The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
KELLY NUTTALL, ) CASE NO.: 1:20-CV-1266
)
Plaintiff, )
) JUDGE DONALD C. NUGENT
v. )
)
PROGRESSIVE PARMA CARE CENTER, ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
LLC dba PARMA CARE CENTER, ) ORDER
)
Defendant. )
This matter is before the Court on the Motions for Summary Judgment of Defendant,
Progressive Parma Care Center, LLC (“Parma Care Center” or “Defendant”) (ECF #18) and
Plaintiff, Kelly Nuttall “Ms. Nuttall” or “Plaintiff’?) (ECF #20). Both parties filed Briefs in
Opposition (ECF #21 and #22) and Defendant filed a Reply in Support of its Motion. (ECF #23).
After careful consideration of the issues and a full review of the filings and all relevant authority,
Defendant Parma Care Center’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF #18) is GRANTED.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND!
Plaintiff, Ms. Nuttall was employed as an Activities Director by Defendant, Parma Care
Center, a residential skilled nursing facility, beginning on or around January 21, 2016. (Johnson
Dep., p. 13; Nuttall Dep., p. 54). The Activities Director is an active member of an interdisciplinary
team and is required to continuously interact with residents and staff and attend resident care
conferences. (Nuttall Dep., pp. 51-53). The Activities Director’s responsibilities include planning
1 The facts as stated in this Memorandum Opinion and Order are taken from the parties’ submissions. Those material
facts that are controverted and supported by deposition testimony, affidavit, or other evidence are stated in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party.
and conducting resident council meetings and functions, recruitment, scheduling, supervision, and
additional organization of events and activities. (/d.). Pursuant to Ohio law, skilled nursing
facilities are required to employ an activities program staff member. (See Ohio Admin. Code 3701-
17-08(E)(1); Johnson Decl. § 14).
Mr. Matthew Johnson (“Mr. Johnson”) oversees Parma Care Center’s operations as its
Executive Director and served as Plaintiffs direct supervisor during the course of her employment
with Defendant. (Johnson Dep., p. 14; Johnson Decl. | 4). Parma Care Center is an employer
covered by the Family and Medical Leave Act (the “FMLA”) and provides its employees,
including Ms. Nuttall, with a general notice and explanation of FMLA leave in its Employee
Handbook. Defendant also keeps a Federal Notice of Employee Rights posted in the facility in a
communal work area. (Johnson Decl. { 5-6). Parma Care Center’s FMLA policy is overseen by
Mr. Johnson and Ms. Davis, Defendant’s Director of Human Resources. (Davis Dep., p. 13;
Johnson Dep., p. 48).
In 2020, Parma Care Center was impacted by COVID-19 and implemented necessary steps
and procedures in order to minimize COVID-19’s impact on its staff and residents. Mr. Johnson
testified that Defendant proactively acquired personal protective equipment (“PPE”) for all staff
members and underwent regular infectious-disease inspections by the Ohio Department of Health,
acquiring only passing scores in compliance with state standards. (Johnson Dep., pp. 38-40;
Johnson Decl. J 13).
In late March of 2020, Ms. Nuttall was exposed to a patient at Parma Care Center who had
contracted COVID-19. (Nuttall Dep., p. 63; Nuttall Decl. 2). Shortly afterward, Plaintiff testified
she began experiencing COVID-19 symptoms and was examined by her physician, Dr. Dhia
Aldoori, MD, on March 30, 2020, during a virtual visit using video-conferencing software. (Nuttall
Dep., 66-67; Nuttall Decl. § 4). Dr. Aldoori diagnosed Ms. Nuttall with a viral upper respiratory
tract infection and advised her to stay home for ten days. (Nuttall Dep., pp. 72, 78, 87-89; 91).
Over the course of her illness, Plaintiff was not prescribed any medication and was never tested
for COVID-19 or COVID-19 antibodies. She was instructed to monitor symptoms and take over-
the-counter medications as needed. (Nuttall Dep., pp. 66, 105). After her doctor’s visit, the
Cuyahoga County Board of Health issued an Order of Isolation to Plaintiff, advising that pursuant
to state law, she was to quarantine until “deemed non-communicable by the Health Commissioner
and therefore no longer pose[d] a substantial threat to the health of the public.” (Nuttall Decl.
On the same day, Ms. Nuttall notified Defendant by phone and Mr. Johnson by text that
she was instructed to quarantine for ten days. (Nuttall Dep., pp., 72, 78, 91; Johnson Dep., p. 41-
42; Johnson Decl. § 7). On April 3, 2020, Ms. Nuttall emailed Ms. Davis inquiring how to proceed
with her absence, and Ms. Davis advised she use available sick or vacation time and file for
unemployment. (Davis Dep., p. 14-16); Nuttall Dep. p. 119).? On April 7, 2020, Ms. Nuttall
contacted her doctor while still self-quarantining, and requested a letter be sent to Defendant
directing she be permitted to continue quarantine as she did not feel comfortable returning to work
? The isolation order recommends isolation until symptom free for 72 hours, or 7 days since symptoms first appeared.
Defendant argues that Ms. Nuttall does not know the exact date of the onset of symptoms, and if her systems first
appeared on March 30, 2020, at the latest, April 6, 2020 was the date the seven-day isolation period ordered by the
Board of Health isolation order ended and April 9, 2020 would have been the end date for her Doctor’s recommended
ten-day self-quarantine.
3 Ms. Davis testified that Ms. Nuttall corresponded with her via email, inquiring “If I use my vacation days up and
I’m still on isolation, do I file for unemployment?” (Davis Dep., p. 15). Ms. Nuttall now alleges in her briefings that
at or around this time, she proved a “serious health condition” and notice to take FMLA leave, triggering Defendant’s
obligation to provide her with requisite FMLA documentation. Ms. Nuttall also alleges that, unbeknownst to her,
Defendant intended to replace her no later than three days after learning for her need of absence, as Mr. Johnson
testified to the authenticity of an April 2, 2020 advertisement for the role of Activities Director. (Johnson Dep. pp.
106-107).
because her immune system was low. (Nuttall Dep., pp. 92-93).4 Dr. Aldoori did not send the
requested correspondence. (Davis Dep., p. 16).
The record shows that on April 10, 2020, Ms. Nuttall communicated via email to Mr.
Johnson her concerns regarding contracting COVID-19 and her hesitancy to return to work,
inquiring which duties could be performed from home. (Nuttall Dep., pp. 106; 113-115; Johnson
Dep. pp. 48-50, 108-110).° On April 16, 2020, Ms. Nuttall sent an email to Mr. Johnson, informing
him that she had not yet been cleared to return to work and a follow-up appointment with her
physician was pending. (Nuttall Dep., pp. 113-114). On April 17, 2020, Plaintiff had a virtual
follow-up examination with Dr. Aldoori and was advised that she was cleared to return to work.
(Nuttall Dep., p. 114; Nuttall Decl. 4 9).°
The record does not show any instance of Plaintiff explicitly requesting to take FMLA
leave before her upper respiratory tract infection diagnosis or during her period of illness and self-
quarantine. (Johnson Dec. § 11). Defendant argues Plaintiff remained at home after the expiration
of both her seven-day isolation period and ten-day self-quarantine, did not provide documentation
for remaining at home, and failed to express intent to return to work upon being cleared by her
physician on April 17, 2020. Plaintiff argues she notified Mr. Johnson on April 17, 2020 by
voicemail of her clearance and intent to return, and on April 21, 2020, Mr. Johnson informed
4 Ms. Nuttall wrote: “I don’t feel I am ready to return to work. You had me out for 10 days. My work isn’t very
cooperative and I would need a note to be out of work any additional time” (Nuttal Dep., p. 93).
> In Summer 2019, during which time period Ms. Nuttall was unable to report to work due to a back injury and
completed FMLA paperwork related to the injury, she was ultimately instructed not to take FMLA leave and was
instead advised to work from home. (Nuttall Decl. 11).
6 Ms. Nuttall alleges that shortly after she was cleared to return to work, Mr. Johnson sent her an email informing her
that her position was no longer available and that she could apply for the assistant to the Activities Director role. Mr.
Johnson testified that if Ms. Nuttall had wanted to remain in the Activities Director role, “she would be here. So no,
I give her an opportunity for something that she’s obviously expressed no desire in doing.” (Johnson Dep.,
Plaintiff that a replacement for the Activities Director position had been found and suggested she
apply for the role of the Director’s assistant. (Nuttall Dep., pp. 114-117; Johnson Dep., pp. 92-94).
In August of 2020, Defendant ultimately filled the position of Activities Director. (Johnson Dep.,
p. 34).
Plaintiff brought her action for interference under the FMLA against Defendant Parma
Care Center on June 9, 2020, alleging that she suffered a “serious health condition” entitling her
to FMLA leave, and Defendant’s failure to provide her with the requisite FMLA notices and a
period of FMLA leave interfered with her statutory rights, directly resulting in her termination.
