concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 1738, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, requires federal courts to “give to a state- court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 1738, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, requires federal courts to “give to a state- court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
-------------------------------------------------------
:
JAVONTE LACY, : CASE NO. 1:21CV00162
:
Plaintiff, :
:
vs. : OPINION & ORDER
: [Resolving Doc. 1]
GARY L. YOST, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
:
-------------------------------------------------------
JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Plaintiff Javonte Lacy, a state prisoner confined at the Lake Erie Correctional
Institution, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Judge Gary
L. Yost, Judge Robert S. Wynn, and “Tammy Dandorfer/ACAPL.”1
For the reasons that follow, this action is dismissed.
I. Background
According to the Complaint, Judge Gary L. Yost is a judge with the Ashtabula
County Court of Common Pleas, Judge Robert Wynn is a judge with the Ashtabula Eastern
County Court, and Tammy Dandorfer, is the Director of the Ashtabula County Animal
Protective League (“ACAPL”).2 Plaintiff states that he was charged with certain crimes
concerning his several dogs in Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas (Case No. 2017-
CR-00161) and Ashtabula Eastern County Court (Case No. 2018-CRA-00017). According
to Plaintiff, as a result of the charges, the ACAPL removed Plaintiff’s dogs from his home.
1 Doc. 1.
Plaintiff asserts that the charges were later dismissed and he attempted to retrieve his dogs
from the ACAPL, but the ACAPL refused to return his dogs because he did not have a
written court order. Plaintiff claims that the ACAPL then sold his dogs illegally.3
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a civil complaint for the return of his dogs in the Ashtabula
County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2018-CV-00092, against the State of Ohio and
the ACAPL. In his Complaint, Plaintiff claimed that the defendants illegally seized his
property, which consisted of “eight Wolf Hybrids and two American Bullies,” and he
requested the return of his dogs or damages in the amount of $10,200 in the event they
could not be returned.4 The Ashtabula County Common Pleas Court dismissed Defendant
State of Ohio, and it granted summary judgment in favor of the ACAPL and awarded the
ACAPL default judgment on its counterclaim.5 Plaintiff appealed the decision to the
Eleventh District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court.6 Plaintiff states that he
appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which declined to accept jurisdiction.7
Plaintiff now alleges in this action that the State of Ohio failed to conduct a proper
investigation into “the Lacy incident,” which resulted in the state’s decision to prosecute
him. He claims that had the state conducted a proper investigation, no charges would
have been filed. He also claims that had the court given him “the proper documentation
after the court issued its ruling,” his dogs would have been timely returned. Plaintiff
3 at 3-4.
4 at 5.
5 ; , 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2019-A-0091, 2020-Ohio-3089 (May 26, 2020).
6
7 Doc. 1 at 5.
alleges that the defendants’ “wrongful and illegal actions” have deprived him of his “legal
and rightful property.”8
Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $60,000.
II. Standard of Review
Although pleadings are liberally construed,9 the Court is required to dismiss
an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.10 A claim lacks an
arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised upon an indisputably meritless legal
theory or when the factual contentions are clearly baseless.11
The dismissal standard for Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) articulated in
,12 and ,13 governs dismissal for failure to state a claim under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).14 A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
when it lacks plausibility in the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) governs basic federal
pleading requirements15 and requires that the pleading contain a short and plain statement
8 at 5-6.
9 , 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); , 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
10 , 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989); , 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir.
1996).
11 , 490 U.S. at 327.
12 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
13 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
14 , 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010).
15 , 550 U.S. at 564.
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.16 In reviewing a complaint, the
Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.17
III. Discussion
A. Judicial Immunity
Plaintiff brings this § 1983 action against Judge Yost and Judge Wynn, claiming that
their failure to issue written orders in Plaintiff’s lower court cases caused him to be
deprived of his property. To establish a violation under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that
a person acting under color of state law deprived him or her of rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.18 Defendants,
however, are immune from liability under § 1983.
It is well established that judicial officers are immune from civil suits for money
damages.19 This immunity applies even if the action at issue was performed in error, done
maliciously, or was in excess of the judge’s authority.20 Judges receive this broad protection
to ensure that the independent and impartial exercise of their judgment in a case is not
impaired by the exposure to damages by dissatisfied litigants.21 Absolute judicial immunity
is therefore overcome only (1) when the conduct alleged is performed at a time when the
defendant is not acting as a judge, or (2) when the conduct alleged, although judicial in
16 , 556 U.S. at 677-78.
17 ., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing , 99 F.3d at 197).
18 , 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S. Ct. 1908, 68 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1981).
19 , 502 U.S. 9, 9, 112 S. Ct. 286, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991); , 105 F.3d
1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997).
20 , 435 U.S. 349, 356, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978).
21 105 F.3d at 1115.
nature, is taken in complete absence of all subject matter jurisdiction of the court over
which he or she presides.22
Neither exception to judicial immunity applies here. Judge Yost and Judge Wynn
are therefore immune from Plaintiff’s claims.
