The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
JANE DOE, ) Case No.: 1:21 CV 1641
)
Plaintiff ) JUDGE SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.
)
v. )
)
LORAIN BOARD OF EDUCATION, )
et al., )
)
Defendants ) ORDER
Currently pending before the court in the above-captioned case are Defendant Jrayene
Nimene’s (“Nimene”) Motion to Compel (ECF No. 16) and the parties’ Stipulated Motion for
Extension of Certain Case Deadlines (“Motion to Extend Case Deadlines”) (ECF No. 30). For the
following reasons, the court grants the Motion to Extend Case Deadlines and grants in part and
denies in part the Motion to Compel. Specifically, the court grants the Motion to Compel to the
extent that it seeks and order compelling Defendant Lorain City Board of Education (the “Board”)
to produce an unredacted version of the investigative Report, and denies the Motion to Compel in
all other aspects.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff Jane Doe (“Plaintiff”) has over twenty years of experience as a teacher and began
working for Lorain High School in October of 2016, as an intervention specialist. (Second Am.
Compl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 1-1.) According to Plaintiff, starting in January 2019, Defendant
Nimene who was Lorain City School District’s Director of Health and Wellness and a member of
the District’s Central Committee engaged in a pattern of sexually harassing her both at work and
when she was at home. (Id. ¶ 8.) On December 23, 2019, Plaintiff reported Defendant Nimene’s
conduct to the administration’s “People Officer.” (Id. ¶ 29.) Upon receipt of Plaintiff’s complaint,
counsel for the Board conducted an investigation into Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the Board’s
policy. (Def. Board’s Resp. at PageID #1111, ECF No. 21.) At the conclusion of this investigation,
counsel for the Board prepared an investigative Report (“Report”), which is the subject of the instant
discovery dispute before the court.
B. Procedural History
On January 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed her Complaint in the Lorain County Court of Common
Pleas, asserting the following three claims for relief under Ohio law: (1) sexual harassment (count
one); (2) aider and abettor liability (count two); and (3) civil liability for criminal conduct (count
three). (Compl. ¶¶ 30 47, ECF No. 1-2.) Plaintiff subsequently amended her Complaint twice in
state court. In her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff modified her sexual harassment claim to
include a cause of action under both federal and state law. Defendants timely removed the case to
this court in response to Plaintiff’s assertion of a federal sexual harassment claim.
On December 8, 2021, Defendant Nimene filed a Motion to Compel (ECF No. 16), asking
the court to order the Board to produce all information withheld on the basis of attorney-client or
work-product privilege. In that Motion, Defendant Nimene lists three concerns relative to this
discovery dispute: (1) Nimene complains of the timing of the release of the Report, (2) Nimene
asserts that the Report ignored concerns that he sent to the Board’s investigators; and (3) Nimene
contends that the amount of redactions in the Report “seem excessive.” (Id. at PageID #1077 1078.)
On December 21, 2021, the Board filed an Opposition to the Motion (ECF No. 19), asserting that
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the Board’s redactions of the Report were proper because “the redacted portions constitute the
opinion, advice, and impressions of the Board’s attorneys.” (Id. at PageID #1099.) The Board also
maintained that Nimene’s first two concerns are not discovery issues that the court can address. (Id.)
That same day, Plaintiff filed a brief in support of Defendant Nimene’s Motion to Compel (ECF
No. 20), joining Defendant Nimene in his request for an unredacted version of the Report.
Relatedly, on December 18, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Discovery Dispute
(ECF No. 18), informing the court that there was an ongoing discovery dispute concerning the
Board’s refusal to produce an unredacted version of the Report. On January 14, 2022, the Board
provided an unredacted version of the document at issue to the court, which the court has reviewed
in camera. (ECF No. 24.) On January 19, 2022, the court held a telephonic status conference with
counsel for the parties in the within case to discuss the discovery dispute. (ECF No. 27.) After a
discussion of the issues relative to the Notice and Motion to Compel, the court determined that it
would issue a written ruling on the matter. (Id.)
On March 4, 2022, the parties filed a Stipulated Motion to Extend Certain Case Deadlines
(ECF No. 30). In that Motion, the parties asked the court to: (1) extend the discovery deadline to 90
days after the court issues an order resolving the discovery dispute; and (2) extend the dispositive
motion deadline to 130 days after the court issues an order resolving the discovery dispute. (Id.)
Because this Order resolves the parties’ discovery dispute, the court hereby grants the parties’
Stipulated Motion to Extend Certain Case Deadlines and instructs the parties to proceed with the
revised schedule consistent with their joint motion.
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) permits parties to “obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs
of the case…” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Pursuant to Rule 37(a)(1), when an opposing party fails to
produce permitted discovery, “a party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery”
so long as the movant has “in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party
failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 37(a)(1). The Sixth Circuit has determined that the “scope of discovery is . . . within the broad
discretion of the trial court.” Lewis v. AB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1998).
Evidence is discoverable if it is non-privileged and relevant to the claims or defenses of either party
or “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1); see also Lewis, 135 F.3d at 402. If not obvious on its face, the initial burden of showing
that the information sought is discoverable, is on the proponent of a motion to compel. Abraham v.
Alpha Chi Omega, 271 F.R.D. 556, 559 (2010); Gruenbaum v. Werner Enters., 270 F.R.D. 298, 302
(S.D. Ohio 2010). Once the information is shown to be discoverable, the burden shifts to the
opponent of the motion to compel “to show why the discovery is irrelevant, overly broad, or unduly
burdensome or oppressive, and thus should not be permitted.” Abraham, 271 F.R.D. at 559.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
At issue is whether the Board waived any privilege or protection that it may have had relative
to the Report, when it raised the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense.1 As another federal district
1 It is undisputed that in its Answer (ECF No. 3), the Board of Education invoked
the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense. (See id. ¶ 25 (asserting that “[the
Board] took appropriate action to remedy any and all allegations of harassment
lodged by Plaintiff thereby barring some or all of Plaintiff’s asserted by causes of
action pursuant to the Faragher-Ellerth defense”).)
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court has explained, “[i]n cases of co-worker harassment, an employer can raise the
Faragher Ellerth affirmative defense, which requires the employer to show that it exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior.” Reitz v. City of
Mt. Juliet, 680 F. Supp. 2d 888, 892 (M.D. Tenn. 2010). In doing so, employers often retain outside
counsel to investigate the employee’s sexual harassment allegations, then, “[i]f the employer is sued,
it argues that the internal investigation shows the employer’s reasonable efforts to detect and prevent
harassment.” Id. Courts have made clear that “a defendant should not be permitted to wield an
internal investigation as a sword while simultaneously shielding its contents via work product
protections leaving the plaintiff without the ability to meaningfully evaluate the affirmative
defense.” Pannek v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 1:19-CV-852, 2021 WL 5533749, at *7 (S.D. Ohio
July 21, 2021) (citing Reitz, 680. F. Supp. 2d at 892); see also E.E.O.C. v. Spitzer Mgmt., Inc., No.
1:06-CV-2337, 2010 WL 1438819, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 9, 2010) (stating that “[b]y asserting a
defense of adequate investigation, [the defendant] ha[d] waived privileges for documents that
constitute evidence of the investigation of the claims for discrimination”); see also McKenna v.
Nestle Purina PetCare Co., No. 2:05-CV-0976, 2007 WL 433291, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2007)
(noting that “there is case law suggesting that by pleading the defense of adequate investigation .
. . an employer may waive privileges for documents related to that investigation”).
Here, Plaintiff and Defendant Niemene assert that the Board “has waived any attorney-client
privilege and work product privilege for the investigatory report into the employee’s complaint,”
by placing the reasonableness of its investigation into Plaintiff’s sexual harassment complaint at
issue in this dispute. (Pl.’s Resp. at PageID #1105, ECF No. 20; Def. Nimene’s Mot. at PageID
#1076, ECF No. 16.) On the other hand, the Board concedes that the “fact” portions of the Report
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are discoverable specifically, the portions of the documents memorializing the information
gathered by the investigators but maintains that the “opinion” portions of the Report remain
privileged. (Opp’n at PageID #1099 1100, ECF No. 19.) After considering the parties’ arguments
and relevant case law, the court finds that Plaintiff and Defendant Nimene’s position are well-taken.
Here, the Board points to two cases from other federal district courts for the proposition that
the “opinion” portions of the report are not subject to disclosure, and thus, were properly redacted.
(Opp’n at PageID #1099 1101, ECF No. 19 (citing Reitz, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 895; and McKenna v.
Nestle Purina PetCare Co., No. 2:05-CV-0976, 2007 WL 433291, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2007)).)
However, the Board’s reliance on the McKenna and Reitz decisions is misplaced. In McKenna, the
court resolved the question of whether the defendant employer was required to disclose the
documents at issue on entirely different grounds namely, the court held that, “[i]f an attorney had
been consulted about an investigation but did not himself or herself conduct interviews, make
disciplinary decisions, or otherwise participate in the investigation itself, the contents of the
attorney’s advice to the client about the investigative process and the decisions made by the
employer remain privileged.” McKenna, 2007 WL 433291, at *4 (emphasis added). However, as
Plaintiff points out, McKenna does not apply to this case because the Report at issue was prepared
by counsel for the Board who “conducted the investigation, interviewed the witnesses, made
findings, and rendered their advice to the Board.” (Pl.’s Resp. at PageID #1108 1109, ECF No. 20.)
Moreover, the word “opinion” is not referenced a single time in the McKenna court’s decision.
In Reitz, the court determined that the “opinion” work product could be redacted because it
“ha[d] no bearing on the issues of [the plaintiff’s] work performance, the discipline she faced before
filing her internal complaint, or any other aspect of [the plaintiff’s] current case.” Id. (emphasis
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added). Reitz, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 895. In reaching its conclusion, the Reitz court noted that
“[s]ections of the [documents at issue] that reflect the lawyers mental impressions, opinions,
conclusions, judgments, or legal theories are not relevant to the plaintiff’s remaining retaliation
claim, nor will they lead to the discovery of relevant information.” Id. (emphasis added). The Reitz
court also explained that because plaintiff’s hostile environment claim had already been dismissed,
the defendant “no longer need[ed] to press its Faragher Ellerth defense, and the plaintiff no longer
need[ed] to examine the depth of the defendant’s investigative efforts.” Id. at 894.
Here, unlike in Reitz, the claim that spurred the Board’s investigation namely, Plaintiff’s
sexual harassment claim remains pending. After reviewing the redacted portions of the Report, in
camera, the court concludes that understanding the Board’s lawyers’ opinions, mental impressions,
and conclusions with respect to the investigation of Plaintiff’s Complaint, is central to Plaintiff’s
ability to determine whether the internal investigation shows that the Board took “reasonable efforts
to detect and prevent harassment.” See Reitz, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 892. Indeed, it is unclear how
Plaintiff could challenge the Board’s affirmative defense without an unreadacted version of the
Report. This is so because the redactions relate to the witnesses’ credibility, the investigators’ legal
analysis of the evidence relative to the investigation, and the investigators’ legal conclusion
concerning whether sexual harassment occurred. This information is plainly relevant to both
Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim and the Board’s Faragher Ellerth defense. Accordingly, the
court grants Defendant Nimene’s Motion to Compel, to the extent that he seeks an order compelling
the Board to produce an unredacted version of the Report.
IV. CONCLUSION
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For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the Motion to Extend Case Deadlines (ECF No.
30) and grants in part and denies in part the Motion to Compel (ECF No. 16). Specifically, the court
grants the Motion to Compel to the extent that it seeks disclosure of an unredacted version of the
investigative Report, and denies the Motion to Compel in all other aspects.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
May 3, 2022
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