Taylor v.Commissioner of Social Security

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

URSULA MARIE TAYLOR, ) CASE NO. 5:20-CV-02010-JDG

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE

) JONATHAN D. GREENBERG

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL )

SECURITY, ) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND

) ORDER

Defendant. )

Plaintiff, Ursula Taylor (“Plaintiff” or “Taylor”), challenges the final decision of Defendant, Kilolo

Kijakazi,1 Acting Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), denying her applications for a

Period of Disability (“POD”), Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), and Supplemental Security Income

(“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423, and 1381 et seq.

(“Act”). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and the consent of the parties,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2). For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner’s final decision is

VACATED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION CONSISTENT WITH THIS

OPINION.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In October 2017, Taylor filed an application for POD, DIB, and SSI, alleging a disability onset

date of March 2, 2017 and claiming she was disabled due to depression, bipolar disorder, ADHD, anxiety

disorder, headaches, heart problem, knee problem, and high blood pressure. (Transcript (“Tr.”) at 21, 82,

1 On July 9, 2021, Kilolo Kijakazi became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security.

94.) The applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration, and Taylor requested a hearing

before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Id. at 21.)

On July 24, 2019, an ALJ held a hearing, during which Taylor, represented by counsel, and an

impartial vocational expert (“VE”) testified. (Id.) On September 5, 2019, the ALJ issued a written

decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. at 21-32.) The ALJ’s decision became final on July 7,

2020, when the Appeals Council declined further review. (Id. at 1-6.)

On September 8, 2020, Taylor filed her Complaint to challenge the Commissioner’s final decision.

(Doc. No. 1.) The parties have completed briefing in this case. (Doc. Nos. 14, 16-17.) Taylor asserts the

following assignments of error:

(1) The ALJ committed harmful error when his RFC did not consider the effect of the

combination of Taylor’s severe impairments on her ability to engage in substantial

gainful activity on a sustained basis.

(2) The ALJ committed harmful error in his determination regarding Taylor’s disabling

pain and her credibility in violation of Social Security Ruling 16-3p.

(3) The ALJ committed harmful error when he sent interrogatories to the vocational

witness after he testified at the hearing and failed to meet his burden at Step Five of

the Sequential Evaluation.

(Doc. No. 14 at 1.)

II. EVIDENCE

A. Personal and Vocational Evidence

Taylor was born in December 1972 and was 46 years-old at the time of her administrative hearing

(Tr. 21, 31), making her a “younger” person under Social Security regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563(c),

416.963(c). She has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English. (Tr. 31.) She

has past relevant work as a retail cashier/stocker and cosmetologist. (Id. at 30.)

B. Relevant Medical Evidence2

On February 9, 2017, Taylor saw cardiologist Dr. Jeffrey Courson for follow up. (Id. at 507.)

Taylor reported feeling well, although she occasionally had mild SVT episodes that stopped when she

rested. (Id.) Dr. Courson told Taylor if her episodes increased in intensity, duration, or frequency she was

to call so he could increase her medication. (Id.) On examination, Dr. Courson found normal rate, regular

rhythm, normal heart sounds, no gallop, no friction rub, no murmur, normal gait, and normal coordination.

(Id.) Taylor’s diagnoses included supraventricular tachycardia, atrial tachycardia, and palpitations. (Id. at

508.) Dr. Courson noted he was making no changes to Taylor’s medication. (Id.)

On May 8, 2017, Taylor saw Tammy Morris at Coleman Professional Services for a diagnostic

assessment. (Tr. 381.) Taylor reported feeling “off balance” and “immune” to Seroquel, waking up

agitated, having mood swings, a lack of appetite, poor sleep, and rapid heartbeat. (Id.) Taylor told Morris

she had a good relationship with her father and was active in her church, including serving as an usher.

(Id. at 382.) She described herself as good at her work and “a great/awesome grandmother.” (Id.) Taylor

reported working part-time, with above average attendance and exemplary performance. (Id. at 383.) On

examination, Morris found average and cooperative behavior, good eye contact, clear speech, engaged and

cooperative mood, congruent affect, logical and circumstantial thought process, unremarkable thought

content, and unremarkable cognitive ability, although Morris noted Taylor reported poor focus with poor

sleep. (Id. at 392-93.) Taylor was wringing her hands and moving in her chair during the session. (Id. at

392.) Morris diagnosed Taylor with unspecified bipolar and related disorder and unspecified insomnia

disorder. (Id. at 395.)

On August 10, 2017, Taylor saw Dr. Nilesh Shah for evaluation of her left knee pain. (Id. at 457-

61.) Taylor reported her knee pain began about a month ago when she got out of bed to go to the

2 The Court’s recitation of the medical evidence is not intended to be exhaustive and is limited to the

evidence cited in the parties’ Briefs.

bathroom and her left knee gave out. (Id. at 457.) The next morning, her left knee was painful and

swollen. (Id.) Taylor reported going to the emergency room twice for the pain and bruising around her

knee two weeks ago. (Id.) Taylor also complained of tenderness. (Id.) Taylor described the pain as

throbbing. (Id.) On examination, Dr. Shah found antalgic gait, no effusion, erythema or warmth, normal

sensory exam, normal alignment of the knee, full range of motion limited by pain, negative Lachman’s,

posterior drawer, and McMurray’s testing, as well as negative varus and valgus stress tests. (Id. at 460.)

Dr. Shah further found no pain to palpation to the patellar tendon, MCL, LCL, medial joint line, lateral

joint line, quad tendon, or pes bursa, negative patellar apprehension, and normal left hip rotation. (Id.)

Dr. Shah administered a cortisone injection. (Id.)

On September 18, 2017, Taylor saw Dr. Shah for follow up. (Id. at 453-56.) Taylor reported her

knee hurt worse the day of the injection, but then she had pain relief for about a week. (Id. at 453.) Her

pain then returned to its original level. (Id.) Taylor told Dr. Shah she did her home exercise program

three to four times, she needed a new band, and she was interested in a brace. (Id.) Taylor described her

pain as sharp. (Id.) On examination, Dr. Shah found antalgic gait, pain with full extension medially, pain

with McMurray’s testing, and pain to palpation along the medial joint line. (Id. at 456.) Dr. Shah ordered

an MRI. (Id.)

On October 3, 2017, Taylor saw Michelle Eller, APN, at Coleman Professional Services for

another evaluation. (Id. at 399.) Taylor reported she was a “‘wreck’”; she fidgeted all the time, she was

not eating well and had no appetite, her sleep was off, her mood was different, she was argumentative and

having outbursts, she had a physical altercation with her fiancé, and when she was angry, she slammed

things and broke things. (Id.) She told Eller she could think her way into depression. (Id.) While Taylor

denied a lack of motivation, she reported disliking being around people and having anxiety in crowds.

(Id.) Taylor denied manic behavior. (Id.) Taylor reported incidents at work where her heart was racing

and she passed out: once in May 2016 and again in January and March of 2017. (Id.) Taylor told Eller

she was working in home health care, although her hours had been cut to 20-25 hours. (Id. at 400.)

On examination, Eller found normal gait and station, normal muscle tone and strength with no

atrophy or deformity, average demeanor, good eye contact, clear speech, full affect, logical thought

process, average intelligence, fair attention and concentration, unremarkable thought content,

unremarkable cognitive impairment, and good insight and judgment. (Id. at 400-01.) Taylor reported her

mood was “‘tired.’” (Id. at 400.) Eller diagnosed Taylor with unspecified bipolar and related disorder and

unspecified insomnia disorder. (Id. at 401.) Taylor reported she had lab work run every six months by her

cardiologist and everything had been good. (Id. at 402.)

On October 16, 2017, Taylor saw Morris for follow up. (Id. at 420.) Taylor reported work was

going well and she was getting 40 hours a week. (Id.) On examination, Morris found average demeanor,

good eye contact, clear speech, anxious, cooperative, and positive mood, congruent affect, logical thought

process, average intelligence, fair attention and concentration, unremarkable thought content,

unremarkable cognitive impairment, and good insight and judgment. (Id. at 420-21.) Taylor reported she

was doing well, and she was thankful for her job. (Id. at 421.)

On October 27, 2017, Taylor saw Dr. Salvatore Frangiamore for evaluation of her left knee pain.

(Id. at 441.) Her symptoms began months ago and had not changed. (Id.) Taylor described the pain as

sharp and consistent, worse with exercise or strenuous activity, particularly prolonged sitting and standing

or walking stairs. (Id.) Taylor rated her pain as a 7/10 at best and 10/10 at worst. (Id.) Taylor reported

the pain interfered with her sleep, and she had tried injections, anti-inflammatory medication, pain

medication, and physical therapy with no relief. (Id.) On examination, Dr. Frangiamore found grossly

normal gait and station, intact sensation, normal motor strength, no evidence of quadricep atrophy,

tenderness over the medial joint line, pain and crepitus elicited with patellar compression, pain with range

of motion at extremes, and pain elicited with McMurray testing without an audible click. (Id. at 444.) Dr.

Frangiamore noted a left knee MRI revealed a torn meniscus with arthritic changes but no chondral

malacia of the medial compartment. (Id.) Dr. Frangiamore recommended left knee arthroscopy. (Id. at

445.)

On November 9, 2017, Taylor saw Dr. Courson, for follow up regarding her supraventricular

tachycardia. (Id. at 356.) She had been seeing Dr. Courson at least once every six months since August

18, 2016. (Id. at 501-32.) Taylor reported doing well, although she had occasional palpitations which

were “sporadic and self limited.” (Id. at 356.) Her most recent episode was about a month ago. (Id.) On

examination, Dr. Courson found normal rate, regular rhythm, normal heart sounds, no gallop, no friction

rub, no murmur, and normal gait and coordination. (Id.) Taylor’s diagnoses included supraventricular

tachycardia, atrial tachycardia, and palpitations. (Id.) Dr. Courson noted:

Ursula is stable from a rhythm perspective. She has occasional episodes that are

self limited, so we will stay on her current regime, but she is to call if this

changes, more frequent, sustained or severe symptoms and we can adjust her

meds. She has a surgery planned next week, arthroscopy on her knee and there is

no reason from a cardiac perspective that she cannot proceed as planned. I will

see her back in 6 months.

(Id. at 357.)

On November 15, 2017, Taylor saw Morris for follow up. (Id. at 404.) Taylor reported doing

well, that she was thankful for her job, she was sleeping better, and she was “‘handling things’ with her

fiancé, home, and children. (Id. at 405.) Taylor was “always doing something” and talked with her family

and friends. (Id. at 406.) On examination, Morris found Taylor well-groomed, with average demeanor,

cooperative behavior, average eye contact and activity, clear speech, “anxious, cooperative [and] positive”

mood, congruent affect, logical thought process, and good insight and judgment. (Id. at 404-05.) Morris

noted Taylor “reports and shows on target completion of tasks and thought processing.” (Id. at 405.)

On November 27, 2017, Taylor underwent left knee surgery to repair a torn meniscus. (Id. at 437-

40.)

On November 28, 2017, Taylor completed an Adult Function Report. (Id. at 278-85.) Taylor

reported she always felt fatigued from her heart condition, her knee caused her to be unable to sit or stand

for a long period of time, and her depression caused her concentration to be off. (Id. at 278.) She reported

no problems with personal care, although she needed alarms to remind her to take her medication. (Id. at

279-80.) She could not stand for too long without getting dizzy. (Id. at 280.) She could do light

housework, although it took her all day because she had to “stop and go.” (Id.) While she reported

disliking going outside because she hyperventilated, she also reported going to work Sunday through

Thursday. (Id. at 281.) She could go out alone, but she did not like to because she was paranoid. (Id.)

She did not drive because she thought she would get into an accident, and she did not shop much because

she got paranoid around a lot of people. (Id.) She could pay bills, count change, handle a savings

account, and use a checkbook. (Id.) She read books when her concentration was good and played cards.

(Id. at 282.) Her depression had worsened, so she spent most of her time in bed or asleep in her room.

(Id.) While she reported staying to herself most of the time, she also went to work and church on a regular

basis. (Id.) While Taylor stated she could only walk for twenty miles minutes before she started beathing

heavily, she also could walk two miles before needing to rest for half an hour. (Id. at 283.) Taylor

reported her concentration was off most times, she could only pay attention for ten minutes at the most,

and she could not understand things like she used to be able to do. (Id.) She did not follow written

instructions well, and spoken instructions had to be repeated until she understood. (Id.)

On December 7, 2017, Taylor saw Michael Golz, PT, for her first physical therapy appointment.

(Id. at 363.) Golz noted Taylor was on medical leave from work. (Id.) Taylor reported pain and some

instability in her right knee. (Id.) Taylor rated her current left knee pain as a 6/10 and told Golz her pain

ranged from a 6/10 at best to an 8/10 at worst. (Id.) She described her pain as constant. (Id.) Bending the

knee, as well as moving after prolonged sitting and walking, aggravated her pain, while ice and position

changes alleviated it. (Id.) Golz noted the swelling of Taylor’s left knee was going down. (Id.) Taylor

reported her pain had improved since her surgery and that she was going to get a brace. (Id. at 364.) On

examination, Golz found antalgic gait, decreased stance time on the left lower extremity, reduced muscle

strength on the left, and grossly normal bilateral hip and ankle motion. (Id.) Golz noted Taylor tolerated

the session well with minimal complaints of pain and difficulty. (Id. at 365.)

On December 12, 2017, Taylor saw Golz for her second physical therapy appointment. (Id. at

370.) Golz noted Taylor displayed maximum effort during the session. (Id. at 371.)

On December 14, 2017, Taylor saw Morris for follow up. (Id. at 409.) On examination, Morris

found Taylor well-groomed, with average demeanor, cooperative behavior, average eye contact and

activity, clear speech, “anxious, cooperative [and] positive” mood, congruent affect, logical thought

process, and good insight and judgment. (Id. at 409-10.) Taylor reported being off her medication for

three months because of changes and rescheduling. (Id. at 410.)

That same day, Taylor failed to appear for her third physical therapy session. (Id. at 373.)

On December 19, 2017, Taylor again failed to appear for her physical therapy session. (Id. at 374.)

On December 29, 2017, Taylor saw Dr. Frangiamore for follow up post-surgery. (Id. at 435.)

Taylor reported moderate pain and told Dr. Frangiamore she had been in a car accident on December 25th

and her left knee hit the dashboard of the car. (Id.) Taylor said the swelling and bruising had gone down

since the accident. (Id.) Taylor reported that before the accident, her knee was doing well. (Id.) On

examination, Dr. Frangiamore found no erythema, mild swelling, no effusion, intact sensation, no gross

motor deficits, and quadricep atrophy compared to the contralateral side. (Id.) Dr. Frangiamore noted

they discussed the importance of appropriate mobilization and that Taylor was to continue with her

physical therapy. (Id.) While the accident set Taylor back, it was a small setback and since Taylor had

been doing well before the accident, Dr. Frangiamore suspected she would be doing well again. (Id.) He

prescribed an anti-inflammatory medication for Taylor’s acute injury. (Id. at 436.)

On January 22, 2018, Taylor saw Scott Rohrbaugh, CNP, at Coleman Professional Services to

establish care. (Id. at 472.) Taylor reported feeling down lately, mood swings, irritability, impulsivity,

being mostly depressed, lack of energy and motivation, feeling hopeless and helpless, and occasional

crying spells. (Id.) Taylor rated her depression as a 7/10 and her anxiety as a 7/10. (Id.) Rohrbaugh

noted Taylor had stopped taking her Remeron because of “over sedation.” (Id.) On examination,

Rohrbaugh found normal gait and station, average and cooperative demeanor/behavior, normal eye

contact, clear speech, “‘swinging’” mood, euthymic affect, normal language, logical thought process,

unremarkable thought content, unremarkable cognition/orientation, and fair/intact insight/judgment. (Id.

at 474.) Rohrbaugh prescribed a low dose of Risperdal. (Id. at 476.)

On January 30, 2018, Taylor saw Alicia Brown at Coleman Professional Services for counseling.

(Id. at 485.) Taylor reported increased stress because of her stepson and his mother and that she was ready

to go back to work. (Id.) Taylor also reported increased anxiety and mood swings because she had not

had her medication for over a month and frustration at losing her job. (Id. at 486.) Taylor told Brown she

did things around the house to keep busy and that she had a dog to care for. (Id. at 486-87.) Taylor

reported considering going back to her old job since they asked her if she would come back. (Id. at 488.)

On examination, Brown found Taylor well-groomed, with average demeanor, cooperative behavior,

average eye contact and activity, clear speech, stressed mood, full affect, logical thought process, and

good insight and judgment. (Id. at 485-86.)

On February 2, 2018, Taylor saw Jennifer Ogorzolka, PA-C, for follow up regarding her left knee.

(Id. at 693.) Taylor reported minimal pain, although she had “rare intermittent achiness” that she believed

got worse when the weather got colder. (Id.) Taylor told Ogorzolka she had no complaints at that time.

(Id.) Taylor reported she had discharged herself from physical therapy several weeks earlier because of

issues with insurance-provided transportation, but she was compliant with her home exercise program and

remained in communication with her physical therapist. (Id.) Taylor told Ogorzolka she was “[v]ery

happy” with her progress and was “[b]ack to doing everything she want[ed] to be doing.” (Id.) On

examination, Ogorzolka found no erythema, swelling, or effusion, intact sensation, no gross motor

deficits, no quadricep atrophy compared to the contralateral side, and a full, pain-free range of motion.

(Id.)

On February 19, 2018, Taylor saw Rohrbaugh for follow up and reported feeling better. (Id. at

478.) Taylor told Rohrbaugh her mood had improved, as had her depression and anxiety, and while she

had occasional mood swings, she was able to control them. (Id.) Taylor rated her depression and anxiety

as a 5/10. (Id.) Taylor’s cardiologist had increased her medication, and Taylor said she had been sleeping

better with the increased dose. (Id.) On examination, Rohrbaugh found normal gait and station, average

and cooperative demeanor/behavior, normal eye contact, clear speech, “‘better’” mood, euthymic affect,

normal language, logical thought process, unremarkable thought content, unremarkable

cognition/orientation, and fair/intact insight/judgment. (Id. at 480-81.) Taylor reported she wanted to stay

on her current medication regimen. (Id. at 483.)

On March 7, 2018, Taylor saw Kayla Craig at Coleman Professional Services for counseling. (Id.

at 489.) Taylor reported feeling better since getting her medication and that she had “‘no stressors

recently.’” (Id.) Taylor told Craig she had not been doing much, just visiting with her grandchildren. (Id.

at 490.) Taylor again reported doing things around the house to stay busy and caring for a dog. (Id.) On

examination, Craig found Taylor well-groomed, with average demeanor, cooperative behavior, average

eye contact and activity, clear speech, euthymic mood, full affect, logical thought process, and average

insight and judgment. (Id. at 489-90.)

On May 22, 2018, Taylor saw Dr. Frangiamore complaining of increased pain and swelling of her

left knee since her last visit. (Id. at 695.) Taylor reported she had started a new job as a valet at Akron

Children’s Hospital and she was walking a lot more. (Id.) Taylor told Dr. Frangiamore she had gone to

the emergency room a week ago for bilateral lower leg and foot swelling. (Id.) Taylor reported she was

diagnosed with peripheral edema, started on Lasix, and given a prescription for compression stockings.

(Id.) Dr. Frangiamore noted the Lasix helped and Taylor said she had the compression stockings in her

car to wear to work that day. (Id.) On examination, Dr. Frangiamore found grossly normal gait, no

significant lower extremity edema, intact sensation, normal motor strength, no evidence of erythema or

effusion, mild swelling of the knee joint, tenderness over the medial patellar facet, pain and crepitus with

patellar compression, full, pain-free range of motion with pain at extremes of flexion, no pain with

weighted single-leg twist, and negative McMurray’s testing. (Id. at 698.) Dr. Frangiamore believed some

of the inflammation was related to the increased time Taylor was on her feet with her new job and

administered a cortisone injection that day. (Id. at 699.) Dr. Frangiamore also noted some of the swelling

may be unrelated to Taylor’s knee surgery. (Id.)

On May 31, 2018, Taylor saw Dr. Courson for follow up. (Id. at 521.) Taylor reported recurrent

episodes of palpitations, which made her feel very tired and affected her job. (Id.) Taylor reported these

episodes occurred about every two weeks, and although they tended to occur with activity, they have also

occurred at rest. (Id.) On examination, Dr. Courson found normal rate, regular rhythm, normal heart

sounds, no gallop, no friction rub, no murmur, normal range of motion, no edema or tenderness, normal

gait, and normal coordination. (Id. at 521-22.) Dr. Courson noted Taylor was going to wear an event

monitor to reassess her episodes. (Id. at 522.)

On June 11, 2018, Taylor went to the emergency room after waking up with heart palpitations and

feeling lightheaded and dizzy. (Id. at 662.) Taylor went to work at Akron Children’s Hospital and was

sent to the emergency room for evaluation. (Id.) Taylor denied chest pain but endorsed shortness of

breath during the episode. (Id.) Taylor reported her episode resolved on its own, and she had not missed

her medication. (Id.) On examination, treatment providers found normal rate, regular rhythm, normal

heart sounds, intact distal pulses, no gallop, and no friction rub. (Id. at 664.) An EKG revealed NSR

without ischemic or arrhythmic changes. (Id.) An EKG done at Akron Children’s Hospital was consistent

with the EKG at the emergency room. (Id.)

On November 13, 2018, Taylor went to the emergency room after getting rear-ended while in

traffic. (Id. at 707.) While Taylor had tenderness of the paraspinal muscles, she moved all extremities and

had 5/5 strength throughout. (Id. at 710-11.) Treatment providers placed Taylor in a cervical collar and

gave her Tylenol. (Id. at 711.) Tylenol improved her symptoms, and the cervical collar was removed.

(Id.) On reexamination, no tenderness was found. (Id. at 712.)

On November 16, 2018, Taylor called 911 after “feeling like her ‘heart was going to pound out of

[her] chest.’” (Id. at 745.) EMS found Taylor in SVT on arrival and administered adenosine. (Id.) At the

emergency room, Taylor appeared to be in sinus tach and said she felt much better. (Id.) When EMS

arrived, Taylor’s heart rate was 200; at the hospital, it was 109. (Id. at 746.) On examination, Taylor’s

heart rhythm was regular with tachycardia. (Id.) During her time at the emergency room, Taylor had no

return of SVT and her heart rate remained stable, decreasing throughout her entire stay with a heart rate in

the 90s at discharge. (Id. at 752.)

On December 6, 2018, Dr. Courson wrote a letter explaining that Taylor experienced an apparent

syncopal episode while at work, although he did not treat her for that episode and could not provide

additional information. (Id. at 500.) Dr. Courson stated Taylor had recurrences of her SVT despite

increasing doses of antiarrhythmic medication. (Id.)

On February 1, 2019, Taylor saw Kimberly Croom, MSN, APRN, CNP, in preparation to undergo

a repeat electrophysiology study and SVT ablation. (Id. at 798.) Croom noted that despite an increase in

Taylor’s medication, she continued to have episodes. (Id.) While Taylor had not had a recurrence of SVT

on the increased dose, she complained of dizziness with the increased dose. (Id.) On examination, Croom

found no murmur, gallop, rubs, or ectopy. (Id. at 800.)

On February 19, 2019, Taylor underwent an electrophysiology study where Dr. Courson was

unable to induce atrial tachycardia. (Id. at 668.) Dr. Courson admitted Taylor to load the antiarrhythmic

medication, Sotalol. (Id.) Dr. Courson also implanted a loop recorder due to Taylor’s palpitations. (Id.)

Dr. Courson noted:

We have made multiple adjustment [sic] in her medications and were unable to

suppress her symptoms. We reattempted EP study early this week and despite an

aggressive study were unable to induce sustained SVT, we had planned on

starting sotalol which was done this admission . . . I recommended an implantable

loop monitor this will allow us to continue to follow her arrythmia over a long

period of time, importantly this will allow us to correlate symptoms with SVT

recurrence and this will help guide antiarrhythmic therapy. As noted above she

has a uniquely, challenging rhythm to manage.

(Id. at 680-81.)

On May 2, 2019, Taylor saw Croom for follow up. (Id. at 813.) Taylor reported occasional

dizziness and palpitations, although she denied recurrent syncope. (Id.) On examination, Croom found no

murmur, gallop, rubs, or ectopy. (Id. at 815.) Taylor’s loop recorder showed no arrythmia. (Id.) Croom

noted:

She is doing well from an arrhythmia and device standpoint. EKG from March

2019 is within normal limits for sotalol administration. BMP was drawn February

2019 and is normal. Loop recorder interrogations reveal no recurrence of

arrythmia. She will follow up with Dr. Courson in 6 months.

(Id.)

C. State Agency Reports

1. Mental Impairments

On December 27, 2017, Cynthia Waggoner, Psy.D., found mild limitations in Taylor’s abilities to

understand, remember, or apply information and adapt or manage oneself, and moderate limitations in her

abilities to interact with others and concentrate, persist, or maintain pace. (Id. at 85, 97.) Dr. Waggoner

opined Taylor appeared capable of tasks with limited to no contact with others. (Id. at 89, 101.) Dr.

Waggoner further opined Taylor seemed capable of handling tasks without many changes in day-to-day

tasks. (Id. at 90, 102.)

On March 23, 2018, on reconsideration, Sandra Banks, Ph.D., found the same limitations in

Taylor’s abilities under the Paragraph “B” criteria. (Id. at 113, 128.) Dr. Banks found Taylor could be

expected to carry out simple and moderately complex tasks at an adequate pace, could interact

appropriately with others during occasional, superficial exchanges in a stable work setting, and could

adapt to routine, predictable changes in day-to-day tasks. (Id. at 117-18, 132-33.)

2. Physical Impairments

On January 27, 2018, Indira Jasti, M.D., opined Taylor could occasionally lift and/or carry 20

pounds, frequently lift and/or carry 10 pounds, stand and/or walk for about six hours in an eight-hour

workday, and sit for about six hours in an eight-hour workday. (Id. at 87, 99.) Taylor’s ability to push

and/or pull was limited to occasional on the left lower extremity. (Id.) Dr. Jasti opined Taylor could

occasionally climb ramps/stairs, but could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (Id.) Taylor could

occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. (Id. at 87-88, 99-100.) Taylor must avoid all

exposure to hazards. (Id. at 88, 100.)

On April 24, 2018, Lynne Torello, M.D., affirmed Dr. Jasti’s findings on reconsideration. (Id. at

115-16, 130-31.)

D. Hearing Testimony

During the July 24, 2019 hearing, Taylor testified to the following:

• She drives but has not because the heart medication she takes makes her tired and

slows her heartrate down. (Tr. 46.) Her husband drives her where she needs to go

when he is not working. (Id. at 46-47.) When he is working, she is at home. (Id. at

47.)

• She last worked about a year and a half to two years ago. (Id.) She stopped working

because she had an episode where her heart condition acted up and her cardiologist

would not let her return. (Id.) She was working part time. (Id.)

• She had surgery on her knee. (Id. at 49.) Her knee has not felt better since the

surgery; it still slips. (Id. at 49-50.) She does not wear a brace. (Id. at 50.) She has

not seen her orthopedic surgeon in two years. (Id.) Physical therapy did not help at

all. (Id.) She does not use an assistive device to walk. (Id.) She used crutches for

two weeks after her knee surgery. (Id. at 64.)

• After she wakes up in the morning, she takes her heart medication and does little

things around the house. (Id. at 54.) But her medication makes her tired, so she

spends half the day laying down until her husband gets home from work. (Id.) If she

has errands or things to do, her husband takes her. (Id.) Then she comes back home

and lays down. (Id. at 54-55.) She lays down for two to three hours a day. (Id. at

55.)

• On a typical day, she wakes up and takes a shower. (Id. at 60.) She gets dressed,

makes something to eat, and sits in the living room. (Id.) She reads her Bible, then

gets up. (Id.) If there’s dishes, she will clean them. (Id.) She watches the Price is

Right every day. (Id.) After that, she gets ready to take her nap. (Id.) She naps until

2:45, and her husband will be home in about an hour and a half. (Id.) She sits and

waits for him to come home. (Id.) If she has any errands to do, her husband takes

her. (Id.) She goes to church every Sunday. (Id. at 61.) She can make it through the

service, which lasts about an hour and fifteen minutes. (Id.) She sees her dad twice a

week. (Id.) She talks to her mom on the phone and visits her when her husband

takes her over there. (Id.) Her husband does the grocery shopping. (Id.) She

sometimes goes with him. (Id. at 61-62.)

• She sees her cardiologist every six months unless she has frequent episodes and he

calls her into the office. (Id. at 56.)

• Her hip has been bothering her, but she has not seen anyone about it. (Id. at 57.)

• She can stand for 15 to 20 minutes before she needs to sit down. (Id.)

• When she woke up that morning, she felt dizzy, so she laid down flat like she is

supposed to do. (Id.) Once she took her medication the dizziness eased. (Id.) She

has fallen before because of dizziness or passing out. (Id.) The last time she fell was

the last episode she had, and she hit the floor. (Id. at 57-58.)

• She also has bipolar disorder. (Id. at 58.) She was going to Coleman Professional

Services every three weeks but stopped going because of her heart condition. (Id.)

Her cardiologist was able to prescribe her medication. (Id.) She now sees a doctor at

Jackson Family Practice. (Id.) She is taking Risperdal, which makes her tired. (Id.)

She was unsure whether the medication helped. (Id.) She has mood swings, she is

hyper, sometimes she cannot be still, she fidgets, and her concentration is off. (Id. at

58-59.)

• As for hobbies, she reads. (Id. at 59.) She can read for 15 minutes before needing to

put the book down. (Id.) She does not watch much TV. (Id.) She has four

grandchildren and usually has two of them with her. (Id.) She is never alone with

her grandchildren. (Id. at 60.)

• Her hip pain that day was a 6/10 because she was sitting; it would be worse if she

were standing. (Id. at 62.) Her knee pain was non-existent, although it is usually an

8/10. (Id.) Her knee pain is an 8/10 about two or three times a month. (Id.) It also

hurts if it rains. (Id.)

• She has to elevate her feet during the day because of the swelling. (Id. at 63.) About

once or twice a month she cannot wear shoes because of the swelling. (Id.)

The VE testified Taylor had past work as a retail cashier/stocker and cosmetologist. (Id. at 67-68.)

The ALJ then posed the following hypothetical question:

Mr. Nimberger, I am going to have a number of hypothetical questions for you

today. Now with any hypothetical question, I do want you to assume somebody

of Mrs. Taylor’s age, education, and that work history you just described for us.

Now the first hypothetical individual would be at the light exertional range and

would have the following additional limitations: she could only occasionally

push, pull, and operate foot controls with the left lower extremity; she could never

climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally climb ramps and stairs;

occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; now she would need to

avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold and vibrations as well as extreme

heat and humidity and avoid all exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights,

moving mechanical parts, and the operation of motor vehicles; now this individual

could perform simple and all the way to moderately-complex tasks, but would not

be able to perform tasks at a production rate pace such as assembly line work; she

could interact with supervisors and a small group of familiar coworkers with no

more than incidental interaction with the general public and she’d be limited to

superficial contact and by that I mean no sales, arbitration, negotiation, conflict

resolution, or confrontation; no group tandem or collaborative tasks; no

management direction or persuasion of others; now lastly, she could respond

appropriately to occasional change in her routine work setting, but any such

changes would need to be easily explained and/or demonstrated in advance of

gradual implementation. Would that first hypothetical individual be able to

perform any of the Claimant’s past relevant work?

(Id. at 68-69.)

The VE testified the hypothetical individual would be able to perform Taylor’s past work as a

retail cashier/stocker and cosmetologist. (Id. at 69.) The VE further testified the hypothetical individual

would also be able to perform other representative jobs in the economy, such as office cleaner, wire

worker, and food worker. (Id. at 69-70.)

The ALJ modified the hypothetical to reduce the exertional level to sedentary. (Id. at 70.) The VE

testified the hypothetical individual could not perform Taylor’s past work. (Id.) The VE testified the

hypothetical individual would be able to perform other representative jobs in the economy, such as

addresser, document preparer, and table worker. (Id. at 70-71.)

III. STANDARD FOR DISABILITY

In order to establish entitlement to DIB under the Act, a claimant must be insured at the time of

disability and must prove an inability to engage “in substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment,” or combination of impairments, that can be expected to

“result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.130, 404.315, 404.1505(a).

A claimant is entitled to a POD only if: (1) she had a disability; (2) she was insured when she

became disabled; and (3) she filed while she was disabled or within twelve months of the date the

disability ended. 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(2)(E); 20 C.F.R. § 404.320.

A disabled claimant may also be entitled to receive SSI benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.905; Kirk v.

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1981). To receive SSI benefits, a claimant must

meet certain income and resource limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1100, 416.1201.

The Commissioner reaches a determination as to whether a claimant is disabled by way of a five-

stage process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). See also Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 594

F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir. 2010); Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990). First, the claimant

must demonstrate that she is not currently engaged in “substantial gainful activity” at the time of the

disability application. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). Second, the claimant must show that she

suffers from a “severe impairment” in order to warrant a finding of disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c),

416.920(c). A “severe impairment” is one that “significantly limits . . . physical or mental ability to do

basic work activities.” Abbot, 905 F.2d at 923. Third, if the claimant is not performing substantial gainful

activity, has a severe impairment that is expected to last for at least twelve months, and the impairment, or

combination of impairments, meets or medically equals a required listing under 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart

P, Appendix 1, the claimant is presumed to be disabled regardless of age, education, or work experience.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). Fourth, if the claimant’s impairment or combination of

impairments does not prevent her from doing her past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f), 416.920(e)-(f). For the fifth and final step, even if the claimant’s impairment

does prevent her from doing her past relevant work, if other work exists in the national economy that the

claimant can perform, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 404.1560(c), 416.920(g).

Here, Taylor was insured on her alleged disability onset date, March 2, 2017, and remains insured

through December 31, 2023, her date last insured (“DLI”). (Tr. 21.) Therefore, in order to be entitled to

POD and DIB, Taylor must establish a continuous twelve-month period of disability commencing between

these dates. Any discontinuity in the twelve-month period precludes an entitlement to benefits. See

Mullis v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 991, 994 (6th Cir. 1988); Henry v. Gardner, 381 F.2d 191, 195 (6th Cir. 1967).

IV. SUMMARY OF COMMISSIONER’S DECISION

The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act

through December 31, 2023.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 2, 2017,

the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: obesity; acute medial

meniscus tear, chondromalacia patella, and osteoarthritis of the left knee, status

post partial medial meniscectomy; degenerative disc disease of the bilateral hips;

supraventricular tachycardia, atrial tachycardia, palpitations, and precordial pain,

status post placement of an implantable loop recorder; syncope, and bipolar

disorder (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that

meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526,

416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the

claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as

defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except that the claimant

occasionally can push, pull and operate foot controls with the left lower

extremity, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps and stairs, but

never can climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. She must avoid concentrated

exposure to extreme cold, extreme heat, humidity and vibrations, and avoid all

exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights, moving mechanical parts and

operation of motor vehicles. She is limited to simple to moderately complex

tasks, but not at a production rate pace (i.e., assembly line work), and is limited to

occasional change in a routine work setting so long as any such changes are easily

explained and/or demonstrated in advance of gradual implementation. She

occasionally can interact with supervisors and [sic] small group of familiar

coworkers. She incidentally can interact with the general public, and is limited to

superficial contact meaning no sales, arbitration, negotiation, conflict resolution

or confrontation, no group, tandem or collaborative tasks, and management,

direction or persuasion of others.

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and

416.965).

7. The claimant was born on December **, 1972 and was 44 years old, which is

defined as a younger individual age 18-44, on the alleged disability onset date.

The claimant subsequently changed age category to a younger individual age 45-

49 (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).

8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in

English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability

because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding

that the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable

job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual

functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national

economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969,

and 416.969(a)).

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security

Act, from March 2, 2017, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g)

and 416.920(g)).

(Tr. 23-32.)

V. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Social Security Act authorizes narrow judicial review of the final decision of the Social

Security Administration (SSA).” Reynolds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 424 F. App’x 411, 414 (6th Cir. 2011).

Specifically, this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards. See Ealy v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir. 2010); White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 281 (6th Cir.

2009). Substantial evidence has been defined as “‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.’” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y

of Health and Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). In determining whether an ALJ’s findings

are supported by substantial evidence, the Court does not review the evidence de novo, make credibility

determinations, or weigh the evidence. Brainard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681

(6th Cir. 1989).

Review of the Commissioner’s decision must be based on the record as a whole. Heston v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 2001). The findings of the Commissioner are not subject

to reversal, however, merely because there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different

conclusion. Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772-73 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d

535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986)); see also Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1999)

(“Even if the evidence could also support another conclusion, the decision of the Administrative Law

Judge must stand if the evidence could reasonably support the conclusion reached.”). This is so because

there is a “zone of choice” within which the Commissioner can act, without the fear of court interference.

Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545 (citing Baker v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984)).

In addition to considering whether the Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial

evidence, the Court must determine whether proper legal standards were applied. Failure of the

Commissioner to apply the correct legal standards as promulgated by the regulations is grounds for

reversal. See, e.g., White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 281 (6th Cir. 2009); Bowen v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Even if supported by substantial evidence, however, a

decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and

where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.”).

Finally, a district court cannot uphold an ALJ’s decision, even if there “is enough evidence in the

record to support the decision, [where] the reasons given by the trier of fact do not build an accurate and

logical bridge between the evidence and the result.” Fleischer v. Astrue, 774 F. Supp. 2d 875, 877 (N.D.

Ohio 2011) (quoting Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 1996)); accord Shrader v. Astrue, No.

11-1300, 2012 WL 5383120, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 1, 2012) (“If relevant evidence is not mentioned, the

Court cannot determine if it was discounted or merely overlooked.”); McHugh v. Astrue, No. 1:10-cv-734,

2011 WL 6130824 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 15, 2011); Gilliam v. Astrue, No. 2:10-CV-017, 2010 WL 2837260

(E.D. Tenn. July 19, 2010); Hook v. Astrue, No. 1:09-cv-1982, 2010 WL 2929562 (N.D. Ohio July 9,

2010).

VI. ANALYSIS

In her first assignment of error, Taylor argues the ALJ committed harmful error when the RFC did

not consider the effect of the combination of her severe impairments on her ability to engage in substantial

gainful activity on a sustained basis. (Doc. No. 14 at 9.) Under this broad assertion, Taylor raises several

arguments regarding the ALJ’s decision: (1) the ALJ failed to cite any evidence to support his conclusion

that Taylor did not meet or equal Listings 1.02, 1.03, and 4.05; (2) the ALJ erred at Step Three in finding

Taylor only had moderate limitations in the “B” criteria under Listing 12.04;3 (3) the ALJ failed to

consider the impact of Taylor’s obesity on her cardiovascular and musculoskeletal impairments; and (4)

the ALJ failed to base the RFC on a medical opinion. (Id. at 9-16.)

The Commissioner responds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that

Taylor did not meet or medically equal a listing. (Doc. No. 16 at 10.)

At the third step in the disability evaluation process, a claimant will be found disabled if her

impairment meets or equals one of the Listing of Impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),

416.920(a)(4)(iii); Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 381 F. App’x 488, 491 (6th Cir. 2010). The Listing of

Impairments, located at Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the regulations, describes impairments the Social

Security Administration considers to be “severe enough to prevent an individual from doing any gainful

activity, regardless of his or her age, education, or work experience.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525(a),

416.925(a). Essentially, a claimant who meets the requirements of a Listed Impairment, as well as the

durational requirement, will be deemed conclusively disabled and entitled to benefits.

3 The Court notes Taylor did not mention Listing 4.05 at the hearing and conceded that this was not a

Listing case. (Tr. 44.) However, the Commissioner does not claim that Taylor forfeited that argument

and because “‘a potential forfeiture may itself be forfeited,’” this court may still decide whether the listing

applies to this case. Linderman v. Comm’r of Social Sec., No. 1:16-CV-944, 2017 WL 2304281, at *8

(N.D. Ohio Apr. 6, 2017) (quoting Sheeks v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 544 F. App’x 639, 641 (6th Cir.

2013)) (additional citations omitted), report and recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 2303996 (N.D.

Ohio May 25, 2017).

Each listing specifies “the objective medical and other findings needed to satisfy the criteria of that

listing.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c)(3), 416.925(c)(3). It is the claimant’s burden to bring forth evidence to

establish that his impairments meet or are medically equivalent to a listed impairment. See e.g. Lett v.

Colvin, No. 1:13 CV 2517, 2015 WL 853425, at *15 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2015). A claimant must satisfy

all of the criteria to “meet” the listing. Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 652 (6th Cir. 2009).

“An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify.”

Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530, 110 S.Ct. 885, 107 L.Ed.2d 967 (1990). A claimant is also disabled

if her impairment is the medical equivalent of a listing, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525(c)(5), 416.925(c)(5), which

means it is “at least equal in severity and duration to the criteria of any listed impairment.” 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1526(a), 416.926(a).

Where the record raises a “substantial question” as to whether a claimant could qualify as disabled

under a listing, an ALJ must compare the medical evidence with the requirements for listed impairments

in considering whether the condition is equivalent in severity to the medical findings for any Listed

Impairment. See Reynolds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 424 F. App’x 411, 414-15 (6th Cir. 2011). In order to

conduct a meaningful review, the ALJ must make sufficiently clear the reasons for her decision. Id. at

416-17. See also Harvey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 16-3266, 2017 WL 4216585, at *5 (6th Cir. March

6, 2017) (“In assessing whether a claimant meets a Listing, the ALJ must ‘actually evaluate the evidence,’

compare it to the requirements of the relevant Listing, and provide an ‘explained conclusion, in order to

facilitate meaningful judicial review.’”) (quoting Reynolds, 424 F. App’x at 416); Joseph v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 741 F. App’x 306, 311 (6th Cir. July 13, 2018) (same)). See also Snyder v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., No. 5:13cv2360, 2014 WL 6687227, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 26, 2014) (“Although it is the

claimant’s burden of proof at Step 3, the ALJ must provide articulation of his Step 3 findings that will

permit meaningful review. . . This court has stated that ‘the ALJ must build an accurate and logical bridge

between the evidence and his conclusion.’”) (quoting Woodall v. Colvin, 5:12CV1818, 2013 WL

4710516, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 29, 2013)).

However, “the ALJ’s lack of adequate explanation at Step Three can constitute harmless error

where the review of the decision as a whole leads to the conclusion that no reasonable fact finder,

following the correct procedure, could have resolved the factual manner in another manner.” Lett, 2015

WL 853425, at *16. See also Ford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-CV-14478, 2015 WL 1119962, at *17

(E.D. Mich. Mar. 11, 2015) (finding that “the ALJ’s analysis does not need to be extensive if the claimant

fails to produce evidence that he or she meets the Listing”); Mowry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:12-CV-

2313, 2013 WL 6634300, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 17, 2013); Hufstetler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.

1:10CV1196, 2011 WL 2461339, at *10 (N.D. Ohio June 17, 2011).

At Step Two, the ALJ found that Taylor’s supraventricular tachycardia, atrial tachycardia,

palpitations, precordial pain, and syncope constituted severe impairments. (Tr. 24.) At Step Three, the

ALJ stated that he considered Listings 1.02, 1.03, and 4.05, and addressed those listings as follows:

The record does not establish the medical signs, symptoms, laboratory findings or

degree of functional limitation required to meet or equal the criteria of any listed

impairment and no acceptable medical source designated to make equivalency

findings has concluded that the claimant’s impairment(s) medically equal a listed

impairment, including listings 1.02, 1.03 and 4.05.

(Id.)

There is no question the ALJ’s analysis at Step Three does not meet the requisite standards set

forth above; the ALJ failed to “actually evaluate the evidence,’ compare it to the requirements of the

relevant Listing, and provide an ‘explained conclusion, in order to facilitate meaningful judicial review.”

Reynolds, 424 F. App’x at 414-15.

With respect to Listing 4.05, nor can reading the decision as a whole save the deficiencies in the

ALJ’s Step Three analysis. The ALJ found as follows regarding Taylor’s cardiac impairments:

In terms of the claimant’s alleged cardiac impairments, the record undoubtedly

evidences that the claimant carries diagnoses of supraventricular tachycardia,

atrial tachycardia, palpitations, and precordial pain. However, the record, when

considered as a whole, is not supportive of the contention that the existence of

these impairments would be preclusive of all types of work.

Even prior to her alleged onset date, the claimant sought treatment with a

cardiologist, care that thereafter continued with consistent appointments every six

months. The claimant did require emergency attention in June and November

2018 but no subsequent hospitalization.

As part of her treatment, the claimant was prescribed a regimen of medication

intended to address her symptoms without indication that it caused significant

side effects or was ineffective, especially considering the regimen only minimally

fluctuated; the dosing was only sporadically adjusted to better address the

claimant’s symptoms. More specifically, the claimant admitted “doing well”

while her cardiologist noted that she was “stable from a rhythm standpoint” as of

November 9, 2017 (1F/1) and, despite reaching the maximum dose of her

medication so the brand had to be changed and a loop recorder implanted in

February 2019 (13F/94; see also 11F; 13F/106), the claimant was considered

“stable” and “doing well from an arrythmia standpoint and device standpoint” by

May 2, 2019 (16F/18).

(Tr. 28.)

The ALJ failed to thoroughly analyze the evidence regarding Taylor’s heart condition in the RFC

analysis, focusing on the positive findings while ignoring the ones supportive of disability. (Id.) For

example, the ALJ failed to mention that: in May 2018, Taylor continued to experience recurrent episodes

of palpitations that occurred both with activity and at rest and which were affecting her job, and her

cardiologist had her wear an event monitor to reassess her episodes; Taylor experienced a syncopal

episode at work in 2018; and even after implantation of the loop recorder, Taylor continued to have

dizziness and palpitations, though no recurrent syncope. (Tr. 500, 521-22, 813-15.) While the ALJ

mentioned the two times Taylor received treatment in the emergency room for her cardiac conditions, he

failed to discuss that in November 2018, when EMS arrived, Taylor’s heart rate was 200 and at the

hospital, it was 109. (Id. at 746.) On examination, Taylor’s heart rhythm was regular with tachycardia.

(Id.) Therefore, even though the ALJ mentioned this evidence, he failed to characterize the treatment

records properly and he failed to analyze this evidence.

As explained in detail above, if relevant evidence is not mentioned, the Court cannot discern

whether the ALJ discounted or overlooked the evidence. Shrader, 2012 WL 5383120, at *6. In addition,

an ALJ may not overlook or ignore contrary lines of evidence. See, e.g., Gentry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

741 F.3d 708, 724 (6th Cir. 2014) (reversing where the ALJ “cherry-picked select portions of the record”

rather than doing a proper analysis); Germany–Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 313 F. App’x 771, 777

(6th Cir. 2008) (finding error where the ALJ was “selective in parsing the various medical reports”). See

also Ackles v. Colvin, No. 3:14cv00249, 2015 WL 1757474, at *6 (S.D. Ohio April 17, 2015) (“The ALJ

did not mention this objective evidence and erred by selectively including only the portions of the medical

evidence that placed Plaintiff in a capable light.”); Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:11-CV-2313, 2013

WL 943874, at *6 (N.D. Ohio March 11, 2013) (“It is generally recognized that an ALJ ‘may not cherry-

pick facts to support a finding of non-disability while ignoring evidence that points to a disability

finding.’”); Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:16-cv-172, 2016 WL 7208783, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Dec.

13, 2016) (“This Court has not hesitated to remand cases where the ALJ engaged in a very selective

review of the record and significantly mischaracterized the treatment notes.”).

As this matter is being remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, and in the

interests of judicial economy, the Court will not address Taylor’s remaining assignments of error.

VII. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s final decision is VACATED AND REMANDED

FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: October 4, 2021 s/ Jonathan Greenberg

Jonathan D. Greenberg United States

Magistrate Judge