(Complaint, ECF #1, JJ 18-23).
On August 30, 2021, Defendant and Plaintiff filed cross motions for summary judgment
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (ECF #18 and #20), wherein Defendant argues Ms. Nuttall cannot
prove the elements of a claim for interference because Plaintiff did not suffer a FMLA-qualifying
condition, she neither requested nor gave notice of an intent to take FMLA leave, and Defendant
never interfered with or denied Plaintiff her rights under the statute. Ms. Nuttall argues her case is
a straightforward violation of the FMLA; Defendant did not recognize Plaintiff's illness as a
“serious health condition” entitling her to leave, it failed to provide her with the FMLA requisite
written notice and a period of FMLA-leave, and these failures resulted in a denial of FMLA rights.
On September 28, 2021, Defendant filed an Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF #21) and on September 29, 2021, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF #22). Defendant filed a Reply in Support of its Motion on
October 12, 2021. (ECF #23). Plaintiff did not file a reply.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when the court is satisfied “that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED.
R. Civ. P. 56(a); Provenzano v. LCI Holdings, Inc., 663 F.3d 806 (6" Cir. 2011). The burden of
showing the absence of any such “genuine issue” rests with the moving party:
[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those
portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any,’ which it believes
demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A fact is “material” only if its resolution will affect
the outcome of the lawsuit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Determination of whether a factual issue is “genuine” requires consideration of the applicable
evidentiary standards. Although evidence may be presented in support of a summary judgment
motion, the moving party need not support its motion with affidavits or similar materials that
negate the non-mover’s claim(s) if they can otherwise show an absence of evidence supporting the
non-mover’s case. Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 788 (6" Cir. 2000). The
court will view the summary judgment motion in the light most favorable to the party opposing
the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Summary judgment should be granted if a party who bears the burden of proof at trial does
not establish an essential element of their case. Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 941
(6" Cir. Ohio 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). Accordingly, “[t]he mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d
476, 479 (6" Cir. Much. 1996) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). Moreover, if the evidence
presented is “merely colorable” and not “significantly probative,” the court may decide the legal
issue and grant summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted). In most civil
cases involving summary judgment, the court must decide “whether reasonable jurors could find
by a preponderance of the evidence that the [non-moving party] is entitled to a verdict.” Jd. at 252.
Once the moving party has satisfied its burden of proof, the burden then shifts to the
nonmoving party. The nonmoving party may not simply rely on its pleadings, but must “produce
evidence that results in a conflict of material fact to be solved by a jury.” Cox v. Kentucky Dep’t
of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 149 (6" Cir. Ky. 1995). FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) states:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
the adverse party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.
The Federal Rules identify the penalty for the lack of such a response by the nonmoving party as
an automatic grant of summary judgment, where otherwise appropriate. Id.
As a general matter, the district judge considering a motion for summary judgment is to
examine “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The court will not consider non-material facts, nor will it weigh
material evidence to determine the truth of the matter. Jd. at 249. The judge’s sole function is to
determine whether there is a genuine factual issue for trial; this does not exist unless “there is
sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Jd.
In sum, proper summary judgment analysis entails “the threshold inquiry of determining
whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issue
that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in
favor of either party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
B. The Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)
The Court has thoroughly and exhaustively reviewed the claims raised by Ms. Nuttall in
this action, the parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment, the responsive briefings, the record, and
all relevant authority. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (the
“FMLA”) entitles eligible employees to a total of twelve (12) weeks of leave per year for various
reasons, including “a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the
functions” of his or her position. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D).
The Act entitles an eligible employee who takes leave under § 2612 for the intended
purpose of the leave to be reinstated upon his or her return from leave to the position held prior to
the leave or to an equivalent position. § 2614(a)(1). “The right to reinstatement guaranteed by 29
U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1) is the linchpin of the entitlement theory because ‘the FMLA does not provide
leave for leave’s sake, but instead provides leave with an expectation [that] an employee will return
to work after the leave ends.’” Edgar v. JAC Prods., 443 F.3d 501, 507 (6" Cir. Mich. 2006).
i. Prima Facie Case for Interference
The interference provision of the FMLA makes it “unlawful for any employer to interfere
with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise any right provided in [the Act.].”
29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). A prima face case of FMLA interference requires the plaintiff to show:
(1) he is an eligible employee; (2) the defendant is an employer as defined in the Act; (3) he was
entitled to leave under the FMLA; (4) he gave defendant notice of his intention to take leave; and
(5) the defendant denied him FMLA benefits to which he was entitled. Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667
F.3d 757, 761; citing Killian v. Yorozu Auto. Tenn., Inc., 454 F.3d 549, 556 (6" Cir. 2006).
Parma Care Center does not dispute that Plaintiff is an eligible employee and that
Defendant is a covered employer. Defendant does argue that Plaintiff was not entitled to FMLA
leave in March or April of 2020 because she did not suffer an FMLA-qualifying condition and
failed to provide adequate notice to her employer of any intent to take FMLA leave for her period
of self-quarantine. Because Plaintiff failed to make the requisite showing, Defendant argues it had
no additional notice obligations with respect to eligibility and Plaintiff cannot show any instance
where Defendant denied, restrained, or otherwise interfered with Ms. Nuttall’s FMLA rights.
Finally, Defendant argues it had no obligation to restore Ms. Nuttall to the Activities Director role.
Ms. Nuttall refutes Defendant’s position, arguing: (1) her March 2020 diagnosis and
quarantine were a “serious health condition” entitling her to FMLA leave and she provided
Defendant with sufficient notice of her intent to take FMLA leave for this illness; (2) Defendant’s
failure to provide her with an FMLA eligibility notice and related paperwork in March of 2020
interfered with her rights under the statute; and (3) Defendant acted unlawfully and denied her
FMLA rights to which she was entitled by failing to restore her to the position of Activities
Director.
For the reasons that follow, the Court finds Ms. Nuttall fails to prove the essential elements
of a prima facie case for interference and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter
of law.
1. Plaintiff’s Entitlement to FMLA Leave
Pursuant to the FMLA, an eligible employee is entitled to leave for, among other things, a
serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform their job, or to care of a spouse
or parent who has a serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612. A plaintiff cannot establish a prima
facie case of FMLA interference without first demonstrating that she suffered from a “serious
health condition.” See Morris v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 320 F.App’x 330, 337 (6
Cir.). “Not all medical problems are subject to the FMLA. It is a plaintiff's burden to establish that
medical problems are severe enough to warrant the FMLA protection.” See Lackey v. Jackson
Cnty., 104 F.App’x 483, 490 (6" Cir. 2004).
The FMLA defines “serious health condition” as an illness, impairment, or physical or
mental condition that involves “inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care
facility” or “continuing treatment by a health care provider.” 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11). A serious
health condition involving “continuing treatment by a health care provider” includes any one or
more of the following:
(a) Incapacity and treatment. “a period of incapacity of more than three
consecutive, full calendar days, and any subsequent treatment or period of
incapacity relating to the same condition, that involves:”
(1) Treatment of two or more times, within 30 days of the first day of
incapacity...by a health care provider;
(2) Treatment by a health care provider on at least one occasion, which
results in a regimen of continuing treatment under the supervision of
the health care provider;
(3) The requirements in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2)...for treatment by a
healthcare provider means an in-person visit to a health care provider.
The first (or only) in-person treatment visit must take place within
seven days of the first day of incapacity.
29 C.F.R. § 825.115. The FMLA defines “incapacity” as the “inability to work, attend school or
perform other regular daily activities due to the serious health condition, treatment therefore, or
recovery therefrom.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)().
Parma Care Center argues that Ms. Nuttall cannot prove she was entitled to FMLA-
protected leave because she did not suffer a “serious health condition” within the meaning of the
statute. “Whether an illness qualifies as a serious health condition under the FMLA is a legal
question which the court must determine.” Alston v. Sofa Express, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-0491, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79719, 2007 WL 3071662, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 19, 2007). “A plaintiff may
not avoid summary judgment on this issue by simply alleging his illness to be a serious health
condition.” Jd.
Federal regulations generally exclude (unless complications arise) conditions like the
“common cold, the flu, ear aches, upset stomach...” as they do not meet the definition of a “serious
health condition” and thus do not qualify for FMLA leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(d). While an order
to isolate or quarantine with respect to COVID-19 may seemingly appear to qualify as an instance
intended for protection by the FMLA, the U.S. Department of Labor has clearly stated that
currently, federal law generally “does not require employers to provide paid leave to employees
who are absent from work because they are sick with COVID-19, have been exposed to someone
with COVID-19, or are caring for someone with COVID-19.” U.S. Department of Labor.’
With respect to Plaintiffs upper respiratory diagnosis, “[a] regimen of continuing
treatment that includes the taking of over-the counter medications such as aspirin, antihistamines,
or salves; or bed-rest, drinking fluids, exercise, and other similar activities that can be initiated
without a visit to a health care provider, is not, by itself, sufficient to constitute a regimen of
continuing treatment for purposes of FMLA leave.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(c).
During her ten-day quarantine period, Plaintiff had one virtual visit with her physician and
was never prescribed medication; rather, she was advised to monitor her symptoms, rest, and take
over-the-counter medication as needed. While Ms. Nuttall had concerns regarding returning to
work because of the potential for COVID-19 exposure and spread, and requested a note permitting
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/fmla/pandemic#:~:text=Currently%2C%20federal%20law%20generally%20doe
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her to prolong her self-quarantine, her doctor never sent the requested correspondence, and she
was cleared to return to work on April 17, 2020.
The Court finds, based on the record and regulatory guidance, that a diagnosis of an upper
respiratory infection is not a qualifying event contemplated by the FMLA. However, Plaintiff does
raise a genuine issue with respect to her physician-directed period of self-quarantine. A “serious
health condition” involves either “inpatient care...” or “continuing treatment by a health care
provider.” 29 U.S.C. § 2611.11. Plaintiff alleges she satisfies her burden of proving a condition
“involving continuing treatment” because she received treatment twice by her health care provider
within 30 days of the onset of her incapacity as her quarantine constitutes “a period of incapacity
of more than three, consecutive, full calendar days.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(a). While “treatment”
has generally referred to an “in-person visit” to a health care provider, Plaintiff directs the Court’s
attention to the Department of Labor’s guidance determining that in light of the COVID-19
pandemic, telemedicine may satisfy the regulatory requirement of an “in-person visit.”*
As “incapacity” requires a showing of the “inability to work, attend school or perform other
regular daily activities due to the serious health condition...”, Plaintiff raises a legitimate question
as to whether her period of quarantine rendered her incapacitated for purposes of performing her
essential work duties.? While the Court is inclined to find, based on the applicable guidance and
8 Plaintiff raises the argument that she carries her burden with respect to the requirement that she received treatment
twice by a health care provider within 30 days of the onset of incapacity, arguing that in light of the circumstances
surrounding COVID-19, the Department of Labor has determined that telemedicine may satisfy the regulatory
requirement of an in-person visit as it “typically involves face-to-face examinations or treatment of patients by remote
video conference...”. Available at: https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/WHD/legacy/files/fab_2020_8.pdf.
Defendant argues the U.S. Department of Labor Bulletin No. 2020-8, referenced by Plaintiff was not issued until
December of 2020, months after the alleged “serious health condition” at issue, and no such guidance existed at the
time of her illness.
° Mr. Johnson testified during his deposition: “If you can’t be there, you can’t provide face-to-face activities, which
is an essential part of that position.” (Johnson Dep. pp. 89-90).
the record, that Ms. Nuttall did not suffer a qualifying “serious health condition” entitling her to
FMLA leave, the Court finds Plaintiff raises a genuine issue of material fact with respect to her
physician ordered self-quarantine.
2. Plaintiff's Notice to Defendant to Take FMLA Leave
Even accepting the contention that Plaintiff's March 2020 illness qualifies as a “serious
health condition” under the FMLA, the Court agrees Defendant is entitled to summary judgment
as a matter of law because Ms. Nuttall did not provide Defendant with sufficient notice of an intent
to take FMLA leave in Spring of 2020 and further cannot show how Defendant restrained, denied,
or otherwise interfered with Plaintiff's exercise of rights under the FMLA.
In order to invoke the protection of the FMLA, an employee must provide notice and a
qualifying reason for requesting leave. Brohm v. JH Props, Inc., 149 F.3d 517, 523 (6" Cir. Ky.
1998). An employer seeking leave “must give the employer enough information to reasonably
conclude that an event described in the FMLA § 2612(a)(1) has occurred.” Wallace v. FedEx
Corp., 764 F.3d 571, 586 (6 Cir. 2006). The Sixth Circuit has noted that where the ‘Plaintiff does
not expressly request [FMLA] leave, the critical question is whether the information imparted to
the employer is sufficient to reasonably apprise it of the employee’s request to take time off for a
serious health condition.” Wanner v. Under Armour, Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 239659 (quoting
Rentz v. Hosp., 195 F. Supp. 3d 933, 941 (E.D. Mich. 2016).
Here, Defendant argues Plaintiff did not reasonably apprise it of any alleged intent to take
FMLA leave. Plaintiff communicated minimal detail regarding her diagnosis and her need to
quarantine, a request Defendant found appropriate and therefore approved. The record does not
show Ms. Nuttall ever provided Defendant with any degree of detail or specificity; she did not
allege her symptoms were atypical, particularly severe, or any anticipation of prolonged symptoms
or illness such that she would remain home past the expiration of her quarantine. In fact, she
testified that she was able to perform some job responsibilities while working remotely at home.
Further still, Plaintiff advised Defendant that her symptoms had resolved, and she was
cleared by her physician to return to work on April 17, 2020. While Defendant expressed
apprehension regarding the virulence of COVID-19 and potential for spread at the facility while
completing her quarantine, Defendant could not have reasonably been expected to conclude that
these remarks were Plaintiff's request to take FMLA leave, or to believe that concern regarding
COVID-19 is a FMLA-qualifying event. Defendant does not argue that Plaintiff failed to comply
with any particular policy, but rather maintains that based on the information Ms. Nuttall did
provide, Defendant could not have reasonably ascertained under the circumstances that Plaintiff
sought FMLA leave.
Defendant’s position is further bolstered by the fact it provided Plaintiff with FMLA
paperwork in the Summer of 2019. Under 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(b)(1), an employer must notify an
employee of FMLA eligibility “[w]hen an employee requests FMLA leave, or when the employer
acquires knowledge that an employee’s leave may be for an FMLA-qualifying reason [...].”
“Employee eligibility is determined (and notice must be provided) at the commencement of the
first instance. However, “[i]f, at the time an employee provides notice of a subsequent need for
FMLA leave during the applicable 12-month period due to a different FMLA-qualifying reason,
and the employee’s eligibility status has not changed, no additional eligibility notice is required.”
29 C.F.R. § 825.300(b)(3).
Plaintiff does not demonstrate how Defendant’s failure to provide FMLA paperwork again
in March of 2020 restrained or otherwise interfered with her ability to pursue FMLA leave. “An
employer’s failure to comply with the notice requirements of the FMLA only supports a cause of
action where the inadequate notice effectively interferes with plaintiff's statutory rights.” Fink v.
Ohio Health Corp., 139 Fed.Appx. 667, 671 (6" Cir. 2005). The record shows Ms. Nuttall had
knowledge of her eligibility since late Summer of 2019 and was familiar with the FMLA process
of completing paperwork. Plaintiff testified that she received and completed FMLA paperwork for
this prior injury in August of 2019. (Nuttall Dep., pp. 54-55). As this timeframe occurred within
12 months of her upper respiratory infection diagnosis, and Plaintiff's eligibility status was
unchanged, Parma Care Center appropriately believed it had no obligation to once again provide
a notice of eligibility under 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(b)(3).
Plaintiff fails to prove she provided sufficient notice of her intent to take FMLA leave in
March of 2020, and even if she had, the Court cannot find that Ms. Nuttall’s rights were interfered
with as a matter of law. Because Defendant had no notice obligations under 29 C.F.R. § 825.300,
Plaintiff cannot argue that Defendant needed to provide an additional rights and responsibilities
notice under 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(c) or a designation notice under 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(d) because
it reasonably concluded leave was not being sought for a FMLA-qualifying event. Finally, Parma
Care Center was not required to request medical certification from Plaintiff because it never
questioned the appropriateness of Plaintiffs quarantine and permitted her to quarantine as many
days as required by her physician. (Nuttall Dep. pp. 70, 78).°
The Court finds Defendant was reasonable in concluding that Plaintiff did not seek leave
under the FMLA for her illness in March of 2020. Accordingly, Defendant did not fail to meet any
notice requirements under the statute, and Plaintiff cannot show any interference with or denial of
rights resulting therefrom. Because Plaintiff did not prove she qualified for protections under the
10 can employer may require that an employee’s leave [...] due to the employee’s own serious health condition [...]
be supported by a certification issued by the health care provider of the employee.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(a). An
employer should make such a request within five business days after leave commences, or the request can be made
later “if the employer has reason to question the appropriateness of the leave or its duration.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b).
FMLA, the Court need not address her allegation that Defendant was required to permit her to
return to the role of Activities Director after her leave. Plaintiff fails to prove her prima facie case
for interference under the FMLA and the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant.
I. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on
Ms. Nuttall’s FMLA interference claim. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant,
Parma Care Center (ECF #18) is hereby GRANTED. This case is hereby TERMINATED. All
other pending motions are terminated.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DONALD C. NUGENT
Senior United States Distiugt Judge
DATED: Nabe 4, Wu