B. State Court Decision
Plaintiff claims in this action that the defendants illegally seized his dogs, and he is
seeking damages. Plaintiff cannot, however, file an action in federal court to relitigate
matters that were already decided in state court proceedings. Federal courts must give the
same preclusive effect to a state-court judgment as that judgment receives in the state
court.23 In other words, if Plaintiff would be barred from litigating the matter again in state
court, he cannot avoid that procedural bar by filing the action in federal court rather than
state court. To determine the preclusive effect a prior state court judgment would have on
the present federal action, this Court must apply Ohio's law on preclusion. 24
In Ohio, the doctrine of res judicata encompasses the two related concepts of claim
preclusion and issue preclusion.25 Under claim preclusion, “a valid, final judgment
rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of
the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.”26 The
doctrine of claim preclusion encompasses “all claims which were or might have been
22 , 502 U.S. at 11-12; , 105 F.3d at 1116.
23 28 U.S.C. § 1738; , 474 F.3d 324, 330 (6th Cir. 2007); ,
471 F.3d 674, 680 (6th Cir. 2006).
24 .,465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S. Ct. 892, 79 L. Ed. 2d 56
(1984).
25 , 120 Ohio St.3d 386, 392, 2008- Ohio 6254, 899 N.E.2d 975, 981
(2008).
26 ., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 382, 1995- Ohio 331, 653 N.E.2d 226 (1995).
litigated in a first lawsuit.”27 By contrast, issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, “precludes
the relitigation of an issue that has been actually and necessarily litigated and determined
in a prior action.”28 Issue preclusion applies when a fact or issue “(1) was actually and
directly litigated in the prior action; (2) was passed upon and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction; and (3) when the party against whom [issue preclusion] is asserted
was a party in privity with a party to the prior action.”29
Here, issue preclusion would apply to bar Plaintiff from relitigating in federal court
his claims against the ACAPL for the return of his dogs or for damages in the event the dogs
could not be returned. The state court necessarily decided the issue concerning the
allegedly illegally seized dogs when it granted summary judgment in favor of the ACAPL.30
And Plaintiff was clearly a party to that action. This Court must give full faith and credit to
the state court’s decision on the issue of the purported seizure of Plaintiff’s dogs.31
Plaintiff is therefore barred from relitigating that matter in this Court.
To the extent Plaintiff is seeking to challenge the outcome of a completed state court
proceeding, this Court lacks jurisdiction to do so pursuant to the
27
28 , 80 Ohio St. 3d 212, 217, 1997-Ohio-345, 685
N.E.2d 529 (1997).
29 , 70 Ohio St.3d 176, 183, 1994- Ohio 358, 637 N.E.2d 917 (1994).
30 , 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2019-A-0091, 2020-Ohio-3089 (May 26, 2020).
31 , 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S. Ct. 892, 79 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1984)
(concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 1738, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, requires federal courts to “give to a state-
court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in
which the judgment was rendered”).
doctrine.32 Lower federal courts cannot review “final state-court judgments because 28
U.S.C. § 1257 vests sole jurisdiction to review such claims in the Supreme Court.”33
The doctrine therefore precludes federal district courts from
asserting jurisdiction over "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments."34
Stated differently, a party who has lost a case in state court is barred from seeking
what in substance would be appellate review of the state-court judgment in that case in
federal court, based on the party's claim that the state-court judgment itself violates his or
her federal rights.35 Rather, to challenge the state court decision, the party must proceed
through the state appellate system and then to the United States Supreme Court.36
Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff attempts to challenge the state-court
judgments rendered in Ashtabula County courts, and is asking to be relieved of the
consequences of those judgments, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over those
claims and they are barred under the doctrine.
C. Due Process
32 , 460 U.S. 462, 483 (1983);
, 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1932).
33 ., 951 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting ,
688 F.3d 290, 298 (6th Cir. 2012)).
34 ., 544 U.S. 280, 283, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 161 L. Ed. 2d 454
(2005).
35 , 688 F.3d at 298-99.
36 , 54 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995).
Even if Plaintiff’s claims were not barred by res judicata or the
doctrine, construing Plaintiffs' Complaint liberally, the Complaint fails to adequately allege
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ “wrongful and illegal actions” deprived him of his
property. Therefore, the only possible claim under §1983 this Court can construe is a claim
that Plaintiff was denied due process. To prevail on a procedural due process claim for the
taking of property through unauthorized acts, as Plaintiff alleges, Plaintiff must plead and
prove that state remedies for redressing the wrong are inadequate. 37 Here, a remedy is
available, however, through the state court system. In fact, Plaintiff indicates that he
utilized this remedy by filing a lawsuit in the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas,
and he appealed the trial court’s decision to the Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio
Supreme Court. There are no facts in the pleading which reasonably suggest that the
available state remedies were inadequate to redress the wrong.
Plaintiff therefore fails to state a plausible claim under §1983 based on due process
violations.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this case is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) and is closed.
The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this
decision could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
37 , 951 F.2d 700, 706 (6th Cir 1991); , 721 F.2d 1062, 1064 (6th
Cir. 1983).
Dated: March 25, 2021
JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE