The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
LOLA T. COLLINS WELCH, CASE NO. 3:21 CV 2012
Plaintiff,
v. JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II
VIVO TOLEDO, et al.,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendants. AND ORDER
BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff Lola T. Collins Welch has filed this action against Vivo Toledo and
Cardinal or “Cardinal Group”. (Doc. 1). For the reasons that follow, this action is dismissed.
On October 25, 2021, Plaintiff filed a brief Complaint containing the words “Rent Lease
& Ejectment,” a purported explanatory paragraph in support of her allegations, and a request for
monetary damages. See Doc. 1. She lists “Vivo Toledo/Cardinal” as Defendants in the caption. It
appears Plaintiff’s Complaint concerns a residential lease with Vivo Toledo. Plaintiff states she
signed a lease with Vivo Toledo after being evicted from Georgetown Village. The apartment
manager demanded two months’ advance payments due to prior evictions on Plaintiff’s record.
According to the Complaint, after Plaintiff moved into her apartment, she experienced
nightmares, her roommate smoked marijuana, and “someone [either] Vivo or [her roommate]
planted brown recluse . . . and two crickets.” Id. She apparently had difficulty paying rent and
negotiated a late payment with Vivo, but “Vivo . . . put [her] in Toledo Municipal Court.” Id.
The Complaint contains no specific allegations against Cardinal / Cardinal Group.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982)
(per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The district court, however, is
required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk
v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law
or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis
when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly incredible.”
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992).
When determining whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be
granted, the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept
all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and discern whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief “requires
more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action.” Id. Although a complaint need not contain detailed allegations, its “factual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the
allegations in the Complaint are true.” Id. The plaintiff must provide more than “an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
The Supreme Court further explained “a claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” 556 U.S. at 678. Additionally, “the plausibility standard is not
akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
acted unlawfully.” Id. This determination is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
DISCUSSION
Cardinal Group
As an initial matter, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Cardinal or “Cardinal Group.”
Although this Court recognizes pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21; Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108,
110 (6th Cir. 1991), the Court is not required to conjure unpleaded facts or construct claims
against defendants on behalf of a pro se plaintiff, see Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008). The complaint must give a defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Lillard v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ., 76
F.3d 716, 724 (6th Cir. 1996).
Here, Plaintiff fails to meet even the most liberal reading of the Twombly and Iqbal
standard as her pleading fails to connect any alleged occurrence to any specific injury, and fails
to identify how Defendant Cardinal harmed her. Indeed, Plaintiff fails to include any factual
allegations concerning Cardinal or Cardinal Group, and does not assert a discernable claim
against the entity based on recognized legal authority. Merely listing a defendant in the caption
of the complaint, but raising no specific factual allegations against the defendant, is insufficient
to raise a plausible claim. See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir.
2004). The Complaint against Cardinal or Cardinal Group does not satisfy the minimum pleading
requirements of Federal Civil Rule 8 and any claims against this defendant are therefore
dismissed.
Lack of Federal Jurisdiction
The remainder of Plaintiff’s Complaint appears to concern eviction proceedings in
Toledo Municipal Court. This Court lacks jurisdiction to address Plaintiff’s state eviction claims.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, unlike state trial courts, do not have
general jurisdiction to review all questions of law. See Ohio ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner, 549 F.3d
468, 474 (6th Cir. 2008). Rather, federal courts have only the authority provided to them by the
Constitution and Congress. Id. Consequently, “[i]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this
limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting
jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (internal
citation omitted).
Generally, the Constitution and Congress provide federal courts authority to hear a case
only when diversity of citizenship exists between the parties, or when the case raises a federal
question. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
1332. Plaintiff’s Complaint on its face fails to demonstrate either federal question or diversity
jurisdiction. She has failed to demonstrate a basis for an exercise of federal diversity jurisdiction
over her apparent state law claims regarding her rent or eviction as she indicates that she and
Defendant Georgetown Village are both citizens of Ohio. See Doc. 1, at 1, Doc. 1-1, at 2; see
also Washington v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., 2003 WL 22146143, at *1 (6th Cir.) (“A plaintiff in
federal court has the burden of pleading sufficient facts to support the existence of the court’s
jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. In a diversity action, ‘the plaintiff must state all parties’
citizenships such that the existence of complete diversity can be confirmed.’”) (quoting Chem.
Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.3d 210, 222 n.13 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Plaintiff’s Complaint on its face presents essentially a challenge to a rent dispute or eviction
action based on Ohio law. Even with the Court’s liberal construction, Plaintiff alleges no claim
arising under federal law for purposes of establishing federal question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331.
Accordingly, there is no indication in the Complaint that this Court has subject matter
jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff’s claims. On that basis alone, this Court must dismiss the
Complaint pertaining to Plaintiff’s eviction.
Younger Abstention
Even if Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a federal claim to support jurisdiction, this Court
cannot grant the relief she requests. The status of the state court proceedings is not clear from the
face of the Complaint. To the extent proceedings against Plaintiff are still pending in the state
court, however, this Court must abstain from hearing challenges to these proceedings. See
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971).
When an individual is the subject of an ongoing state action involving important state
matters, she cannot interfere with the pending state action through a parallel federal action
involving claims that could have been raised in the state case. Watts v. Burkhart, 854 F.2d 839,
844-48 (6th Cir. 1988). If the state defendant files such a case, Younger abstention requires the
federal court to defer to the state proceeding. Id.; see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S.
1, 15 (1987).
Abstention is appropriate where: (1) the state proceedings are ongoing, (2) the state
proceedings implicate important state interests, and (3) the state proceedings afford the plaintiff
with an adequate opportunity to raise federal questions. Leveye v. Metro. Pub. Def. Office, 73 F.
App’x 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45). Abstention is mandated
whether the state-court proceeding is criminal, quasi-criminal, or civil in nature, so long as
federal court intervention “unduly interferes with the legitimate activities of the state.” Younger,
401 U.S. at 44.
Regarding the third requirement of Younger, the relevant inquiry is whether the state
proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.
415, 430 (1979). The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that state procedural law bars
presentation of his or her claims. Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 14. When a plaintiff has not
attempted to present his federal claims in the state court proceedings, the federal court should
assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of “unambiguous
authority to the contrary.” Id. at 15; see also Szarell v. Summit Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 2019
WL 3946191, at *3 (N.D. Ohio) (finding third Younger factor satisfied where plaintiff failed to
allege in the pleadings that state court proceedings did not or could not provide her with an
opportunity to present her federal claim).
Here, if the eviction or rent recoupment proceedings against Plaintiff are still pending, all
three factors supporting abstention are present. Eviction proceedings pending in a municipal
court implicate important state interests. See Dudley v. Michalak, 2008 WL 750554, at *1 (N.D.
Ohio) (applying Younger doctrine and abstaining from an eviction action in Toledo Municipal
Court). And there is no suggestion in the Complaint that any purported claim asserted by
Plaintiff in this federal lawsuit is barred in the state action.
A contrary ruling by this Court would unduly interfere with state court proceedings.
Therefore, even assuming a properly asserted federal claim, this Court must abstain from hearing
Plaintiff’s claims to the extent they are still pending in state court.
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Plaintiff does not clearly indicate what she hopes to accomplish by asserting her claim.
To the extent the state court proceedings are complete and Plaintiff’s Complaint constitutes an
appeal of a judgment in the hopes of obtaining a reversal of that judgment, this Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction to consider this claim pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See
Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). “Where federal relief can only be predicated upon a
conviction that the state court was wrong, it is difficult to conceive [of] the federal proceeding as,
in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state-court judgment.” Catz v.
Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 295 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Keene Corp. v. Cass, 908 F.2d 293, 296-97
(8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 25)), amended on other grounds, 243 F.3d 234
(6th Cir. 2001). Federal appellate review of state court judgments can only occur in the United
States Supreme Court. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415-16.
Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff seeks relief from the consequences of a state court
proceeding, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider such a claim.
Res Judicata
Finally, to the extent the state court proceedings have concluded and Plaintiff seeks to
litigate her eviction or rent payment dispute again in a different court in the hopes of achieving a
different result, she is barred from doing so. Plaintiff cannot file an action in federal court to
relitigate matters previously decided in state court proceedings. Federal courts must give the
same preclusive effect to a state-court judgment as that judgment receives in the rendering state.
28 U.S.C. § 1738; Abbott v. Michigan, 474 F.3d 324, 330 (6th Cir. 2007); Young v. Twp. of
Green Oak, 471 F.3d 674, 680 (6th Cir. 2006). To determine the preclusive effect of a prior state
court judgment would have on the present federal action, the Court must apply the law of
preclusion of the state in which the prior judgment was rendered. Migra v. Warren City School
District Board of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984).
In Ohio, the doctrine of res judicata encompasses the two related concepts of claim
preclusion and issue preclusion. State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emp. Ret. Bd., 120 Ohio St. 3d. 386,
392 (2008). “Claim preclusion prevents subsequent actions, by the same parties or their privies,
based on any claim arising out of a transaction that was the subject matter of a previous action.”
Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St. 3d 379, 382 (1995). Claim preclusion also bars subsequent
actions whose claims “could have been litigated in the previous suit.” Id. By contrast, issue
preclusion, or collateral estoppel, prevents the “relitigation of any fact or point that was
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in a previous action between the same parties or
their privies,” even if the causes of action differ. Id. Issue preclusion applies when a fact or issue
“(1) was actually and directly litigated in the prior action; (2) was passed upon and determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction; and (3) when the party against whom [issue preclusion] is
asserted was a party in privity with a party to the prior action.” Thompson v. Wing, 70 Ohio St.3d
176, 183 (1994).
Here, it appears Plaintiff is challenging the validity of her eviction or other state court
proceedings related to her rent payments. But per the allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint, these
issues are or were pending in Toledo Municipal Court. Even if the causes of action in this action
are new, if the state court proceedings are complete, then the facts necessary to support those
claims were determined by the state court. This Court must give full faith and credit to that
judgment. Plaintiff is therefore barred from relitigating those matters in this Court.
For all of the above reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2), be and the
same hereby is, GRANTED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e);
and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for a Protection Order (Doc. 3), be and the
same hereby is DENIED; and the Court
FURTHER CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this
decision could not be taken in good faith.
s/ James R. Knepp II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE