Szarell v. Summit County Court of Common Pleas

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

DANIELLE-NICHOL SZARELL, ) CASE NO. 5:18-cv-2975

)

PLAINTIFF, ) JUDGE SARA LIOI

)

)

vs. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

) ORDER

)

SUMMIT COUNTY COURT OF )

COMMON PLEAS, et al., )

)

DEFENDANTS. )

Pro se plaintiff Dannielle Nichol Szarell (“Szarell”) brings this action against the Summit

County Court of Common Pleas, ADM, Community Support Services, Northcoast Behavioral

Health Institution, and the Summit County Jail. (Doc. No. 1 [“Compl.”].) Szarell moves to

proceed with this action in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2), and that motion is granted.

For the reasons that follow, this case is dismissed.

I. Background

The content of Szarell’s complaint is sparse and difficult to discern. The statement of her

claim consists entirely of a list of federal and Ohio statutes. (Compl. at 5.1) She alleges no facts

concerning the conduct of each defendant relative to the listed federal and state statutes. For

relief, she seeks restitution by compensation for medical costs, out-of-pocket expenses, lost

wages, pain and suffering, jail bond, and false imprisonment. (Id. at 6.)

1 All page number references are to the page identification numbers generated by the Court’s electronic filing

system.

In addition to the complaint, Szarell filed a “memorandum” regarding a criminal case in

the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR-2011-04-1079 (State of Ohio v.

Danielle Nicole Smith) (“Criminal Case”) and Ninth District Court of Appeals Case No. 28102,

State v. Danielle Nichol Smith, C.A. No. 28123, 2017 WL 1450519 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 19,

2017) (collectively, “Ohio court proceedings”). (Doc. No. 3 [“Mem.”].) In the memorandum,

Szarell asserts challenges to the Criminal Case, including “Bogus/Fabricated charges” and failure

to receive Miranda rights when arrested by the Stow Police Department, so Szarell “was

oblivious I was being arrested.” (Id. at 28, 30.)

Szarell then filed a supplemental memorandum (Doc. No. 4 [“Supp. Mem.”].) In the

supplemental memorandum, Szarell alleges that the Summit County Court of Common Pleas has

abused its power and is “liable to be dissolved,” and designates Dustin David Szarell to receive

property taken from Szarell by that court. (Id. at 34–36.)

Most recently, Szarell filed a document containing multiple captions as follows: “Writ of

Motion to Dismiss, Quo Warranto, Notice of Demand, Writ of Habeas Corpus.” (Doc. No. 5

[“Writ”].)2 In the writ, Szarell states that “[t]his writ is issued by common right pursuant to

God’s law (Common Law) as applicable to this case, against Children Services … attempting to

deny custody, by collusion … to [Danielle-Nichol Szarell] and [Dustin-David Szarell] without

just cause or either in good faith. (Id. at 4 (emphasis removed).)

2 The Court collectively refers to the complaint, memorandum, supplemental memorandum, and writ as

“pleadings.”

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II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,

365, 102 S. Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520,

92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972), the Court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis

action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,

lacks an arguable basis in law or fact, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

immune from such relief. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338

(1989); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an

arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised upon an indisputably meritless legal theory or

when the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

The dismissal standard for Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) articulated in Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) governs dismissal for failure to state a claim

under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). In order to state a

plausible claim, a pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–78. Plaintiff is not required to include detailed

factual allegations, but must provide more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-

me accusation. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151

F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 197).

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B. Analysis

The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332

Federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over civil actions “arising under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and over cases

where there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and the amount in

controversy exceeds $75,000.00, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Federal courts are courts of

limited jurisdiction, and the party invoking jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the

Court’s authority to hear a case. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377,

114 S. Ct. 1673, 128 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1994).

Szarell identifies diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as the basis for subject

matter jurisdiction. (Compl. at 4.) But she does not allege facts in the pleadings concerning the

citizenship of each party or the amount in controversy. Nor does she articulate any facts from

which the Court could infer diversity jurisdiction pursuant to § 1332. In the absence of subject

matter jurisdiction, the Court lacks authority over this matter and this case is dismissed. Carlock

v. Williams, 182 F.3d 916 (Table) (6th Cir. 1999) (when the face of the complaint provides no

basis for federal jurisdiction, the action may be dismissed as frivolous and for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction) (citing Michigan Sav. & Loan League v. Francis, 683 F.2d 957, 960 (6th Cir.

1982)).

Szarell fails to state a plausible claim for relief

Even if the Court construed Szarell’s citation to various federal statutes as the basis for a

federal question pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under § 1331, the pleadings do not satisfy federal

notice pleading requirements because they do not provide defendants with fair notice of the

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claims against them and the grounds upon which those claims rest. Twombly, 550 U.S at 555.

Merely listing defendants in the caption of the complaint, but raising no specific factual

allegations against each defendant, is insufficient to raise a plausible claim. See Gilmore v. Corr.

Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,

155–57, 98 S. Ct. 1729, 56 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1978)). Even liberally construing the pleadings,

Szarell, at best, asserts conclusory defendants-unlawfully-harmed-me allegations which are

insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

This case is subject to dismissal pursuant to § 1915(e)(2) for this additional reason.

The Court may not interfere with Ohio court proceedings

Even if this action were not subject to dismissal for the above-stated reasons, the Court

would nevertheless dismiss this action.

The pleadings are unclear as to the status of the Ohio court proceedings. But to the extent

that Szarell asks this Court to intervene, the Court may not do so. A federal court must abstain

from interfering with pending state court proceedings involving important state interests absent

extraordinary circumstances not present here. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44–45, 91 S.

Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971). Abstention is appropriate where: (1) state proceedings are

ongoing, (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests, and (3) the state

proceedings afford plaintiff with an adequate opportunity to raise federal questions. Criminal

proceedings implicate important state interests. Leveye v. Metro. Pub. Def. Office, 73 F. App’x

792, 794 (6th Cir. 2003) (a criminal case implicates an important state interest as state criminal

prosecutions have traditionally been considered an arena in which federal courts decline to

interfere) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–45). With respect to the third factor, it is Szarell’s

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burden to demonstrate that she is barred from presenting any federal claim that she may have in

the state court proceedings, and she does not allege that those proceedings did not or could not

provide her with an opportunity to do so. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14–15, 107 S.

Ct. 1519, 95 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1987). Therefore, to the extent that the Ohio court proceedings remain

pending, the second and third factors of the Younger abstention analysis are satisfied, and the

Court abstains from interfering with those pending proceedings.

To the extent that Szarell claims that she was unlawfully charged and detained in the

Criminal Case, habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy to challenge the fact or duration of her

conviction and/or confinement. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L.

Ed. 2d 383 (1994) (“habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges

the fact or duration of his confinement ... even though such a claim may come within the literal

terms of § 1983”) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-490, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 36 L. Ed.

2d 439 (1973)). A state prisoner does not state a cognizable claim under § 1983 unless and until

her conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid

by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. Szarell does not allege or infer in the pleadings that the

Criminal Case has been resolved in her favor or invalidated in any of the ways articulated in

Heck.

Lastly, to the extent the pleadings constitute an appeal of any state court proceeding, this

Court lacks jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Dist. of Columbia Court

of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1983); Rooker v.

Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16, 44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed. 362 (1923). “Where federal

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relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong, it is difficult to

conceive the federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the

state-court judgment.” Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 295 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Keene Corp.

v. Cass, 908 F.2d 293, 296-97 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 25)), amended on

other grounds 243 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2001). Federal appellate review of state court judgments

can only occur in the United States Supreme Court. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483; Rooker, 263

U.S. at 415-16. The Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain such an appeal.

II. Conclusion

For all the foregoing reasons, this action is dismissed. Szarell’s motion to proceed in

forma pauperis is granted (Doc. No. 2). The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3),

that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 21, 2019 □□ □□

HONORABLE SARA LIOI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE