Hauman v. City of Youngstown

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

GEORGE E. HAUMAN, ) Case No. 4:19-cv-1806

)

Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese

)

v. )

)

CITY OF YOUNGSTOWN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

)

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff George Hauman filed suit against the City of Youngstown and various

City entities and officials for violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights. According to the complaint, City officials conducted illegal searches and

seizures of his real property and failed to provide him due process for alleged

violations of the City’s ordinances relating to property maintenance. Defendants

move for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This action arises out of several code violations involving Mr. Hauman’s

property, located at 153 Hilton Avenue, Youngstown, Ohio. As a result of these code

violations, City officials “red tagged” Mr. Hauman’s house, meaning the City issued

and posted on the house an order to vacate the premises. Because Defendants

maintain they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, they do not dispute the

facts alleged in the complaint or present other evidence. Therefore, the Court takes

the allegations of the complaint as true for purposes of this motion.

A. Youngstown Property Maintenance Code

The Youngstown Property Maintenance Code applies to every structure and

premises within the City and constitutes the “minimum requirements and standards

for the health, safety and welfare of the public.” Youngstown, Ohio, Codified

Ordinance § 546.01(b) (2016). The intent of the code is “to ensure public health, safety

and welfare, improve aesthetics, and prevent the deterioration of properties and

premises within the City.” Id. § 546.01(c).

As relevant here, the code provides that every plumbing fixture “shall be

properly connected to either a public water system or to an approved private water

system.” Id. § 546.04(66). Further, it provides that “every occupied building shall be

provided with an electrical system in compliance” with certain requirements. Id.

§ 546.04(84). Those requirements relate to proper fusing, sufficient receptacle and

lighting outlets, proper wiring and installation, and adequate service of the electrical

system. Id. § 546.04(86).

To enforce these provisions, City officials “charged with enforcing this code are

authorized to enter upon any premises, at reasonable times, for purposes of

conducting an exterior inspection.” Id. § 546.03. Officials may also inspect the

interior but only with the consent of the property owner. Id. “If consent is denied,

the inspector may not enter unless there are exigent circumstances or an

administrative or other warrant is obtained.” Id.

B. Notice of Ordinance Violations to Mr. Hauman

On August 2, 2017, the City “red tagged” Mr. Hauman’s house by posting an

order to vacate on the front window. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 1, PageID #1.) A code enforcement

officer, Laura Fulmer, signed the order, which notified Mr. Hauman that the property

was in violation of the code because it was not connected to a water system and lacked

electrical facilities, in violation of Section 546.04(66) and Section 546.04(84). (ECF

No. 22-2, PageID #329.) The order described the remedial action needed to correct

the code violations and the appeal procedure. (Id.) According to the complaint, a

notice of violation was taped next to the order to vacate. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 1, PageID #2.)

That notice does not appear in the record.

On September 11, 2017, the City issued a second notice of violation, which Ms.

Fulmer also signed; it too notified Mr. Hauman that his property was not in

compliance with the code. (ECF No. 22-1, PageID #320.) The notice lists Mr. Hauman

as the owner according to both county and city records. (Id.) It assessed an

administrative penalty of one hundred dollars and described Mr. Hauman’s appeal

rights. (Id.)

C. Mr. Hauman’s Appeal

On August 9, 2017, Mr. Hauman requested a hearing with the Property

Maintenance Appeals Board relating to both the order to vacate and the first notice

of violation. (ECF No. 22-2, PageID #330.) On September 20, 2017, Mr. Hauman

received notice that the appeals board scheduled his appeal for a hearing nearly a

later, on August 9, 2018. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 4, PageID #2.)

On that date, Mr. Hauman attended the appeal hearing. (Id., ¶ 6, PageID #3.)

At the hearing, according to the complaint, the appeals board informed Mr. Hauman

that it was not hearing the appeal of the red-tag order but rather concerned only the

alleged violations listed on the notice of violation. (Id.) According to the complaint,

on August 16, 2018, Mr. Hauman received notice that the appeals board denied his

appeal, though the denial was postmarked on August 13, 2018. (Id., ¶ 11, PageID

#5.) The denial of Mr. Hauman’s appeal does not appear in the record.

D. Events Surrounding the Appeal Hearing

The day before the hearing, August 8, 2018, Plaintiff alleges that City inspector

Neil McCallum entered his property and refused to leave. (Id., ¶ 5, PageID #3.)

According to the complaint, Mr. McCallum stated he was “like a police officer and can

go anywhere I want to without a warrant” and “I have the Law Department on my

side.” (Id.)

On August 14, 2017, after the appeals board denied Mr. Hauman’s appeal but

before Mr. Hauman received notice of that denial, Mr. Hauman alleges an encounter

between himself and City officials. According to the complaint, Code Enforcement

Superintendent Michael Durkin, accompanied by several police officers, appeared at

Mr. Hauman’s house. (Id., ¶ 7, PageID #3.) One of the officers informed Mr. Hauman

that Mr. Durkin and the officers were there to red tag the house because it was not

connected to a water system and lacked electrical facilities. (Id.) After some

discussion, Mr. Durkin and the officers agreed that if Mr. Hauman could demonstrate

the property had working utilities, then they would not tag the house. (Id.)

Mr. Hauman so demonstrated, and the officer filmed his demonstration of the

utilities. (Id., PageID #4.)

However, Mr. Durkin subsequently informed Mr. Hauman that he had to

connect to the public water system and, if he did not, he would be arrested for

trespassing. (Id.) At that point, a policer officer placed Mr. Hauman in handcuffs

and told him he was being arrested for “criminal trespassing.” (Id.; id., ¶ 15, PageID

#7.) After Mr. Hauman’s girlfriend, Mary Matterson, informed Mr. Durkin and the

officers that she would connect the property to the public water system, the officers

released Mr. Hauman and departed. (Id., ¶ 7, PageID #4.) Mr. Durkin

informed Matterson that she had until the next day to take the remedial action;

otherwise, Mr. Hauman would again be arrested for criminal trespassing. (Id.)

Sometime following this encounter with Mr. Durkin, Matterson initiated water

service for the property in her name. (Id., ¶ 13, PageID #6.)

E. Subsequent Developments

According to the complaint, Mr. Hauman sold the property in September 2018.

(Id., ¶¶ 1 & 12, PageID #1 & #5.) Nonetheless, the City continues to bill Mr. Hauman

for water, sewer, and garbage despite knowing that Mr. Hauman no longer owns the

property. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 13, PageID #6.)

Further, according to the complaint, the City issued another notice of violation

on March 28, 2019, which a property inspector named Vera Grier signed. (ECF No. 1,

¶ 12, PageID #5.) That notice does not appear in the record. Ms. Grier signed another

notice of violation dated May 8, 2019, which does appear in the record. (ECF No. 22-1,

PageID #321.) That notice lists Mr. Hauman as the owner according to City records

and Matterson as the owner according to county records. (Id.) The notice assessed

an administrative penalty of one hundred dollars and described how to appeal. (Id.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A few months later, on August 8, 2019, Plaintiff filed his complaint pro se.

(ECF No. 1.) As Defendants, Plaintiff names the City of Youngstown and various

City entities, including the Property Code Enforcement and Demolition Department,

the Property Maintenance Appeals Board, and the police department. (Id., PageID

#1.) Further, Plaintiff names various City officials as Defendants, including City

Inspector Neil McCallum, Code Enforcement Superintendent Michael Durkin, Code

Enforcement Officer Laura Fulmer, Property Inspector Vera Grier, and Mark

Williams, a member of the appeals board. (Id.) Plaintiff also names as Defendants

City Law Director Jeff Limbian and First Assistant Law Director James Vivo. (Id.)

Plaintiff brings his claims against all named persons in their individual and official

capacities. (Id., PageID #7.) Finally, Plaintiff includes in his complaint thirty John

Doe Defendants.

Against Defendants, Plaintiff brings constitutional claims under Section 1983.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants deprived him of due process in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment. (Id., ¶ 14, PageID #6.) Further, Plaintiff alleges

Defendants subjected his person and property to illegal search and seizure in

violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id.) In addition, Plaintiff

asserts a State-law claim for trespass against Mr. McCallum. (Id., ¶ 5, PageID #3.)

Defendants move for summary judgment on all Plaintiff’s claims. (ECF No. 21.)

Plaintiff opposes. (ECF No. 22.)

ANALYSIS

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary

judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view evidence in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Kirilenko-Ison v. Board of Educ. of

Danville Indep. Schs., 974 F.3d 652, 660 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the initial burden

of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact as to an essential

element of the claim or defense at issue. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472,

1479–80 & n.12 (6th Cir. 1989); Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 584 F. Supp. 2d 974,

988 (N.D. Ohio 2008). After discovery, summary judgment is appropriate if the

nonmoving party fails to establish “an element essential to that party’s case and upon

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Tokmenko v. MetroHealth

Sys., 488 F.Supp.3d 571, 576 (N.D. Ohio 2020) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).

“The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the

court of the basis for its motion” and identifying the portions of the record “which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (citing

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323). Then, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific

facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)). “When the moving party has carried its burden under

Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than show there is some metaphysical doubt

as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586.

If a genuine dispute exists, meaning “the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” summary judgment is not

appropriate. Id. However, if “the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly

probative,” summary judgment for the movant is proper. Id. The “mere existence of

some factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly

supported motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)

(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48). To determine whether a genuine dispute

about material facts exists, it is not the Court’s duty to search the record; instead, the

parties must bring those facts to the Court’s attention. See Betkerur v. Aultman Hosp.

Ass’n, 78 F.3d 1079, 1087 (6th Cir. 1996). Ultimately, the Court must determine

“whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a

jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251.

I. Proper Defendants

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for State violations of rights secured

under the Constitution or federal law. Dibrell v. City of Knoxville, Tenn., 984 F.3d

1156, 1160 (6th Cir. 2021). As an initial matter, the Court considers whether the

entities and individuals Plaintiff names are proper Defendants under Section 1983.

I.A. City of Youngstown Sub-Units

First, in addition to the City of Youngstown, Plaintiff names as Defendants the

Property Code Enforcement and Demolition Department, the Property Maintenance

Appeals Board, and the police department. As Defendants point out, these entities

are sub-units of the City of Youngstown. Sargent v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 150

F. App’x 470, 475 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that police departments are “merely sub-

units of the municipalities they serve” and, therefore, are not proper defendants in a

Section 1983 action). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against these

entities fail as a matter of law and summary judgment is warranted.

I.B. Mark Williams, James Vivo, and Jeff Limbian

In his complaint, Plaintiff names Mr. Williams, Mr. Vivo, and Mr. Limbian as

Defendants both in the caption and in a table that follows the signature block. (ECF

No. 1, PageID #1 & 9–10.) However, Plaintiff does not make any factual allegations

against these individuals. “[C]laims against government officials arising from alleged

violations of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that

demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right.”

Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008). The Court determines that

Plaintiff has not established any claim against Mr. Williams, Mr. Vivo, or

Mr. Limbian. Accordingly, these Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

II. Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 contains no substantive rights, rather, it provides a statutory

vehicle for vindicating rights found in the Constitution or another federal law.

Dibrell, 984 F.3d at 1160. Under Section 1983, the “threshold inquiry” is to determine

the specific constitutional right at issue. Id. (citing Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137

S. Ct. 911, 920 (2017)). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional

rights but does not cite any specific right.

Once Defendants moved for summary judgment, Plaintiff was required “to

come forward with every legal theory” on which his complaint relied. National Credit

Union Admin. v. Michigan Nat’l Bank of Detroit, 771 F.2d 154, 161 (6th Cir. 1985).

In the Court’s view, based on its reading of Plaintiff’s opposition, Plaintiff alleges two

claims—one for due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and the other for

unlawful search and seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (See

ECF No. 22.) In the Court’s view, Plaintiff has forfeited any other constitutional

claims.

II.A. Due Process

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend.

XIV. The due process clause has both substantive and procedural components. EJS

Props., LLC v. City of Toledo, 698 F.3d 845, 855 (6th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants violated his due process rights by enforcing the City’s Property

Maintenance Code and issuing administrative penalties pursuant to them. (ECF

No. 1, ¶ 10, PageID #5.)

II.A.1. Substantive Due Process

Substantive due process bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions

“regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Zinermon v.

Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331

(1986)). The type of governmental actions due process proscribes depends on the

nature of the right being deprived. Shoemaker v. City of Howell, 795 F.3d 553, 564

(6th Cir. 2015). Where governmental actions deprive individuals of fundamental

rights, courts apply strict scrutiny to the alleged deprivation. Id. (citing Reno v.

Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993)). Here, Plaintiff has not identified a fundamental

right implicated by the ordinances’ property maintenance requirements, and the

Court concludes that one is not at issue here. See Bell v. Ohio State Univ., 351 F.3d

240, 250 (6th Cir. 2003) (recognizing a narrow list of rights as fundamental).

Where government actions do not affect fundamental rights, they will be

upheld if they are rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Sheffield v. City of

Fort Thomas, 620 F.3d 596, 613 (6th Cir. 2010). “This standard is highly deferential;

courts hold statutes unconstitutional under this standard of review only in rare or

exceptional circumstances.” Doe v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 501 (6th

Cir. 2007). “Under rational basis scrutiny, government action amounts to a

constitutional violation only if it is so unrelated to the achievement of any

combination of legitimate purposes that the court can only conclude that the

government's actions were irrational.” Michael v. Ghee, 498 F.3d 372, 379 (6th Cir.

2007) (cleaned up). The plaintiff bears the burden to show that “there is no rational

connection between the enactment and a legitimate government interest.” Sheffield,

620 F.3d at 613 (cleaned up).

Defendants contend that the minimum maintenance standards related to

water systems and electricity protect the social and economic welfare of the

community. (ECF No. 21-1, PageID #246.) Public health, safety, and welfare are

legitimate governmental interests. See Harris v. Akron Dept. of Public Health, 10

Fed.Appx. 316, 319 (6th Cir. 2001) (identifying health, safety, and welfare of the

public as legitimate governmental interests). Plaintiff does not dispute that his

property did not comply with the Property Maintenance Code; instead, Plaintiff

argues that his property had adequate utilities furnished through solar panels and a

“rainwater collection system.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 7, PageID #3; ECF No. 22, PageID #318;

ECF No. 22-2, PageID #330.) But whether Plaintiff believes that the ordinances are

“unnecessary or ineffectual simply is not relevant to rational basis review.” Bojicic v.

DeWine, __ F. Supp. 3d __, No. 3:21-CV-00630-JGC, 2021 WL 4977018, at *11 (N.D.

Ohio Oct. 27, 2021).

Because no fundamental right is implicated by the City’s property

maintenance requirements and because those requirements are rationally related to

legitimate governmental purposes, enforcement of the ordinances did not violate

Plaintiff’s substantive due process rights.

II.A.2. Procedural Due Process

For a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must establish a constitutionally

protected liberty or property interest and show that such an interest was deprived

without appropriate process. Midkiff v. Adams Cty. Reg'l Water Dist., 409 F.3d 758,

762–63 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972)).

Then, the inquiry becomes “whether the deprivation of that interest contravened

notions of due process.” Id. (quoting Thomas v. Cohen, 304 F.3d 563, 576 (6th Cir.

2002)). Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff had a constitutionally protected

property interest but maintain that no deprivation occurred because Plaintiff did not

allege that he ever paid the administrative penalties levied against him nor that he

was evicted from his property. (ECF No. 21-1, PageID #246.)

If a deprivation occurred, the Court determines that Plaintiff received due

process. At bottom, due process requires that a person be “given notice of the case

against him” and “opportunity to meet it.” Shoemaker, 795 F.3d at 559 (quoting

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348–49 (1976)). Here, the City provided Plaintiff

with ample notice of the allegations against him, including at least the three notices

of violation that are in the record. (ECF No. 22-1, PageID #320–21; ECF No. 22-2,

PageID #329.) Each of the notices explained Plaintiff’s appeal rights and the appeal

process. (Id.) Indeed, Plaintiff exercised his appeal rights and received a hearing in

front of the Property Maintenance Appeals Board. (ECF No.1, ¶ 6, PageID #3; ECF

No. 22-2, PageID #330.)

Plaintiff argues that he did not receive an appeal because the appeals board

did not hear his appeal of the red-tag order specifically. (ECF No. 22, PageID

#316–18.) However, Plaintiff does not contest that the appeals board heard his

appeal as it related to the underlying alleged code violations. (Id.) The Court

determines that Plaintiff had a sufficient opportunity to be heard and to meet the

case against him. Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff received

procedural due process.

II.B. Search and Seizure Claims

The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the

Fourteenth, protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend.

IV; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

subjected him to “illegal search and seizure of his property and his person.” (ECF

No. 1, ¶ 14, PageID #6.)

II.B.1. Unlawful Search Claims

Generally, a search of private property without consent is per se unreasonable

unless a valid warrant authorizes the search or an established exception to the

requirement for a warrant applies. Camara v. Municipal Ct. of City & Cnty. of San

Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528–29 (1967). Plaintiff challegnes two searches of his

property. On August 8, 2018, City inspector Neil McCallum entered onto and

inspected Plaintiff’s property without a warrant. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 5, PageID #3.) On

August 14, 2017, Code Enforcement Superintendent Michael Durkin and City police

officers came to Plaintiff’s property, and at least one police officer entered and

inspected Plaintiff’s property. (Id., ¶ 7, PageID #3–4.)

As to Mr. McCallum’s search, Plaintiff does not allege that Mr. McCallum

entered his house. Rather, Plaintiff alleges only that Mr. McCallum trespassed on

his property and refused to leave. (Id., ¶ 5, PageID #3.) The Fourth Amendment

recognizes a distinction of constitutional significance between a house’s interior and

exterior. Widgren v. Maple Grove Twp., 429 F.3d 575, 583 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding no

Fourth Amendment search where a government agent merely inspected a structure’s

exterior, even where the inspection occurred on the property of the objecting party).

Although Plaintiff alleges that Mr. McCallum trespassed while conducting the

inspection, trespass alone does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Oliver v.

United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183–84 (1984). Plaintiff does not allege that

Mr. McCallum’s actions were unduly intrusive or that he employed any methods

beyond observations with the naked eye. Accordingly, the Court determines that

Mr. McCallum did not conduct a Fourth Amendment search by entering Plaintiff’s

property and inspecting the house’s exterior.

Regarding the incident involving Mr. Durkin and the police officers, at least

one police officer entered Plaintiff’s house. According to the sequence of events

described in the complaint, Mr. Durkin and the police officers first arrived at

Plaintiff’s front door. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 7, PageID #3.) Then, “after some discussion,”

Plaintiff came to an agreement with Mr. Durkin and the officers that, if Plaintiff

showed them the house had working utilities, they would remove the red tag from

the property. (Id.) Plaintiff proceeded to show a police officer the working utilities

inside the house. (Id.) Based on these events, the Court finds that any inspection of

the interior of Plaintiff’s house was conducted with Plaintiff’s consent. “Consent from

an individual whose property is to be searched . . . validates a search that would

otherwise be considered unreasonable and unconstitutional.” Shamaeizadeh v.

Cunigan, 338 F.3d 535, 547 (6th Cir. 2003). In these circumstances, the Court

determines that any search Mr. Durkin conducted of Plaintiff’s property did not

violate Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth Amendment.

II.B.2. Unlawful Seizure Claims

Turning to the right against unreasonable seizures of property, a seizure

occurs under the Fourth Amendment where “there is some meaningful interference

with an individual's possessory interests in that property.” United States v. Jacobsen,

466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).

II.B.2.i. Seizure of Mr. Hauman’s Property

Plaintiff argues that the City seized his property when it red tagged the

property with an order to vacate, signed by Ms. Fulmer, stating that no person was

permitted on the premises. (ECF No. 22, PageID #317; ECF No. 22-2, PageID #329.)

Mr. Hauman also points to the multiple notices of violation, which Ms. Fulmer and

Ms. Grier signed. (ECF No. 22, PageID #316.) Plaintiff argues that these actions

prevented him from entering his property because he was subject to arrest for

trespassing. (ECF No. 22, PageID #318.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not

shown meaningful interference with his possessory interests because Plaintiff does

not allege that he paid any fines or that the City evicted him or prevented him from

deeding the property to a third party. (ECF No. 21-1, PageID #246.)

Regarding the alleged code violations of Plaintiff’s property, Plaintiff received

multiple notices, he appealed those determinations, and he received a hearing before

the appeals board. Only after the appeals board’s denial did Mr. Durkin and the

police officers inform Plaintiff that he would be arrested for trespassing if he did not

vacate the property. On these facts, and lacking any contrary authority in support of

Plaintiff’s position, the Court cannot say that the mere red tagging of Plaintiff’s

property constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

Even if a seizure occurred, “reasonableness is still the ultimate standard”

under the Fourth Amendment. Soldal v. Cook Cnty., Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 71 (1992).

Here, the Court concludes that the actions against Plaintiff’s property—including the

issuance of notices of violation, Mr. Durkin’s renewal of the red tag, and the police

officers’ enforcement of the order to vacate—were reasonable. Accordingly, the Court

determines that the actions of Ms. Fulmer, Ms. Grier, and Mr. Durkin did not violate

Plaintiff rights under the Fourth Amendment.

II.B.2.ii. Seizure of Mr. Hauman’s Person

As to the seizure of his person, Plaintiff alleges that a police officer placed him

in handcuffs during the August 14, 2018 incident, before releasing him. (ECF No. 1,

¶¶ 7 & 15, PageID #4 & #6–7.) However, as Defendants point out, Plaintiff has not

identified the officer who handcuffed him or named that officer as a Defendant in this

action. (ECF No. 23, PageID #347.) Defendants argue that they are entitled to

summary judgment for any claim of alleged unconstitutional seizure of Plaintiff’s

person. (Id.) The Court agrees.

Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure required Plaintiff to effect

service of the summons and the complaint on Defendants within 90 days after the

filing of the complaint. A failure to effect service may be excused on a showing of

good cause. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). “Unless a named defendant agrees to waive

service, the summons continues to be the sine qua non directing an individual or

entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.”

Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 351 (1999).

In the complaint, Plaintiff named certain John Doe Defendants, one as a

placeholder for the police officer who handcuffed him. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 15, PageID

#6–7.) Plaintiff filed his complaint on August 8, 2019. (ECF No. 1.) However,

Plaintiff has still—over two years later—not identified the John Doe Defendants, and

has yet to serve them, contrary to the requirements of Rule 4(m). In these

circumstances, dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against the John Doe Defendant is

warranted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); see also Petty v. County of Franklin, Ohio, 478

F.3d 341, 346 (6th Cir. 2007).

II.C. Claims Against the City of Youngstown

Plaintiff brings claims against the City of Youngstown and against

Mr. McCallum, Mr. Durkin, Ms. Fulmer, and Ms. Grier in their official capacities.

(ECF No. 1, ¶ 18, PageID #7.) Official-capacity suits represent another way of

pleading an action against the entity for which the officer is an agent. Monell v.

Department of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978). “A suit

against an individual in his official capacity is the equivalent of a suit against the

governmental entity.” Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir.1994).

Therefore, if the claim against the municipality fails, the official-capacity claims must

also fail. Scott v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, 503 F. Supp. 3d 532, 541

(W.D. Ky. 2020).

Municipalities may be held liable for the constitutional violations of their

employees only where the municipality’s policy or custom led to the violation. Monell,

436 U.S. at 694–95. “There can be no liability under Monell without an underlying

constitutional violation.” Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 622 (6th Cir. 2014).

Because no employee of the City of Youngstown violated Plaintiff’s federal

constitutional rights, Plaintiff cannot prevail on a Monell claim, and the City of

Youngstown is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. For the same reason,

Mr. McCallum, Mr. Durkin, Ms. Fulmer, and Ms. Grier are entitled to summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims.

III. State-Law Claim

Plaintiff's complaint presents one State-law claim for trespass against

Mr. McCallum. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 5, PageID #3.) On the day before the hearing at the

appeals board, City inspector Neil McCallum entered Plaintiff’s property and refused

to leave. (Id., ¶ 5, PageID #3.) According to the complaint, Mr. McCallum stated he

was “like a police officer and can go anywhere I want to without a warrant” and “I

have the Law Department on my side.” (Id.)

A court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related claims that “form

part of the same case or controversy” as any claim over which the court has original

jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), this Court “may

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . [it] has dismissed

all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Further, Section 1367(c)(3)

provides that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where

“(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially

predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original

jurisdiction; (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons

for declining jurisdiction.” In deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction,

the district court should consider factors such as “comity, judicial economy,

convenience, and fairness.” Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 196 F.3d

617, 620–21 (6th Cir. 1999).

After reviewing the record in this matter, and in the interests of promoting

finality in the resolving the disputes between the parties, the Court will not exercise

its discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s State-law claim

against Mr. McCallum. Under Ohio law, trespass occurs where a person, without

authority or a privilege, physically invades or unlawfully enters the private premises

of another person, resulting in damages. See, e.g., Apel v. Katz, 83 Ohio St. 3d 11, 19,

1998-Ohio-420, 697 N.E.2d 600 (citations omitted). Because the record, construed in

Plaintiff’s favor, shows that Mr. McCallum was discharging his official duties, he

authority or a privilege to enter Plaintiff’s property. Therefore, no trespass occurred

as a matter of Ohio law.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment in substantial part and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claim against the

John Doe Defendant.

Specifically, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of the City of

Youngstown’s Property Code Enforcement and Demolition Department, the Property

Maintenance Appeals Board, and the Youngstown Police Department. Each of these

named Defendants is part of the City of Youngstown municipal government and not

a proper Defendant.

The Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Mr. Williams, Mr. Vivo,

and Mr. Limbian because Plaintiff fails to make any allegations against them.

The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs

constitutional claims against the properly named Defendants because the record

shows that no violation of Plaintiffs federal constitutional rights occurred. Therefore,

these Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's unlawful seizure claim against the John

Doe police officer based on Plaintiffs failure to effect service.

Finally, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Defendant

McCallum on Plaintiffs State-law trespass claim.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 2, 2022

J.Philip Calabrese

United States District Judge

Northern District of Ohio

21