Vaughn v. Secretary of the Department Veteran Affairs

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JULIUS MAURICE VAUGHN, ) Case No. 1:21-cv-1786

)

Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese

)

v. ) Magistrate Judge David A. Ruiz

)

SECRETARY OF THE )

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS )

AFFAIRS, )

)

Defendant. )

)

OPINION AND ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff Julius Maurice Vaughn filed suit Secretary of the Department

of Veterans Affairs Denis R. McDonough, seeking relief for alleged employment

“Discrimination based on sex male (none sexual) in violation of current Federal laws

and Statu[t]es.” (ECF No. 1, PageID #2.)

Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he Department of Veterans Affairs through its

Management, Managers, Supervisors, Agents, Agency and Staff created a Hostile

work environment” and “had a campaign of intimidation” against him and that he

was retaliated against after he filed an EEO Complaint. (Id.) He alleges the

Department of Veterans Affairs “did nothing to put a stop to the Demeaning

Vindictive onslaught of attacks” against him, “violate[d] the spirit of the Law with

Retribution, Harassment, Retaliation and Reprisal when [he] went to the Office of

Resolution Management to try [to] resolve issues that [he] had with Management,”

and “created a Hostile work environment through a false narrative of write up,

falsehoods, innuendoes, mistruths, and outright lies.” (Id., PageID #2–3.) Asserting

that he was “forced to retire early by [his] employer and caused to take an early

retirement penalty,” he seeks damages and other relief, including eight years of full

pay and benefits that he could have achieved for the full retirement against of sixty-

seven. (Id., PageID #3.)

With his complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF

No. 2.) That motion is GRANTED. Accordingly, his complaint is subject to screening

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). That statute requires district courts to screen all in

forma pauperis complaints filed in federal court and to dismiss before service any

such complaint that the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a

claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who

is immune from such relief.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard for evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) applies in

determining whether a complaint states a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B). Hill v.

Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the dismissal standard

articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007), applies in evaluating a pro se complaint under

Section 1915(e)(2)(B)). To survive dismissal, the complaint “must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Hill, 630 F.3d at 471 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Although the plausibility

standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’. . . it asks for more than a

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The factual allegations in the pleading “must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that

all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more

than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not

‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

Further, although pleadings and documents filed by pro se litigants are

“liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 93, 94 (2007), “the lenient

treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92

F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Pro se plaintiffs must still meet basic pleading

requirements, and courts are not required to conjure allegations on their behalf.

Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 579–80 (6th Cir. 2001); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d

591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).

DISCUSSION

Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed in

accordance with Section 1915(e)(2)(B) because, even liberally construed, it does not

contain allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for federal employment

discrimination.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from

discriminating against an employee “with respect to his compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To establish a prima

facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that he (1) is a

member of a protected class, (2) was subject to an adverse employment decision, (3)

was qualified for the position, and (4) was treated differently than a similarly situated

individual outside the protected class. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,

762 (6th Cir. 2006).

A plaintiff may also establish a violation of Title VII by proving that

discrimination based on sex created a hostile or abusive work environment. Williams

v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 560 (6th Cir. 1999). “Discrimination in this

form occurs [w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation,

ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of

the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.” Id. (internal

citation and quotation omitted). To establish a hostile work environment sexual

harassment claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class,

(2) was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment, (3) the harassment complained of

was based on sex, (4) the alleged harassment created a hostile work environment,

and (5) the existence of vicarious employer liability. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 762.

Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate the required elements

of either kind of Title VII employment discrimination claim. Although Plaintiff

alleges in conclusory terms that he was mistreated, harassed, falsely written-up, and

subjected to a hostile work environment that forced him to retire early from his

employment, he has not alleged facts in his complaint supporting his conclusory

allegations of mistreatment or giving rise to a plausible inference that any

mistreatment he alleges was taken against him was based on or because of his sex

(or any other characteristic protected by Title VII). A complaint is properly dismissed

for failure to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B) where, as here, it “fail[s] to

provide any support” for an allegation that a defendant unlawfully discriminated on

the basis of a characteristic protected by Title VII. Tucker v. Victor Gelb, Inc.,

No. 98-4070, 1999 WL 801544, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 28, 1999). “Conclusory allegations

of discrimination are insufficient to state a Title VII claim.” Id. (“A complaint that

includes only conclusory allegations of discriminatory intent without supporting

factual allegations does not sufficiently show entitlement to relief.” HDC, LLC v. City

of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2012)).

Plaintiff’s complaint likewise fails to state a plausible claim under Title VII’s

retaliation provision, which it makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate

against an employee “because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an

unlawful employment practice by [Title VII].” Kirkland v. James, 657 F. App’x 580,

584 (6th Cir. 2016).

To establish a prima facie claim of Title VII retaliation, a plaintiff must show

that (1) he engaged in activity protected by Title VII, (2) this exercise of protected

rights was known to the defendant, (3) the defendant thereafter took adverse

employment action against the plaintiff, or the plaintiff was subjected to severe or

pervasive retaliatory harassment by a supervisor, and (4) there was a causal

connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action or

harassment. Hunter v. Secretary of U.S. Army, 565 F.3d 986, 996 (6th Cir. 2009).

Plaintiff’s complaint indicates he engaged in activity protected by Title VII by

filing an EEO complaint. He alleges that harassment against him intensified after

he did so, but he has not alleged specific facts in his complaint supporting his

conclusory allegations of harassment or of retaliation or demonstrating all of the

required elements of a prima facie claim. For example, he has not alleged facts

supporting a plausible inference that there was a causal connection between the

protected activity and a subsequent adverse employment action or severe or pervasive

retaliatory harassment by a supervisor. “Temporal proximity alone . . . cannot

establish a causal connection.” Dean-Lis v. McHugh, 598 F. App’x 412, 415 (6th Cir.

2015) (citation omitted). And in general, “conclusory allegations of retaliatory motive

unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state . . . a claim.” Harbin-Bey

v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2005).

Although, as noted above, a complaint need not contain detailed factual

allegations, its “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level” to avoid dismissal. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Even liberally

construing Plaintiff’s complaint, it does not allege facts sufficient to meet this

standard.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In light of this dismissal, Plaintiff’s pending

motion for a status conference (ECF No. 3) is denied. Further, the Court certifies,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be

taken in good faith.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 12, 2022

J. Philip Calabrese

United States District Judge

Northern District of Ohio