Shampine v. East Cleveland Board of Education

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

LATEFAH SHAMPINE, CASE NO. 1:22 CV 1273

Plaintiff, JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING

v.

EAST CLEVELAND BOARD MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

OF EDUCATION, et al., ORDER

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

Pro se plaintiff Latefah Shampine has filed a civil complaint in this matter against

multiple defendants. She sues the East Cleveland Board of Education, Chambers Elementary

School, Myra Loy Corley, Cleveland Board of Education, Charlene Hobbs, and Pastor Lincoln

Haughton. (Doc. No. 1.)

Her three-count complaint does not set forth clear allegations or legal claims. In her

complaint, she complains she was refused employment and denied a position as a substitute

teacher, despite being highly qualified, as a result of the “jealousy and hate” of principals

Charlene Hobbs and Pastor Lincoln Haughton, who she contends are both child molesters and

have abused school children. (See id. at 2-4.) She contends Hobbs and Haughton are friends and

“fraudulently” took jobs from her and “placed lies on her record” to take employment from her.

(Id. at 4-5.)

Plaintiff, however, neither references nor cites any specific federal claim or cause of

action against any defendant in her pleading. Rather, her complaint on its face refers only to

numerous provisions of the Ohio Revised Code, the vast majority of which pertain to state

crimes (including rape, sodomy, child endangering, and permitting child abuse among others).

(See id. at 1-2.) She characterizes her action as a “horrible sexual complaint.” (Id. at 2.)

For relief, plaintiff seeks “50 million” from Hobbs and Haughton and “25 million from,

East Cleveland School Board, Cleveland Board, and Myra Corley.” (Id. at 7.)

With her complaint, plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 2.)

That motion is granted.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

Federal district courts are expressly required, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), to screen

all in forma pauperis complaints filed in federal court, and to dismiss before service any such

complaint that the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief

may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To survive a dismissal for failure to state a claim, a pro se complaint

must set forth sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state claim to relief that is plausible

on its face. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the dismissal standard

articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544 (2007) governs dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)). Although detailed factual

allegations are not required, the “allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Further, although the standard of review for pro se pleadings is liberal, the generous

construction afforded pro se plaintiffs has limits. Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th

Cir. 1996). Pro se plaintiffs must still meet basic pleading requirements, and courts are not

required to conjure allegations on their behalf or “guess at the nature” of their claims. Wells v.

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).

Upon review, the Court finds plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed pursuant to §

1915(e)(2)(B). Even according the complaint the deference to which a pro se pleading is

entitled, it fails to meet basic pleading requirements necessary to state a plausible claim upon

which this Court may grant her relief.

Plaintiff’s complaint on its face fails to allege any specific federal claim or cause of

action, and it impossible for the Court to discern whether plaintiff purports to assert a federal

claim relating to employment, or simply to assert claims under the Ohio statutes she cites. See

Lillard v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996) (a court is not required to

accept summary allegations or unwarranted conclusions in determining whether a complaint

states a claim for relief). Even if plaintiff’s complaint could be liberally construed as purporting

to assert a federal claim of employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., it is insufficient to state such a claim. Title VII prohibits “employer

discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, in hiring, firing, salary

structure, promotion and the like.” Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 342

(2013). But plaintiff’s complaint does not allege facts from which a reasonable inference could

be drawn that she suffered an adverse employment action “on the basis” or because of a

characteristic protected by Title VII. Conclusory allegations of discrimination are insufficient to

state a federal Title VII claim. See Tucker v. Victor Gelb, Inc., 194 F.3d 1314 (TABLE), 1999

WL 801544 (6th Cir. 1999) (upholding summary dismissal of Title VII claim).1

1In addition, a plaintiff fails to state a Title VII claim where “the record does not conclusively

show that she exhausted her administrative remedies prior to filing her complaint in federal

court.” Tucker, 1999 WL 801544, at *1. “In order to satisfy the prerequisites to an employment

discrimination action, a claimant must: 1) file a timely charge of discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC); and 2) receive and act upon the EEOC’s notice

In the absence of a plausible federal claim, the Court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over any state-law claims plaintiff seeks to assert (including determining whether she

has any plausible civil cause of action under the state criminal statutes she cites). A district court

“may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” if that court “has dismissed all

claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). There is no independent

basis for the Court to exercise diversity jurisdiction over plaintiff's state-law claims. In order for

a federal court to assert diversity jurisdiction over state-law claims, there must be complete

diversity of citizenship between plaintiff and all defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Owen Equip.

& Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978) (“diversity jurisdiction does not exist unless

each defendant is a citizen of a different State from each plaintiff’) (emphasis in original). It is

clear from plaintiff's pleading that complete diversity of citizenship between plaintiff and all

defendants does not exist.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an

appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

Bhar

Dated: November 2, 2022 Clady

CHARLES E. FLEMING

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

of right to sue.” /d. Even if plaintiffs complaint were sufficient to suggest she is asserting a

Title VI claim, it is still subject to dismissal because she does not allege or demonstrate that she

pursued a charge of discrimination with the EEOC prior to filing this action.