Griesmar v. City of Stow, Ohio

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

CANDICE MARIE GRIESMAR, ) Case No. 5:20-cv-01356

)

Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese

)

v. )

)

CITY OF STOW, OHIO, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

)

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Candice Marie Griesmar filed suit in State court alleging that

Defendants City of Stow, Officer J. Bailey, and Lieutenant H. Prusha violated her

rights and those of a putative class under the federal and Ohio Constitutions. (ECF

No. 1-2.) Defendants timely removed based on federal question jurisdiction because

Plaintiff included a claim under Section 1983 in Count I and a claim under Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), in Count II. (ECF No. 1.)

Plaintiff and Defendants each move for summary judgment on the threshold federal

claim. (ECF No. 24; ECF No. 26.) For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s motion and GRANTS Defendants’ motion. Because this disposition

resolves the claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines

to exercise supplemental discretion and REMANDS the remaining claims to State

court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case arises out of a traffic stop officers from the Stow, Ohio police

department conducted early on the morning of May 30, 2019. (ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 19,

PageID #10; ECF No. 5, ¶ 16, PageID # 37.) As a result of the traffic stop,

Ms. Griesmar was cited for speeding, subjected to a search of her vehicle, and

ultimately arrested and charged with felony and misdemeanor drug charges. (ECF

No. 1-2, ¶ 19–21, PageID #10; ECF No. 5, ¶ 16, PageID # 37.)

A. The Traffic Stop

While on patrol, Officer Bailey observed a vehicle traveling over 50 miles per

hour in a 35 miles per hour zone. (ECF No. 21, PageID #203, 273.) The radar system

in Officer Bailey’s cruiser showed that the vehicle was traveling at 56 miles per hour.

(Id., PageID #202, 273.) At approximately 12:58 a.m., Officer Bailey pulled the

vehicle over and questioned the driver, Ms. Griesmar, who stated she was not aware

of her speed or of the speed limit. (Id., PageID #273; ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 19, PageID # 10;

ECF No. 5, ¶ 16, PageID # 37.) During this conversation, Officer Bailey smelled “a

slight odor of marijuana,” but did not mention it to Ms. Griesmar. (ECF No. 21,

PageID #221.) Officer Bailey returned to his cruiser to write a citation for speeding.

(Id., PageID #273.)

B. The Vehicle Search

After returning to Ms. Griesmar’s vehicle and serving the citation, Officer

Bailey asked to search the vehicle because he “continually smelled a light odor of

marijuana coming from her vehicle.” (ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 23–24, PageID # 10; ECF No. 5,

¶ 18, PageID # 37.) Officer Bailey asked for Ms. Griesmar’s consent to search the

vehicle and Ms. Griesmar replied that she “just wanted to go home.” (ECF No. 1-2,

¶ 24, PageID # 10; ECF No. 5, ¶ 18, PageID # 37.) Officer Bailey told Ms. Griesmar

that “due to the odor or marijuana it was actually not an option and that [he] was

going to search her vehicle.” (ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 24, PageID # 10; ECF No. 5, ¶ 18, PageID

# 37.) Ms. Griesmar told Officer Bailey that the smell was emanating from marijuana

roaches in her ashtray, which she showed to him. (ECF No. 20, PageID #134–135;

ECF No. 21, PageID #273.)

At that point, Officer Bailey asked Ms. Griesmar to exit the vehicle and advised

dispatch that he was conducting a vehicle search. (ECF No. 21, PageID #273.) In

response to Officer Bailey’s call to dispatch, Lieutenant Prusha came to the scene to

provide back up for the vehicle search. (ECF No. 21, PageID #273; ECF No. 22,

PageID #306–07.) Lieutenant Prusha arrived after Ms. Griesmar had exited the

vehicle. (ECF No. 20, PageID #136; ECF No. 22, PageID #307.)

During the search of Ms. Griesmar’s vehicle, Officer Bailey discovered a two-

and-a-half-inch section of a straw, two plastic bags containing a total of ten pills, and

a folded receipt containing an unidentifiable white pill. (ECF No. 21, PageID #273.)

Officer Bailey identified the section of straw as consistent with what is often used for

snorting drugs. (ECF No. 21, PageID #274.) Further, because of the way the pills

were stored in plastic bags, Office Bailey surmised they were illegal. (ECF No. 21,

PageID #236.) Using a database she accessed from her cell phone, Lieutenant Prusha

identified the pills that Officer Bailey had discovered as oxycodone hydrochloride and

cyclobenzaprine hydrochloride. (ECF No. 21, PageID #235–36, 273; ECF No. 22,

PageID #315–16, 333–34.) On finding and identifying the pills, Officer Bailey gave

Ms. Griesmar her Miranda warning and questioned her. (ECF No. 20, PageID #138;

ECF No. 21, PageID #273.) Ms. Griesmar claimed that the pills were prescribed.

(ECF No. 20, PageID #139; ECF No. 21, PageID #273.) However, Ms. Griesmar could

not produce the prescriptions or remember their names. (ECF No. 20, PageID #144,

167–68; ECF No. 21, PageID #273.)

C. Ms. Griesmar’s Arrest

Subsequently, Office Bailey placed Ms. Griesmar under arrest and transported

her to the jail. (ECF No. 21, PageID #273; ECF No. 22, PageID #333.) Lieutenant

Prusha accompanied Officer Bailey to the jail to assist him with the booking. (ECF

No. 21, PageID #273.)

Ms. Griesmar was booked at the Macedonia jail at 3:36 a.m. (ECF No. 23-6,

PageID #483.) Later that morning, at 10:00 a.m., a municipal court judge arraigned

Ms. Griesmar by video on all charges. (ECF No. 20, PageID #161–62; ECF No. 23-6,

PageID #484; ECF No. 23-5, PageID #445.) The same day, around 3:00 p.m.,

Ms. Griesmar was released from jail on a personal recognizance bond. (ECF No. 20,

PageID #166, 187; ECF No. 23-6, PageID #23-6, PageID #481.) The municipal court

notified Ms. Griesmar that she had to appear for a hearing on June 6, 2019. (ECF

No. 20, PageID #164–65, 188.)

Ms. Griesmar was charged with felony and misdemeanor drug charges. (ECF

No. 1-2, ¶ 20, PageID #10; ECF No. 5, ¶ 16, PageID #37; ECF No. 23-5, PageID

#439–74.) Ultimately, a fifth-degree felony drug charge against Ms. Griesmar was

dismissed. (ECF No. 1-2, PageID #18–19.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Based on these facts, Plaintiff filed suit in State court and brought two federal

claims against Defendants. (ECF No. 1-2.) Defendants timely removed. (ECF No. 1.)

In Count I, Plaintiff asserts, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the Defendant officers

unlawfully detained her and seized her property. (ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 18–35, PageID

#10–12.) Plaintiff also claims that a “class of others have been arrested without a

warrant” and “without prompt determinations of probable cause.” (Id. ¶ 35, PageID

#12.) In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that the City’s “failure to maintain and enforce

proper training or policies and procedures” violated her federal constitutional rights.

(Id., ¶ 37, PageID #12.) Plaintiff also brings claims under State law. (Id., ¶ 40–46,

PageID # 12–13.)

The parties agreed to address the underlying federal constitutional claims

first. (ECF No. 15.) Accordingly, both Defendants and Plaintiff move for summary

judgment on Count I, which asserts a violation of Section 1983. (ECF No. 24; ECF

No. 26.) In addition, Defendants move for summary judgment on Count II on the

ground that if Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendant officers in Count I fails, then

Plaintiff’s Monell claim against the City of Stow in Count II necessarily fails as well.

(ECF No. 24-1, PageID # 499–500.)

ANALYSIS

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary

judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Kirilenko-Ison v. Board

of Educ. of Danville Indep. Schs., 974 F.3d 652, 660 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

After discovery, summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party fails

to establish “an element essential to that party’s case and upon which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial.” Tokmenko v. MetroHealth Sys., 488 F. Supp. 3d

571, 576 (N.D. Ohio 2020) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).

“The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court

of the basis for its motion” and identifying the portions of the record “which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (citing Celotex Corp.,

477 U.S. at 322). Then, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts showing

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 250 (1986)). “When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c),

its opponent must do more than show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586.

If a genuine dispute exists, meaning “the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” summary judgment is not

appropriate. Id. However, if “the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly

probative,” summary judgment for the movant is proper. Id. The “mere existence of

some factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly

supported motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)

(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48). To determine whether a genuine dispute

about material facts exists, it is not the Court’s duty to search the record; instead, the

parties must bring those facts to the Court’s attention. See Betkerur v. Aultman Hosp.

Ass’n, 78 F.3d 1079, 1087 (6th Cir. 1996). Ultimately, the Court must determine

“whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a

jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251.

I. Section 1983 Claim (Count I)

Plaintiff argues that Officer Bailey and Lieutenant Prusha subjected her to a

warrantless arrest without providing a prompt determination of probable cause by a

neutral and detached magistrate. (ECF No. 26-1, PageID #520.) She alleges that the

officers violated her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF

No. 1-2, ¶ 32, PageID #11.)

I.A. The Constitutional Right at Issue

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for State violations of rights secured

under the Constitution or federal law. Dibrell v. City of Knoxville, Tennessee, 984

F.3d 1156, 1160 (6th Cir. 2021). In this respect, the statute does not create

substantive rights, but provides a means of redress. Dibrell v. City of Knoxville,

Tennessee, 984 F.3d 1156, 1160 (6th Cir. 2021). Whether a defendant has violated a

constitutional right turns on the meaning of the constitutional text; therefore, the

“threshold inquiry” under Section 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right

at issue. Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S. Ct. 911, 920 (2017).

Plaintiff’s claims arise out of a traffic stop that State officers initiated and her

subsequent arrest and detention. The Fourth Amendment, which protects an

individual’s right against warrantless searches and seizures, squarely applies to this

situation. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273–74 (1994) (Fourth Amendment, not

substantive due process, applies to claims arising out of pretrial deprivations of

liberty); Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 750 (6th Cir. 2006) (applying

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to claim of continued detention without probable

cause); Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Div., 58 F. Supp. 3d 842, 846 (N.D. Ohio

2014), aff’d in relevant part Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128

(6th Cir. 2015) (applying the Fourth Amendment to unlawful seizure allegation).

Nonetheless, Plaintiff contends that the Fourteenth Amendment also applies

to her claims. Plaintiff argues that Ohio law requires a determination of probable

cause “forthwith” by issuing a warrant and that “the State’s failure to implement its

rights may violate federal due process.” (ECF No. 30-1, PageID # 549–550.) However,

Plaintiff fails to develop this argument. Plaintiff does not explain how Defendants’

actions violated Ohio law or. if a violation occurred, how that violation deprived

Plaintiff of her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, and consistent

with clear precedent applying Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to similar claims,

the Court analyzes Plaintiff’s claims under governing principles under the Fourth

Amendment.

I.B. Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.”

U.S. Const. amend. IV; United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012). Warrantless

searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable, subject to a “few specifically

established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357

(1967). Plaintiff’s complaint alleges Fourth Amendment violations regarding the

initial stop, the search of her vehicle, and her subsequent arrest and detention.

I.B.1. The Traffic Stop

“A police officer may legally stop a car when he has probable cause to believe

that a civil traffic violation has occurred.” United States v. Torres-Ramos, 536 F.3d

542, 550 (6th Cir. 2008). According to Officer Bailey’s contemporaneous report and

his later testimony, Officer Bailey observed Ms. Griesmar’s car traveling over 50

miles per hour in a zone with a 35 miles per hour speed limit. (ECF No. 21, PageID

#202–03, 273.) His claim is based on his personal observation and the radar reading

showing that the vehicle was traveling at 56 miles per hour. (Id.) Plaintiff contests

Officer Bailey’s claim that Ms. Griesmar was speeding because it was “never

adversarial[ly] tested.” (ECF No. 30-1, PageID #546.) But considering Defendants’

evidence that Ms. Griesmar was speeding, Plaintiff must do more than show there is

some “metaphysical doubt” about that fact. Plaintiff sets forth no facts showing that

Ms. Griesmar’s speeding is a genuine issue of material fact in dispute. Accordingly,

the Court determines that Officer Bailey had probable cause to stop Ms. Griesmar for

speeding, a civil infraction.

Further, Plaintiff argues that Officer Bailey did not have the reasonable

suspicion necessary to justify prolonging the traffic stop after serving the traffic

citation. (ECF No. 30-1, PageID #545–46.) “Once the purpose of the traffic stop is

completed, a police officer may not further detain the vehicle or its occupants unless

something that occurred during the traffic stop generated the necessary reasonable

suspicion to justify a further detention.” Torres-Ramos, 536 F.3d at 550 (cleaned up).

In other words, to detain Ms. Griesmar beyond the purpose of the original traffic

violation, which was to issue a speeding ticket, Officer Bailey must have had a

“reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.” Id. As

discussed below, Officer Bailey’s detection of the smell of marijuana provided

probable cause for the search of Ms. Griesmar’s vehicle. Such probable cause satisfied

the reasonable suspicion requirement for continued detention. See United States v.

Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (reasonable suspicion standard is lower than

probable cause).

I.B.2. The Search of Ms. Griesmar’s Vehicle

Warrantless searches of vehicles “are per se unreasonable under the Fourth

Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated

exceptions.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at

357). One such exception permits an officer to search a vehicle without a warrant if

probable cause supports the search. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982).

Probable cause means reasonable grounds for belief the vehicle contains evidence of

a crime, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.

United States v. Bennett, 905 F.2d 931, 934 (6th Cir. 1990). Put another way,

probable cause exists where “there is a ‘fair probability that contraband or evidence

of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” United States v. Wright, 16 F.3d 1429,

1437 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). In

determining whether probable cause exists, the Court does not look to events before

or after the search or the subjective intent of the officers; instead, the Court considers

the objective facts known to the officers at the time of the search. Smith v. Thornburg,

136 F.3d 1070, 1075 (6th Cir. 1994).

Officer Bailey detected the smell of marijuana on first encountering

Ms. Griesmar in her vehicle and on returning to her vehicle to issue the speeding

citation. (ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 23–24, PageID # 10; ECF No. 5, ¶ 18, PageID # 37; ECF

No. 21, PageID #221.) The Sixth Circuit has consistently held that a police officer’s

detection of the smell of marijuana may provide probable cause to search a vehicle

after a routine traffic stop. United States v. Carter, No. 1:14-cr-194-1, 2015 WL

13037479, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 26, 2015), aff’d, 662 F. App’x 342 (6th Cir. 2016)

(collecting cases). Where such probable cause exists, an officer may search any area

of the vehicle in which contraband or evidence of the criminal activity may be found.

Gant, 556 U.S. at 347. Further, Ms. Griesmar informed Officer Bailey there were

marijuana roaches in the car and showed them to him before he conducted the search.

(ECF No. 20, PageID #134–135; ECF No. 21, PageID #273.) Accordingly, Officer

Bailey had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of her vehicle.

I.B.3. Ms. Griesmar’s Arrest

The test for whether an arrest is constitutionally valid is “whether, at the

moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it.” Beck v.

Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). A warrantless arrest does not violate the Fourth

Amendment where there is probable cause. United States v. Dotson, 49 F.3d 227, 230

(6th Cir. 1995). In searching Ms. Griesmar’s vehicle, Officer Bailey discovered, in

addition to the marijuana roaches, a section of straw consistent with drug use and

pills contained in plastic bags. (ECF No. 21, PageID #273.) Lieutenant Prusha

identified the pills as controlled substances. (ECF No. 21, PageID #235–36, 273; ECF

No. 22, PageID #315–16, 333–34.) These facts are sufficient to establish probable

cause for Ms. Griesmar’s arrest. To the extent Plaintiff contends Ms. Griesmar’s

arrest was unlawful, Plaintiff fails to advance any argument on that point.

I.B.4. Ms. Griesmar’s Detention

In the case of a warrantless arrest, an officer’s assessment of probable cause

provides legal justification for the arrest and brief detention of a person suspected of

a crime. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113–14 (1975). Once a suspect is in custody,

however, “the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause

as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.” Id. at 114. An

adversarial hearing is not required, id. at 120-21, nor is there a single preferred

pretrial procedure, id. at 123. Rather, whatever procedure a State adopts, “it must

provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause [to arrest] as a condition

for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and this determination must be made

by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest.” Id. at 125. “[A] jurisdiction

that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will,

as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein.” County

of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).

Plaintiff contends that Ms. Griesmar never received a judicial determination

of probable cause. (ECF No. 26-1, PageID #519; ECF No. 30-1, PageID #540.)

Defendants maintain that she did. (ECF No. 33, PageID #561.) The record shows

that, after Ms. Griesmar’s initial detention (at 12:58 a.m.) a municipal court judge

arraigned her the same day, at 10:00 a.m., and determined that probable cause

existed for her arrest and prosecution. (ECF No. 23-5, PageID #445.) The judge’s

order stated: “The court having reviewed the notarized affidavit in the case file finds

probable cause to continue for preliminary hearing or felony status.” (Id.) Plaintiff

quibbles that the form states only a finding of probable cause “for preliminary hearing

or status” (ECF No. 30-1, PageID #540 (emphasis added)), not a finding of probable

cause for a felony or misdemeanor arrest. Though the State form may be unartfully

drafted or leave something to be desired, the proceeding before a State court judge

satisfied Ms. Griesmar’s federal constitutional right to a prompt determination of

probable cause before a neutral magistrate. Defendants have shown that

Ms. Griesmar was in fact arraigned on the charges on the same morning as her arrest.

Plaintiff presents no facts showing that there is a genuine dispute over this matter.

Further, Plaintiff argues that Ms. Griesmar was detained for an unreasonable

amount of time. (ECF No. 24, PageID #520; ECF No. 30-1, PageID #541.) From

Ms. Griesmar’s initial detention at 12:58 a.m. to her arraignment at 10:00 a.m.,

Ms. Griesmar was detained for approximately nine hours. (ECF No. 30-1, PageID

#541.) From the initial detention to Ms. Griesmar’s ultimate release from custody at

3:08 p.m., she was detained for less than fifteen hours all together. (ECF No. 30-1,

PageID #541.) Defendants argue that, under McLaughlin, the Fourth Amendment

is satisfied if an individual receives a judicial determination of probable cause within

48 hours of her arrest. (ECF No. 33, PageID #563.) In response, Plaintiff contends

that, even if the detention is less than 48 hours, there might still be a violation under

McLaughlin. (ECF No. 30-1, PageID #548.) Plaintiff argues that this case is part of

a “subtle, systemic practice of hours of needless delay” arising from particular State

practices. (Id., PageID #548–49.)

Under McLaughlin, detention lasting less than 48 hours might violate the

Fourth Amendment. 500 U.S. at 56 (“This is not to say that the probable cause

determination in a particular case passes constitutional muster simply because it is

provided within 48 hours.”). Under McLaughlin, a jurisdiction that provides a

judicial probable cause determination within 48 hours complies with the promptness

requirement of Gerstein and “will be immune from systemic challenges.” Id.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s systemic challenge cannot proceed. Further, under

McLaughlin, a particular plaintiff challenging the promptness of a determination

made within 48 hours of arrest must “prove that his or her probable cause

determination was delayed unreasonably.” Id. “Examples of unreasonable delay are

delays for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay

motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay’s sake.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff did not allege that her probable cause determination was

unreasonably delayed for improper purposes.

Even if Ms. Griesmar never received a proper probable cause determination,

as Plaintiff contends (ECF No. 30-1, PageID #540), Plaintiff still fails to show that

fifteen hours was an unreasonable amount of time for detention following arrest.

Under Gerstein, an officer’s probable cause determination justifies a warrantless

arrest and a brief period of detention. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113–14. That detention

may not then be extended without a prompt judicial determination that there is

probable cause to arrest. Id. Plaintiff’s detention, at most fifteen hours long, ended

within a constitutionally reasonable period of time, even without a judicial

determination of probable cause. See Cox v. City of Jackson, Tennessee, 811 F. App’x

284, 287 (6th Cir. 2020) (one-day detentions without a judicial determination of

probable cause did not give rise to a Fourth Amendment claim). Accordingly, the

length of detention did not violate Ms. Griesmar’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the probable cause determination should have

been made at the police station before booking Ms. Griesmar in the local jail. (ECF

No. 30-1, PageID #541.) But the Court will not second-guess the State’s course of

action where it resulted in no constitutional violation.

I.C. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that Officer Bailey and Lieutenant Prusha are entitled to

qualified immunity against Plaintiff’s claims. Because the Court determines that

neither Officer Bailey nor Lieutenant Prusha committed a constitutional violation,

the Court need not address qualified immunity.

II. Monell Claim (Count II)

In addition to her Section 1983 claims against Officer Bailey and Lieutenant

Prusha, Plaintiff brings a Monell claim against the City of Stow for its alleged

inadequate training and supervision. (ECF No. 1-2, ¶¶ 36–37, PageID # 12.)

Defendants argue that, without an underlying constitutional deprivation committed

by Officer Bailey or Lieutenant Prusha, Plaintiff cannot prevail on the Monell claim.

(ECF No. 24-1, PageID # 499.) Plaintiff objects, on the ground that Defendants’

argument violates the parties’ prior agreement to brief the alleged constitutional

violation in Count I and defer other issues. (ECF No. 30-1, PageID #538; see also

ECF No. 15, PageID #98.)

Before these early summary-judgment proceedings, the parties agreed that the

Court would first address the Section 1983 claims against Officer Bailey and

Lieutenant Prusha contained in Count I. (ECF No. 15.) Further, they agreed that

the Monell claim against the City of Stow contained in Count II “is bifurcated from

the initial Dispositive Motion process and will be addressed by the court, if necessary,

upon further order of the court.” (Id.) Consistent with this agreement, the parties

agreed not to conduct discovery on Count II until further order of the Court. (Id.)

After the parties reached this agreement, the Court advised that it would consider

the related Monell claim to the extent appropriate in connection with the federal

constitutional issues raised in Count I. (Minutes, Aug. 6, 2021.) That is, if Plaintiff

were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law or questions of fact foreclosed judgment

as a matter of law, then the Monell claim would remain for further proceedings.

However, because Defendants argue the City of Stow is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law, not a matter of fact, the Court determines that neither discovery nor

additional briefing is necessary to render judgment on the Monell claim, and such an

outcome is consistent with the parties’ agreement and discussions with the Court.

Monell holds that municipalities may be held liable for the constitutional

violations of their employees only where the municipality’s policy or custom led to the

violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694–95. “There can be no liability under Monell

without an underlying constitutional violation.” Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606,

622 (6th Cir. 2014). The “conclusion that no officer-defendant has deprived the

plaintiff of any constitutional right a fortiori defeats a claim against the government

entity as well.” Scott v. Clay Cnty., 205 F.3d 867, 879 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing City of

Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799)) (cleaned up). In this case, because no

employee of the City of Stow violated any of Plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights,

the City of Stow, Plaintiff may not maintain a claim against the City of Stow. Given

the Court’s disposition of Count I, no further federal proceedings no matter how

extensive or involved—as a matter of fact or law—can alter this outcome.

III. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Having disposed of the only bases for subject-matter jurisdiction in federal

court, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

remaining State-law claims. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), this Court “may

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . [it] has dismissed

all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Because comity to State courts is

a substantial interest, there is “a strong presumption against the exercise of

supplemental jurisdiction once federal claims have been dismissed.” Packard v.

Farmers Ins. Co. of Columbus, 423 F. App’x. 580, 584 (6th Cir. 2011). The Court

should retain jurisdiction “only in cases where the interests of judicial economy and

the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation outweigh [the] concern over needlessly

deciding state law issues.” Id. (quoting Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d

719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006)).

The discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims

extends to all stages of litigation, including summary judgment. See Booker v. City

of Beachwood, 451 F. App’x. 521, 523 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Nails v. Riggs, 195 F.

App’x. 303, 313 (6th Cir. 2006)). In exercising that discretion, the Court may consider

the convenience to the parties and expeditiousness in resolving the case. Long v.

Bando Mfg. of Am., Inc., 201 F.3d 754, 761 (6th Cir. 2000). Here, the parties have

not exerted substantial time or effort in briefing the merits of the state law causes of

action; instead, the parties addressed only the federal constitutional issues and

arguments. Accordingly, comity and the interest in judicial economy favor remand of

Plaintiffs State-law claims. Therefore, the Court has no occasion to consider

Plaintiff's claims under State law.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for summary

judgment and GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Counts I and

Il. The Court REMANDS Counts III through V to the Summit County Court of

Common Pleas.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 24, 2022

J.Philip Calabrese

United States District Judge

Northern District of Ohio

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