dismissing municipal court as a party in a § 1983 and Title VII action alleging racial and sexual harassment “because under Ohio law, Ohio courts are not ”
How later courts described this case
- dismissing municipal court as a party in a § 1983 and Title VII action alleging racial and sexual harassment “because under Ohio law, Ohio courts are not ”
- “Consequently, an Ohio common pleas court is a segment of county government, but an arm of the state . . . .”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
:
BRIDGET A. NOVAK, : CASE NO. 1:20-cv-00303
:
Plaintiff, : ORDER
: [Resolving Doc. 25]
vs. :
:
SHERRY CLOUSER, , :
:
Defendants. :
:
:
:
JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Plaintiff Bridget A. Novak, formerly employed by Lorain County Ohio Court
of Common Pleas, sues Lorain County and her former supervisors.1 Defendants move for
judgment on the pleadings.2 Plaintiff has not filed an opposition.
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion.
I. Background
On February 12, 2020, Plaintiff Novak, then represented by counsel, sued Lorain
County Common Pleas Court and Lorain County Adult Probation Department.3 Plaintiff
Novak generally alleged that Defendants discriminated against her on the basis of her age
and sex in violation of federal law.4
On March 10, 2020, Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that
neither Lorain County Common Pleas Court nor Lorain County Adult Probation
1 Doc. 19.
2 Doc. 25.
3 Doc. 1.
Department are ( , able to sue or be sued).5
Rather than oppose Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint.6
In the first amended complaint, Plaintiff Novak changed the defendants to Lorain County
Court of Common Pleas Administrator Sherry Closure and Deputy Administrator Debra
Tansey.7
On April 14, 2020, Defendants filed a second motion for judgment on the
pleadings.8 With this second motion, Defendants argued that Plaintiff again sued
nonviable parties.9
Rather than oppose Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff filed a second amended
complaint, naming a new set of defendants.10 In this most recent complaint, Plaintiff sues
(1) Lorain County; (2) the Honorable Raymond J. Ewers, the Administrative Judge for the
Lorain County Court of Common Pleas; (3) Court Administrator Sherry Clouser; and
(4) Deputy Court Administrator Debra Tansey.11
Immediately after filing the second amended complaint, Plaintiff’s counsel moved to
withdraw.12 He said that Novak informed him that she no longer wanted his
representation.13
On May 21, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion to withdraw.14 The
5 Doc. 7.
6 Doc. 10.
7
8 Doc. 12.
9
10 Doc. 19.
11
12 Doc. 20.
13 at 1.
14 Doc. 24.
Court instructed that, “Plaintiff should obtain substitute counsel.” To date, Plaintiff has not
obtained substitute counsel.
On June 5, 2020, Defendants filed a third motion for judgment on the pleadings.15
With this third motion, Defendants argued that Plaintiff again sued nonviable parties.16
On July 10, 2020, the Court ordered Plaintiff to respond to Defendants’ third motion
for judgment on the pleadings by July 24, 2020. This deadline has passed, and Plaintiff has
not responded to Defendants’ motion.
On July 27, 2020, Plaintiff Novak moved to postpone proceedings.17 Novak asked
for a stay pending resolution of a state personnel administrative review.18 The Court
hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to postpone proceedings. The state review body’s
decision is unrelated to this instant case.
The Court considers the Defendants’ third motion for judgment on the pleadings.
II. Standard of Review
When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(c), “all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the
opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving
party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.”19
III. Discussion
In Defendants’ third motion for judgment on the pleadings, Defendants argue that
Plaintiff’s second amended complaint fails to sue any viable party under Title VII or the Age
15 Doc. 25.
16
17 Doc. 30.
18 at 1.
19 , 539 F.3d 545, 549 (6th Cir. 2008).
Discrimination in Employment Act.20 Specifically, Defendants argue that (1) the individual
Defendants are not “employers” within the meaning of the relevant statutes and (2) Lorain
County is a legal entity distinct from the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas and
therefore never employed Plaintiff.21
The Court considers each argument in turn.
A. The Individual Defendants Are Not Viable Parties in This Suit.
Defendants argue that the individual defendants—Ewers, Clouser, and Tansey—do
not qualify as “employers” under Title VII or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.22
Defendants are correct that under federal law individual supervisors cannot be sued
in their individual capacities.23 However, Plaintiff’s complaint seems to sue the individual
Defendants in their .
The complaint caption names the defendants as follows: “Honorable Raymond J.
Ewers, as administrative judge for the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas,” “Sherry
Closure as Administrator [for the] Lorain County Court of Common Pleas,” and “Debra
Tansey as Deputy Administrator [for the] Lorain County Court of Common Pleas.”24
The dependent clauses following the Defendants’ names ( , “as Administrator”)
suggest an “official capacity” suit. Furthermore, “[i]f there is indication that defendants
are being sued in their individual capacities, the Court assumes they are being sued in their
20 Doc. 25 at 3-4.
21
22 Doc. 25 at 5-7.
23 115 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 1997); ,
210 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s dismissal of Title VII and ADEA claims against
individual defendants because “defendants, sued in their individual capacities, are not included within the
statutory definition of ‘employer’ under Title VII and its sister civil rights statutes, and accordingly cannot be
held personally liable for discrimination”).
24 Doc. 19 at 1 (emphasis added).
official capacities.”25
Because Plaintiff sues Ewers, Clouser, and Tansey in their official capacities, Plaintiff
is suing the government agency itself.26 Thus, Plaintiff is suing her employer, the Lorain
County Court of Common Pleas.
Unfortunately for Plaintiff, Lorain County Court of Common Pleas is
not and therefore cannot be sued in court.
State law determines a state entity’s capacity to sue or be sued in federal
court.27 The Ohio Supreme Court has held that, under Ohio law, a court can neither sue
nor be sued absent “express statutory authority.”28 Because “the State of Ohio is the only
entity capable of providing express statutory authority for a court to be sued—Title VII [or
any other federal statute] cannot provide that authority.”29
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings
as to Plaintiff’s claims against the individual defendants.
B. Lorain County Is Also Not a Viable Party in This Suit.
Defendants argue that “[t]he County is likewise not an appropriate party in this
matter because the County was not Novak’s employer as a matter of law.”30
25 , No. 2:12-CV-977, 2014 WL 3547375, at *4 (S.D. Ohio July 17, 2014) (quoting and
affirming magistrate judge).
26 , No. C-1-07-004, 2007 WL 2029043, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Jul. 10, 2007) (“[T]here
appears to be no bar to a plaintiff bringing Title VII and ADEA claims against individual defendants in their
official capacity, which is in effect a lawsuit against the governmental agency itself.”).
27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3).
28 , 344 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ohio 1976).
29 , 912 F. Supp. 2d 527, 530 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (citation
omitted); , 892 F. Supp. 2d 918, 923 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (dismissing
municipal court as a party in a § 1983 and Title VII action alleging racial and sexual harassment “because
under Ohio law, Ohio courts are not ”); ., No. 3:09 CV 2998, 2010 WL
2572861, at *3–4 (N.D. Ohio June 23, 2017) (holding that Title VII action could not be maintained against
state juvenile court as a matter of law).
30 Doc. 25 at 3; at 7-9.
Defendants are correct. Lorain County Court of Common Pleas (where Novak
worked) and Lorain County are separate and distinct legal entities.
Ohio courts are state entities, not divisions of county government.31
Because Plaintiff cannot allege facts that, if believed, would establish that Lorain
County was her employer, the County cannot be held liable for any claims involving
employment discrimination.32
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings
as to Plaintiff’s claims against Lorain County.
IV. Conclusion
Plaintiff’s motion to postpone proceedings is DENIED.33 Defendants’ third motion
for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED in full.34 This case is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 6, 2020
JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
31 , 105 F.3d 264, 269 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Consequently, an Ohio common
pleas court is a segment of county government, but an arm of the state . . . .”) (emphasis in original).
32 , 2010 WL 2572861, at *2-3 (concluding that county could not be held liable—
under Title VII, the ADA, and § 4112—for alleged employment discrimination involving former employee of
juvenile court).
33 Doc. 30.
34 Doc. 25.