Somos v. Classic MS LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

BRADFORD LEE SOMOS, ) CASENO. 1:22 CV 1081

Plaintiff, )

v. ) JUDGE DONALD C. NUGENT

CLASSIC MS, LLC, )

) MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendant. ) AND ORDER

I. Introduction

Pro se plaintiff Bradford Lee Somos filed this action against his former employer, Classic

MS, LLC (“Classic”) (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff's complaint concerns his termination from

employment with Classic on February 15, 2022. He seeks declaratory and compensatory relief.

According to the complaint, Classic’s Human Resources Department advised all

employees that Classic intended to mandate Covid-19 vaccinations and employees could contact

Human Resources for accommodation requests. (Doc. No. | at 2). Plaintiff provided his

employer with a “notarized religious exemption letter.” Classic advised Plaintiff, however, that

the letter he provided was not the correct, updated religious exemption form and he must

complete the new form that complied with state and federal laws. (Id. at 4). Classic advised

Plaintiff that should he choose not to submit the updated exemption form, he would be “removed

from the schedule.” (/d. at 5). Plaintiff objected to the new form as “legally inappropriate”

because it required information concerning his medical history, including previous vaccinations

and pharmaceutical drug use. (/d.). Plaintiff failed to provide the requested religious exemption

form and Classic terminated him.

Plaintiff alleges employment discrimination, and in support, he cites to the Americans

with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiff

contends that Classic’s use of a religious exemption form that required medical history

information was not “explicitly required for a job duty or business need” and was therefore a

violation of the ADA. Plaintiff also alleges that Classic “rejected Plaintiff's religious exemption

letter in contradiction to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” (/d. at 7).

II. Standard of Review

Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2).The Court grants

that application.

Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365, 102 S.

Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct.

594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972). The district court, however, is required to dismiss an in forma

pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 US. 319, 328, 109

S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990);

Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis

in law or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual

contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

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The dismissal standard for Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) articulated in Bel] Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

US. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) governs dismissal for failure to state a claim

under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). To state a plausible

claim, a pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The plaintiff is not required

to include detailed factual allegations, but he or she must provide more than an unadorned, the

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing

Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 197). .

Ii. Discussion

A. ADA Claim

The Americans with Disabilities Act “broadly prohibits ‘discriminat[ion] against a

qualified individual on the basis of disability’ as it applies to aspects of employment including

hiring, advancement, and firing.” Hostettler v. College of Wooster, 895 F.3d 844, 848 (6th

Cir.2018) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). The ADA requires employers to provide disabled

employees with “reasonable accommodations” to avoid discrimination. See, e.g., Kleiber v.

Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 868 (6th Cir. 2007). If an employer does not provide

reasonable accommodations to disabled employees, an employee has an actionable claim under

the ADA. Id,

A plaintiff may demonstrate disability discrimination in two ways- directly or indirectly.

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Id. Under the direct method of proof, the plaintiff must show (1) that he is an individual with a

disability, and (2) that he is otherwise qualified for his job despite the disability “(a) without

accommodation from the employer; (b) with an alleged ‘essential’ job requirement eliminated; or

(c) with a proposed reasonable accommodation.” Ferrari v. Ford Motor Co., 826 F.3d 885, 891

(6th Cir.2016) (quoting Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1186 (6th Cir. 1996)

(abrogated by Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc)).

Claims that allege a failure to accommodate “necessarily involve direct evidence.” Kleiber, 485

F.3d at 868.

To establish a claim for disability discrimination under the indirect method, a plaintiff

must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that (1) he is disabled, (2) he

is otherwise qualified for the position, with or without reasonable accommodation, (3) he

suffered an adverse employment decision, (4) the employer knew or had reason to know of the

plaintiff's disability, and (5) the position remained open while the employer sought other

applicants or the disabled individual was replaced. Ferrari, 826 F.3d at 891-92 (quoting

Monette, 90 F.3d at 1186); Whitfield v. Tennessee, 639 F.3d 253, 259 (6th Cir. 201 1). Once the

plaintiff establishes a prima facie case under the indirect method, the burden shifts to the

defendant to “offer a legitimate explanation for its action.” Monette, 90 F.3d at 1186 (applying

the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct.

1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973)). If the defendant does so, the burden then shifts back to the

plaintiff, who “must introduce evidence showing that the proffered explanation is pretextual.” Jd.

Regardless of the method, Plaintiff's argument fails. Here, Plaintiff states that Classic’s

use of a religious exemption form that requires information concerning Plaintiff's medical

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history violates the ADA because this information is not required for the job or Classic’s

business need. Plaintiff, however, has failed to allege any facts that, if believed, would support an

ADA claim. Importantly, he has failed to allege that he is an individual with a disability, which is

a prerequisite to demonstrating that he is qualified for protection under the ADA. See Alessio v.

United Airlines, Inc., No. 5:17-cv-01426, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197834, at *6( N.D. Ohio Nov.

20, 2018). This failure, alone, is fatal to his claim. See, e.g., Currie v. Cleveland Metro. Sch.

Dist., No. 1:15 CV 262, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87311, 2015 WL 4080159, at *4 (N.D. Ohio July

6, 2015) (dismissing pro se complaint, noting “[a] complaint alleging an ADA violation is

properly dismissed for failure to identify a disability”).

Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the ADA.

B. Title VII Claim

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from discriminating

against an employee “with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. □ □ .” 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). It is a violation of Title VII to take an adverse employment decision

against an employee because of his membership in a protected class. See, e.g., White v. Columbus

Metro. Hous. Auth., 429 F.3d 232, 240 (6th Cir. 2005).

To establish a Title VII religious discrimination claim, a plaintiff must either present

direct evidence of discrimination or introduce circumstantial evidence that would allow an

inference of discriminatory treatment. Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 864-865 (6th Cir.

2003). To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination using circumstantial evidence,

a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for

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his job; (3) he suffered an adverse employment decision; and (4) he was replaced by a person

outside the protected class or treated differently than similarly situated non-protected employees.

Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587, 603 (6th Cir.2008); Makar v. Cleveland Clinic

Found., No. 1:19CV1185, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45784, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 11, 2021).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts supporting a plausible religious

discrimination claim. First, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts of direct religious discrimination.

Direct evidence is “that evidence which, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful

discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer’s actions.” Johnson, 319 □□□□ □□

865 (citing Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods. Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 926 (6th

Cir. 1999)). Such evidence “does not require a factfinder to draw any inferences in order to

conclude that the challenged employment action was motivated at least in part by prejudice

against members of the protected group.” Jd. Plaintiff has presented no such evidence.

Plaintiff also fails to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination as he fails to

allege facts suggesting that he was replaced by a person outside the protected class or that he was

treated differently than similarly situated non-protected employees. In fact, according to the

complaint, Classic required all of its employees to complete the religious exemption form should

they wish to seek an accommodation. (See Doc. No. 1 at 2). And only when Plaintiff failed to

complete the form was he terminated.

Plaintiff has therefore failed to state a Title VII claim upon which relief can be granted.

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) is granted.

For the foregoing reasons, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). The

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Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal from this decision may not be

taken in good faith.

IT ISSO ORDERED.

DONALD C. No

United States District’ Judge

DATED: + l bp»

Hy mbes 11

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