The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
CHADWICK LYNN MILLER, ) CASE NO. 5:19cv1868
)
PLAINTIFF, ) JUDGE SARA LIOI
)
) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
) ORDER
vs. )
)
)
STATE OF OHIO, et al, )
)
DEFENDANTS. )
Pro se plaintiff Chadwick Lynn Miller (“Miller”) filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the State of Ohio, the Stark County Common Pleas Court, the Stark County Sheriff’s
Department, and the Stark County Clerk of Courts. In the complaint, Miller alleges he was charged
and convicted of improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle. (Doc. No. 1 (Complaint
[“Compl.”]) at 6-7.1) He states terrorists installed thought reading transmission technology on him
against his will. (Id. at 6.) He claims defendants violated his constitutional rights, and he seeks
monetary damages in the amount of $25,000,000,000. (Id. at 6, 11.)
I. BACKGROUND
On July 17, 2017, the Stark County Grand Jury indicted Miller on one count of carrying a
concealed weapon, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2923.12, and one count of improperly
handling firearms in a motor vehicle, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2923.16. He pled guilty to
improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle on November 20, 2017, and the charge of
1 All page numbers refer to the page identification number generated by the Court’s electronic docketing system.
carrying a concealed weapon was dismissed. On January 5, 2018, the trial court sentenced Miller
to three years of community control. He did not appeal his conviction or sentence. Instead, Miller
filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and challenging
his plea as not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. The trial court denied the petition.
The state appellate court upheld that decision. State v. Miller, No. 2019CA00046, 2019 WL
5268633, at *1-3 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2019).
Miller claims that terrorists installed thought reading technology in his brain. He states he
communicates daily with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). He alleges that the trial
judge, the prosecutor, and his attorney knew about the situation and “attempt[ed] to retaliate
[against him] for reporting violations to the FBI for trafficking purposes.” (Compl. at 6.) He was
ordered to undergo a psychiatric evaluation to determine his competency to stand trial. He contends
this was an attempt to humiliate him and to “change [his] truthful thought process on the matter as
mentally breaking [him] down in an attempt to brainwash, traffic and punish [him] for not having
the thought process desired by those breaking the law.” (Id. at 8.) According to Miller, the FBI has
all the evidence needed to prove his innocence, but his attorney refused to defend him in that way.
He contends his constitutional rights were violated and the defendants are “very dangerous and
out of control.” (Id.) He states he has continued to report abuses to the FBI.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365,
92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 102 S.
Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972), the Court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks
an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L.
2
Ed. 2d 338 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of
Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when
it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly
baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted when it lacks plausibility in the complaint. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
564, 127 S. Ct. 195, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).
A pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868
(2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above
the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Bell Atl.
Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. A plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must
provide more than an unadorned, the defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not meet this pleading standard. Id. In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe
the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151
F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998). The Court, however, is given discretion to refuse to accept without
question the truth of a plaintiff’s allegations when they may be fairly described as fanciful,
fantastic, delusional, wholly incredible, or irrational. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33,
112 S. Ct. 1728, 118 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1992). The case at bar undoubtedly presents just such a
complaint.
III. DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, the State of Ohio has sovereign immunity from suits for damages. The
Eleventh Amendment is an absolute bar to the imposition of liability upon the State. Latham v.
3
Office of Attorney Gen. of State of Ohio, 395 F.3d 261, 270 (6th Cir. 2005); Bouquett v. Clemmer,
626 F. Supp. 46, 48 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
The Stark County Common Pleas Court and the Stark County Sheriff’s Department are not
sui juris, meaning that under Ohio law, they are not legal entities capable of suing or being sued.
Tysinger v. Police Dep’t of City of Zanesville, 462 F.3d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 2006); Papp v. Snyder,
81 F. Supp. 2d 852, 857 n.4 (N.D. Ohio 2000). They are merely subunits of a municipality, in this
case Stark County. To the extent that Miller intended to sue the entire Stark County Clerk of Courts
Office rather than the Court Clerk himself, it too is not sui juris. As a consequence, Miller’s claims
against these defendants fail as a matter of law.
To the extent the claims against them can be liberally construed as asserted against Stark
County, see Johari v. City of Columbus Police Dep’t, 186 F. Supp. 2d 821, 825 (S.D. Ohio 2002),
they also fail to state a claim. Miller cannot sue a local government entity under § 1983 on the
theory of respondeat superior liability. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 692-94, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). A plaintiff may only hold a local government
entity liable under § 1983 for the entity’s own wrongdoing. Id. A local government entity violates
§ 1983 where its official policy or custom actually serves to deprive an individual of his or her
constitutional rights. Id. The Sixth Circuit has held that a plaintiff may show the existence of a
policy or custom leading to the alleged violation by identifying the following: “‘(1) the
municipality’s legislative enactments or official policies; (2) actions taken by officials with final
decision-making authority; (3) a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) a custom of
tolerance or acquiescence of federal violations.’” Winkler v. Madison Cty., 893 F.3d 877, 901 (6th
Cir. 2018) (quoting Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 621 (6th Cir. 2015)). To state a claim for
relief against a municipality under § 1983, a plaintiff must: (1) identify the municipal policy or
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custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was
incurred due to execution of that policy. Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003). Miller
does not identify a particular policy or custom of Stark County, nor does he allege he suffered an
injury that was caused by that policy.
Miller also fails to state a claim against the Clerk of Court as an individual. Miller cannot
establish the liability of any defendant absent a clear showing that the defendant was personally
involved in the activities which form the basis of the alleged unconstitutional behavior. Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371, 96 S. Ct. 598, 46 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1976); Mullins v. Hainesworth, No.
95-3186, 66 F.3d 326 (Table), 1995 WL 559381, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 20, 1995). Miller does not
allege any facts pertaining to the Clerk of Court. He cannot hold the Clerk liable in his individual
capacity.
The majority of Miller’s allegations are focused on his conviction. Although Miller pled
guilty to the charge of improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle, and admits he was
carrying a gun, he contends his prosecution violated his constitutional rights. In order to recover
damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, however, a § 1983 plaintiff
must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal or called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
486-87, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994). A claim for damages calling into question the
validity of conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
Therefore, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the Court must consider whether
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence. If it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that
the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. If, however, the Court determines that the
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plaintiff's claims, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding
criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of
some other bar to the suit. In this case, Miller appears to contend he is either innocent of the charge,
or at least justified in breaking the law by a greater threat to his safety. This claim, if it were
successful, would call his conviction into question. He must, therefore, demonstrate that his
conviction was reversed on appeal or set aside by a federal court habeas action. He has not done
so. Miller cannot proceed with any claims pertaining to his conviction.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, Miller’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No.
2) is granted, and this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3), an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 9, 2019 Sy
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE