The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
LINUS UNDIANDEYE, ) CASE NO. 1:19 CV 1391
)
Plaintiff, ) JUDGE DAN AARON POLSTER
)
vs. )
) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
FRANK JACKSON, et al., ) AND ORDER
)
Defendants. )
Pro se Plaintiff Linus Undiandeye filed this action against Cleveland Mayor Frank
Jackson, former Cuyahoga County Sheriff Clifford Pinkney, Cuyahoga County Executive
Armond Buddish, Cleveland Heights Police Officer Chris Skok, Cuyahoga County Jail Director
Kenneth Mills, Cuyahoga County Jail Corporal Bodaker, Attorney Tyresha Brown-O’Neal,
Cuyahoga County Jail Sergeant Smyte, Cuyahoga County Jail Mental Health Chief Janet
Platten, Cuyahoga County Assistant Prosecutor Andrew Gatti, and Cuyahoga County Assistant
Prosecutor Melissa Riley. In the Complaint (Doc. # 1), Plaintiff challenges his criminal
prosecution and objects to conditions in the Cuyahoga County Jail. He seeks monetary and
injunctive relief.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee in the Cuyahoga County Jail. He asserts three types of
claims. The first type concern his criminal prosecution. He claims Assistant Prosecutors Gatti
and Riley, along with his attorney Brown-O’Neal, are denying him a speedy trial. He also
alleges Cleveland Heights Police Officer Skok obtained a search warrant with inaccurate
information in the affidavit.
The second type of claims asserted by Plaintiff pertain to the conditions of his
confinement in the jail. He states he was required to sleep on the floor with a mattress missing
most of its cotton stuffing. He states he was forced in eat in his cell in close proximity to the
toilet, which was not properly cleaned. He contends the jail staff are having sex with inmates
and selling drugs. He claims he has been denied pain medication, mental health services and
drug counseling.
The third type of claim asserted by Plaintiff concerns use of excessive force by
corrections officers in the jail. Plaintiff alleges he has been assaulted many times by jail staff.
He indicates Smyte jumped on his back while he was already handcuffed and lying on the
ground.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,
365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the Court is required to
dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of
Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact
when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
-2-
A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks
“plausibility in the Complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A
pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual allegations in the
pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555.
The Plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than
“an unadorned, the-Defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A
pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not meet this pleading standard. Id. In reviewing a Complaint, the Court must construe the
pleading in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151
F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir.1998)
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff first challenges his pending criminal case. He claims his attorney and the
prosecutors are denying him a speedy trial and a Cleveland Heights police officer obtained a
search warrant with inaccurate information. A federal court must decline to interfere with
pending state proceedings involving important state interests unless extraordinary circumstances
are present. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971). When a person is the target of
an ongoing state action involving important state matters, he or she cannot interfere with the
pending state action by maintaining a parallel federal action involving claims that could have
been raised in the state case. Watts v. Burkhart, 854 F.2d 839, 844-48 (6th Cir. 1988). If the
state Defendant files such a case, Younger abstention requires the federal court to defer to the
-3-
state proceeding. Id; see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987). Based on
these principles, abstention is appropriate if: (1) state proceedings are on-going; (2) the state
proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate
opportunity to raise federal questions. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar
Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). Abstention is mandated whether the state court proceeding is
criminal, quasi-criminal, or civil in nature as long as federal court intervention “unduly
interferes with the legitimate activities of the state.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
All three factors supporting abstention are present. Plaintiff contends his criminal case is
still pending. State court criminal matters are of paramount state interest. See Younger, 401
U.S. at 44-45. The third requirement of Younger is that Plaintiff must have an opportunity to
assert his federal challenges in the state court proceeding. The pertinent inquiry is whether the
state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims. Moore v. Sims, 442
U.S. 415, 430 (1979). The burden at this point rests on the Plaintiff to demonstrate that state
procedural law bars presentation of his claims. Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 14. When a Plaintiff
has not attempted to present his federal claims in the state court proceedings, the federal court
should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of
“unambiguous authority to the contrary.” Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 15. Here, claims of speedy trial
and defective search warrants can be asserted in the course of the state court criminal case. The
requirements of Younger are satisfied and this Court must abstain from interfering in any
pending state court criminal action against the Plaintiff.
Furthermore, Plaintiff cannot bring civil rights claims against the prosecutors or his own
defense attorney. Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from damages for initiating a
-4-
prosecution and in presenting the state’s case. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976);
Pusey v. Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 658 (6th Cir. 1993). A public defender or a court-appointed
defense counsel, while acting in that capacity, is not a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321 (1981).
Plaintiff next challenges the conditions of his confinement in the jail. “The Eighth
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment protects prisoners from the
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Baker v. Goodrich,649 F.3d 428, 434 (6th Cir.
2011) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). Pretrial detainee claims, though
they fall under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth
Amendment, City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp.,463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983), are analyzed under
the same rubric as Eighth Amendment claims brought by prisoners. See Roberts v. City of Troy,
773 F.2d 720, 723 (6th Cir.1985) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979)).
The Supreme Court in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991), set forth a framework
for courts to use when deciding whether certain conditions of confinement constitute cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff must first plead facts
which, if true, establish that a sufficiently serious deprivation has occurred. Id. Seriousness is
measured in response to “contemporary standards of decency.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.
1, 8 (1992). Routine discomforts of prison life do not suffice. Id. Only deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs or extreme deprivations regarding the conditions of confinement will
implicate the protections of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 9. Plaintiff must also establish a
subjective element showing the prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.
Id. Deliberate indifference is characterized by obduracy or wantonness, not inadvertence or
-5-
good faith error. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Liability cannot be predicated
solely on negligence. Id. A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when both the
objective and subjective requirements are met. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
In this case, Plaintiff fails to establish the subjective element of his claims. Deliberate
indifference “entails something more than mere negligence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. An
official acts with deliberate indifference when “he acts with criminal recklessness,” a state of
mind that requires that the official act with conscious disregard of a substantial risk of serious
harm. Id. at 837. This standard is met if “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk
to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Id. Plaintiff does not allege facts reasonably suggesting that the County Executive,
the Sheriff, the Warden, the Jail Director, the Mayor of Cleveland or the Chief Mental Health
Officer were personally aware of his situation, that they drew the inference that his health may
have been at risk, and disregarded that risk in their actions. He cannot state a claim for relief
against them for violation of his Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Finally, Plaintiff asserts claims for use of excessive force. He contends, without
explanation, that he was assaulted numerous times by Bodaker and Smyte. He alleges that on
one occasion, Smyte jumped on his back while he was already handcuffed and lying on the
ground. He does not indicate what precipitated this incident. Prison officials may often be
required to use physical contact to insure prison security; however, they can violate the Eighth
Amendment if the contact represents an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). The standard used to analyze “excessive force” claims under
-6-
the Eighth Amendment requires the Court to determine whether the officer acted in a good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline, or whether he acted maliciously and sadistically to cause
harm. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8-10. Here, Plaintiff does not provide any information regarding the
incidents. He simply concludes that the force used was excessive. The factual allegations in the
pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555.
Absent factual allegations concerning the incidents in question, the claim never rises from a
possible claim to that of a plausible claim for relief.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court
certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be
taken in good faith.1
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Dan Aaron Polster October 22, 2019
DAN AARON POLSTER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
1 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides:
An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that it is not
taken in good faith.
-7-