Hunter v. May

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

JOSEPH R. HUNTER, JR., CASE NO. 3:21 CV 2247

Plaintiff, JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II

v.

WARDEN HAROLD MAY, et al., MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

ORDER

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

Pro se Plaintiff Joseph R. Hunter, Jr., an inmate in the Toledo Correctional Institution

(“TCI”), filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against TCI Warden Harold May,

TCI Deputy Warden of Operations Mr. Watters, TCI Major Brown, TCI Captain John Doe, TCI

Unit Manager Ms. Abbott. TCI Unit Management Chief Mr. Robinson, TCI Correctional Officer

D. Koran, and TCI Correctional Officer T. Hayes. Plaintiff alleges he was attacked by another

inmate while housed in the A-1 East Extended Restrictive Housing Unit. He asserts Defendants

were deliberately indifferent to his safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He further

asserts state law claims for dereliction of duty and negligence. He seeks monetary damages and

injunctive relief.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff contends he was housed in the A-1 East Extended Restrictive Housing Unit at

TCI on May 8, 2021. (Doc. 1, at 3). He describes this unit as housing inmates who pose the

greatest threats to security. Id. He contends Officer Hayes unlocked the cell door of inmate John

Doe so Doe could perform janitorial work. Id. Hayes and Koran then came to Plaintiff’s cell,

placed him in handcuffs, and escorted him to the J-Pay machine. Id. After Plaintiff used the

machine, Koran informed Plaintiff he would have to wear leg shackles as well as handcuffs on

the trip back to his cell. Id. After the officers attached the leg shackles, Doe appeared and

stabbed Plaintiff multiple times with a shank. Id. Plaintiff states he required 40 stitches to close

the wounds and has permanent scarring. Id. He asserts Defendants were deliberately indifferent

to his safety by knowingly allowing inmates to clean while officers escorted other inmates

secured in shackles and handcuffs. Id. at 4. He claims Defendants Warden May, Deputy Warden

of Operations Watters, Major Brown, Shift Captain John Doe, Unit Manager Abbott, and Unit

Management Administrator Robinson have created a policy or custom of breaching safety

protocols and failed to address ten previous inmate assaults in the Extended Restrictive Housing

Unit. Id. at 3-4. He asserts claims under the Eighth Amendment as well as state tort law claims of

dereliction of duty and negligence. Id. at 4. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages and

injunctive relief to prevent retaliation for filing this lawsuit. Id.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,

365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the Court is required to

dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of

Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact

when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are

clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks

“plausibility in [the] complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A

pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual allegations in the

pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the

assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. The

plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than “an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading

that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

meet this pleading standard. Id. In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559,

561 (6th Cir.1998).

DISCUSSION

The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to

punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous,” nor may it contravene

society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). The

Eighth Amendment protects inmates by requiring that “prison officials . . . ensure that inmates

receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and . . . ‘take reasonable measures to

guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (quoting

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). This, however, does not mandate that a

prisoner be free from discomfort or inconvenience during his or her incarceration. Ivey v. Wilson,

832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). Prisoners are

not entitled to unfettered access to the medical treatment of their choice, see Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992), nor can they “expect the amenities, conveniences and services

of a good hotel”, Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir. 1988); Thaddeus-X v. Blatter,

175 F.3d 378, 405 (6th Cir. 1999). In sum, the Eighth Amendment affords the constitutional

minimum protection against conditions of confinement which constitute health threats but does

not address those conditions which cause the prisoner to feel merely uncomfortable or which

cause aggravation or annoyance. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10 (requiring extreme or grave

deprivation).

The Supreme Court in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991), set forth a framework

for courts to use when deciding whether certain conditions of confinement constitute cruel and

unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. A plaintiff must first plead facts

which, if true, establish that a sufficiently serious deprivation has occurred. Id. Seriousness is

measured in response to “contemporary standards of decency.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8. Routine

discomforts of prison life do not suffice. Id. Only deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs or extreme deprivations regarding the conditions of confinement will implicate the

protections of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 9. A plaintiff must also establish a subjective

element showing the prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id.

Deliberate indifference is characterized by obduracy or wantonness, not inadvertence or good

faith error. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Liability cannot be predicated solely on

negligence. Id. A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when both the objective

and subjective requirements are met. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

In this case, Plaintiff has not pled facts to suggest that the subjective component of the

Eighth Amendment has been satisfied against any of the named Defendants. The subjective

component of an Eighth Amendment claim requires a showing that prison officials knew of, and

acted with deliberate indifference to, an inmate’s health or safety. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-03.

Deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere negligence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at

835. This standard is met if “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”

Flanory v. Bonn, 604 F.3d 249, 253-55 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).

Plaintiff contends Koran and Hayes opened the cell of John Doe so Doe could perform

janitorial duties. (Doc. 1, at 3). Plaintiff does not indicate these Defendants had any reason to

suspect Doe held animosity toward Plaintiff or that Plaintiff belonged to a specific identifiable

group of prisoners for whom risk of assault is a serious problem. Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,

102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996); Marsh v. Arn, 937 F.2d 1056, 1061 (6th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff

simply does not allege enough facts to suggest Koran and Hayes’s actions rose to the level of a

constitutional violation.

Plaintiff alleges Warden May, Deputy Warden of Operations Watters, Major Brown,

Shift Captain Doe, Unit Manager Abbott, and Unit Management Administrator Robinson are

liable for Eighth Amendment violations because they knowingly breached safety protocols by

failing to adequately address inmate assaults in the A-1 East Extended Restrictive Housing Unit.

(Doc. 1, at 3-4). Plaintiff provides no additional information concerning this statement. To hold

each of these Defendants individually liable under the Eighth Amendment, he must allege facts

that demonstrate each of them was personally involved in the events surrounding his assault. He

does not do so. He also does not allege these Defendants had any reason to believe the John Doe

inmate had any animosity or posed a substantial risk of harm to the Plaintiff. He thus also fails to

state a claim for relief against them.1

Finally, Plaintiff asserts claims for negligence and dereliction of duty. (Doc. 1, at 4).

These claims arise, if at all, under state tort law. State employees are immune from civil liability

under Ohio law for injuries caused in the performance of the employee’s duties “unless the . . .

employee’s actions were manifestly outside the scope of his employment or official

responsibilities, or unless . . . the . . . employee acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a

wanton or reckless manner.” Ohio Rev. Code § 9.86. The Ohio Court of Claims, however, has

the “exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine, initially, whether the . . . employee is entitled

to personal immunity under section 9.86 . . .” Ohio Rev. Code § 2743.02(F). Federal courts,

including this Court, therefore cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims

against a state employee in his or her individual capacity until the Ohio Court of Claims

determines that the employee is not entitled to immunity under Ohio Revised Code § 9.86.

Haynes v. Marshall, 887 F.2d 700, 704 (6th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, unless and until the Ohio

Court of Claims decides that Defendants may not invoke immunity from civil liability conferred

by Ohio Revised Code § 9.86, this Court has no jurisdiction to consider the state law claims

asserted against them.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is

ORDERED that this action be, and the same hereby is, DISMISSED pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §1915(e); and the Court

1. Based on the language of the complaint, it appears Plaintiff may also be attempting to allege a

§ 1983 claim under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

However, for the same reasons Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims fail, any potential Monell

claims fail as well.

FURTHER CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this

decision could not be taken in good faith.

s/ James R. Knepp II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE