The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
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:
JAMIE GILBO, :
: Case No. 1:19-cv-00767
Plaintiffs, :
:
vs. : OPINION & ORDER
: [Resolving Doc. 17]
AGMENT LLC, :
:
Defendants. :
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JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Plaintiffs Jamie Gilbo and Alyssa Smith formerly worked as exotic dancers at Brass
Pole, a strip club. Plaintiffs bring the present action against Agment LLC, d/b/a Brass Pole,
and Harley Rowe, Brass Pole’s owner, president, and managing member, claiming that
Defendants misclassified Plaintiffs as independent contractors and failed to pay them the
Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) required minimum wage.1
Plaintiffs move for summary judgment on Counts I and II of the complaint on the
grounds that Plaintiffs were employees and are entitled to back wages for their work.2
Defendants oppose.3
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion regarding whether
Plaintiffs should receive back wages.
I. Background
Brass Pole is a gentleman’s club.4 Defendant Rowe owns and manages the
1 Doc. 1.
2 Doc. 17.
3 Doc. 23. Plaintiffs replied. Doc. 22.
4 Doc. 17-1 at 9.
business.5 Although some Brass Pole’s workers are payroll employees, including
Defendant Rowe, the managers, DJ, bouncer, bartenders, “door girl,” and “house mom,”
Brass Pole does not pay the dancers anything.6 Brass Pole claims the dancers are
independent contractors.
Defendant claims that Brass Pole is a bar and grill.7 Although the club has a license
to serve food, it has no kitchen or menu.8 If a customer asks for food a manager can tell
them the price of sandwiches.9 The club serves precooked foods, such as burgers and Hot
Pockets, that it heats in a microwave.10 Defendant Rowe purchases the food at Sam’s
Club.11 Brass Pole also has a liquor license and serves beer, wine, and liquor that it
purchases at a grocery store.12
Female exotic dancers perform semi-nude at the club during its operational hours.13
Brass Pole’s dancers receive compensation exclusively from tips and can earn tips in three
ways. First, the club has a main stage with a pole that dancers can dance on.14 Brass Pole
does not pay dancers for dancing on the main stage. Dancers earn only whatever tips they
receive from customers.15
Second, dancers can provide private lap dances to customers. For such dances, the
customers pay nothing to Brass Pole. Instead, the customers pay the dancers a negotiated
5 at 4, 8.
6 at 10-12, 19.
7 at 9.
8 at 12.
9
10
11
12
13 at 15. While Defendant reported that the number of dancers working at any time could be between two or
sixteen, in an earlier lawsuit Defendant reported that there were typically twelve to fifteen dancers per night. at 13-14.
14 at 15.
15
fee.16 Defendant Rowe says that the dancers are supposed to charge twenty dollars, but
sometimes the women charge more.17 Brass Pole requires the dancers pay twenty dollars
to Brass Pole for the first private dance they perform each night. This “leasing space”
charge decreases to five dollars for each additional dance.18
Finally, dancers can also make money by working in the VIP room.19 Brass Pole
charges customers fifty dollars to rent the room for fifteen minutes.20 The dancers negotiate
with the customer for payment for any work they perform in the VIP room and do not have
to pay a portion to Brass Pole.21
Brass Pole advertises that it is hiring entertainers once a month in the
.22 Women inquiring about a job must fill out an application.23 Before working at
Brass Pole, dancers must audition.24 All dancers must be approved by Brass Pole, and
dancers are not allowed to hire others to perform for them.25
Some dancers have experience prior to dancing at Brass Pole while others do not.26
Dancers are not required to undergo training before performing, and Brass Pole does not
provide any training.27 Dancers are not required to have any specialized equipment for
their jobs, but are responsible for purchasing their own outfits, makeup and shoes.28
16 at 14.
17 . Plaintiffs say that Defendants set the rates they could charge. Docs. 17-2 at 2; 17-3 at 2.
18 Doc. 17-1 at 14. Plaintiffs say this charge was fifteen dollars when they worked at Brass Pole. Docs. 17-2 at 2;
Doc. 17-3 at 2.
19 Doc. 17-1 at 14.
20 at 15.
21
22 at 16.
23
24 Docs. 17-1 at 16; 17-2 at 1; 17-3 at 1.
25 Docs. 17-1 at 17-18; 17-2 at 3; 17-3 at 3.
26 Docs. 17-1 at 16; 17-2 at 1; 17-3 at 1.
27 Docs. 17-1 at 19; 17-2 at 1; 17-3 at 1.
28 Docs. 17-1 at 19; 17-2 at 1; 17-3 at 1.
Brass Pole sets the hours of operation and is open six days a week from 4:00 p.m. to
2:30 a.m.29 Brass Pole controls and pays for the lighting, decor, layout, music royalties,
advertising, music systems, phone systems, software, and insurance.30 Brass Pole charges
five dollars for admission unless a customer has a free pass.31 The club does not share the
cover charge revenue with the dancers.32
On Thursday, Friday, and Saturday nights, the club uses a DJ.33 The DJ downloads
or streams music from the internet.34 When the DJ is not there the manager controls the
music.35
Brass Pole advertises in the and on Facebook.36 The club
advertised Plaintiffs as Brass Pole dancers on Facebook.37 Plaintiffs say that they personally
used Snapchat, Facebook, and text messaging to contact customers regarding when
plaintiffs would be dancing.38
Brass Pole enforces the state-mandated dress code for dancers.39 The club keeps
track of which dancers are present at the club through a sign-in sheet.40 The DJ keeps track
of the private dances and VIP room work that the dancers perform.41
The parties dispute the rules that Brass Pole enforces for its dancers. Plaintiffs claim
29 Docs. 17-1 at 11.
30 at 18-19.
31 at 13.
32
33 at 15.
34
35 at 16.
36 at 20.
37 Docs. 17-2 at 2-3; 17-3 at 2.
38 Docs. 17-2 at 2; 17-3 at 2.
39 Doc. 17-1 at 17.
40
41
that Brass Pole required dancers to fill out a schedule.42 The schedule required dancers to
sign up for preset six-hour shifts. Plaintiffs say that Brass Pole required dancers to work six
hours every time they came to dance.43 Plaintiffs also say that Brass Pole requires dancers
to work at least one weekday before dancers are allowed to work the busiest weekend
nights.44
Defendant Rowe says that he tried to enforce a dancer schedule to insure dancer
coverage, but it wasn’t utilized.45 He also disagrees that dancers need to work a weekday
shift to work on the weekend.46 Defendant claims that the six-hour shift is a suggestion but
not a requirement.47
Plaintiffs say they were directly supervised by Brass Pole’s managers and
Defendant Rowe.48 They say that management sent dancers home for failing to comply
with the club’s rules.49 Plaintiffs report that they had to get approval from management to
leave before the shift end.50 Plaintiff Smith states that on April 15, 2019 she had to seek
Defendant Rowe’s approval to leave early for personal reasons.51 Plaintiffs also say that
dancers were fined for arriving late or leaving early and that Defendant Rowe fined Plaintiff
Gilbo twenty dollars for leaving early.52
Defendant Rowe says that no one supervises the dancers.53 He denies that dancers
42 Docs. 17-2 at 2; 17-3 at 2.
43 Docs. 17-2 at 2; 17-3 at 2.
44 Docs. 17-2 at 2; 17-3 at 2.
45 Docs. 17-1 at 25.
46
47
48 Docs. 17-2 at 3; 17-3 at 3.
49 Docs. 17-2 at 2; 17-3 at 2.
50 Docs. 17-2 at 2; 17-3 at 2.
51 Doc. 17-2 at 2.
52 at 3.
53 Doc. 17-1 at 10.
were fined for leaving early while Plaintiffs worked at Brass Pole.54
Defendant Rowe admits that the club uses sign-in sheets that track when dancers
arrive, when they leave, and why they left early.55 He says he uses the sign-in sheets so
that the DJ can keep track of which dancers are available to call up to the stage and to help
the bouncer knows who is there for safety reasons.56 Defendant admits, however, that the
DJ doesn’t actually review the sign-in sheet.57 He also says that the club doesn’t have a
reason for keeping track of dancers leaving early and why.58
Plaintiff Jamie Gilbo worked at Brass Pole from approximately August 14, 2018 to
March 26, 2019.59 Plaintiff Alyssa Smith worked at Brass Pole from approximately June 22,
2018 to June 3, 2019.60 Plaintiffs say that they worked for Brass Pole while they were
dancers at the Brass Pole.61
II. Discussion
A. Summary Judgment Standard
A party is entitled to summary judgment if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.”62 The Court views all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.63 The nonmoving party “must show sufficient evidence to create a
54 at 25.
55 at 26-27.
56 at 27.
57
58
59 Docs. 17-2 at 1; 17-1 at 11.
60 Doc. 17-3 at 1.
61 Docs. 17-2 at 1; 17-3 at 1.
62 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
63 , 506 F.3d 496, 500-501 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
genuine issue of material fact.”64 There must be enough evidence for a jury to reasonably
find for the nonmoving party.65 A scintilla of evidence is not enough to defeat a summary
judgment motion.66
B. Plaintiffs Are Covered Individually by the FLSA.
The parties dispute whether the FLSA applies.
An employee can gain FLSA protection in two ways. First, employees of an
enterprise engaged in the commerce or the production of goods in commerce have
“enterprise coverage.”67 To qualify for enterprise coverage, a company must have at least
$500,000 of gross sales.68 Second, employees that are themselves engaged in interstate
commerce or the production of goods in commerce are covered individually.69
Defendants claim that the FLSA does not apply to Brass Pole because Brass Pole’s
annual gross sales and business is less than $500,000.70 Plaintiffs do not dispute that the
Brass Pole has less than $500,000 gross sales but claim that the FLSA covers them as
individuals.71
Plaintiffs argue that they are individually covered because they use the internet and
cell phones, both instruments of interstate commerce, in their jobs. Specifically, Brass Pole
64 (citation omitted).
65
66
67 , 920 F.Supp. 799, 802-803 (N.D. Ohio 1996).
68 at 803 n. 1.
69 at 803.
70 Doc. 23 at 1. Defendants refer to Brass Pole’s tax returns but have not submitted the tax returns or even the
relevant numbers from those documents. Defendants only make the bare assertion that Brass Pole falls under the $500,000
threshold.
71 Doc. 17 at 17-20. Defendant does not raise any arguments on this point, although it is the Plaintiffs’ burden to
prove that they qualify for FLSA coverage. , No. 6:14-CV-6074, 2017 WL
3425887, at *3 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 9, 2017).
dancers perform to music downloaded or streamed from the internet.72 Brass Pole
advertises on the internet through Facebook.73 Plaintiffs texted customers and also used
the internet to contact customers directly about their work through Snapchat and
Facebook.74
Other courts have held that using internet music gives exotic dancers individual
FLSA coverage, because the internet is a well-established instrumentality of interstate
commerce.75 This Court agrees with those courts. “Plaintiffs were required to regularly use
the [i]nternet to perform their dances . . .;” Plaintiffs used text messaging to contact
customers; and both parties used the internet to advertise the dancers’ services.76 This
satisfies the requirements for individual coverage under the FLSA.77
C. Plaintiffs Were Employees of Brass Pole.
The Court next determines whether Plaintiffs Gilbo and Smith were employees of
Defendant Brass Pole and therefore entitled to damages under the FLSA.78
The FLSA defines “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer.”79 The
Sixth Circuit finds that “employees are those who as a matter of economic reality are
dependent upon the business to which they render service.”80 Under the economic reality
test, the Court examines six factors:
72 Doc. 17-1 at 15.
73 at 20.
74 2017 WL 3425887, at *3.
75 , No. 7:14CV00698, 2015 WL 8489998, at 6 (W.D. Va. Dec. 9, 2015);
2017 WL 3425887, at *3-4.
76 Docs. 17-1 at 15; 17-2 at 2; 17-3 at 2.
77 Although Defendants argue that Brass Pole does not qualify for enterprise coverage, Plaintiffs only argue that
they are covered individually, so the Court does not reach this question.
78 Many state and federal courts have found that exotic dancers are employees. ,
241 F. Supp.3d 1318, 1323 n. 5 (collecting approximately thirty cases that found exotic dancers to be employees).
79 29 U.S.C. § 203(e).
80 , 781 F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
1) The permanency of the relationship between the parties; 2) the
degree of skill required for the rendering of the services; 3) the
worker’s investment in equipment or materials for the task; 4) the
worker’s opportunity for profit or loss, depending upon his skill; . . .
5) the degree of the alleged employer’s right to control the manner
in which the work is performed[; and] . . . 6) whether the service
rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer’s business.81
Defendant does not dispute that the second and sixth factors weigh in favor of
Plaintiffs as “dancing was an integral part of Defendant’s business and did not require a
high degree of skill.”82
The Court agrees that these two factors weigh in favor of finding Plaintiffs were
Brass Pole employees. Defendant Rowe’s deposition testimony and Plaintiffs’ affidavits
agree that no special skills were needed, and no training was required of or provided to
dancers.83 Other courts have held that dancers such as Plaintiffs “do not exhibit the skill or
initiative indicative of persons in business for themselves.”84
Additionally, the dancers are integral to Brass Pole’s business. Indeed, in a 2016
case involving the same Defendant, that court agreed that the dancers were integral, stating
that “[n]o reasonable juror could conclude that customers primarily came to the club for its
other offerings, which included beer, liquor, and frozen burgers from Sam’s Club.”85
The Court must determine whether the other, disputed factors also weigh in favor of
finding that Plaintiffs were employees.
a. The Permanency of the Relationship
Independent contractors generally transfer from place to place as work is offered,
81
82 Doc. 23 at 5.
83 Docs. 17-1 at 16,19; 17-2 at 1; 17-3 at 1.
84 , No. 1:15 CV 886, 2016 WL 1588654, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 20, 2016) (collecting cases).
85 at *7.
whereas employees typically work for one employer in a “continuous and indefinite”
relationship.86 While this may be true, many groups, such as waiters or bartenders, are free
to work at other establishments and are not permanent employees, but are nonetheless
classified as “employees” under the FLSA.87 Due to this, courts considering whether exotic
dancers are employees have given this factor less weight in light of the nature of the
dancers’ work.88
In the present case, Plaintiffs Gilbo and Smith worked at Brass Pole for
approximately seven and twelve months, respectively.89 The Plaintiffs say that they worked
for Brass Pole exclusively during that time. These Plaintiffs do not claim the Brass Pole
prohibited them from working elsewhere.90
The Court agrees with the findings of other courts that the itinerant nature of exotic
dancers’ employment weighs in favor of Defendants.91 Like others, however, this Court
will also afford this factor less weight given the nature of the dancers’ work.
b. The Dancers’ Investment
“[C]ourts must compare the worker’s investment in the equipment to perform his
job with the company’s total investment, including office rental space, advertising,
software, phone systems, or insurance.”92
Both parties agree that Plaintiffs are only responsible for their own outfits, makeup,
86 , 781 F.3d at 807 (citation omitted).
87 , , 967 F. Supp. 2d 901, 921 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
88 (collecting cases).
89 Docs. 17-1 at 11; 17-2 at 1; 17-3 at 1.
90 Docs. 17-2 at 1; 17-3 at 1.
91 967 F. Supp. 2d at 921; , 998 F.2d 324, 328 (5th Cir. 1993);
, 992 F. Supp. 1343, 1352 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
92 , 781 F.3d 799, 810 (6th Cir. 2015).
and shoes.93 They do not provide any investment or specialized equipment for the
business.94
In contrast, Defendants pay for everything required to operate the business—the
utilities, insurance, taxes, alcohol, food, paper products, advertising, music systems,
software, downloaded music, and phone systems.95 Defendant Rowe said that Defendants
invest “a couple hundred thousand” dollars in the business.96
On balance, it is clear that Defendants’ investment in the business far outweighs
Plaintiffs’ investment.97 This factor weighs in favor of Plaintiffs.
c. The Opportunity for Profit or Loss
The Court next examines the amount of control Defendants had over Plaintiffs’
opportunity for profit or loss and whether Plaintiffs were able to increase their own profits
through their management and technical skill.98
To a degree, Plaintiffs influenced the money they made each night. Plaintiffs say
that they directly contacted customers through Facebook, Snapchat, and text messaging to
tell the customers they would be dancing at Brass Pole that night.99 Plaintiffs also
controlled their own outfits.100 Construing the evidence in favor of Defendants, Plaintiffs
could also determine which night to work and negotiate the fee for certain types of dances
93 Docs. 17-1 at 19; 17-2 at 1; 17-3 at 1.
94 Doc. 17-1 at 19. Plaintiffs also state that they advertised their work through Facebook, Snapchat, and text
messages, leading to the conclusion that they invested in cell phones as well. Common items that most people use daily
(i.e. cars, computer equipment, hand tools) are not typically considered as evidence of economic independence in
determining whether an individual is an independent contractor. , 781 F.3d at 810-11.
95 Doc. 17-1 at 12-13, 19.
96 at 19.
97 , No. 3:14-CV-161-TAV-CCS, 2016 WL 7799340, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 2, 2016)
(finding that investment factor weighed in favor of plaintiffs “like nearly every court that has addressed this issue”).
98 , 781 F.3d 799, 812 (6th Cir. 2015).
99 Docs. 17-2 at 2; 17-3 at 2.
100 Docs. 17-1 at 19; 17-2 at 1; 17-3 at 1.
directly with the customers.101
Despite the Plaintiffs’ control over certain aspects of their work at Brass Pole,
Defendants’ actions influenced Plaintiffs’ earnings to a much greater degree. Brass Pole
“ha[d] a significant role in drawing customers to its [club],”102 which is the “critical factor in
determining profits and losses of both defendants and plaintiffs.”103 Defendants were
responsible for “advertisement, location, business hours, maintenance of facilities,
aesthetics, and inventory of beverages and food.”104 Given Defendants’ high degree of
control over customer volume, this factor weighs slightly in Plaintiffs’ favor.
d. The Degree of Control
In 2016, Defendant Brass Pole was sued by a different group of dancers who also
claimed that Defendant incorrectly categorized them as independent contractors and failed
to pay required wages.105 In that lawsuit, the court found that, among other factors,
Defendant exercised a great degree of control over the dancers’ work through a contract
called “Talent Conditions of Leasing the Premises,” which set rules for Brass Pole
dancers.106
Defendant Rowe reports the earlier lawsuit, Brass Pole did away with earlier
contract, no longer tells dancers “when to come and when to go,” and quit telling dancers
they had to work weekdays.”107 Defendants say the only dress code enforced is the state
101 Doc. 17-1 at 14, 25.
102 , 998 F.2d 324, 328 (5th Cir. 1993); , 2016 WL 1588654, at *6 (collecting cases holding that exotic
dancers’ opportunity for profit or loss is largely determined by establishments).
103 , 2016 WL 1588654, at *6.
104
105 2016 WL 1588654.
106
107 Doc. 17-1 at 32.
law and that dancers are only sent home if they aren’t complying with the law.108
As discussed above, Plaintiffs dispute Defendants’ characterization of the rules
imposed on the dancers. Plaintiffs report that dancers were not able to come and go at
will. Plaintiff Gilbo says she was fined for leaving early, and Plaintiff Smith says she had to
seek permission to leave.109 Plaintiffs also say that they were required to work on
weekdays.110 Plaintiffs say that Defendants set the rate for private and VIP room dances.111
Despite the dispute regarding what rules remain in effect, Defendants still leave
important facts undisputed. Defendant Rowe admits that while Plaintiffs danced at Brass
Pole he tried to implement a schedule with suggested six-hour shifts. He also admits that
Brass Pole uses a sign-in sheet to record when the dancers arrive, leave, and their reasons
for leaving early.112
Under this factor, the operative question is whether Plaintiffs control so much of the
business that they “stand as separate economic entit[ies]” or whether their “economic status
is inextricably linked to those conditions over which defendants have complete control.”113
Even though Defendants deny any control over the dancers aside from enforcing
state laws, at least one court has found that a club that similarly denied dancer control
except for state laws still exercised control over the dancers through the “atmosphere,
clientele, and operation of the club.”114 Other courts have similarly found that setting the
hours of operation, cover charge, types of food and beverages sold, location, and facility
108 at 17, 29.
109 Docs. 17-2 at 3; 17-3 at 2.
110 Docs. 17-2 at 2; 17-3 at 2.
111 Docs. 17-2 at 2; 17-3 at 2.
112 Doc. 17-1 at 25-27.
113 , 890 F. Supp. 586, 592 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (citation and quotations omitted).
114 , No. WMN-13-430, 2013 WL 5964476, at *4 (D. Md. Nov. 7, 2013).
maintenance meant that dancers were “entirely dependent on the [club] to provide [them]
with customers, and [their] economic status [was] inextricably linked to those conditions
over which [the club had] complete control.”115
Plaintiffs in this case report that they made efforts to bring patrons to the club, but
there is no doubt that Defendants controlled the flow of club customers. Defendants chose
the location and hours of operation.116 Defendants also decided whether to charge a cover
fee and what beverages and food would be provided.117 Additionally, Defendants
controlled the club’s atmosphere.118
Even in light of the parties’ dispute regarding the Defendants’ rules for dancers, this
factor weighs in favor of Plaintiffs.
e. Weighing all factors
Construing the disputed facts in Defendants favor still leads to the conclusion that
the Plaintiffs were employees under the FLSA. Although the parties disagree as to some of
the rules Defendants imposed on dancers, a reasonable jury could only conclude, given
the totality of the facts, that Plaintiffs were economically dependent upon Defendants
under the economic reality test. Therefore, Plaintiffs were employees.
D. Defendant Rowe Is Jointly Liable for Plaintiffs’ Damages.
Plaintiffs argue that in addition to Brass Pole, Defendant Rowe should be found to
be an employer under the FLSA and personally liable for Plaintiffs’ damages.119
115 , 47 F. Supp. 3d 260, 269 (D. Md. 2014), ,825
F.3d 235 (4th Cir. 2016).
116 Doc. 17-1 at 11-13.
117
118
119 Doc. 17 at 20-22. Defendants did not submit any argument on this point.
To be personally liable, Defendant Rowe must meet the FLSA definition of
“employer,” defined to “include[] any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of
an employer in relation to any employee.”120 More than one employer can be liable for
FLSA obligations.121 An individual’s status as an employer is a legal determination for the
court based on the economic realities of the case.122
While no single factor controls an individual’s status, courts examine whether the
person has a “significant ownership interest in the corporation” and “control over
significant aspects of the corporation’s day-to-day functions.”123 The individual does not
need have exclusive control over the day-to-day operations as long as he or she controls
significant aspects of the daily functions.124
Defendant Rowe’s ownership and control over Brass Pole makes him an employer.
Rowe is the sole owner, managing member, and President of Brass Pole.125 He also owns
and controls the company that owns the Brass Pole’s building and the land it sits on.126
Defendant Rowe controls daily operations at the club. He sets the hours of operation, has
sole check-signing authority, and purchases the food and beverages.127
Although Brass Pole’s managers may have some control over operations and handle
matters such as auditions, Rowe directly supervises the managers and tells them what to
120 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
121 , 942 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1991).
122
123 at 966 (finding liability where the individual was the COO, had a significant ownership interest, and
controlled parts of the company’s day-to-day functions); 2016 WL 7799340, at *13 (finding individual
liability where the individuals were the sole owners, made hiring and firing decisions, drafted the contract with dancers,
set rules and policies, maintained financial records, ensured compliance with rules, supervised workers, and could waive
rules); , 2017 WL 5157238, at *4-5 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 3, 2017) (holding individual liable where
she was heavily involved in the day-to-day management of the restaurant she owned).
124 942 F.2d at 965.
125 Doc. 17-1 at 4, 8.
126 at 5.
127 at 4, 11-12.
do.128 He and the general manager run the business day-to-day, and he and the managers
have the ability to hire and fire employees.129 Defendant Rowe made the decision to
classify the dancers as independent contractors.130
Because Defendant Rowe is the sole owner of the business and significantly controls
daily operations, Defendant Rowe is jointly liable for Plaintiffs’ damages.
E. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Recovery.
Plaintiffs assert both FLSA and Ohio law claims regarding their unpaid wages.
“Ohio law incorporates the FLSA’s definitions, standards, and principles for its minimum
wage and overtime compensation provisions.”131 Despite the fact that the two statutes rely
upon the same standards, Ohio law provides for greater damages, essentially three times
the amount of back wages, whereas federal law only allows for double the amount of back
wages.132 Given the higher potential for recovery, Plaintiffs ask for damages under Ohio
law.133
The parties agree that Defendants did not pay Plaintiffs wages under Ohio law.134
Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to back wages under Ohio law. During Plaintiffs’ periods of
employment, in 2018 and 2019, the applicable minimum wage was $7.25 per hour.135
128 at 10.
129 at 10, 16.
130 at 11.
131 , No. 2:17-cv-668, 2017 WL 5900559, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 28, 2017).
132 Specifically, under Ohio law an employer must pay back wages plus damages, where “[d]amages [are]
calculated as an additional two times the amount of the back wages.” Ohio Const., Art. II, § 34a. Under federal law, an
employer must pay “unpaid minimum wages . . . and [ ] an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.”
29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
133 Doc. 17 at 23.
134 It is clearly established that Defendants did not pay Plaintiffs anything. Docs. 17-1 at 23; 17-2 at 1; 17-3 at 1.
135 The Ohio Constitution sets the parameters for the annual increase of Ohio’s minimum wage. Ohio Const., Art.
II, § 34a. Ohio’s director of commerce adjusts the wage rate according to the constitutional provision. Ohio Rev. Code §
4111.02. In 2018, the Ohio department of commerce mandated that all employers who grossed less than $305,000 pay
their employees at minimum the federal minimum wage. Ohio Dept. of Comm., 2018 Minimum Wage,
https://www.com.ohio.gov/documents/dico_2018MinimumWageposter.pdf (last accessed Feb. 13, 2020). In 2019 an
Despite Ohio law requiring employers to keep records of employees’ hours for at
least three years following the employees’ final date of employment,136 Brass Pole has only
produced partial records of Plaintiffs’ hours in the form of sign-in sheets.137
Courts hesitate to punish employees when an employer’s incomplete records leave
hours-worked questions. Instead, if an employee can prove that he or she performed the
work for which he or she seeks compensation and provide sufficient evidence of the work
“as a matter of just and reasonable inference,” the burden shifts to the employer to
contradict the employee’s claim with evidence of the precise amount of work or evidence
to negate the inference drawn from the employee’s submissions.138
Plaintiffs have submitted a partial set of Brass Pole dancer sign-in sheets.139 The
documents show that Plaintiff Gilbo worked 672.04 hours and that Plaintiff Smith worked
545.68 hours during their period of dancing for Brass Pole.140 Based on the records
available, Plaintiffs worked an average of 4.23 hours and 2.66 hours per day,
respectively.141 There are sign-in sheets missing from 34 days during the period Gilbo
worked at Brass Pole. For Smith, 92 days’ sig-in sheets are missing. Applying average
hours worked to the days for which Brass Pole did not produce sign-in sheets, Gilbo
estimates that she worked 143.82 unaccounted for hours, while Smith worked 244.72
employer grossing less than $314,000 had to pay the federal minimum wage. Ohio Dept. of Comm., 2019 Minimum
Wage, https://www.com.ohio.gov/documents/dico_2019MinimumWageposter.pdf (last accessed Feb. 13, 2020). In both
years, the federal minimum wage was $7.25. The record does not reflect the Brass Pole’s gross income from 2018 or 2019,
but Plaintiffs only seek the federal minimum wage, which in both years was lower than Ohio’s minimum wage rate. Doc.
17 at 17.
136 Ohio Const., Art. II, § 34a.
137 Doc. 17-8.
138 62 F.3d at 779.
139 Doc. 17-8.
140 Docs. 17-4; 17-5. These numbers have been rounded to the nearest hundredth of an hour.
141 Docs. 17-4; 17-5.
hours.142
In total, Gilbo claims she was denied $5,914.99 in minimum wages. Smith claims
she was denied $5,730.42.143 With an additional two times the amount of unpaid wages,
Plaintiffs estimate that their damages total $17,744.97 and $17,191.26, respectively.144
Defendants have not disputed these calculations, challenged the method of
calculating the damages, or put forth their own estimation. In fact, Defendant has been
entirely silent on this point.145
Because Plaintiffs’ estimations are reasonable based upon the available records and
because Defendants have failed to meet their burden of rebutting Plaintiffs’ estimated
damages, the Court awards Plaintiff Gilbo $17,744.97 in damages and Plaintiff Smith
$17,191.26 in damages.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment as to Counts I and II. Defendants are jointly liable for the damages granted to
Plaintiffs, Plaintiff Gilbo shall receive $17,744.97 in damages and Plaintiff Smith
$17,191.26 in damages.
Plaintiffs are ordered to notify the Court by February 24, 2020 as to whether they
plan to proceed to trial on Plaintiffs’ Counts III, IV, and V regarding overtime and tip
violations.
142 Docs. 17-4; 17-5.
143 Docs. 17-4; 17-5.
144 Doc. 17 at 26.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 14, 2020
JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE