The Church of Holy Redemption v. Wendell, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

PASTOR DEAN J. SANDSTROM,

Plaintiff, DECISION AND ORDER

v. 1:23-CV-00405 EAW

PAUL WENDELL, JR, individually

and in his official capacity as

Chautauqua County Executive, et al.,

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

Pro se plaintiff Dean J. Sandstrom (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against defendants

Chautauqua County Executive Paul Wendell, Jr., Chautauqua County Director of Real

Property Services Kim A. Meleen, Assistant Chautauqua County Attorney Todd Thomas,

Town of Carrol Tax Collector Susan Rowley, Town of Carrol Tax Assessor Tera Darts,

and City of Jamestown Tax Assessor Lisa Volpe (collectively “Defendants”). (Dkt. 1).

Plaintiff initially filed the lawsuit on behalf of himself and The Church of Holy

Redemption (“the Church”). The Court advised the Church that, as a non-profit

association, it could not proceed pro se and needed to retain counsel if it wished to pursue

the claims asserted in this matter. (Dkt. 2). Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration

(Dkt. 13), which was denied (Dkt. 16). When the Church failed to retain counsel by the

extended deadline, its claims were dismissed. (See id.). Plaintiff then filed a motion to

join the Dean Joseph Sandstrom Trust (“the Trust”) as a plaintiff. (Dkt. 18). The Court

denied the motion without prejudice because Plaintiff did not provide a proposed amended

pleading explaining the basis for joinder of the Trust, and further advised that the Trust

could not appear in the case without representation by counsel. (Dkt. 19).

Presently before the Court is a motion to dismiss the complaint filed by defendants

Tera Darts, Kim A. Meleen, Todd Thomas, and Paul Wendell, Jr. (collectively “County

Defendants”). (Dkt. 14). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on August 22, 2023 (Dkt.

21), and County Defendants filed a reply on September 5, 2023 (Dkt. 23). For the reasons

set forth below, County Defendants’ motion is granted and the claims against those

defendants are dismissed without prejudice.1

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s complaint. (Dkt. 1). As required at

this stage of the proceedings, the Court treats Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true.

The Church is a religious institution in Western New York that owns real property

that is used for religious exercises and community services and Plaintiff is the Church’s

pastor. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 17, 27). On December 12, 2015, Plaintiff created the Trust, a private

1 The complaint is not dismissed as to defendants Lisa Volpe or Susan Rowley.

Counsel for Lisa Volpe filed an answer on June 15, 2023. (Dkt. 12). On August 25, 2023,

she filed a response to Plaintiff’s submission in opposition to the pending motion to dismiss

inexplicably stating that “by Order of the Court . . . this matter is and has been dismissed

since July 17, 2023.” (Dkt. 22). While the Church was dismissed as a party in July of

2023 in light of its failure to obtain counsel, nothing in any of the Court’s orders dismissed

Plaintiff’s claims. Defendant Susan Rowley has not appeared through counsel, or

answered or otherwise moved against Plaintiff’s complaint. Nonetheless, because the

Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims, it will issue

an order to show cause directing Plaintiff to set forth sufficient reasons as to why the

complaint should not also be dismissed against defendants Lisa Volpe and Susan Rowley

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

charitable trust. (Id. at ¶ 34). On December 15, 2016, Plaintiff incorporated the Church,

named the Church as beneficiary of the Trust, and issued 100% of the rights to distribution

of the Trust estate to the Church. (Id. at ¶ 35). The Church owns two real properties, one

located at 341 Wiltsie Road, in Frewsburg, New York and a second at 341-343 Forest

Avenue in Jamestown, New York (collectively “the properties”). (Id. at ¶ 37). The

complaint alleges that “[b]oth properties are used exclusively in furtherance of the

Church’s purposes, and no pecuniary profit benefits any of the officers or, members, or

employees and the Church is not used as a guise for profit-making operations.” (Id. at ¶ 8).

Plaintiff alleges that the religious belief of the Church prevents him from owning real

property. (Id. at ¶ 33).

In February of 2017, the Church provided paperwork to the tax assessors for the

Town of Carrol and City of Jamestown notifying them of the conversion of the properties

for religious use. (Id. at ¶ 42). Some five years later, in February of 2022, Defendant

Thomas sent a notice of petition and notice of foreclosure to Plaintiff regarding past due

property taxes for the properties. (Id. at ¶ 44). Despite being informed by Plaintiff that the

properties had been converted to religious use and were exempt, Defendants concluded

that the Church did not meet the legal definition of a church and informed Plaintiff that the

conversion some five years earlier was ineffective. (Id. at ¶ 53).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants impermissibly burdened Plaintiff and the Church’s

right to free exercise of religion by prohibiting Plaintiff from converting, using, and

developing the properties for religious use without any rational or compelling government

interest in doing so. (Id. at ¶¶ 19, 20). Plaintiff further alleges that the Church’s religious

beliefs are substantially burdened by having to apply for tax-exempt status, keep records

of income and expenses, and provide statements sworn to under oath. (Id. at ¶¶ 29, 32).

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standards

County Defendants seek dismissal pursuant to both Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6). The legal standards applicable to each are set forth below.

A. Rule 12(b)(1)—Subject Matter Jurisdiction

“A district court properly dismisses an action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction if the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to

adjudicate it. . . .” Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecomms, S.á.r.l, 790 F.3d

411, 416-17 (2d Cir. 2015) (quotation and citation omitted). “A plaintiff asserting subject

matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it

exists.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). “When considering

a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction . . . a court must accept as true

all material factual allegations in the complaint.” Shipping Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Drakos,

140 F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Tandon v. Captain’s Cove Marina of Bridgeport,

Inc., 752 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 2014) (“In resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(1), the district court must take all uncontroverted facts in the complaint . . . as true,

and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction.”). In

addition, a court is not limited to the allegations in the complaint and can “refer to evidence

outside the pleadings,” Luckett v. Bure, 290 F.3d 493, 496-97 (2d Cir. 2002), but it “may

not rely on conclusory or hearsay statements contained in the affidavits,” J.S. v. Attica

Central Schools, 386 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2004). “Indeed, a challenge to the

jurisdictional elements of a plaintiff’s claim allows the Court to weigh the evidence and

satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Celestine v. Mt. Vernon

Neighborhood Health Ctr., 289 F. Supp. 2d 392, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quotation omitted),

aff’d, 403 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2005).

“Where, as here, the defendant moves for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), Fed. R.

Civ. P., as well as on other grounds, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) challenge

first since if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the

accompanying defenses and objections become moot and do not need to be determined.”

Rhulen Agency, Inc. v. Alabama Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 896 F.2d 674, 678 (2d Cir. 1990)

(quotation omitted).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)—Failure to State a Claim

“In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6), a district court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents

attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the

complaint.” DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010). A court

should consider the motion by “accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Trs. of Upstate N.Y. Eng’rs Pension Fund

v. Ivy Asset Mgmt., 843 F.3d 561, 566 (2d Cir. 2016). To withstand dismissal, a plaintiff

must set forth “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 589 F.3d 542,

546 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need

detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his

entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal

quotations and citations omitted). “To state a plausible claim, the complaint’s ‘[f]actual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Nielsen

v. AECOM Tech. Corp., 762 F.3d 214, 218 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555). While the Court is “obliged to construe [pro se] pleadings liberally, particularly

when they allege civil rights violations,” McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d

Cir. 2004), even pleadings submitted pro se must satisfy the plausibility standard set forth

in Iqbal and Twombly, see Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Even after

Twombly, though, we remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally.”).

II. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff’s first claim in his complaint arises under the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, et seq. This statute

provides: “No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner

that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious

assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden

on that person, assembly, or institution—(A) is in furtherance of a compelling

governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling

governmental interest.” Id. § 2000cc(a)(1). Plaintiff also raises constitutional claims,

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that include alleged violations of the Free Exercise

and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, he asserts New York state law claims for breach of

implied contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

As relief, Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment that Defendants’ prohibition of the

conversion of the properties for religious use violates Plaintiffs’ rights pursuant to RLUIPA

and the Constitution, entry of injunctive relief enjoining Defendants from prohibiting the

conversion, use, and development of the properties for religious use, and an award of

compensatory and punitive damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees. (Dkt. 1 at 15).

III. The Court lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Federal Claims

“Where, as here, the defendant moves for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), Fed. R.

Civ. P., as well as on other grounds, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) challenge

first since if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the

accompanying defenses and objections become moot and do not need to be determined.”

Rhulen Agency, Inc. v. Alabama Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 896 F.2d 674, 678 (2d Cir. 1990)

(quotation omitted). Although County Defendants pose alternative arguments in support

of their motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, most compelling is County

Defendants’ argument that the Tax Injunction Act and principles of comity bar the Court’s

consideration of Plaintiff’s federal claims.

The Tax Injunction Act provides that “[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend

or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain,

speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341;

Campaniello v. New York State Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., 737 F. App’x 594, 596 (2d Cir.

2018) (“The TIA is meant to strictly limit federal courts from interfering with local tax

matters. . . . This prohibition is jurisdictional and strips the federal courts of subject matter

jurisdiction.” (citation omitted); Pan v. City of Niagara Falls, No. 20-CV-1896 (JLS), 2023

WL 3025149, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2023) (“The Tax Injunction Act prohibits federal

courts from issuing injunctive or declaratory relief in challenges to state tax laws if state

remedies are adequate.” (citing Kraebel v. New York City Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 959

F.2d 395, 400 (2d Cir. 1992))); Roberts v. NYS Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., No. 1:22-CV-0208

(LTS), 2022 WL 1004246, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2022) (“[T]he TIA bars taxpayers from

challenging the payment of state taxes in a federal district court.”). “The principal purpose

of the Tax Injunction Act [is] ‘to limit drastically federal district court jurisdiction to

interfere with so important a local concern as the collection of taxes.’” California v. Grace

Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408-09 (1982) (quoting Rosewell v. LaSalle National

Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 522 (1981)); see also Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 107 (2004) (“In

sum, this Court has interpreted and applied the TIA only in cases Congress wrote the Act

to address, i.e., cases in which state taxpayers seek federal-court orders enabling them to

avoid paying state taxes.”).

Under the related doctrine of comity, federal courts are restrained ‘“from

entertaining claims for relief that risk disrupting state tax administration,’ including claims

for damages” if state court remedies are plain, adequate, and complete. Glob. Leadership

Found. v. City of New York, No. 22-2095, 2023 WL 3144043, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 2023)

(quoting Levin v. Com. Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413, 417 (2010)). “While the TIA bars

injunctive and declaratory relief, ‘it is the principle of comity that prevents a taxpayer from

seeking damages.’” DeMartino v. New York State Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., No. 22-720, 2023

WL 2563967, at *4 (2d Cir. Mar. 20, 2023) (quoting Dorce v. City of New York, 2 F.4th

82, 97 (2d Cir. 2021)); see also Casciani v. Town of Webster, 501 F. App’x 77, 80 (2d Cir.

2012) (“Actions under § 1983 seeking damages related to the collection of state taxes are

barred by the principle of comity so long as there is a procedurally adequate state

alternative procedure for challenging the assessment.”). The comity doctrine is more

expansive than the Tax Injunction Act and “restrains federal courts from entertaining

claims for relief that risk disrupting state tax administration.” Levin, 560 U.S. at 417.

In order for a state remedy to be considered sufficient under the Tax Injunction Act

or principles of comity, it need only be procedurally adequate and complete, and the

procedures provided under New York law have been deemed to be so. See Tully v. Griffin,

Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 75 (1976) (“It also seems clear that under New York law [plaintiff] can

fully preserve its right to challenge the amount of tax due while litigating its constitutional

claim that no tax at all can validly be assessed against it.”); Casciani, 501 F. App’x at 80

(“Because New York has procedurally adequate mechanisms for challenging tax

assessments, see Joseph v. Hyman, 659 F.3d 215, 220-21 (2d Cir. 2011), [plaintiff’s]

§ 1983 damages claim is barred by the principle of comity.”); Roberts, 2022 WL 1004246,

at *3 (“The Supreme Court of the United States has previously concluded that the State of

New York’s procedures for challenging tax assessments meet the abovementioned ‘plain,

speedy and efficient’ standard. (citing Tully, 429 U.S. at 74-77; Long Island Lighting Co.

v. Town of Brookhaven, 889 F.2d 428, 431 (2d Cir. 1989))). Specifically, New York

provides multiple avenues for a party seeking to challenge a tax assessment or denial of an

exemption. See, e.g., Henke v. City of Newburgh, N.Y., No. 11-CV-3663, 2012 WL

12883587, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2012) (“[T]he remedies available in the New York

state courts are sufficient to protect plaintiffs’ rights regarding tax assessment challenges,

. . . including the procedures in Article 7 of the [Real Property Tax Law], Article 78

proceedings, declaratory judgment actions, and Section 1983 claims in state court.”), aff’d,

519 F. App’x 55 (2d Cir. 2013).

Here, Plaintiff is attempting to enjoin County Defendants from assessing taxes

based on their determination that the Church is not entitled to tax-exempt status. But

Plaintiff has not provided any basis for the Court to conclude that New York does not

provide plain, speedy, and efficient remedies through its state court avenues. Indeed, it

does and Plaintiff’s claims seeking to prevent the collection of taxes are barred by the Tax

Injunction Act, thus depriving this Court of jurisdiction over the claims. See, e.g., Henke,

2012 WL 12883587, at *1 (efforts by church to challenge failure to grant tax exempt status

barred by Tax Injunction Act).

Further, as to Plaintiff’s claims seeking relief not expressly barred by the Tax

Injunction Act, principles of comity warrant the Court declining to exercise jurisdiction.

The Court examines three factors to assess the applicability of comity principles to assess

whether a party’s claims may proceed in federal court: first, whether the case presents

issues of economic discrimination that do not involve “classifications subject to heightened

scrutiny . . . or fundamental rights”; second, whether the federal and state courts are equally

suited to address the issues; and third, whether the matters in question relate to the party’s

own tax liability. Dorce, 2 F.4th at 100; see also Glob. Leadership Found. v. City of New

York, No. 21CV10942 (DLC), 2022 WL 2788398, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2022) (“The

Supreme Court has identified three factors to distinguish between cases where comity

controls and those that may proceed in federal court. . . . First, a federal court provides a

less appropriate forum in cases that do not involve classifications subject to heightened

scrutiny or fundamental rights. . . . Second, comity is more likely to bar cases in which the

court must decide whether the inequality should be fixed by leveling up--extending the

benefit to all--or leveling down--withdrawing the benefit from all. . . . And third, state

courts and agencies are better suited to hear cases in which the plaintiff’s own tax liability

is at issue.” (citations and quotations omitted)), aff’d, No. 22-2095, 2023 WL 3144043 (2d

Cir. Apr. 28, 2023).

The Second Circuit decision in Global Leadership Foundation, 2023 WL 3144043,

is instructive. In that case, Global Leadership Foundation (“GLF”), a non-profit secular

charity established to promote educational and cultural enrichment for students, applied for

and was denied multiple requests for property-tax exemptions. Id. at *1. GLF also opposed

increases in the assessment value of its property. Id. In its complaint, GLF alleged that

the denial of tax exemptions and increase in the assessed value of its property were acts of

retaliation and discrimination. Id. at *1. GLF brought “claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for violations of the Free Speech Clause, Establishment Clause, Due Process

Clause, and Equal Protection Clause, as well as claims against the City for municipal

liability.” Glob. Leadership Found., 2022 WL 2788398, at *2. The Second Circuit

affirmed the district court’s determination that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

over all of Plaintiff’s claims based on the Tax Injunction Act and comity doctrine, despite

the inclusion of claims alleging core First Amendment rights. 2023 WL 3144043 at *2.

So too here, the crux of the claims in Plaintiff’s complaint concern his allegations

that the Church is substantially burdened by having to apply for tax-exempt status and that

the denial of his applications for that status were unconstitutional and violative of his

federal and constitutional rights. Each of his federal claims amount to a challenge of the

denial of the Church’s tax-exempt status and constitute an effort to disrupt state tax

administration. Although, like GLF, Plaintiff asserts claims implicating fundamental rights

under the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses and that weighs in his favor on a comity

assessment, the other factors weigh in favor of a state forum, particularly where the

remedies available in state court are adequate and the challenges raised are not to an

unconstitutional government program, but rather, to claims arising out of Plaintiff’s own

tax liability. Accordingly, despite Plaintiff’s attempts to recharacterize his claims as

amounting to a zoning challenge, or a suggestion that the assessment exceeded the

jurisdictional limits for tax assessors, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged any burden on his

religious beliefs apart from having to apply for tax-exempt status or being required to pay

taxes. At its core, Plaintiff is seeking a federal court ruling on a local tax matter, which is

specifically circumscribed by the Tax Injunction Act and principles of comity. See Pan,

2023 WL 3025149, at *4 (“Therefore, because procedurally adequate state remedies, such

as a § 1983 action in state court, are available to [Pan], his constitutional objections to the

[City’s] tax assessment should be lodged in state court, not federal court. . . . For these

reasons, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Pan’s Section 1983 claims challenging his

property assessments and the City’s tax administration scheme.” (quotation and citation

omitted)); Carnivale v. City of New York, No. 17-CV-1868 (WFK), 2017 WL 5558646, at

*2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2017) (“Here, although Plaintiff cites to the Fourth, Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, essentially he is asking this Court to

determine that he does not owe property taxes the City has determined are due and

owing.”), aff’d, 711 F. App’x 59 (2d Cir. 2018); Cmty. Programs of Westchester of Jewish

Cmty. Servs. v. City of Mount Vernon, No. 06 CIV. 3332 SCRGAY, 2007 WL 2981915, at

*2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2007) (“In this case, plaintiff challenges the denial of tax exempt

status to its property. However, plaintiff cannot deny that a plain, speedy and efficient

remedy exists for it in the New York state courts. . . . Moreover, the fact that plaintiff

ascribes discriminatory animus to defendants does not allow this Court to exercise

jurisdiction.”); see also Islamic Ctr. of Nashville v. Tennessee, 872 F.3d 377, 386 (6th Cir.

2017) (dismissing claims for violations of Religious Freedom Restoration Act, RLUIPA,

and Establishment Clause brought by religious nonprofit organization challenging denial

of its application for retroactive property tax exemption on grounds that the Tax Injunction

Act and comity principles barred action).

IV. Plaintiff’s RLUIPA Claim

Although there are plenty of cases within this Circuit dismissing constitutional

claims on the basis of the Tax Injunction Act and principles of comity, the Court has not

found a case in this Circuit dismissing a RLUIPA claim on those grounds, although as

referenced above the Sixth Circuit reached that conclusion in Islamic Ctr. of Nashville.

Nonetheless, out of an abundance of caution, the Court addresses County Defendants’ other

arguments with respect to Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim, and concludes that it fails on alternate

grounds even if the Court were to conclude that it was not subsumed by the Tax Injunction

Act and principles of comity.

A. Standing and Ripeness

“The law of Article III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles,

serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political

branches.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (citations omitted).

“[S]tanding is not dispensed in gross” and “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing

for each claim [it] seeks to press and for each form of relief that is sought.” Town of

Chester, N.Y. v. Laroe Ests., Inc., 581 U.S. 433, 439 (2017) (quotations omitted). “A

plaintiff seeking injunctive or declaratory relief cannot rely on past injury to satisfy

[standing’s] injury requirement but must show a likelihood that he or she will be injured in

the future.” Deshawn E. by Charlotte E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 344 (2d Cir. 1998); see

also Marcavage v. City of New York, 689 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 2012) (“To obtain

prospective relief, such as a declaratory judgment or an injunction, a plaintiff must show,

inter alia, ‘a sufficient likelihood that he [or she] will again be wronged in a similar way.”

(emphasis and alteration in original and quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,

111 (1983))).

“[T]he doctrine of standing serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately

resolved through the judicial process.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990).

The Second Circuit has explained:

To satisfy the requirements of Article III standing, plaintiffs must

demonstrate “(1) [an] injury-in-fact, which is a concrete and particularized

harm to a legally protected interest; (2) causation in the form of a fairly

traceable connection between the asserted injury-in-fact and the alleged

actions of the defendant; and (3) redressability, or a non-speculative

likelihood that the injury can be remedied by the requested relief.”

Hu v. City of New York, 927 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Selevan v. New York

Thruway Auth., 711 F.3d 253, 257 (2d Cir. 2013)). “These elements are not mere pleading

requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case.” Id. (quotation and

alteration omitted).

At the pleading stage, to survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) based on lack of standing, a plaintiff must “allege facts that

affirmatively and plausibly suggest that [he] has standing to sue.” Amidax Trading Grp. v.

S.W.I.F.T. SCRL, 671 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2011). “The presence of a disagreement,

however sharp and acrimonious it may be, is insufficient by itself to meet Art. III’s

requirements.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 704 (2013) (quotation and citation

omitted).

County Defendants argue that because the Church owns the property and owes the

property taxes, as such, it is the only entity with standing to assert any of the claims in

Plaintiff’s complaint. (Dkt. 14-2 at 7-16). However, Plaintiff specifically alleges that he

is the pastor of the Church and has a leasehold interest in the properties. (Dkt. 21 at 4).

Moreover, it appears that he resides at one of the properties. (See Dkt. 1 at 20, 54

(identifying Plaintiff’s address as 341 Wiltsie)). RLUIPA permits a claim to be asserted

by an individual with “an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other property

interest in the regulated land,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5), and the Second Circuit has

confirmed that property ownership in the subject property is not required to establish

standing for a RLUIPA claim, see Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield Cnty., Inc. v. Litchfield

Historic Dist. Comm’n, 768 F.3d 183, 201 (2d Cir. 2014) (“There can be little doubt that

Rabbi Eisenbach has met the constitutional requirements of Article III standing to assert

his RLUIPA claim. At a minimum, Rabbi Eisenbach alleged that he intended to live at the

proposed facilities. The HDC’s denial of the Chabad’s application, and the conditions it

imposed on any renewed application, thus deprived Rabbi Eisenbach of the ability to live

in the facilities as proposed, an injury that may be redressed by relief from the district

court.”); see also Omar Islamic Ctr. Inc. v. City of Meriden, 633 F. Supp. 3d 600, 614 (D.

Conn. 2022) (“Under Second Circuit law, a plaintiff need not have a legally cognizable

property interest in order to have Article III standing to bring a claim pursuant to RLUIPA.

. . Second, Plaintiff has alleged discrimination, which is a sufficient injury in fact to pursue

RLUIPA claims.”); Congregation Rabbinical Coll. of Tartikov, Inc. v. Vill. of Pomona,

915 F. Supp. 2d 574, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that trained rabbis who sought to live

and to teach at a planned rabbinical college affected by zoning ordinances had standing to

assert RLUIPA claim), aff’d, 945 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2019).

Relatedly, “constitutional ripeness” is “a specific application of the actual injury

aspect of Article III standing” i.e., an injury-in-fact. Nat’l Org. for Marriage, Inc. v. Walsh,

714 F.3d 682, 688 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Rabbi Israel Meyer Hacohen Rabbinical

Seminary of Am. v. Town of Putnam Valley, No. 21 CV 07050 (NSR), 2022 WL 4357933,

at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2022) (“The doctrine of ripeness is closely related to the doctrine

of standing.”), appeal withdrawn, No. 22-2746, 2022 WL 19571119 (2d Cir. Dec. 9, 2022).

“Constitutional ripeness, in other words, is really just about the first [standing] factor—to

say a plaintiff’s claim is constitutionally unripe is to say the plaintiff’s claimed injury, if

any, is not ‘actual or imminent,’ but instead ‘conjectural or hypothetical.’” Nat’l Org. for

Marriage, 714 F.3d at 688 (citation omitted); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (To establish standing, “the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in

fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized .

. . and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” (internal quotation and

citations omitted)).

While in the instant context, “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required

for RLUIPA claims,” Murphy v. Zoning Comm’n of Town of New Milford, 223 F. Supp.

2d 377, 382 & n.3 (D. Conn. 2002) (“The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Patsy v. Board of

Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), as to why exhaustion is not a prerequisite to a § 1983 claim,

is equally applicable to claims under RLUIPA.”), a RLUIPA claim nevertheless must be

ripe for review, Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of Greater Rochester v. Town of Milo, 563

F. Supp. 3d 71, 81 (W.D.N.Y. 2021). “Federal suits in the land-use context, like this one,

are generally not ripe for adjudication until a landowner receives a final, definitive decision

on a land-use application.” Vill. Green At Sayville, LLC v. Town of Islip, 43 F.4th 287, 290

(2d Cir. 2022); see also Ateres Bais Yaakov Acad. of Rockland v. Town of Clarkstown, 88

F.4th 344, 351 (2d Cir. 2023) (“So long as a plaintiff has submitted a meaningful

application to municipal agencies to address its land-use controversy, and the municipal

entity responsible for the relevant zoning laws has had an opportunity to commit to a

position ‘that by all accounts, it intends to be final,’ the parties’ dispute is sufficiently final

for ripeness purposes.” (quoting Vill. Green at Sayville, 43 F.4th at 297-98)); Murphy v.

New Milford Zoning Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342, 348 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that “the

Supreme Court has developed specific ripeness requirements applicable to land use

disputes,” including that the plaintiff “was required to obtain a final, definitive position as

to how it could use the property from the entity charged with implementing the zoning

regulations”).

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that he submitted a meaningful application to

challenge the controversy or gave Defendants an opportunity to commit to a position

intended to be “final.” Plaintiff does not allege that he completed the necessary

requirements to challenge the properties’ status, commenced any appeal of the

determination, or that such efforts would be futile, weighing against a finding that the

claims are ripe. See Rabbi Israel Meyer Hacohen Rabbinical Seminary of Am., 2022 WL

4357933, at *1 (granting motion to dismiss on grounds that RLUIPA claim was not ripe

because decision was not final); see also Structure Tone, LLC v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co.,

No. 23-CV-5015 (JPO), 2023 WL 8850073, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2023) (“[T]he court

made clear that this issue implicates subject matter jurisdiction, because a sufficiently ripe

dispute is necessary to satisfy Article III’s ‘actual case or controversy’ requirement.”). On

this basis, Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim is not ripe for review and is subject to dismissal for a

lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

B. Failure to State a Claim

Alternatively, even if the Court possessed subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

RLUIPA claim, the claim must be dismissed on the merits because Plaintiff has not alleged

the existence of a land use regulation that has substantially burdened his religious beliefs.

Under RLUIPA, “the term ‘land use regulation’ means a zoning or landmarking law, or the

application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant’s use or development of land

(including a structure affixed to land), . . .” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-5.

In Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250 (W.D.N.Y. 2005),

the Court held that a town’s eminent domain proceedings did not constitute “land use

regulation” for purposes of RLUIPA because RLUIPA’s statutory definition expressly

limits its application to zoning and landmarking laws that restrict development or use of

property. Id. at 254-55. The court noted that “landmarking laws” “generally involve the

‘regulat[ion] and restrict[ion of] certain areas as national historic landmarks, special

historic sites, places and buildings for the purpose of conservation, protection,

enhancement and perpetuation of these places of natural heritage.’” (quoting N.Y. Village

L. § 7-700). Likewise, “zoning laws” in New York state are designed ‘“to regulate and

restrict the height, number of stories and size of buildings and other structures, the

percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts, and other open spaces, the

density of population, and the location and use of buildings, structures and land for trade,

industry, residence or other purposes . . .’ within their borders.” Id. (quoting N.Y. Town

L. § 261). The Court concluded that although eminent domain proceedings involve land,

it was a distinct concept not covered by zoning or landmarking regulations, such that

application to RLUIPA was warranted. Id. at 258; see also Ripley v. City of Olean, New

York, No. 18-CV-00941-LJV-JJM, 2019 WL 4396074, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2019)

(deeming a city requirement that contractors performing work within the city be insured,

which Amish roofer was unable to satisfy because of his religion, did not constitute a land

use regulation), adopted, No. 18-CV-941, 2019 WL 4394189 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2019);

Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 998 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that “a

government agency implements a ‘land use regulation’ only when it acts pursuant to a

‘zoning or landmarking law’ that limits the manner in which a claimant may develop or

use property in which the claimant has an interest” and that an annexation statute did not

fall within that definition (quoting Prater v. City of Burnside, 289 F.3d 417, 434 (6th Cir.

