Opinion

Myers v. Wood County

Court
District Court, N.D. Ohio
Filed
Feb 28, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 28.0%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

Craig R. Myers, Case No.: 3:19CV2564

Plaintiff,

v. OPINION AND ORDER

Wood County, Ohio,

Defendant.

Pro se plaintiff Craig R. Myers, a state prisoner, sues Wood County, Ohio for damages

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the basis the County “has a policy and practice of setting excessive bail

for pretrial detainees.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 1). Plaintiff is in the custody of the Ohio Department of

Rehabilitation and Correction pursuant to journal entry of sentence in State v. Myers, Wood

County Court of Common Pleas Case No. 2011-CR-03641. He alleges that in October 2012, he

received an excessive bail determination ($200,000) in his case, after bail previously set for him

at $50,000 was revoked. (Id. at 2-3, ¶¶ 13-15.) He contends that the October 2012 bail

determination resulted in his pretrial detention in county jail, violating his constitutional rights.

The plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Accordingly, his

complaint is now before the court for initial screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). That

statute requires district courts to review all in forma pauperis complaints filed in federal court, and

to dismiss before service any such complaint that the court determines is frivolous or malicious,

fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). To survive

1 On May 10, 2013, a Wood County jury found the plaintiff guilty of one count of abduction and

one count of felonious assault. He was sentenced on July 8, 2013, to an aggregate term of eight

years of imprisonment.

a dismissal for failure to state claim, a complaint must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (holding that the dismissal standard

articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544 (2007) for determining a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) governs dismissals

for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)).

The plaintiff’s complaint, even liberally construed, fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim.

To hold a county government liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that an official

policy, custom, or practice of the county itself violated his federal rights. Fields v. Henry County,

Tenn., 701 F.3d 180, 183 (6th Cir. 2012). The plaintiff “must ‘identify the policy, connect the

policy to the [County] itself and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the

execution of that policy.’” Estate of Graham v. County of Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 383 (6th Cir.

2004) (quoting in part Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't., 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)).

The plaintiff does not allege facts plausibly suggesting that a policy, custom, or practice of

Wood County caused the constitutional violations he alleges in connection with his bail. He does

not allege facts identifying a specific county policy, custom, or practice that was applied or used

in deciding his bail. The docket in his criminal case indicates that the judge revoked his bond, and

imposed the bond he now contends was excessive, after hearing evidence on a motion by the

prosecutor to revoke his bond on the basis of criminal offenses he committed. The individualized

bond/bail determinations made by the judge in the plaintiff’s criminal case do not demonstrate that

an official policy, custom, or practice of Wood County led to the constitutional violations of which

he complains. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Franklin, No. 3: 16 CV 1342, 2016 WL 6948363, at * 5-

6 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 28, 2016) (holding that a plaintiff failed to allege a § 1983 claim against a

county in connection with her bail where she did not identify a county policy or custom, or allege

facts suggesting that the county actually set her bail).

Further, any § 1983 claims the plaintiff purports to allege against the County are plainly

time-barred. See Fraley v. Ohio Gallia County, No. 97-3564, 1998 WL 789385, at *1 (6th Cir.

1998) (sua sponte dismissal of an in forma pauperis complaint is appropriate where the complaint

on its face demonstrates an affirmative defense such as the statute of limitations). The statute of

limitations for § 1983 actions arising in Ohio is the limitations statute applicable for bodily injury,

which requires that an action to be filed within two years after its accrual. Browning v. Pendleton,

869 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1989). Any claim the plaintiff had in connection with his 2012 bail

determination and/or his allegedly unlawful resulting pretrial detention accrued in 2012 (or, at the

latest in 2013, when he was convicted and sentenced on the charged crimes), well more than two

years before he filed this action in November 2019. Therefore, his complaint is subject to sua

sponte dismissal on the basis of the statute of limitations.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is ordered that the plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

So ordered.

/s/ James G. Carr

Sr. U.S. District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.