Welch v. Ashtabula County Children Services Board

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

Amber Welch, et al., ) CASE NO. 1:22 CV 1992

)

Plaintiffs, ) JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN

)

vs. )

)

Ashtabula County Children Services Bd., ) Memorandum of Opinion and Order

et al., )

Defendants. )

INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court upon Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11). This case

arises out of a state court order of temporary custody over a minor child. For the reasons that

follow, the motion is GRANTED.

FACTS

For purposes of ruling on the pending motion, the facts set forth in the Verified

Complaint (“Complaint”) are presumed true.

Plaintiffs Amber Welch and R.W. bring this lawsuit against defendants Ashtabula County

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Children Services Board (“ACCSB”), Tania Burnett, and Angela Lawton. Welch is R.W.’s

mother. Defendant Burnett is the Executive Director of the ACCSB, and defendant Lawton is

the caseworker who worked with R.W.

On June 4, 2020, Ashtabula County officials obtained an ex parte emergency order

giving them custody of R.W. The following day, ACCSB filed a complaint for temporary

custody, alleging that R.W. is a neglected child. According to the complaint, R.W. had been

arrested for domestic violence, and Welch thereafter refused to pick up R.W. from the detention

center. The complaint also alleged that certain health issues suffered by R.W. were not being

properly addressed by Welch. That same day, the juvenile court held a hearing. At the hearing,

both parents, the guardian ad litem, and R.W. agreed that based on R.W.’s heath and behavioral

problems, it was in the best interests of R.W. to be placed in the temporary custody of ACCSB.

This way, R.W. could receive the treatment that she needed.

On July 2, 2020, the juvenile court held an adjudicatory hearing regarding the issues

raised in the complaint. Welch admitted that she did not pick up R.W. from the detention center,

and the juvenile court determined R.W. to be a dependent. On August 5, 2020, the juvenile court

held a dispositional hearing and kept her in the temporary custody of ACCSB despite R.W.’s

wish to remain at home with her family.

The court entry memorializing the hearing noted a “Sunset Date” of June 29, 2021, when

in fact the correct Sunset Date was June 4, 2021. The Sunset Date appears to be one year after

the juvenile court issues an order of temporary custody. ACCSB may file motions for the

extension of that date, but it appears that the juvenile court may extend an order of temporary

custody for no longer than two years past the entry of the initial order. After the two year mark,

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the juvenile court must decide whether to issue a permanent placement.

On March 25, 2021, the juvenile court held a semi-annual review of R.W.’s case.

ACCSB advised the court that R.W was doing well in school and in her placement. The

guardian ad litem concurred noting that it was the best “R.W. has ever been doing.”

On June 29, 2021, ACCSB filed a motion to extend temporary custody over R.W.

According to the complaint, there is no docket entry resolving the motion.

On November 16, 2021, a case review was filed with the juvenile court, which contained

positive statements regarding Welch.

It appears that the juvenile court held a hearing on December 9, 2021 regarding R.W.’s

placement at a qualified residential treatment facility (“QRTP”). Due to COVID, the hearing

was held remotely. The court agreed the QRTP was appropriate, and R.W. was placed at

Cincinnati Children’s Hospital. The docket entry indicates that ACCSB made an oral motion to

extend temporary custody of R.W., which the court granted to June 5, 2022.

On February 28, 2022, ACCSB filed another motion to extend temporary custody.

Thereafter, on June 23, 2022, ACCSB field a motion to modify temporary custody to planned

permanent living. On August 1, 2022, Cincinnati Children’s Hospital indicated that R.W. was

clinically ready for discharge.

On October 3, 2022, the juvenile court asked the parties to submit bench briefs regarding

the passage of the two-year deadline. In other words, it appears that the juvenile court

questioned whether it maintained jurisdiction over R.W.

On October 27, 2022, defendant Lawton sent an email communication indicating that

ACCSB intended to place R.W. in a facility in Arkansas on November 7, 2022, depending on the

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decision of the juvenile court judge. According to the complaint, Welch had maintained her

relationship with R.W. and wanted R.W. to return home. If ACCSB decided to place R.W. in

Arkansas, Welch and other family members would be unable to visit.