2002))); Colorado Springs Fellowship Church v. City of Colorado Springs, No. 21-CV-

1368-WJM-MEH, 2022 WL 344895, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 4, 2022) (laws relating to

tenants’ rights and eviction proceedings did not constitute land use zoning or landmarking

laws covered by RLUIPA); Zinman v. Nova Se. Univ., Inc., No. 21-CV-60723, 2021 WL

4025722, at *20 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2021) (holding that party failed to state RLUIPA claim

where emergency masking and stay-home orders issued during Covid-19 pandemic were

“not zoning or landmarking laws, nor do they involve the application of zoning or

landmarking laws”), adopted, No. 21-CIV-60723-RAR, 2021 WL 4226028 (S.D. Fla. Sept.

15, 2021), aff’d, No. 21-13476, 2023 WL 2669904 (11th Cir. Mar. 29, 2023).

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that his desired use of the property for religious

purposes was prohibited by any land use regulation related to a zoning or landmarking law.

Rather, the burden identified by Plaintiff relates solely to the application for and denial of

the Church’s tax-exempt status. (See Dkt. 21 at 26 (“Plaintiff Sandstrom asserts that the

defendants’ actions, especially regarding the tax-exempt status of the properties in

question, are a clear violation of his rights under (RLUIPA).”); 27 (“The consistent and

pronounced neglect Sandstrom experienced in his attempts to secure attention for his tax-

exempt applications exemplifies such a burden [pursuant to RPLUIPA].”)). In other words,

Plaintiff does not cite to any land use regulation relating to zoning or landmarking to

support his RLUIPA claim, but instead claims that his religious beliefs are being

substantially burdened by Defendants’ tax determination for the properties. Indeed,

Plaintiff’s complaint does not identify any restriction that actually limits his ability to

practice his religion at the properties unrelated to the properties’ tax status. For these

reasons, Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim fails to plausibly state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.

V. State Law Claims

Having determined, for the reasons set forth above, that Plaintiff has not asserted

viable federal claims, the Court considers whether it should exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over his state law breach of implied contract and breach of implied covenant

of good faith and fair dealing claims. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), “in any civil action of

which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have

supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action

within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under

Article III of the United States Constitution.” Where, as here, it is determined that the

Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the asserted federal claims or that they

otherwise fail to state a claim, it is appropriate to dismiss the state law claims and not

exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See Cangemi v. United States, 13 F.4th 115, 134 (2d

Cir. 2021) (“Where a district court dismisses all federal claims under Rule 12(b)(1) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, the district court is precluded from exercising

supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”); Cohen v. Postal

Holdings, LLC, 873 F.3d 394, 399 (2d Cir. 2017) (“It follows that when a district court

correctly dismisses all federal claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(1), the district court is thereby precluded from exercising supplemental

jurisdiction over related state-law claims.”); Valencia ex rel. Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299,

305 (2d Cir. 2003) (where “federal law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of

factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction

over the remaining state-law claims” (quoting Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484

U.S. 343, 349-50 (1988)).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state law breach of implied contract and breach of implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims are dismissed without prejudice.

VI. Leave to Amend

Generally, the Court will afford a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend “unless

the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended

complaint would succeed in stating a claim.” Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir.

2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, leave to amend pleadings is properly

denied where amendment would be futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d

Cir. 2000); see also Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993)

(“Where it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive, . . . it is not

an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.”); Myers v. Sperazza, 11-CV-292(JTC),

2012 WL 6690303, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2012) (dismissing pro se complaint without

leave to amend because “there is no indication a valid claim can be stated and the court has

determined that leave to amend the complaint would be futile’).

Here, the deficiencies with Plaintiff's complaint, including most significantly this

Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction, cannot be cured with better pleadings. Thus,

although the Court is cognizant of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court concludes that

allowing Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint would be an exercise in

futility.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, County Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. 14) is

granted, and Plaintiff's claims are dismissed without prejudice as to defendants Kim A.

Meleen, Todd Thomas, Paul Wendell, Jr., and Tera Darts. The Clerk of Court is directed

to terminate these defendants from this action.

SO ORDERED.

Leche

_piP

ELIZABETHA. WOLFORD

hief Judge

United States District Court

Dated: March 22, 2024

Rochester, New York

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