Randle v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

____________________________________________

SHANELL R.,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE # 1:21-cv-00166

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

____________________________________________

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

LAW OFFICES OF KENNETH HILLER, PLLC KENNETH R. HILLER, ESQ.

Counsel for Plaintiff MARY ELLEN GILL, ESQ.

600 North Bailey Ave

Suite 1A

Amherst, NY 14226

U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. HEETANO SHAMSOONDAR,

OFFICE OF REG’L GEN. COUNSEL ESQ.

Counsel for Defendant

6401 Security Boulevard

Baltimore, MD 21235

J. Gregory Wehrman, U.S. Magistrate Judge,

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER

The parties consented in accordance with a standing order to proceed before the

undersigned. The court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The matter

is presently before the court on the parties’ cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant

to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon review of the administrative record

and consideration of the parties’ filings, the plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the administrative

record is DENIED, the defendant’s motion for judgment on the administrative record is

GRANTED, and the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff was born on April 2, 1972 and has at least a high school education. (Tr. 216, 220).

Generally, plaintiff’s alleged disability at the time of application was post-traumatic stress disorder

(PTSD), right knee and foot issues, psoriasis, depression, tendonitis, bilateral carpal tunnel, and

stomach problems. (Tr. 219).

B. Procedural History

On August 22, 2017, plaintiff protectively applied for Supplemental Security Income

Benefits (SSI) under Title XVI. (Tr. 191). Plaintiff’s application was denied initially, and she

timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). On December 16, 2019,

plaintiff appeared telephonically before ALJ Hortensia Haaversen. (Tr. 91-126). On March 24,

2020, ALJ Haaversen issued a written decision finding plaintiff not disabled under the Social

Security Act. (Tr. 8-24). On December 8, 2020, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for

review of the ALJ’s decision. (Tr. 1-4). Thereafter, plaintiff timely sought judicial review in this

Court.

C. The ALJ’s Decision

Generally, in her decision, the ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions

of law:

1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 22, 2017, the

application date (20 CFR 416.971 et seq.).

2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: osteoarthrosis; degenerative joint disease

of the knees (20 CFR 416.920(c)).

3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or

medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P,

Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the

residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(a) and SSR

83-10, except the claimant can lift and carry 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds

frequently. She can stand or walk 2 hours in an 8-hour workday; and she can sit about 6 hours in

an 8-hour workday. She can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She can occasionally climb

ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. (This residual functional capacity is based

on the January 23, 2018 opinion of Gary Ehlert, M.D. (B3A), with occasional climbing of ramps

and stairs, in consideration of the consultative examiner’s findings and opinion.)

5. The claimant has no past relevant work (20 CFR 416.965).

6. The claimant was born on April 2, 1972 and was 45 years old, which is defined as a younger

individual age 18-44, on the date the application was filed. The claimant subsequently changed

age category to a younger individual age 45-49 (20 CFR 416.963).

7. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English (20

CFR 416.964).

8. Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant does not have past relevant work

(20 CFR 416.968).

9. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity,

there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can

perform (20 CFR 416.969 and 416.969(a)).

10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since August

22, 2017, the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.920(g)).

(Tr. 8-24).

II. THE PARTIES’ BRIEFINGS

A. Plaintiff’s Argument

Plaintiff argues the ALJ substituted her lay judgment for medical opinion regarding mental

limitations and formulated an unsupported RFC with no off-task provision. (Dkt. No. 7 [Pl’s Mem.

of Law]).

B. Defendant’s Arguments

In response, defendant argues the ALJ properly evaluated the record as a whole, including

the medical opinion evidence, and that the RFC with no mental limitations was supported by

substantial evidence. (Dkt. No. 8 [Dec.’s Mem. of Law]).

III. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARD

A. Standard of Review

A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo whether an

individual is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Wagner v. Sec’y of Health & Human

Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the Commissioner’s determination will only be

reversed if the correct legal standards were not applied, or it was not supported by substantial

evidence. See Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Where there is a reasonable

basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application of the substantial

evidence standard to uphold a finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant

will be deprived of the right to have her disability determination made according to the correct

legal principles.”); Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983); Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d

23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979).

“Substantial evidence” is evidence that amounts to “more than a mere scintilla,” and has

been defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427 (1971). Where

evidence is deemed susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner’s

conclusion must be upheld. See Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).

“To determine on appeal whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence,

a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining evidence from both sides, because an

analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts from its weight.”

Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988).

If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s finding must be sustained “even

where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff’s position and despite that the court’s

independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner’s].” Rosado v. Sullivan,

805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In other words, this Court must afford the Commissioner’s

determination considerable deference, and may not substitute “its own judgment for that of the

[Commissioner], even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon a de novo review.”

Valente v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984).

B. Standard to Determine Disability

The Commissioner has established a five-step evaluation process to determine whether an

individual is disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. The Supreme

Court has recognized the validity of this sequential evaluation process. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482

U.S. 137, 140-42, 107 S. Ct. 2287 (1987). The five-step process is as follows:

(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2)

whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3)

whether the impairment meets or equals the severity of the specified impairments

in the Listing of Impairments; (4) based on a ‘residual functional capacity’

assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past relevant work

despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are significant numbers of jobs in the

national economy that the claimant can perform given the claimant's residual

functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.

McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2014).

IV. ANALYSIS

The ALJ found the plaintiff had the severe impairments of osteoarthrosis and degenerative

joint disease of the knees. (Tr. 14). The ALJ discussed that she also considered plaintiff’s other

medically determinable impairments, including those not severe, when assessing the RFC. (Tr.

15). In particular, the ALJ found plaintiff’s medically determinable mental impairments of

depressive disorder and anxiety did not inhibit plaintiff’s ability to function on a daily basis and

were therefore not severe as directed by the disability regulations after applying the “paragraph B”

special technique. (Tr. 15). As the Second Circuit has explained, this technique requires the

reviewing authority to determine first whether the claimant has a “medically determinable mental

impairment and if so, must then rate the degree of functional limitation resulting from the

impairment(s) in accordance with four broad functional areas: (1) activities of daily living; (2)

social functioning; (3) concentration, persistence, or pace; and (4) episodes of decompensation.

Under the paragraph B special criteria, the ALJ appropriately explained her reasoning in reaching

her conclusions about the four broad areas of mental functioning at Step 2 of the sequential

evaluation, finding that plaintiff had no limitations in the functional areas of. See 20 C.F.R. §

416.920a(d)(1) (“If we rate the degrees of your limitation as “none” or “mild,” we will generally

conclude that your impairment(s) is not severe, unless the evidence otherwise indicates that there

is more than a minimal limitation in your ability to do basic work activities.”).

Plaintiff does not take issue with the ALJ’s finding that her depressive disorder and anxiety

were non-severe impairments, and her single argument is the ALJ should have imposed limitations

for the non-severe mental impairments in the RFC. (Dkt. No. 7 at 8-9). The Court rejects this basis

for remand.

Plaintiff correctly maintains that despite being a non-severe impairment, the ALJ was

required to consider the effects of all impairments, including both severe and non-severe, in

formulating plaintiff's RFC. See McAninch v. Astrue, 2011 WL 4744411, at *24 (W.D.N.Y. Oct.

6, 2011) (citing Walterich v. Astrue, 578 F.Supp.2d 482, 503, 512 (W.D.N.Y. 2008)) (adopting

report and recommendation that in determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ is required

to address multiple impairments in combination and to consider their cumulative effect as well as

the combined effects of nonsevere impairments (citing Dixon v. Shalala, 54 F.3d 1019, 1031 (2d

Cir. 1995) (the SSA must evaluate the “combined impact [of a claimant's impairments] on a

claimant's ability to work, regardless of whether every impairment is severe”))).

In the instant case, the ALJ considered the opinions of state agency psychological

consultant Dr. D. Brown and psychiatric consultative examiner Dr. Ransom, both of whom found

plaintiff had at most mild limitations from her mental health impairments. (Tr. 16, see Tr. 138-39,

406; see 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1), (2); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.913a(b)(1)(State agency

psychological consultants are highly qualified and experts in Social Security disability

evaluation)). In January 2018, Dr. Brown reviewed the record and opined that plaintiff had no

limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information; interacting with others;

concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; or adapting or managing herself. (Tr. 138-39). The

ALJ found this opinion persuasive and that it was well explained with appropriate citations to the

medical evidence and consistent with the findings and opinions of Dr. Ransom. (Tr. 16, See Tr.

138). Dr. Ransom examined plaintiff in December 2017 and opined that plaintiff would have “very

mild” episodic difficulties understanding, remembering, and applying complex directions and

instructions; regulating emotions; controlling behavior; and maintaining wellbeing. (Tr. 406). Dr.

Ransom also noted plaintiff last received mental health treatment almost a year prior to her SSI

application date. (Tr. 404). The ALJ found Dr. Ransom’s medical opinion persuasive as it was

supported by her unremarkable mental status examination findings. (Tr. 16).

Thus, the record establishes the ALJ did consider plaintiff's non-severe mental health

impairments, but nothing in the record indicated there were limitations to plaintiff's ability to

perform work related activities based on any mental impairment. The ALJ's finding that further

RFC limitations were not necessary to account for the effects of plaintiff's non-severe mental

impairments, was supported by substantial evidence, and was not the product of legal error. See

e.g., Heather C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90709 at *11 (N.D.N.Y.

2022)(ALJ did not err when he made an RFC finding that did not include mental health limitations,

despite medical opinion evidence of “mild” difficulties in social functioning and stress, where

plaintiff's mental health impairments were properly found to be “non-severe” at Step Two, causing

“no more than a minimal effect” on the plaintiff's ability to work).

Essentially plaintiff also contends that Dr. Ransom’s opinion of “very mild” episodic

difficulties in understanding, remembering, and applying complex directions and instructions;

regulating emotions; controlling behavior; and maintaining well-being equate to plaintiff being

off-task 10% of the workday. (Dkt. No. 7 at 9). However, plaintiff has not identified any supported

additional limitations. It is plaintiff's burden to prove a more restrictive RFC than the RFC assessed

by the ALJ, and she has failed to do so. See Smith v. Berryhill, 740 F. App'x 721, 726 (2d Cir.

2018). It is not enough for plaintiff to merely disagree with the ALJ's weighing of the evidence or

to argue that the evidence in the record could support her position. Jones v. Sullivan, 949 F.2d 57,

59 (2d Cir. 1991) (reviewing court must afford the Commissioner’s determination considerable

deference and cannot substitute its own judgment even if it might justifiably have reached a

different result upon a de novo review).

ACCORDINGLY, it is

ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 7) is

DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 8) is

GRANTED.

Dated: January 2, 2024 J. Gregory Wehrman

Rochester, New York HON. J. Gregory Wehrman

United States Magistrate Judge