Plaintiffs filed a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in this

Court seeking to prevent defendants from placing R.W. at the Arkansas facility. Generally

speaking, plaintiffs argued that the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction over R.W.

According to plaintiffs, the time limits set forth under the Ohio Revised Code expired and

ACCSB had no statutory right to any type of custody over R.W. Thereafter, plaintiffs withdrew

their motion. In their notice of withdrawal, plaintiffs indicate that the parties agreed to release

R.W. to Welch’s custody.

The complaint contains six claims for relief. Count one is a Section 1983 claim for

unreasonable seizure. Court two is a Section 1983 claim for violation of procedural due process.

These counts are asserted against only Burnett and Lawton in their personal capacities. Counts

three and four seek injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment, respectively. Count five is a

claim for “interference with custody” and count six is a claim for false imprisonment. These

four claims are asserted against all defendants, including Burnett and Lawton in both their

individual and official capacities.

Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint, and plaintiffs oppose the motion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Dismissal is appropriate when a plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). We assume the factual allegations in the complaint are true and

construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Comtide Holdings, LLC v.

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Booth Creek Management Corp., 2009 WL 1884445 (6th Cir. July 2, 2009) (citing Bassett v.

Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir.2008) ). In construing the complaint

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, “the court does not accept the bare assertion

of legal conclusions as enough, nor does it accept as true unwarranted factual inferences.”

Gritton v. Disponett, 2009 WL 1505256 (6th Cir. May 27, 2009) (citing In re Sofamor Danek

Group, Inc., 123 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir.1997). As outlined by the Sixth Circuit:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the

statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests.”Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). However, “[f]actual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and to “state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. A plaintiff must “plead[ ]

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir.2012). Thus, Twombly and Iqbal require that

the complaint contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face based on factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570;

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

ANALYSIS

Defendants argue that dismissal is warranted because social workers have absolute

immunity for conduct associated with the judicial phase of the child custody process. According

to plaintiff, retaining custody of R.W. through late filings with the Court is entitled to absolute

immunity. Alternatively, defendants argue that they are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity

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because they acted pursuant to court orders regarding custody. Defendants also argue that they

are entitled to qualified immunity and that ACCSB is not sui juris.

In response, plaintiffs argue that defendants are not entitled to either absolute or quasi-

judicial immunity. According to plaintiffs, these types of immunity are associated only with

judicial processes akin to initiating court actions or testifying. Immunity is not available for

performing administrative, investigative, or agency decision-making. Plaintiffs also argue that

qualified immunity is not available because clearly established Fourth Amendment law prohibits

the unreasonable seizure of a minor by the state. Plaintiffs further dispute that “qualified

immunity under R.C. 2744.02” is applicable.

1. The individual defendants

As an initial matter, although not identified under a separate heading, the Court notes that

in the context of qualified immunity, defendants very generally raise the issue of insufficiency of

the pleadings and cite to the standard set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544

(2007). In response, plaintiffs argue that the allegations related to state of mind are, in fact,

sufficiently plead. The Court finds that the issue of the sufficiency of the pleadings was

sufficiently raised to permit the Court to address whether Rule 8’s pleading requirements are

satisfied.

Upon review, the Court finds that the Complaint must be dismissed as to the individual

defendants because there are no allegations identifying any actions taken by either Burnett or

Lawton. The only allegations specific to these individuals are as follows:

4. Defendant [ ] Burnett is the Executive Director for ACCS and has been an active

participant regarding her agency’s decisions regarding Plaintiff and R.W.;

5. Defendant [ ] Lawton is the on-going ACCS caseworker for R.W.;

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45. On October 27, 2022, Defendant Lawton sent an email to numerous individuals

associated with R.W.’s Juvenile Court case which indicated ACCS intends to

send R.W. to placement in Arkansas on November 7, 2022.

58. This Count One is asserted against Defendants Burnett and Walton [sic]1, in their

individual capacities only....

66. This Count Two is asserted against Defendants Burnett and Walton [sic], in their

individual capacities only....

Upon review, the Court finds that these allegations do not satisfy Rule 8(b). Although

the rule requires only a “short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief,” the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held that in addressing allegations of constitutional

violations, courts must look to the conduct alleged against each individual separately.

This Court has consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising

from alleged violations of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that

demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” Lanman

v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir.2008) (citing Terrance v. Northville Reg'l

Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir.2002)).

Heyne v. Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools, 655 F.3d 556, 564 (6th Cir. 2011).

Moreover, courts cannot “ascribe the acts of all [i]ndividual [d]efendants to each

individual defendant.” Id.

In this case, there are simply no allegations whatsoever directed at any actions taken by

Burnett that would result in a Fourth Amendment violation. Plaintiffs allege only that Burnett

was an active decisionmaker for the decisions made with respect to plaintiff R.W. But, the

Complaint does not detail a single decision Burnett actually made regarding R.W. And, with

regard to Lawton, the sole allegation is that defendant Lawton sent an email discussing the

1 This Court will assume arguendo that plaintiffs intended to assert

counts one and two against defendants Burnett and Lawton, as the

Complaint makes no mention of an individual named Walton.

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possible placement of R.W. in Arkansas. There are simply no allegations that either individual

defendant personally arrested, detained, or seized R.W. Compare, Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cty

Department of Children and Family Services, 724 F.3d 687 (6th Cir. 2013) (denying qualified

immunity where social workers personally went into home and forcibly removed children). Nor

do these allegations give rise to a violation of the procedural due process rights of either

plaintiff. The allegations in this regard fare worse. Plaintiffs allege that “defendants’ repeated

and ongoing violation of the statutory deadlines and requirements” constitutes a due process

violation. As an initial matter, these allegations fail to identify which individual defendant

engaged in any particular behavior. To the extent plaintiffs are complaining that there was error

in connection with the untimely filing of motions, the exhibits attached to the Complaint

demonstrate that a prosecuting attorney bore responsibility for those filings. Absent any

allegations that Burnett or Lawton personally took any specific action in connection with this

matter, the Complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted with respect to counts

one and two.

With regard to count three, plaintiffs seek injunctive relief preventing defendants from

placing R.W. in Arkansas. Based on the representations made by plaintiffs in connection with

the motion for temporary restraining order, it appears that this claim is now moot. The Court’s

understanding is that R.W. was not placed in Arkansas, and custody has been returned to

plaintiff Welch.

The Court finds that the remaining claims, i.e., plaintiffs’ state law claims for declaratory

judgment, “interference with custody,” and false imprisonment fail for the same reasons set forth

above. Plaintiffs fail to meet Rule 8’s pleading requirements because the Complaint contains no

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factual allegations directed at either defendant. Therefore, these claims are also subject to

dismissal.

2. ACCSB

ACCSB moves to dismiss the Complaint on the basis that it is not sui juris. In response,

plaintiffs appear to argue that Ohio counties are amenable to suit. In this case, however,

plaintiffs did not sue an Ohio county.2 Rather, plaintiffs filed suit against a branch of the

county government. It is well-settled that county branches are not sui juris. See, Loper v.

Cuyahoga County Children and Family Services, 2019 WL 1597552 (N.D. Ohio April 15,

2019)(collecting cases). Therefore, dismissal is warranted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11) is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Patricia A. Gaughan

PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN

United States District Judge

Dated: 4/6/23

2 Plaintiffs also argue that they alleged a “policy or procedure for

ignoring timely filing deadlines by [ACCBS]” and, therefore, their

Section 1983 claims survive. A review of the Complaint discloses

that plaintiffs allege no such policy, nor are the Section 1983

claims asserted against ACCBS. Regardless, ACCBS is not sui

juris even if the Complaint contained those allegations and claims.

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