applying Heck to post release control sanctions
How later courts described this case
- applying Heck to post release control sanctions
- holding that the dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) for determining a motions to dismiss governs dismissals of pro se prisoner complaints under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
CHARLES TINGLER, Pro Se, ) Case No.: 1: 20 CV 2664
)
Plaintiff )
) JUDGE SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.
v. )
)
ERIN HOSTON, )
)
) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
Defendant ) AND ORDER
Introduction
Pro Se Plaintiff Charles Tingler has filed a prisoner civil rights complaint against Ohio
Parole Authority Officer Erin Hoston. (Doc. No. 1.)
In his complaint, he indicates he is a “post release control violator” and alleges his
constitutional rights under the First and Eighth Amendments were violated in connection with
Ohio Parole Board sanctions issued against him, including incarceration, for post release control
violations involving contacting government officials. He seeks “immediate release,” money
damages, and to “prevent the Ohio Parole Board from issuing sanctions against [him] regarding
contacting government officials.” (Id. at 5.)
Standard of Review
Federal district courts are expressly required to review any complaint “in which a prisoner
seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” and to
dismiss before service any such action that the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to less
stringent standards than pleadings drafted by lawyers, Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th
Cir. 2011), pro se complaints must still set forth sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face in order to avoid dismissal. Hill v. Lappin, 630
F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) for
determining a motions to dismiss governs dismissals of pro se prisoner complaints under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A).
Discussion
Upon review, the court finds that the Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. Even
liberally construed, it does not allege any plausible claim upon which he may be granted relief in
a civil rights action.
First, where a person in state custody challenges the validity of a criminal sentence and
the relief he seeks is his immediate release or a speedier release, his sole federal remedy is a writ
of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Post-release control in Ohio
is part of a judicially imposed sentence, and individuals subject to post-release control are “in
custody” for purposes of the habeas corpus statute. See, e.g., In re Stansell, 828 F.3d 412, 416
(6th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, to the extent the Plaintiff seeks “immediate release” from state
custody, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.
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Second, the Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible claim civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Although the Plaintiff apparently believes he should not have been sanctioned by the Ohio
Parole Board for post release control violations, in order to recover damages for an allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, a § 1983 plaintiff must first demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence in question has been reversed on direct appeal, overturned by a state
governing body, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994). Heck is applicable to parole revocation decisions
and sanctions involving incarceration for post release control violations. See Lathan v. United
States, No. 3: 18 CV 2115, 2019 WL 857962, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 22, 2019) (applying Heck to
post release control sanctions); see also Pettus-Brown v. Adult Parole Authority, No. 2: 18 CV
82, 2019 WL 2058627, at *1 (S.D. Ohio May 9, 2019) (adopting Report and Recommendation
applying Heck to a complaint challenging to the constitutionality of Ohio’s post-release control
statute and requests declaratory and injunctive relief). The Plaintiff has not demonstrated that
the Ohio Parole Board sanctions of which he complains have been invalidated or set aside in any
of the ways articulated in Heck.
Further, the Eleventh Amendment is an absolute bar to the imposition of liability upon
states, state agencies, and state employees and officers sued in their official capacities. See
Bouquett v. Clemmer, 626 F. Supp. 46, 48 (S.D. Ohio 1985); see also Mockbee v. Scioto Cty.
Adult Parole Auth., No. 1:17-cv-254, 2017 WL 2222322, at *3 (S.D. Ohio May 22, 2017) (the
Ohio Parole Board is a state agency immune from suit). Although a plaintiff can bring claims
against state employees and officers acting in their individual capacities, to do so, a plaintiff must
allege facts demonstrating how an individual defendant was personally involved in the activities
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which form the basis of his claims. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976);
Mullins v. Hainesworth, No. 95-3186, 1995 WL 559381, at *1 (6th Cir. 1995). The Plaintiff has
not alleged facts suggesting that or how Defendant Hoston was personally involved in violations
of his First and Eighth Amendment rights.
Conclusion
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint fails to state a
plausible civil rights claim upon which he may be granted relief and is dismissed in accordance
with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an
appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Solomon Oliver, Jr.
SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
February 23, 2021
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