“To the extent that the dismissal in the original action was for lack of standing, there is no res judicata bar to a second action by a party with proper standing.”
How later courts described this case
- “To the extent that the dismissal in the original action was for lack of standing, there is no res judicata bar to a second action by a party with proper standing.”
- affirming district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim because “there is no private right of action under the FERPA”
- “[T]here is as much obligation upon a judge not to recuse himself when there is no occasion as there is for him to do so when there is.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
TIFFANY D. WHEATLEY, ) CASE NO. 4:21-cv-1831
)
Plaintiff, )
) JUDGE BRIDGET M. BRENNAN
v. )
)
BOARDMAN LOCAL SCHOOLS, ) ORDER
DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, )
et al., )
)
)
Defendants.
Before this Court are Plaintiff Tiffany Wheatley’s judicial recusal motion (Doc. No. 53)
and motion for relief from a judgment or order (Doc. No. 54.) For the reasons that follow, the
judicial recusal motion is DENIED, and the motion for relief from a judgment or order is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
In her recusal motion, Plaintiff states that the undersigned must recuse herself from the
above-captioned case due to her close relationship with Defendants and their counsel. (Doc.
No. 53 at PageID 556-57, ¶ 4.). To Plaintiff, these pre-existing relationships have caused the
undersigned to violate the constitution, federal law, and the Code of Conduct for United States
Judges. (Id. at PageID 556, 569, ¶¶ 1, 50.) On June 3, 2022, Plaintiff filed a document raising
concerns about the undersigned’s impartiality and hinting that she intended to file a formal
recusal motion. (Doc. No. 38.) In response, the Court held an on-the-record status conference
on June 23, 2022, at which Plaintiff was given an opportunity to provide information supporting
1
recusal. After hearing from Plaintiff and defense counsel, the Court determined that there was
no basis for recusal. Likewise, Plaintiff’s motion reiterates many of the same arguments
addressed at the June 23, 2022 status conference – none of which alters the Court’s
determination that recusal is not warranted. Because Plaintiff has not demonstrated that recusal
is necessary, this motion is denied. See Easley v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 853 F.2d 1351,
1356 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[T]here is as much obligation upon a judge not to recuse himself when
there is no occasion as there is for him to do so when there is.”) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted)).
Plaintiff’s motion for relief from a judgment or order (Doc. No. 54) asks this Court to
amend its Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Defendants’ motions to dismiss and
dismissing all of Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice (Doc. No. 40.) The Court has reviewed this
motion and amends its Memorandum Opinion and Order issued on June 24, 2022, as follows:
Plaintiff’s Title VI, Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Denial of a Free Appropriate Public
Education claims are hereby dismissed without prejudice to allow Plaintiff’s daughter or a party
with standing to bring these claims on their own behalf.1 Matthews v. Craige, No. 1:16-cv-
11680, 2016 WL 3522320, at *2 (E.D. Mich. June 28, 2016) (dismissing claims brought by pro
se parent on child’s behalf without prejudice so that child may bring claims through counsel);
1 Plaintiff’s Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”) claim remains dismissed
with prejudice because there is no private cause of action under this statute. Gonzaga Univ. v.
Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002) (“FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions contain no rights-creating
language, they have an aggregate, not individual, focus, and they serve primarily to direct the
Secretary of Education’s distribution of public funds to educational institutions. They therefore
create no rights enforceable under § 1983.”). Plaintiff, therefore, failed to state a viable claim
for relief. Nor could any private litigant ever do so. E.,g, Bevington v. Ohio Univ., 93 F. App’x
748, 750 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim because
“there is no private right of action under the FERPA”).
2
Gillig v. Nike, Inc., 602 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“To the extent that the dismissal in the
original action was for lack of standing, there is no res judicata bar to a second action by a party
with proper standing.”). To the extent that Plaintiff’s motion seeks any other amendment of the
Court’s June 24, 2022 Memorandum Opinion and Order, it is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________________________________
BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN
Date: January 23, 2023 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3