in her individual
capacity. See ECF No. 39-1 at PageID #: 306. The Court accepts these stipulations by
parties.
2 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant used derogatory comments against Italian
American employees such as “henchmen”, “minions”, “hacks”, “flying monkeys”,
“greasy”, and “sausage makers.”
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at
679. The factual allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing authorities).
In other words, claims set forth in a complaint must be plausible, rather than conceivable.
Id. at 570. “[When] the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged -- but it has not ‘show[n]’ -- ‘that the
pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). The
factual allegations in the complaint “must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of
facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555 (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, p. 235-236
(3d ed. 2004)). In addition to reviewing the claims set forth in the complaint, a court may also
consider exhibits, public records, and items appearing in the record of the case as long as the
items are referenced in the complaint and are central to the claims contained therein. Bassett v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008); Erie Cty., Ohio v. Morton
Salt, Inc., 702 F.3d 860, 863 (6th Cir. 2012).
III. Discussion
A. Punitive Damages
Defendants argue that the Board of Trumbull County Commissioners is a political
subdivision and, thus, is not subject to punitive damages. See ECF No. 39 at PageID #: 303.
Defendants assert, “Plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages…because punitive damages
cannot be awarded in an action against a political subdivision unless there is a provision to the
contrary.” Hooper v. Trimble Bd. of Educ., No. 2:21-CV-2749, 2021 WL 5877840 (S.D. Ohio
Dec. 13, 2021). The Court agrees.
The Court finds that Plaintiff may, however, recover punitive damages against Defendant
Frenchko in her individual capacity. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). Therefore, Plaintiff’s prayer
for punitive damages persists only as to Defendant Frenchko in her individual capacity.
B. Defamation and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
1. Defamation
Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss the defamation claim as a matter of law.
See ECF No. 47. Defendants specify that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, thus necessitating a dismissal. See ECF No. 39 at PageID #: 295-303. Plaintiff retorts
that “[Defendant] Frenchko has made statements in public forums claiming Plaintiff mistreats
her husband and children and has made false accusations towards Plaintiff’s mental health.”
ECF No. 45 at PageID #: 320. “[T]o establish a prima facie case of defamation, a plaintiff must
prove the following elements: (1) a party published a statement; (2) with knowledge that the
statement was false and defaming to the other; or (3) with reckless disregard for the truth of the
statement or with negligence in failing to ascertain the truth of the statement.” Hudik v. Fox
News Network, LLC, 512 F. Supp. 3d 816, 824 (M.D. Tenn. 2021).
“[T]he publication requirement for defamation…only requires communication to a third
party.” Green v. Mason, 504 F. Supp. 3d 813, 830 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (citing Welling v. Weinfeld,
113 Ohio St.3d 464, 866 N.E.2d 1051 (2007)). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Frenchko’s
alleged defamatory comments were made during a radio interview and through social media.
See ECF No. 45 at PageID #: 322. Although Defendant denies the defamatory nature of her
comments, she does not deny that they were made in public forums, thus satisfying the first
element of defamation—the statements were published. See ECF No. 39 at PageID #: 297-298.
In support of its motion, Defendant asserts the following:
Plaintiff may find Commissioner Frenchko’s statements
unflattering, but she cannot prove them false or defamatory. First,
the Channel 21 video clip about which Commissioner Frenchko
commented shows Plaintiff confessing to the media, ‘I treat my
husband terrible, I treat my daughter terrible…because of what goes
on here.’ In her tweet, Commissioner Frenchko merely parroted
and satirized Plaintiff’s admission. Second, Plaintiff did ask the
Industrial Commission to allow – in her allergy claim -- a health and
behavior assessment and intervention (“HBAI”) based on reported
anxiety. The Industrial Commission denied that request. (Exhibit
B.) Thus, Commissioner Frenchko’s statement -- that Plaintiff’s
‘psych’ claim had been denied – was substantially true.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Conversely, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s Motion “invites this Court to go beyond the
pleadings to examine evidence attached to their Motion that allegedly shows an admission by
Plaintiff that she mistreats her family members.” ECF No. 45 at PageID #: 322. Plaintiff also
urges that the amended complaint adequately addresses each of the remaining elements required
to establish a prima facie case of defamation.
Based on the record now before it, the Court denies the Motion for Partial Judgment on
the Pleadings pertaining to the claim of Defamation.
2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Defendant Frenchko argues that Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for intentional
infliction of emotion distress. See ECF No. 47. Defendant points out that “[t]o establish a claim
of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: ‘(1)
extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent or recklessness, (3) causation, and (4) severe
emotional distress.’” Parker v. Midwest Loan Servs., Inc., No. 15-11708, 2016 WL 1242440
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2016). The alleged conduct must be “so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Godfredson v. Hess & Clark, Inc.,
173 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 1999)). Defendant argues that Plaintiff ‘s amended complaint is
“[u]naccompanied by any allegations about how her life has been altered. [So] the fact that
Plaintiff sought counseling is insufficient to raise an inference that she suffered a serious
emotional injury.” ECF No. 47 at PageID #: 337. In support of her claim, Plaintiff notes that the
amended complaint3 (ECF No. 37) “details the extreme and outrageous conduct that ]Defendant]
Frenchko – in a position of immense authority – directed towards Plaintiff and other employees
in Trumbull County.” ECF No. 45 at PageID #: 324.
Accepting Plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations as true, Plaintiff’s amended complaint
adequately addresses the elements necessary to establish a claim of Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress. Therefore, at this stage of the litigation, the Court denies Defendants’
Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings pertaining to the claim of Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress.
3 See ECF No. 37 at PageID #: 276-277.
3. Summary
Regarding the claims of Defamation and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, the
Court finds the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings to be premature. A granting of the Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings, at this point in the proceedings, would deprive the parties of the
opportunity to introduce proper evidence in support of their positions. Should Defendants
remain steadfast in their position that, even with the presence of additional evidence, that
Plaintiff has no claim to relief, Defendants can move for summary judgment pursuant to Fed R.
Civ. P. 56. “Summary judgment is appropriate where ‘the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Scola
v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 557 F. App'x 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a)). The Court, therefore, denies Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings
pertaining to the claims of Defamation and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons above, the Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings is granted in that
punitive damages may not be awarded against the Board of Trumbull County Commissioners.
The Court also rules that Plaintiff may recover punitive damages against individual Defendant
Frenchko, but only in her individual capacity. Lastly, the Court denies, as premature, the Motion
for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings pertaining to the claims of Defamation and Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
April 7, 2023 /s/ Benita Y. Pearson
Date Benita Y. Pearson
United States District Judge